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THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 


PRESENTED  BY 

PROF.  CHARLES  A.  KOFOID  AND 
MRS.  PRUDENCE  W.  KOFOID 


I 


• 


TREATISE 


ON    THE 


MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE 


OF 


INSANITY 


• 


BY    I.   RAY,   M.  D. 

UPEBINTENDENT   OF   THE   MAINE    INSANE    HOSPITAL. 


SECOND     EDITION. 


WITH    ADDITIONS. 


BOSTON: 

WILLIAM    D.   TICKNOR    AND    CO 

COBNEB    OF   WASHINGTON   AND   SCHOOL   STBEETS. 
M  DCCC  XLIV. 


V 

^kV* 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1844, 

By  WILLIAM  D.  TICKNOR  AND  Co. 
in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  District  of  Massachusetts. 


BOSTON: 

PRINTED    BY    FREEMAN   AND    BOLLES, 
WASHINGTON   STREET. 


Public. 
\ 

TO  THE  Ul^O 


HON.    HORACE   MANN; 

TO   WHOSE  PERSEVERING  EXERTIONS, 

OUR  COUNTRY    [S   MAINLY    INDEBTED 

FOR   ONE    OF    ITS  NOBLEST    INSTITUTIONS    FOR   AMELIORATING 

THE      CONDITION     OF     THE     INSANE, 

THIS   WORK  IS  RESPECTFULLY  INSCRIBED 

AS    A   HUMBLE 

ACKNOWLEDGMENT  OF  ESTEEM, 
BY 

I.  RAY. 


PREFACE. 


FEW,  probably,  whose  attention  has  not  been  particu- 
larly directed  to  the  subject,  are  aware,  how  far  the  con- 
dition of  the  law  relative  to  insanity  is  behind  the  present 
state  of  our  knowledge  concerning  that  disease.  While  so 
much  has  been  done,  within  a  comparatively  short  period, 
to  promote  the  comfort  of  the  insane,  and  so  much  im- 
provement has  been  effected  in  the  methods  of  treating  their 
disorder,  as  to  have  deprived  it  of  half  its  terrors,  it  is  both 
a  curious  and  a  melancholy  fact,  that  so  little  has  been 
accomplished  towards  regulating  their  personal  and  social 
rights,  by  more  correct  and  enlightened  principles  of  juris- 
prudence. While  nations  are  vieing  with  one  another  in  the 
excellence  of  their  public  establishments  for  the  accommo- 
dation of  this  unfortunate  class  of  our  fellow-men,  arid  phy- 
sicians are  every  year  publishing  some  instance  of  an  un- 
exampled proportion  of  cures,  we  remain  perfectly  satisfied 
with  the  wisdom  of  our  predecessors  in  everything  relative 
to  their  legal  relations.  This,  no  doubt,  is  mainly  the  fault 
of  medical  men  themselves,  who  have  neglected  to  obtain 


VI  PREFACE. 

for  the  results  of  their  researches,  that  influence  on  the  law 
of  insanity,  which  they  have  exerted  on  its  pathology  and 
therapeutics.  In  general  treatises  on  legal  medicine,  this 
branch  of  it  has  always  received  a  share  of  attention ;  but 
the  space  allotted  to  it  is  altogether  too  limited  to  admit  of 
those  details,  which  can  alone  be  of  any  really  useful  ser- 
vice ;  and  it  is  one  of  those  branches  on  which  the  author 
is  usually  the  least  qualified  by  his  own  experience,  to  throw 
any  additional  light.  Insanity  itself  is  an  affection  so  ob- 
scure and  perplexing,  and  the  occasions  have  now  become 
so  frequent  and  important  when  its  legal  relations  should 
be  properly  understood,  that  an  ampler  field  of  illustration 
and  discussion  is  required  for  this  purpose,  than  is  afforded 
by  a  solitary  chapter  in  works  of  this  description. 

Notwithstanding  the  great  prevalence  of  insanity  in  Great 
Britain,  and  the  vast  amount  of  property  affected  by  legal 
regulations  and  decisions  respecting  it,  yet  the  English  lan- 
guage does  not  furnish  a  single  work,  in  which  the  various 
forms  and  degrees  of  mental  derangement  are  treated  in 
reference  to  their  effect  on  the  rights  and  duties  of  man. 
Dr.  Haslam's  tract  on  Medical  Jurisprudence  as  it  Relates 
to  Insanity,  (1807),  which  was  republished  in  this  country 
in  1819  by  Dr.  Cooper,  in  a  volume  of  tracts  by  various 
English  writers  on  different  subjects  of  medical  jurispru- 
dence; though  abounding  in  valuable  reflections,  is  alto- 
gether too  brief  and  general,  to  be  of  much  practical  ser- 
vice as  a  book  of  reference.  Among  a  few  other  works 
more  or  less  directly  concerned  with  this  subject,  or  in 
which  some  points  of  it  are  particularly  touched  upon,  the 
Inquiry  Concerning  the  Indications  of  Insanity,  (1830), 


PREFACE.  Vll 

by  Dr.  Conolly,  late  Professor  in  the  London  University,  is 
worthy  of  especial  notice  in  this  connexion,  for  the  remark- 
able ability  and  sound  judgment  with  which  all  its  views 
are  conceived  and  supported.  Though  not  entirely  nor 
chiefly  devoted  to  the  legal  relations  of  the  insane,  yet  the 
medico-legal  student  will  find  his  views  of  insanity  enlarged 
and  improved  by  a  careful  perusal  of  it ;  and  every  physi- 
cian will  do  well  to  ponder  the  suggestions  contained  in  the 
chapter  on  the  "Duties  of  medical  men  when  consulted  con- 
cerning the  state  of  a  patient's  mind."  In  the  JUDGMENTS 
of  Sir  John  Nicholl,  (contained  in  Haggard,  Phillimore 
and  Addams's  Reports)  in  the  Ecclesiastical  Courts,  which 
in  their  jurisdiction  of  WILLS,  have  frequent  occasion  to  in- 
quire into  the  effect  of  mental  diseases  on  the  powers  of  the 
mind,  are  also  to  be  found,  not  only  some  masterly  analyses 
of  heterogeneous  and  conflicting  evidence,  but  an  acquaint- 
ance with  the  phenomena  of  insanity  in  its  various  forms, 
that  would  be  creditable  to  the  practical  physician,  and  an 
application  of  it  to  the  case  under  consideration,  that  satis- 
fies the  most  cautious  with  the  correctness  of  the  decision. 
In  Germany  this  branch  of  legal  medicine  has  received 
a  little  more  attention,  and  in  a  work  entitled,  Die  Psycol- 
ogie  in  ihren  Hauptanwendungen  auf  die  Rechtspjlege, 
(Psychology  in  its  chief  Applications  to  the  Administration 
of  Justice)  by  J.  C.  Hoffbauer,  a  Doctor  of  Laws  and  Pro- 
fessor in  the  University  of  Halle,  and  published  in  1809, 
we  had,  till  quite  recently,  the  only  complete  and  method- 
ical treatise  on  insanity  in  connexion  with  its  legal  relations. 
It  bears  the  impress  of  a  philosophical  mind,  accustomed 
to  observe  the  mental  operations  when  under  the  influence 


Vlll  PREFACE. 

of  disease  ;  it  contains  a  happy  analysis  of  some  states  of 
mental  impairment,  and  its  doctrines  are  generally  correct, 
and  in  many  instances  in  advance  of  his  own,  and  even  our 
time.  Hoff bauer,  however,  not  being  a  practical  physi- 
cian, was  less  disposed  to  consider  insanity  in  its  pathologi- 
cal, than  in  its  psychological  relations,  and  consequently 
has  attached  too  little  importance  to  its  connexion  with 
physical  causes,  and  to  the  classification  and  description 
of  its  different  forms  by  means  of  which  they  may  be  recog- 
nized and  distinguished  from  one  another.  It  is  also  too 
deeply  imbued  with  the  peculiar  metaphysical  subtleties 
in  which  his  countrymen  are  so  fond  of  indulging,  to  suit 
the  taste  or  convenience  of  the  English  reader.  It  has  been 
translated  into  French  by  Dr.  Chambeyron,  with  many  val- 
uable notes  by  Esquirol  and  Itard. 

In  France,  M.  Georget  has  cultivated  this  field  of  in- 
quiry with  a  success  proportioned  to  his  indefatigable  zeal 
and  diligence ;  and  his  various  writings  will  ever  be  resorted 
to  by  future  inquirers,  as  they  have  been  by  the  author  of 
the  present  work,  as  to  a  fund  of  original  and  interesting 
information.  Having  long  been  devoted  to  the  study  of  in- 
sanity, and  especially  to  the  observation  of  the  manners  and 
character  of  the  insane,  he  was  peculiarly  well'  qualified  to 
treat  this  subject  in  a  spirit  corresponding  to  the  present 
condition  of  the  science.  His  work  entitled,  Des  Maladies 
mentales,  considerees  dans  leurs  rapports  avec  la  legislation 
civile  et  criminelle,  (1827),  is  an  admirable  manual,  and 
though  but  a  humble  brochure,  it  yet  abounds  with  valuable 
information  and  is  pervaded  by  sound  and  philosophical 
views.  In  his  Examen  medical  des  proces  criminels  des 


PREFACE.  IX 

nommes  Leger,  Feldtman,  Lecoujfe,  (1825),  and  his  Dis- 
cussion medico-legale  sur  la  Folie,  (1826),  as  well  as  a  se- 
quel to  the  last,  entitled,  Nouvelle  discussion  medico-legale 
sur  la  Folie,  (1828),  he  has  collected  accounts  of  numerous 
criminal  trials,  in  which  insanity  was  pleaded  in  defence 
of  the  accused,  and  has  taken  the  occasion  to  discuss  the 
many  important  questions  to  which  they  give  rise.  In  the 
course  of  these  discussions  there  is  scarcely  a  dark  or  dis- 
puted point  in  the  whole  range  of  the  subject,  which  he  has 
not  examined  with  great  ability ;  and  if  he  has  not  always 
settled  them  satisfactorily  to  the  unprejudiced  inquirer,  he 
has  at  least  afforded  him  the  means  of  forming  more  clear 
and  definite  views. 

On  becoming  aware  of  the  deficiency  in  our  medical 
literature,  of  works  on  insanity  considered  exclusively  in 
its  legal  relations,  it  was  the  author's  first  thought  to  make 
a  translation,  either  of  Hoffbauer's  or  Georget's  work,  but 
considering  that  the  numerous  notes  which  would  be  re- 
quired in  order  to  bring  it  up  to  the  present  state  of  the 
science,  and  adapt  it  to  our  own  laws,  would  prove  incon- 
venient and  embarrassing  to  the  reader,  besides  not  fully 
accomplishing  the  object,  he  was  induced  to  abandon  this 
project,  and  as  the  only  means  of  fairly  developing  the  sub- 
ject, to  prepare  an  original  work,  —  original  strictly  in  plan 
and  in  many  of  its  general  views  only,  —  for  the  materials 
have  been  necessarily  drawn,  in  a  great  degree,  from  other 
sources  than  the  author's  own  experience.  The  main  ob- 
ject which  he  proposed  to  himself,  was  to  establish  the  legal 
relations  of  the  insane  in  conformity  to  the  present  state  of 
our  knowledge  respecting  their  disease.  In  furtherance 


X  PREFACE. 

of  this  object,  he  has  given  a  succinct  description  of  the 
different  species  of  insanity,  and  the  characters  by  which 
they  are  distinguished  from  one  another,  so  that  the  profes- 
sional student  may  have  some  means  of  recognizing  them 
in  practice,  and  thence  deducing,  in  regard  to  each,  such 
legal  consequences  as  seem  warranted  by  an  humane  and 
enlightened  consideration  of  all  the  facts.  He  is  well  aware 
that  he  has  presented  some  views  that  will  not,  at  first  sight, 
meet  with  the  cordial  assent  of  all  his  readers.  He  can 
only  say  in  justification,  that  they  have  appeared  to  him  to 
be  founded  on  well-observed,  well-authenticated  facts,  and 
that  as  such,  it  was  an  imperative  duty  required  by  the 
claims  of  humanity  and  truth,  to  present  them  in  the 
strongest  possible  aspect.  Before  being  condemned  for  sub- 
stituting visionary  and  speculative  fancies,  in  the  place  of 
those  maxims  and  practices  which  have  come  down  to  us 
on  the  authority  of  our  ancestors,  and  been  sanctioned  by 
the  approval  of  all  succeeding  times,  he  hopes  that  the 
grounds  on  which  those  alleged  fancies  have  been  built, 
will  be  carefully,  candidly,  and  dispassionately  examined. 
Of  the  manifold  imperfections  of  his  work,  no  one  can  be 
more  sensible  than  the  author  himself;  but  if  it  succeed  in 
directing  attention  to  the  subject  and  putting  others  on 
the  track  of  inquiry,  it  will,  at  the  very  least,  have  been 
followed  by  one  beneficial  result. 
Eastport,  Me.,  March  20*A,  1838. 


Since  the  publication  of  the  first  edition  of  this  work, 
quite  a  number  of  contributions,  possessing  various  degrees 


PREFACE.  XI 

of  merit,  have  been  made  to  the  subject.  Among  those 
most  deserving  the  attention  of  the  professional  inquirer, 
I  would  mention  the  following  :  The  Medical  Jurisprudence, 
of  Insanity,  by  J.  M.  Pagan,  M.  D.,  Lecturer  on  Medical 
Jurisprudence,  Member  of  the  Faculty  of  Physicians  and 
Surgeons  of  Glasgow,  &c.  London,  1840  ;  On  the 
effect  of  drunkenness  upon  criminal  responsibility,  &c.  by 
Prof.  C.  J.  A.  Mittermaier,  translated  from  the  German  into 
the  American  Jurist,  XXIII.  290  ;  On  the  different  forms 
of  insanity  in  relation  to  jurisprudence,  by  J.  C.  Prichard, 
M.  D.,  F.  R.  S.  London,  1842 ;  Report  of  the  trial  of 
D.  McNaughton  for  the  murder  of  Mr.  Drummond,  by 
Bousfield  and  Merrett.  London,  1843  ;  De  la  Folie  dans 
ses  rapports  avec  les  questions  medico-judiciares,  par  M. 
Marc ;  (On  insanity  considered  in  its  medico-judicial  re- 
lations, by  M.  Marc,)  Paris,  1839.  Among  these,  the 
work  of  Marc  is  preeminently  valuable,  for  he  was  rarely 
qualified  for  the  undertaking.  During  a  long  and  brilliant 
professional  career,  insanity  in  its  manifold  relations  occu- 
pied a  large  portion  of  his  attention.  He  was  in  habits  of 
intimacy  with  many  of  those  physicians  who  were  devoted 
to  its  study  and  treatment ;  for  twenty-five  years  he  ex- 
amined officially  the  mental  condition  of  applicants  for 
admission  into  the  private  establishments  for  the  insane ; 
and  in  his  quality  of  expert,  he  was  often  commissioned 
by  the  courts  to  examine,  for  judicial  purposes,  the  mental 
condition  of  individuals.  Although  not  a  work  of  the  highest 
philosophical  order,  yet  the  accuracy  of  its  statements,  the 
general  correctness  of  its  views,  and  its  eminently  practical 
character,  render  it  exceedingly  valuable  to  the  medical 


Xll  PREFACE. 

jurist.  From  these  sources  as  well  as  my  own  personal 
observations,  I  might  have  enlarged  this  edition  with  many 
striking  cases,  but  as  I  have  quoted  cases  solely  with  the 
view  of  illustrating  general  principles,  I  have  sought  to 
multiply  them  no  farther  than  seemed  to  be  necessary  for 
this  purpose.  Some  additions  have  been  made  which,  it  is 
hoped,  will  increase  the  usefulness  of  the  work ;  and  some 
of  the  sections  have  been  rearranged ;  but  excepting  these, 
no  other  except  merely  verbal  changes  have  been  introduced. 

Maine  Insane  Hospital,  May  1,  1844. 


CONTENTS. 


Page. 
PHELIMINAEY  VIEWS 1 

CHAPTER  I. 
Mental  Disease  in  General 65 

CHAPTER  II. 
Idiocy 69 

CHAPTER    III. 
Imbecility 74 

CHAPTER    IV. 
Legal  consequences  of  Mental  Deficiency 95 

CHAPTER  V. 
Pathology  and  Symptoms  of  Mania 125 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Intellectual  Mania          .  147 

Sec.  I.  General  Intellectual  Mania 147 

Sec.  II.  Partial  Intellectual  Mania       ......        155 

b 


XIV  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Page. 
Moral  Mania 163 

Sec.  I.  General  Moral  Mania 165 

Sec.  II.  Partial  Moral  Mania         .  180 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

Legal  consequences  of  Mania 228 

Sec.  I.  Legal  consequences  of  Intellectual  Mania        .        .        .  229 

Sec.  II.  Legal  consequences  of  Moral  Mania        .        .        .        .  251 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Dementia 269 

7- 

CHAPTER  X. 
Legal  consequences  of  Dementia 278 

CHAPTER  XI. 
Febrile  Delirium 295 

CHAPTER  XII. 
Legal  consequences  of  Delirium 300 

CHAPTER  XIII. 
Duration  and  curability  of  Madness       .        .        .        .        .        .        307 

CHAPTER  XIV. 
Lucid  Intervals 314 

CHAPTER  XV. 
Simulated  Insanity 332 

CHAPTER  XVI. 
Concealed  Insanity 362 

CHAPTER  XVII. 
Epilepsy  and  its  Legal  Consequences 369 


CONTENTS.  XV 

CHAPTER    XVIII. 
Suicide  375 

CHAPTER    XIX. 

Page. 
Legal  consequences  of  Suicide 385 

CHAPTER    XX. 
Somnambulism 389 

CHAPTER  XXI. 
Legal  consequences  of  Somnambulism  396 

CHAPTER  XXII. 

Simulated  Somnambulism  .        .        .        .  .        .        399 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 
Effect  of  Insanity  on  Evidence 402 

CHAPTER  XXIV. 
Drunkenness •  413 

CHAPTER  XXV. 

Legal  consequences  of  Drunkenness        .        .        .        .        .        .        426 

CHAPTER  XXVI. 

Interdiction  and  Isolation  457 


MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE 


OF 


INSANITY 


PRELIMINARY  VIEWS. 

STATUTES  were  framed  and  principles  of  law  laid  down, 
regulating  the  legal  relations  of  the  Insane,  long  before 
physicians  had  obtained  any  accurate  notions  respecting 
their  malady  ;  and,  as  might  naturally  be  supposed,  error 
and  injustice  have  been  committed  to  an  incalculable  extent 
under  the  sacred  name  of  law.  The  actual  state  of  our 
knowledge  of  insanity,  as  well  as  of  other  diseases,  so  far 
from  being  what  it  has  always  heretofore  been,  is  the  accu- 
mulated result  of  the  observations,  which,  with  more  or  less 
accuracy  and  fidelity,  have  been  prosecuted  through  many 
centuries,  under  the  guidance  of  a  more  or  less  inductive 
philosophy.  In  addition  to  the  obstacles  to  the  progress  of 
knowledge  respecting  other  diseases,  there  has  been  this 
also  in  regard  to  insanity,  that,  being  considered  as  resulting 
from  a  direct  exercise  of  divine  power,  and  not  from  the 
operation  of  the  ordinary  laws  of  nature,  and  thus  associated 
with  mysterious  and  supernatural  phenomena  confessedly 
above  our  comprehension,  inquiry  has  been  discouraged  at 
the  very  threshold,  by  the  fear  of  presumption,  or,  at  least* 
of  fruitless  labor.  To  this  superstition,  we  may  look  as  the 
1 


2  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

parent  of  many  of  the  false  and  absurd  notions,  that  have 
prevailed  relative  to  this  disease,  and  especially  of  the  reck- 
less and  inhuman  treatment,  once  universally  bestowed  on 
its  unfortunate  subjects.  Instead  of  the  kindness  and  care, 
so  usually  manifested  towards  the  sick,  as  if  it  were  a  natural 
right  for  them  to  receive  it ;  instead  of  the  untiring  vigilance, 
the  soothing  attention,  the  lively  solicitude  of  relatives  and 
friends ;  the  patient,  afflicted  with  the  severest  of  diseases, 
and  most  of  all  dependent  for  the  issue  of  his  fate  on  others, 
received  nothing  but  looks  of  loathing,  was  banished  from 
all  that  was  ever  dear  to  him,  and  suffered  to  remain  in  his 
seclusion  uncared  for  and  forgotten.  In  those  receptacles, 
where  living  beings,  bearing  the  image  and  superscription 
of  men,  were  cut  off  from  all  the  sympathies  of  fellow-men, 
and  were  rapidly  completing  the  ruin  of  their  spiritual 
nature,  there  were  scenes  of  barbarity  and  moral  desolation, 
which  no  force  of  language  can  adequately  describe.  The 
world  owes  an  immense  debt  of  gratitude  to  the  celebrated 
Pinel,  who,  with  an  ardor  of  philanthropy,  that  no  discour- 
agement could  quench,  and  a  courage  that  no  apprehen- 
sion of  danger  could  daunt,  succeeded,  at  last,  in  removing 
the  chains  of  the  maniac,  and  establishing  his  claims  to  all 
the  liberty  and  comfort,  which  his  malady  had  left  him 
capable  of  enjoying.  With  the  new  aspect,  thus  presented, 
of  the  moral  and  intellectual  condition  of  this  portion  of  our 
race,  the  medical  jurisprudence  of  insanity  became  invested 
with  an  interest,  that  has  led  to  its  most  important  improve- 
ments. 

§  2.  In  all  civilized  communities,  ancient  or  modern,  in- 
sanity has  been  regarded  as  exempting  from  the  punishment 
of  crime,  and  under  some  circumstances  at  least,  as  vitiating 
the  civil  acts  of  those  who  are  affected  with  it.  The  only 
difficulty,  or  diversity  of  opinion,  consists  in  determining 
who  are  really  insane,  in  the  meaning  of  the  law,  which  has 
been  content  with  merely  laying  down  some  general  princi- 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  3 

\ 

pies,  and  leaving  their  application  to  the  discretion  of  the 
judicial  authorities.  Inasmuch,  as  the  greatest  possible  vari- 
ety is  presented  by  the  mental  phenomena  in  a  state  of 
health,  it  is  obvious,  that  profound  study  and  extensive  ob- 
servation of  the  moral  and  intellectual  nature  of  man  can 
alone  prevent  us,  from  sometimes  confounding  them  with 
the  effects  of  disease.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  an  almost 
self-evident  proposition,  that  a  certain  knowledge  of  the 
mind  in  its  healthy  state  is  an  essential  preliminary,  to  the 
attainment  of  correct  ideas  concerning  its  diseased  manifest- 
ations. If,  in  addition  to  this,  it  is  considered,  that  opinions 
on  the  nature  of  insanity,  viewed  solely  in  the  light  of  a  dis- 
ease—  of  a  derangement  of  the  physical  structure,  —  have 
been  constantly  changing  for  the  better,  it  follows  of  course, 
that  its  legal  relations,  which  should  be  determined  in  some 
measure  by  our  views  of  its  nature,  ought  to  be  modified 
by  the  progress  of  our  knowledge.  That  much  of  the  juris- 
prudence of  insanity,  in  times  past,  should  bear  marks  of 
the  crude  and  imperfect  notions,  that  have  been  entertained 
of  its  pathological  character,  is  not  to  be  wondered  at;  but, 
it  is  a  matter  of  surprise,  that  it  should  be  adhered  to,  as  if 
consecrated  by  age,  long  after  it  has  ceased  to  be  supported 
by  the  results  of  more  extensive  and  better  conducted  inqui- 
ries. It  is  to  be  feared,  that  the  principles,  laid  down  on 
this  subject  by  legal  authorities,  have  been  viewed  with  too 
much  of  that  reverence,  which  is  naturally  felt  for  the  opin- 
ions and  practices  of  our  ancestors  ;  and  that  innovations 
have  been  too  much  regarded,  rather  as  the  offspring  of 
new-fangled  theories,  than  of  the  steady  advancement  of 
medical  science.  In  their  zeal  to  uphold  the  wisdom  of  the 
past,  from  the  fancied  desecrations  of  reformers  and  theo- 
rists, the  ministers  of  the  law  seem  to  have  forgotten,  that, 
in  respect  to  this  subject,  the  real  dignity  and  respectability 
of  their  profession  is  better  upheld,  by  yielding  to  the  im- 
provements of  the  times  and  thankfully  receiving  the  truth, 


4  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY". 

from  whatever  quarter  it  may  come,  than  by  turning  away 
with  blind  obstinacy,  from  everything  that  conflicts  with  long- 
established  maxims  and  decisions.  In  the  course  of  the  re- 
view proposed  to  be  taken  of  the  principles,  that  have  regu- 
lated the  civil  and  criminal  responsibilities  of  the  insane,  the 
reader  will  have  constant  opportunity  to  witness  the  influ- 
ence of  the  spirit  above  condemned  ;  and  be  inclined,  per- 
haps, to  consider  it  as  the  source  of  that  striking  difference, 
presented  by  the  sciences  of  law  and  medicine,  in  the 
amount  of  knowledge  they  respectively  evince  on  the  sub- 
ject of  insanity. 

§  3.  Legislators  and  jurists  have  done  little  more,  than 
merely  to  indicate  some  of  the  most  obvious  divisions  of  in- 
sanity, without  undertaking  anything  like  a  systematic  clas- 
sification of  its  various  forms.  In  the  Roman  law,  the  in- 
sane, or  dementes,  are  divided  into  two  classes  ;  those  whose 
understanding  is  weak  or  null,  mente  capti,  and  those  who 
are  restless  and  furious,  furiosi.  The  French  and  Prussian 
codes  make  use  of  the  terms,  demence,  fureur  and  imbecillite, 
without  pretending  to  define  them.  The  English  common 
law  originally  recognized  but  two  kinds  of  insanity,  idiocy 
and  lunacy,  the  subjects  of  which  were  designated  by  the 
term,  non  compotes  mentis,  which  was  used  in  a  generic 
sense  and  meant  to  embrace  all,  who,  from  defect  of  under- 
standing, require  the  protection  of  the  law.  An  occasional 
attempt  has  been  made  by  jurists,  to  attach  some  definite 
ideas  to  these  terms,  and  to  point  out  the  various  descrip- 
tions of  persons,  to  whom  they  may  be  applied.  Lord  Coke 
says,  there  are  four  kinds  of  men,  who  may  be  said  to  be 
non  compotes  mentis  :  —  1.  An  idiot,  who,  from  his  nativity, 
by  a  perpetual  infirmity  is  non  compos ;  2.  He  that  by  sick- 
ness, grief,  or  other  accident,  wholly  loseth  his  memory  and 
understanding  ;  3.  A  lunatic  that  hath  sometimes  his  under- 
standing, and  sometimes  not,  aliquando  gaudet  lucidis  in- 
tervallis  ;  and  therefore  he  is  called  non  compos  mentis^  so 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS.  %  5 

long  as  he  hath  not  understanding  ;  4.  He  that  by  his  own 
vicious  act  for  a  time  depriveth  himself  of  his  memory  and 
understanding,  as  he  that  is  drunken.1 

§  4.  Nothing  can  show  more  plainly  how  imperfect 
were  the  notions  of  the  early  law-writers  concerning  insa- 
nity, than  this  classification  of  insane  persons,  and  their 
attempts  to  define  the  several  classes.  An  idiot  is  defined  to 
be  a  person,  who  cannot  count  or  number  twenty  pence,  or 
tell  who  was  his  father  or  mother,  or  how  old  he  is,  so  as 
it  may  appear  that  he  hath  no  understanding  of  reason, 
what  shall  be  for  his  profit  or  what  shall  be  for  his  loss ;  but 
if  he  have  sufficient  understanding  to  know  and  understand 
his  letters,  and  to  read  by  teaching  or  information,  he  is  not 
an  idiot.2  Now  the  truth  is,  that  many  of  those  whose 
idiocy  is  unquestionable,  are  capable  of  attaining  the  kind 
of  knowledge  herein  specified,  by  means  of  the  ordinary 
intercourse  with  men,  or  of  special  teaching.  The  entire 
loss  of  memory  and  understanding,  attributed  to  the  second 
class,  is  observed  only  as  a  sequel  to  madness  or  some  other 
disease,  or  as  the  result  of  some  powerful  moral  causes  ;  so 
that  if  this  is  to  be  considered  an  essential  character  of  mad- 
ness, by  much  the  larger  proportion  of  madmen  will  be 
altogether  excluded  from  this  classification ;  for,  instead  of 
wholly  losing  their  understanding,  they  are  for  the  most 
part  perfectly  rational  on  some  topics,  and  in  some  relations 
of  life  ;  and  a  little  effort  is  frequently  necessary,  in  order 
to  detect  the  fact  of  the  understanding  being  at  all  impaired. 
Judging  from  the  almost  exclusive  use  of  the  term  lunacy, 
and  the  frequent  reference  to  lucid  intervals,  the  intermittent 
character  of  madness  was  either  more  common,  some 
hundreds  of  years  since,  or,  which  is  more  probable,  in 
consequence  of  the  general  belief  in  its  connexion  with 

1  Coke's  Littleton,  247  a. 

2  1  Fitzherbert,  Natura  Brevium,  5S3,  ed.  1652. 

1* 


6  MEDJCAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

lunar  influences,  this  intermission  was  imagined  to  occur 
far  oftener  than  it  really  did.  This  certainly  is  a  more 
reasonable  explanation,  than  the  idea  that  the  course  of 
nature  has  changed,  so  that  lucid  intervals,  which  were  once 
of  the  most  common  occurrence  in  insanity,  are  now  among 
its  rarest  phenomena 

§  5.  Common  sense  and  a  tolerable  share  of  the  intelli- 
gence of  the  time,  if  fairly  exercised,  would  probably  pre- 
vent, in  practice,  any  grossly  improper  application  of  these 
theoretical  principles  ;  but,  in  civil  cases,  the  law,  though 
not  disposed  to  guage  the  exact  measure  of  men's  intellects, 
has  sometimes  insisted  on  technical  distinctions,  that  have 
little  foundation  in  nature  or  reason.  Originally,  com- 
missions of  lunacy  were  granted  for  the  purpose  of  inquiring 
whether  the  individual  were  either  an  idiot  ex  nativitate,  or 
a  lunatic,  in  Coke's  meaning  of  the  term,  arid,  in  conse- 
quence thereof,  incapable  of  governing  himself  and  man- 
aging his  worldly  affairs.  The  injustice  of  leaving  beyond 
the  protection  of  the  law,  that  larger  class  of  insane,  who, 
though  neither  idiots,  nor  lunatics,  labor  under  more  or 
less  mental  derangement,  led  to  a  change  in  the  form  of  the 
writ,  by  which  the  phrase  unsound  mind  was  used  for  the 
purpose  of  embracing  all  others,  who  were  considered 
proper  objects  of  a  commission.  What  is  the  precise 
meaning  of  this  term,  it  is  not  easy  to  gather  from  the 
observations  of  various  high  legal  authorities,  who  have 
attempted  to  fix  its  meaning.  It  seems  to  be  agreed,  that 
it  is  not  idiocy,  nor  lunacy,  nor  imbecility,  but  beyond  this 
all  unanimity  is  at  an  end.  Lord  Hardwicke  held,  that  un- 
soundness  of  mind  did  not  mean  mere  weakness  of  mind, 
but  a  depravity  of  reason  or  a  want  of  it.1  Lord  Eldon 
once  referred  to  the  case  of  a  person  advanced  in  years, 
"whose  mind  was  the  mind  of  a  child,"  and  observed,  that, 

1  Ex  parte  Barnsley,  3  Atkyns's  Reports,  168. 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS.  7 

"  it  was,  therefore,  in  that  sense,  imbecility  and  inability  to 
manage  his  affairs,  which  constituted  unsoundness  of 
mind."1  The  same  high  authority  had  observed,  on  a  pre- 
vious occasion,  that  "  the  court  had  thought  itself  authorized 
to  issue  the  commission  de  lunalico  inquirendo,  provided  it 
is  made  out,  that  the  party  is  unable  to  act  with  any  proper 
and  provident  management ;  liable  to  be  robbed  by  any 
one ;  under  that  imbecility  of  mind,  not  strictly  insanity, 
but  as  to  the  mischief,  calling  for  as  much  protection  as 
actual  insanity."  2  Mr.  Amos,  late  professor  of  Medical 
Jurisprudence  in  the  London  University,  has  said,  that  "  the 
term  unsoundness  of  mind,  in  the  legal  sense,  seems  to 
involve  the  idea  of  a  morbid  condition  of  intellect,  or  loss  of 
reason,  coupled  with  an  incompetency  of  the  person  to 
manage  his  own  affairs."  ;  Whatever  it  may  signify,  it  has 
always  been  insisted  on,  that  the  return  of  the  commission 
must  state  the  incapacity  or  inability  of  the  party  to  manage 
his  affairs,  to  be  evidence  of  its  existence,  in  order  that  the 
party  may  have  the  protection  of  the  law.  If  the  jury  are 
unwilling,  from  what  they  see,  to  infer  the  presence  of  a 
mental  condition,  to  which  the  highest  dignitaries  of  the  law 
have  declined  fixing  a  precise,  intelligible  meaning,  then  the 
inquisition  is  quashed.  The  feelings  of  dread  and  disgust, 
with  which  madness  has  been  generally  contemplated,  have 
often  deterred  juries,  acting  under  a  commission,  from 
returning  a  verdict  of  unsound  mind,  which  has  become 
equivalent  to  insanity ;  either  from  a  disinclination  to  em- 
barrass the  family  with  an  odious  distinction,  or  because  the 
individual  was  not  really  unsound  in  the  popular  accepta- 
tion of  the  term,  though  his  mental  faculties  might  have 
been  so  far  enfeebled  by  old  age,  or  sickness,  or  congenital 
causes,  as  to  render  him  absolutely  incapable  of  conducting 

1  Haslam  :  Medical  Jurisprudence  as  it  relates  to  Insanity,  336. 
*  8  Vesey's  Reports,  66.   3  London  Medical  Gazette,  Vol.  8,  p.  19. 


8  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

himself  or  his  affairs,  —  a  fact,  which  they  have  sometimes 
returned.  These  attempts  to  change  the  ordinary  course 
have  never  succeeded,  the  court  having  in  every  case  re- 
quired the  verdict  to  be  in  the  words  of  the  inquisition,  or  in 
equipollent  words.  "  It  is  settled,"  says  Lord  Eldon,  "  that 
if  the  jury  find  merely  the  incapacity  of  the  party  to  manage 
his  affairs,  and  will  not  infer  from  that  and  other  circum- 
stances unsoundness  of  mind,  though  the  party  may  live 
where  he  is  exposed  to  ruin  every  instant,  yet  upon  that 
finding  the  commission  cannot  go  on."  l  The  consequence 
is,  that  the  afflicted  party  must  either  forego  the  protection 
of  the  law,  or  fix  upon  his  family  a  sort  of  stigma  of  the 
most  disagreeable  and  onerous  description.  When  it  is 
considered  how  many  are  the  cases,  where  individuals  are 
incapacitated  from  managing  their  affairs,  simply  from  that 
impairment  of  the  mind  so  common  in  old  age,  or  mere  de- 
fect of  memory,  the  other  powers  remaining  sound,  it  is  a 
little  surprising,  that  no  effectual  measures  have  been  taken, 
to  render  the  operation  of  the  law  less  imperfect  and  un- 
equal. It  is  not  easy  to  see  the  ground  of  the  extreme  re- 
pugnance displayed  by  the  English  courts,  towards  any 
return  that  does  not  assert  the  mental  unsoundness  of  the 
affected  party,  unless  it  may  be  some  obstacle  thereby 
thrown  in  the  course  of  the  subsequent  proceedings.  The 
object  of  the  commission  is,  to  ascertain  whether  or  not  the 
party  in  question  is  incapable,  by  reason  of  mental  infirm- 
ities, of  governing  himself  and  managing  his  affairs  ;  and  if 
they  so  find  him,  it  certainly  is  irrelevant  to  any  useful 
purpose,  to  connect  this  inability  as  an  effect  with  any 
particular  kind  of  insanity,  whether  expressed  in  common 
or  technical  language.  Indeed,  to  require  a  jury  to  infer 
explicitly  unsoundness  of  mind  from  inability  to  manage 
affairs,  which  is  of  itself  sufficient  evidence  of  all  the  men- 

1  19  Vesey's  Reports,  286. 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS.  9 

tal  unsoundness,  that  is  required  for  practical  purposes,  and 
reject  their  return  if  they  do  not,  would  seem  exceedingly 
puerile,  where  it  not  strictly  professional.  In  ex  parte 
Cranmer,1  where  the  jury  pronounced  the  party  in  their 
verdict,  "  so  far  debilitated  in  his  mind  as  to  be  incapable 
of  the  general  management  of  his  affairs,"  Lord  Chancellor 
Erskine  gives  some  reasons  for  finding  fault  with  the  terms 
of  the  verdict,  and*  directing  the  inquisition  to  be  quashed. 
"  The  verdict,"  he  says,  "  does  not  state  distinctly,  that  he 
is  incapable  ;  but  that  he  is  so  far  debilitated  in  his  mind, 
that  he  is  not  equal  to  the  general  management  of  his 
affairs."  The  very  word  incapable,  it  is  true,  is  not  used, 
but  the  words  "  not  equal  "  are  surely  of  equivalent  mean- 
ing ;  and  it  is  not  easy  to  conceive,  how  a  clearer  or  stronger 
idea  of  a  person's  incapacity  can  be  conveyed,  than  to  pro- 
nounce him  "  not  equal  to  the  management  of  his  affairs." 
"  How  can  I  tell,"  he  asks,  "  what  is  '  so  far  debilitated  in 
his  mind  that  he  is  not  equal  to  the  general  management  of 
his  affairs  ? ' '  He  certainly  could  not  tell  the  precise 
quantity  of  mind  left,  but  even  if  the  party  had  been  re- 
turned non  compos  and  therefore  unequal  to  the  manage- 
ment of  his  affairs,  it  is  not  quite  obvious,  how  any  more 
definite  notion  on  this  point  would  have  been  conveyed.2 

§  6.  The  business  of  the  jury  in  these  cases  is,  to  ascer- 
tain whether  the  individual  is  mentally  capable  of  managing 
his  affairs ;  and  this  is  a  duty,  which,  generally  speaking, 
they  are  able  to  perform  with  tolerable  correctness.  But 

1  12  Vesey's  Reports,  406. 

*  In  a  recent  case,  the  inquisition  was  quashed  by  Lord  Lynd- 
hurst,  because  the  verdict  of  the  jury  said  too  much,  instead  of  too 
little,  viz. :  "  that  the  party  was  not  a  lunatic,  but  partly  from  para- 
lysis and  partly  from  old  age,  his  memory  was  so  much  impaired 
as  to  render  him  incompetent  to  the  management  of  his  affairs,, 
and  consequently  that  he  was  of  unsound  mind,  and  had  been  so 
for  two  years."  In  Re  Holmes,  4  Russel's  Chancery  Reports,  182., 


10  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

what  can  be  more  irrelevant  to  the  object  in  view,  or  more 
remote  from  the  ordinary  circle  of  their  reflections,  than 
the  additional  duty  of  deciding  whether  his  mental  impair- 
ment has  gone  far  enough,  to  bear  being  designated  by  the 
technical  phraseology,  unsoundness  of  mind  ?  When  it  is 
recollected,  too,  that  the  members  of  these  juries  are  mostly 
uneducated  men,  and  but  few  of  them  at  all  acquainted  with 
the  force  of  legal  or  medical  distinctions,  it  cannot  be  sup- 
posed, that  such  a  return  is  always  the  recorded  opinion  of 
unbiased,  understanding  minds.  Indeed,  the  inconvenience 
and  injustice  of  these  proceedings  have  been  so  strongly  felt, 
as  to  have  led  to  the  repeated  expression  of  a  wish,  that  its 
defects  were  remedied  by  the  action  of  the  legislature. 
That  it  should  still  continue  in  a  country,  where  it  is  linked 
in  with  a  system,  whose  foundations  are  in  the  very  consti- 
tution of  the  government,  is  perhaps  not  strange ;  but,  that 
it  should  be  used  in  some  of  our  own  states,  which  are  un- 
trammelled by  such  considerations,  is  certainly  an  anomaly 
in  legislation. 

§  7.  This  is  not  the  only  instance,  where  the  principles 
of  common  sense  and  common  justice,  which  ought  to 
regulate  the  legal  relations  of  the  insane,  have,  with  astonish- 
ing inconsistency,  been  strangely  disregarded  in  the  maxims 
of  the  common  law.  While  theoretically  it  requires  that 
contracts,  to  be  valid,  should  spring  from  a  free  and  delibe- 
rate consent,  it  refuses  to  suffer  the  party  himself  to  avoid 
them  on  the  plea  of  lunacy,  in  accordance  with  an  ancient 
maxim,  that  no  man  of  full  age  shall  be  allowed  to  disable 
or  stultify  himself;  though,  at  the  same  time,  it  does  allow 
his  heirs,  or  other  persons  interested,  to  avail  themselves  of 
this  privilege.1  Thus,  a  person,  who  recovers  from  a  tem- 
porary insanity,  before  'the  return  of  an  inquisition,  has  no 
remedy  at  law  or  in  equity  for  the  most  ruinous  contracts, 

1  2  Blackstone,  295. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  11 

that  he  may  have  entered  into  while  in  that  condition,  except 
on  the  ground  of  fraud,  though,  after  his  death,  his  heirs 
may  have  them  set  aside  by  establishing  the  fact  of  lunacy 
alone.  Well  may  a  distinguished  jurist  exclaim,  that,  "  it  is 
matter  of  wonder  and  humiliation,  how  so  absurd  and  mis- 
chievous a  maxim  could  have  found  its  way  into  any  system 
of  jurisprudence,  professing  to  act  on  civilized  beings."  l 
It  arose,  no  doubt,  in  part,  from  erroneous  notions  of  the 
nature  of  insanity,  and  partly  from  apprehensions,  not  well 
founded,  of  the  consequences,  that  might  follow  the  admis- 
sion of  the  plea  of  lunacy  in  avoidance  of  contracts.  Within 
a  few  years,  however,  the  English  courts  have  almost  en- 
tirely disregarded  the  ancient  maxim,2  and  in  this  country, 
it  has  long  since  lost  its  authority  altogether.3  Indeed,  there 
now  seems  to  be  a  strong  disposition  to  run  to  the  opposite 
extreme.  We  cannot  but  think  that  the  ends  of  justice 
would  be  better  obtained,  if  no  general  rule  at  all  were 
adopted,  and  every  case  decided  on  its  own  merits.  Where 
the  insanity  of  one  of  the  parties  is  perfectly  well  known  to 
the  other,  or  might  have  been  so  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary 
sagacity,  a  contract  between  them,  except  for  the  necessaries 
of  life  or  comforts  and  luxuries  suitable  to  his  wealth  or 
station,  should  obviously  be  held  invalid,  because  the  insane 
party  is  deprived  by  the  act  of  providence  of  his  natural 
share  of  discernment  and  foresight.  It  often  happens,  how- 
ever, that  a  person's  insanity  is  not  generally  known  and  is 
not  very  apparent,  and,  in  such  cases,  if  it  can  be  proved, 
that  the  contract  is  a  fair  and  reasonable  one  on  the  face  of 
it,  and  was  entered  into  in  perfect  honesty  and  good  faith, 


1  1  Story's  Commentaries  on  Equity  Jurisprudence,  §  225. 

*  Bagster  v.  Earl  Portsmouth,  Chitty  on  Contracts,  256  ;  Gates  v. 
Boen,  2  Strick.  1104. 

3  3  Day,  90,  Webster  v.  Woodward  ;  15  Johns.  503,  Rice  v.  Peet  ; 
5  Pick.  431,  Mitchell  v.  Kingman. 


12  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

he  certainly  should  not  be  permitted  to  stultify  himself,  in 
order  to  escape  its  performance.  Neither  does  his  death  or 
interdiction  so  change  the  case,  as  to  render  it  proper  for 
his  heirs  or  guardians,  to  do  that  which  he  could  not  do  for 
himself.  Much  as  the  law  is  bound  to  protect  the  interests 
of  the  insane,  it  is  no  less  required  to  protect  those  who 
deal  with  them,  unacquainted  with  their  mental  condition. 
It  as  often  happens,  that  the  same  party  suffers  from  the 
avoidance  of*  the  contract, 'as  that  the  insane  or  his  heirs  do 
from  its  validity  ;  and  nothing  can  be  more  clearly  unjust, 
than  the  application  of  a  maxim  or  general  rule,  that  favors 
only  the  interests  of  the  unsound  party. 

§  8.  Though  little  of  this  pertinacious  adherence  to 
merely  technical  distinctions  is  observed,  in  the  application 
of  the  law  to  criminal  cases,  yet  there  is  much  of  the  same 
respect  for  antiquated  maxims,  that  have  little  else  to  recom- 
mend them  but  their  antiquity,  and  are  so  much  the  more 
pernicious  in  their  application,  as  the  interests  of  property 
are  of  less  importance  than  reputation  and  life.  It  by  no 
means  follows,  that  a  person,  declared  to  be  non  compos  by 
due  process  of  law,  is  to  be  considered,  on  that  account, 
merely,  to  be  irresponsible  for  his  criminal  acts.  This  is  a 
question  entirely  distinct,  and  is  determined  upon  very  differ- 
ent views  of  the  nature  of  insanity,  and  of  its  effects  on  the 
operations  of  the  mind ;  and,  here  it  is,  that  the  lawyer  en- 
croaches most  on  the  domain  of  the  physician.  The  first 
attempt  to  point  out  precisely  those  conditions  of  insanity, 
in  which  the  civil  and  criminal  responsibilities  are  unequally 
affected,  was  made  by  Lord  Hale.  "There  is  a  partial 
insanity,"  says  he,  "  and  a  total  insanity.  The  former  is 
either  in  respect  to  things,  quoad  hoc  vel  illud  insanire. 
Some  persons  that  have  a  competent  use  of  reason,  in  re- 
spect of  some  subjects,  are  yet  under  a  particular  dementia, 
in  respect  of  some  particular  discourses,  subjects,  or  applica- 
tions :  or  else  it  is  partial  in  respect  of  degrees ;  and  this  is 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS.  13 

the  condition  of  very  many,  especially  melancholy  persons, 
who  for  the  most  part  discover  their  defect  in  excessive  fears 
and  griefs,  and  yet  are  not  wholly  destitute  of  the  use  of 
reason  ;  and  this  partial  insanity  seems  not  to  excuse  them, 
in  the  committing  of  any  offence  for  its  matter  capital ;  for, 
doubtless,  most  persons  that  are  felons  of  themselves  and 
others,  are  under  a  degree  of  partial  insanity,  when  they 
commit  these  offences.  It  is  very  difficult  to  define  the 
invisible  line  that  divides  perfect  and  partial  insanity ;  but 
it  must  rest  upon  circumstances  duly  to  be  weighed  and 
considered  both  by  judge  and  jury,  lest  on  the  one  side  there 
be  a  kind  of  inhumanity  towards  the  defects  of  human 
nature;  —  or,  on  the  other  side,  too  great  an  indulgence 
given,  to  great  crimes."  '  So  strongly  was  this  celebrated 
jurist  possessed  with  the  idea,  that  it  is  the  strength  and 
capacity  of  the  mind  only  that  are  affected  by  insanity,  that 
he  has  actually  founded  upon  it, 'a  test  of  criminal  responsi- 
bility. "  Such  a  person,"  says  he,  "  as  laboring  under 
melancholy  distempers,  hath  yet  ordinarily  as  great  under- 
standing as  ordinarily  a  child  of  fourteen  years 'hath,  is  such 
a  person  as  may  be  guilty  of  treason  or  felony."  As  if  the 
only  difference  between  sanity  and  insanity  were  precisely 
that  which  is  made  by  difference  of  age,  and  as  if  there 
could  be  two  things  more  unlike  than  the  mind  of-  a  person 
"  laboring  under  melancholy  distempers,"  and  that  of  a  child 
fourteen  years  old. 

§  9.  The  doctrines,  thus  dogmatically  laid  down  by  Lord 
Hale,  have  exerted  no  inconsiderable  influence  on  the  judicial 
opinions  of  his  successors  ;  and  his  high  authority  has  always 
been  invoked  against  the  plea  of  insanity,  whenever  it  has 
been  urged  by  the  voice  of  philanthropy  and  true  science. 
If,  too,  in  consequence  of  the  common  tendency  of  indul- 
gence in  forced  and  unwarrantable  constructions,  whenever 

1  Pleas  of  the  Crown,  30. 
2 


14  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

a  point  is  to  be  gained,  his  principles  have  been  made  to 
mean  far  more  than  he  ever  designed,  the  fact  impressively 
teaches  the  importance  of  clear  and  well-defined  terms,  in 
the  expression  of  scientific  truths,  as  well  as  of  enlarged, 
practical  information,  relative  to  the  subjects  to  which  they 
belong.  In  the  time  of  this  eminent  jurist,  insanity  was  a 
much  less  frequent  disease  than  it  now  is,  and  the  popular 
notions  concerning  it  were  derived  from  the  observation  of 
those  wretched  inmates  of  the  mad-houses,  whom  chains  and 
stripes,  cold  and  filth,  had  reduced  to  the  stupidity  of  the 
idiot,  or  exasperated  to  the  fury  of  a  demon.  Those  nice 
shades  of  the  disease,  in  which  the  mind,  without  being 
wholly  driven  from  its  propriety,  pertinaciously  clings  to 
some  absurd  delusion,  were  either  regarded  as  something 
very  different  from  real  madness,  or  were  too  few,  too  far 
removed  from  the  common  gaze,  and  too  soon  converted  by 
bad  management  into  the  more  active  forms  of  the  disease, 
to  enter  much  into  the  general  idea  entertained  of  madness. 
Could  Lord  Hale  have  contemplated  the  scenes  presented 
by  the  lunatic  asylums  of  our  own  times,  we  should  un- 
doubtedly have  received  from  him  a  very  different  doctrine, 
for  the  regulation  of  the  decisions  of  after  generations. 

§  10.  Judging  from  the  few  cases  that  have  been  reported, 
the  course  of  practice  in  the  English  criminal  courts  has  been 
in  strict  conformity  to  the  principles  laid  down  by  Hale.  For 
instance,  in  the  trial  of  Arnold  in  1723  for  shooting  at  Lord 
Onslow,  Mr.  Justice  Tracy  observed,  "  that  it  is  not  every 
kind  of  frantic  humor,  or  something  unaccountable  in  a 
man's  actions,  that  points  him  out  to  be  such  a  madman,  as 
is  exempted  from  punishment :  it  must  be  a  man,  that  is 
totally  deprived  of  his  understanding  and  memory,  and  doth 
not  know  what  he  is  doing,  no  more  than  an  infant,  than  a 
brute,  or  a  wild  beast,  such  a  one  is  never  the  object  of  pun- 
ishment." l  This  is  but  the  echo  of  Lord  Hale's  doctrine, 

1  8  Hargrave's  State  Trials,  322. 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS.  15 

and  the  circumstances  of  the  case  show  how  faithfully  the 
principles  were  applied.  Arnold  seems  to  have  been  of 
weak  understanding  from  his  birth,  and  to  have  led  an  idle, 
irregular,  and  disordered  life,  sometimes  unequivocally  mad, 
and  at  all  times  considered  exceedingly  strange  and  differ- 
ent from  other  people  ;  one  witness  describing  him  as  a 
strange,  sullen  boy  at  school,  such  as  he  had  never  seen 
before.  It  was  testified  by  his  family  and  his  neighbors, 
that  for  several  years  previous,  they  had  considered  and 
treated  him  as  mad,  occasionally  if  not  always,  although  so 
little  disposed  to  mischief,  that  he  was  suffered  to  be  at  large. 
Contrary  to  the  wishes  of  his  friends,  he  persisted  in  living 
alone  in  a  house  destitute  of  the  ordinary  conveniences  ;  was 
in  the  habit  of  lying  about  in  barns  and  under  hay-ricks  ; 
would  curse  and  swear  to  himself  for  hours  together ;  laugh 
and  throw  things  about  the  house  without  any  cause  what- 
ever, and  was  much  disturbed  in  his  sleep  by  fancied  noises. 
Among  other  unfounded  notions,  he  believed  that  Lord 
Onslow,  who  lived  in  his  neighborhood,  was  the  cause  of  all 
the  tu. units,  disturbances,  and  wicked  devices,  that  happened 
in  the  country,  and  his  thoughts  were  greatly  occupied  with 
this  person.  He  was  in  the  habit  of  declaring,  that  Lord 
Onslow  sent  his  devils  and  imps  into  his  room  at  night  to 
disturb  his  rest,  and  that  he  constantly  plagued  and  bewitched 
him,  by  getting  into  his  belly  or  bosom,  so  that  he  could 
neither  eat,  drink  nor  sleep,  for  him.  He  talked  much  of 
being  plagued  by  the  Bottles  and  Bolleroys ;  he  declared 
in  prison  it  was  better  to  die  than  live  so  miserably,  and 
manifested  no  compunction  for  what  he  had  done.  Under 
the  influence  of  these  delusions,  he  shot  at  and  wounded 
Lord  Onslow.  The  proof  of  insanity  was  strong  enough, 
but  not  that  degree  of  it,  which  the  jury  considered  sufficient 
to  save  him  from  the  gallows,  and  he  was  accordingly  sen- 
tenced to  be  hung.  Lord  Onslow  himself,  however,  thought 
differently ;  and,  by  means  of  his  intercession,  the  sentence 


16  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

was  not  executed,  and  Arnold  was  continued  in  prison  for 
life.  It  is  clear,  that  the  court  recognized  that  class  of  mad- 
men only,  as  exempted  from  the  penal  consequences  of 
crime,  whose  reason  is  completely  dethroned  from  her  em- 
pire, and  who  are  reduced  to  the  condition  of  an  infant,  a 
brute,  or  a  wild  beast.  If  it  be  true,  that  such,  as  the  court 
said,  are  never  the  objects  of  punishment,  though  it  neg- 
lected to  state  that  they. are  never  the  objects  of  prosecution, 
the  converse  must  be  equally  true,  that  those  not  exactly  in  this 
condition  can  never  avoid  punishment  on  the  plea  of  insanity. 
It  appears,  then,  that  the  law  at  that  time  did  not  consider  an 
insane  person  irresponsible  for  crime,  in  whom  there  re- 
mained the  slightest  vestige  of  rationality  ;  though,  it  did 
then  and  has  ev.er  since  deprived  him  of  the  management  of 
himself  and  his  affairs,  and  vitiates  his  civil  acts,  even  when 
they  have  no  relation  to  the  circumstances  that  caused  his 
madness.  That  the  progress  of  science  and  general  en- 
lightenment has  produced  no  improvement  of  the  law  on  this 
subject,  is  abundantly  shown  in  the  strong  declarations  of 
Sir  Yicary  Gibbs,  when  attorney-general  of  England,  on  the 
trial  of  Bellingham,  in  1812.  "  A  man,"  says  he,  "  may  be 
deranged  in  his  mind,  —  his  intellects  may  be  insufficient 
for  enabling  him  to  conduct  the  common  affairs  of  life,  such 
as  disposing  of  his  property,  or  judging  of  the  claims  which 
his  respective  relations  have  upon  him  ;  and  if  he  be  so,  the 
administration  of  the  country  will  take  his  affairs  into  their 
management,  and  appoint  to  him  trustees  ;  but,  at  the  same 
time,  such  a  man  is  not  discharged  from  his  responsibility 
for  criminal  acts." l  Lord  Erskine  had  previously  given 
the  same  doctrine  the  sanction  of  his  authority,  in  his  cele- 
brated speech  in  defence  of  Hadfield.  "  1  am  bound,"  he 
says,  "  to  admit  that  there  is  a  wide  distinction  between  civil 
and  criminal  cases.  If,  in  the  former,  a  man  appears,  upon 

1  Collinson  on  Lunacy,  057. 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS.  17 

the  evidence,  to  be  non  compos  mentis,  the  law  avoids  his 
act,  though  it  cannot  be  traced  or  connected  with  the  mor- 
bid imagination  which  constitutes  his  disease,  and  which 
may  be  extremely  partial  in  its  influence  upon  conduct ; 
but,  to  deliver  a  man  from  responsibility  for  crimes,  above 
all,  for  crimes  of  great  atrocity  and  wickedness,  I  am  by  no 
means  prepared  to  apply  this  rule,  however  well  established, 
when  property  only  is  concerned." 

§11.  That  a  person,  whom  the  law  prevents  from  man- 
aging his  own  property,  by  reason  of  his  mental  impairment, 
should,  in  respect  to  criminal  acts,  be  considered  as  possess- 
ing all  the  elements  of  responsibility,  and  placed  on  the 
same  footing  with  men  of  the  soundest  and  strongest  minds, 
is  a  proposition  so  strange  and  startling,  that  few,  uninflu- 
enced by  professional  biases,  can  yield  to  it  unhesitating  as- 
sent, or  look  upon  it  in  any  other  light,  than  as  belonging  to 
that  class  of  doctrines,  which,  while  they  may  be  the  per- 
fection of  reason  to  the  initiated,  appear  to  be  the  height  of 
absurdity  to  every  one  else.  Georget,  an  able  French  writer 
on  the  legal  relations  of  the  insane,  in  commenting  on  the 
speech  of  M.  de  Peyronnet,  who,  in  the  trial  of  Papavoine, 
had  adduced  the  passage  above  extracted  from  Lord  Hale, 
in  support  of  his  own  views,  expresses  his  astonishment  and 
indignation,  that  such  sentiments  should  ever  have  been  ut- 
tered, least  of  all,  quoted  with  approbation,  in  a  French  court 
of  justice,  by  the  chief  law-officer  of  the  government.  "  Can 
we  help  wondering,"  he  exclaims,  "  at  these  sentiments  of 
Lord  Hale,  who  seems  to  make  more  account  of  property 
than  life.  No  excuse  for  the  unfortunate  man,  who,  in  a 
paroxysm  of  madness,  commits  a  criminal  offence,  while 
civil  acts  are  to  be  annulled,  even  when  they  have  no  rela- 
tion to  the  insane  impressions,  that  might  have  influenced 
his  conduct." l  The  language  of  the  law,  virtually  addressed 


1  Discussion  medico-legale  sur  la  Foliej  8. 
2* 


18  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

to  the  insane  man,  is,  your  reason  is  too  much  impaired  to 
manage  'your  property  ;  you  are  unable  to  distinguish  be- 
tween those  measures,  which  would  conduce  to  your  profit 
and  such  as  would  end  in  your  ruin,  and  therefore  it  is 
wisely  taken  altogether  from  your  control ;  but,  if  under  the 
influence  of  one  of  those  insane  delusions,  that  have  ren- 
dered this  step  necessary,  you  should  kill  your  neighbor, 
you  will  be  supposed  to  have  acted  under  the  guidance  of  a 
sound  reason  ;  you  will  be  tried,  convicted,  and  executed 
like- any  common  criminal,  whose  understanding  has  never 
been  touched  by  madness.  As  for  any  physiological  or 
psychological  ground,  for  this  distinction  between  the  legal 
consequences  of  the  civil  and  criminal  acts  of  an  insane  per- 
son, it  is  in  vain  to  look  for  it.  That  the  mind,  when  med- 
itating a  great  crime,  is  less  under  the  influence  of  disease, 
and  enjoys  a  more  sound  and  vigorous  exercise  of  its  pow- 
ers, than  when  making  a  contract,  or  a  will,  few,  probably, 
will  be  hardy  enough  to  affirm  ;  and  yet  the  practice  of  the 
law  virtually  admits  it.  The  difference,  if  there  be  any, 
would  seem  to  be  all  the  other  way.  In  the  disposal  of 
property,  the  mind  is  engaged  in  what  has .  perhaps  often 
exercised  its  thoughts ;  the  conditions  and  consequences  of 
the  transaction  require  no  great  mental  exertion  to  be  com- 
prehended ;  and  there  may  be  nothing  in  it,  to  deprive  the 
mind  of  all  the  calmness  and  rationality  of  which  it  is  capa- 
ble. Now,  criminal  acts,  though  abstractly  wrong,  may  un- 
der certain  circumstances  become  right  and  meritorious ; 
and,  if  the  strongest  and  acutest  minds  have  sometimes  been 
perplexed  on  this  point,  what  shall  we  say  of  the  crazy  and 
distorted  perceptions  of  him,  whose  reason  shares  a  divided 
empire  with  the  propensities  and  passions  ?  Most  maniacs 
have  a  firm  conviction,  that  all  they  feel  and  think,  is  true, 
just  and  reasonable  ;  and  nothing  can  shake  their  convictions. 
The  contracts  of  the  insane  are,  in  many  cases,  declared  to 
be  invalid,  and  are  set  aside,  in  courts  of  equity,  on  the 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS.  19 

ground  of  fraud  ;  in  accordance  with  an  established  princi- 
ple, that  the  parties  to  a  contract  must  be  capable  of  giving 
their  deliberate  and  rational  consent,  the  power  of  doing 
which  is  destroyed  by  mental  derangement.1  In  point  of 
mental  soundness,  they  must  be  equal,  and  common  justice 
requires,  that  the  insane  man,  in  his  dealings  with  his  fellow 
men,  should  be  protected  from  the  effect  of  his  disorder. 
Even  in  the  simplest  transaction,  it  is  supposed  that  the  in- 
sane party  may  not  be  able  to  discern  all  the  circumstances, 
that  may  conduce  to  his  advantage,  and  may  not  act  as  if  his 
mind  were  perfectly  sound.  But,  it  remains  to  be  proved, 
that,  in  the  commission  of  a  criminal  offence,  he  has  more 
clearly  apprehended  its  abstract  nature,  its  relations  to  the 
injured  party,  and  its  consequences  to  himself,  than  he 
would  all  the  circumstances  attending  a  contract ;  if,  there- 
fore, he  have  not  acted  rationally,  but  under  the  influence 
of  a  disorderd  mind,  he  ought  to  be  no  more  responsible  for 
the  former  than  for  the  latter. 

§  12.  A  distinction  is  also  made  between  civil  and 
criminal  cases,  in  regard  to  evidence  respecting  the  state  of 
the  party's  mind.  In  the  former,  proof  drawn  from  the 
nature  of  the  act  in  question  is  sometimes  paramount  to  all 
others,  and,  in  the  absence  of  others,  admitted  to  be  alone 
conclusive ;  while,  in  the  latter,  to  seek  to  prove  the  exist- 
ence of  insanity,  from  the  character  of  the  act,  would  be 
viewed  as  nothing  less  than  a  begging  of  the  question.  "  If 
a  lunatic  person,"  says  Swinburne;2  "  or  one  that  is  beside 
himself  at  sometimes  but  not  continually,  make  his  testa- 
ment, and  it  is  not  known  whether  the  same  were  made 
while  he  was  of  sound  mind  and  memory  or  no,  then  in 
case  the  testament  be  so  conceived,  as  thereby  no  argument 
of  phrensy  or  folly  can  be  gathered,  it  is  to  be  presumed 

1  Story's  Commentaries  on  Equity  Jurisprudence,  §  227. 
*  Of  Testaments  and  Last  Wills,  Part  II,  Section  3. 


20  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

that  the  same  was  made  during  the  time  of  his  calm  and 
clear  intermissions,  and  so  the  testament  shall  be  adjudged 
good,  yea,  although  it  cannot  be  proved  that  the  testator 
useth  to  have  any  clear  and  quiet  intermissions  at  all,  yet 
nevertheless  I  suppose  that  if  the  testament  be  wisely  and 
orderly  framed,  the  same  ought  to  be  accepted  for  a  lawful 
testament."  Sir  John  Nicholl  has  observed,  that  where 
there  is  no  direct  evidence  of  the  time,  or,  consequently,  of 
the  deceased's  state  of  mind  at  the  time,  of  the  act  done, 
recourse  must  be  had  to  the  usual  mode  of  ascertaining  it 
in  such  cases  —  which  is  by  looking  at  the  act  itself.  "  The 
agent  is  to  be  inferred  rational,  or  the  contrary,  in  such 
cases,  from  the  character  broadly  taken  of  his  act."  !  So, 
on  the  other  hand,  "  in  the  case  of  a  person  who  is  some- 
times sane  and  sometimes  insane,  if  there  be  in  it  a  mixture 
of  wisdom  and  folly,  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  the  same  was 
made  during  the  testator's  phrensy,  even  if  there  be  but  one 
word  sounding  to  folly."2  If,  then,  testamentary  disposi- 
tions that  conflict  with  the  natural  distribution  of  property 
and  the  known  and  expressed  intentions  of  the  testator,  yea, 
if  they  contain  but  one  word  "  sounding  to  folly,"  are  to  be 
held  as  sufficient  evidence  of  unsound  mind,  in  doubtful 
cases,  why,  when  an  atrocious  crime  is  shown  to  be  motive- 
less, unnatural,  in  opposition  to  the  habits,  feelings,  and 
principles  of  the  whole  past  life,  and  unfollowed  by  any 
consciousness  of  guilt,  should  not  this  act  be  considered  as 
equally  strong  proof  of  unsoundness  of  mind  ?  Why  is  it, 
that  instead  of  being  thus  considered,  it  actually  avails  the 
accused  nothing ;  the  character  of  the  act,  in  the  last  resort, 
being  too  often  explained,  on  the  supposition  of  an  inherent 


1  1  Addam's  Ecclesiastical  Reports,  74,  Scruby  and  Finch  v. 
Fordham  and  others.  See  also  1  Phillimore's  Reports,,  90  ;  1  Dow's 
Reports,  178,  for  a  recognition  of  the  same  principle. 

*  Swinburne,  Part  II,  §  3,  pi.  16. 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS.  21 

ferocity  and  thirst  for  blood,  which  no  considerations  can 
restrain ;  even  in  the  face  of  totally  different  dispositions, 
indicated  by  the  whole  tenor  of  his  life. 

§  13.  Notwithstanding  that  Lord  Hale's  doctrine  was 
cited  with  approbation  by  M.  de  Peyronnet,  (§  11),  yet,  by 
the  French  penal  code,  madness,  without  limit  or  condition, 
exempts  from  the  punishment  of  criminal  acts.  The  lan- 
guage of  the  law  is,  that  "there  is  no  crime -nor  offence 
when  the  accused  was  in  a  state  of  madness  at  the  time  of 
the  action."  '  The  existence  of  insanity  once  established, 
the  accused  is,  by  the  spirit  of  the  law,  acquitted.  This 
intention  has  sometimes  been  near  being  defeated,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  great  liberty  allowed  to  French  juries,  in  the 
construction  of  the  phraseology  of  their  verdict,  in  which 
they  may  declare,  if  they  choose,  not  whether  the  accused 
was  guilty  or  not«  guilty,  sane  or  insane,  but  whether  or  not 
the  act  was  committed  voluntarily?  A  verdict  of  this  kind, 
in  an  instance  mentioned  by  Georget,  led  to  a  curious  result, 
in  the  hands  of  men  who  were  not  indoctrinated  in  the  subtle- 
ties of  metaphysics.  The  fact  of  insanity  having  been 
given  to  the  jury  for  decision,  they  returned  that  the  accused 
acted  voluntarily  and  with  -premeditation;  and,  secondly, 
that  he  was  insane  at  the  time  of  committing  the  act.3  This 
verdict,  so  consistent  in  reality,  but  so  utterly  contradictory 
in  a  legal  sense,  was  received  by  the  court  and  understood 
to  mean,  that  the  accused  possessed  the  will  of  a  madman, 
a  merely  animal  will  which  excludes  legal  culpability.  Had 
not  the  last  question  been  raised,  the  accused,  though  mad, 
would  have  been  condemned  to  death.4  It  seems  evident, 


1  II  n'y  a  ni  crime  ni  delit  lorsque  le  prevenu  6tait  en  etat  de  de- 
mence  au  temps  de  1'action.     Art.  64. 

2  Special  verdicts  in. Criminal  cases  are  quite  common  in  France. 

3  Des  maladies  mentales,  100. 

4  It  is  one  of  those  metaphysical  subtleties,  so  prevalent  on  the 


22  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

that  the  legislator,  in  framing  that  law,  was  impressed  with 
the  difficulty  of  drawing  the  line  between  general  and  par- 
tial insanity,  and  of  estimating  the  quantity  of  reason  left 
after  the  invasion  of  this  disease,  and  therefore  determined 
to  avoid  it  altogether  by  recognizing  but  one  kind  of  insanity. 
Though  not  prepared  to  acquiesce  entirely  in  the  disposi- 
tions of  this  enactment,  yet  it  is  infinitely  preferable,  with 
all  its  faults,  to  the  English  practice  of  requiring  a  number 
of  men,  who  may  have  had  very  little  education  of  any 
kind,  and  least  of  all,  any  very  accurate  notions  of  the  influ- 
ence of  insanity  on  the  operations  of  the  mind,  to  sit  in 
judgment  on  the  measure  of  a  man's  understanding,  and 

subject  of  insanity,  that  the  acts  of  an  insane  mind  are  involuntary. 
It  certainly  can  be  of  little  practical  consequence,  what  epithet  is 
applied  to  the  acts  of  a  mind  admitted  to  be  insane  ;  though  it  seems 
to  be  an  abuse  of  language,  to  call  any  act  involuntary, 'which  pro- 
ceeds from  a  person's  own  free  will.  True,  the  exercise  of  the  will 
may  be  greatly  influenced  by  the  condition  of  the  mind,  even  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  deprive  a  person  of  all  criminal  responsibility 
But  this  does  not  necessarily  prove  the  act  to  be  involuntary,  unless, 
for  instance,  every  man,  who  commits  a  criminal  act  under  the 
influence  of  strong  passions,  is  considered  as  acting  involuntarily. 
The  objection  to  this  distinction  is,  that  it  is  used  as  a  test  in  the 
decision  of  doubtful  cases,  every  one  being  left  to  decide,  as  he 
pleases,  what  acts  are  voluntary,  and  what  involuntary.  A  curious 
application  of  the  distinction  is  made  by  Mr.  Shelford,  in  his  work 
on  Lunatics,  (Introduction,  p.  xlix.)  when  speaking  of  suicide. 
"  The  art  with  which  the  means  are  often  prepared,  and  the  time 
occupied  in  planning  them,  seem  to  mark  it  [suicide]  as  an  act  of 
deliberate  volition ;  but  the  acts  of  an  insane  mind  are  involuntary, 
and  not  voluntary  ;  therefore,  the  question  must  always  revert  to, 
what  was  the  real  condition  of  the  mind  when  suicide  was  com- 
mitted." If  the  preparation  for  the  suicidal  act  be  so  indicative  of 
that  volition  which  is  exercised  by  sound  minds  only,  it  is  not  very 
clear  by  what  process  of  logic,  from  these  two  propositions  would 
be  drawn  the  conclusion,  that  the  "  question  must  always  revert  to 
what  was  the  real  condition  of  the  mind  when  suicide  was  com- 
mitted." 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS. 


23 


decide  whether  or  not  he  had  enough  of  reason  left  to  dis- 
cern the  nature  of  the  act  he  committed.  True,  mental 
unsoundness  is  not  necessarily  incompatible  with  crime,  for 
we  can  conceive  of  cases,  where  the  criminal  act  is  beyond 
the  sphere  of  the  influence  of  the  reigning  delusion,  and 
therefore,  as  far  as  that  is  concerned,  the  offspring  of  a 
sound  mind,  yet  we  must  acknowledge  the  extreme  difficulty 
of  establishing  this  fact,  and  the  caution  with  which  we 
should  proceed  to  a  decision. 

§  14.  On  the  trial  of  Had  field,  for  shooting  at  the  king 
in  Drury  Lane  theatre,  in  1800,  there  occurred  for  the  first 
time,  in  an  English  criminal  court,  anything  like  a  thorough 
and  enlightened  discussion  of  insanity  as  connected  with 
crime  ;  and  the  result  was,  that  a  fatal  blow  was  given  to 
the  doctrines  of  Lord  Hale  by  Mr.  Erskine,  who  brought  all 
the  energies  of  his  great  mind  to  bear  upon  the  elucidation 
of  this  subject.1  In  accordance  with  these  doctrines,  the 
attorney-general  had  told  the  jury,  that  to  protect  a  person 
from  criminal  responsibility,  there  must  be  a  total  depriva- 
tion of  memory  and  understanding.  To  this  Mr.  Erskine  very 
justly  replied,  that  if  these  expressions  were  meant  to  be  taken 


'  One  reason,  why  the  criminal  law  of  insanity  has  undergone  so 
little  improvement  in  England,  is,  probably,  that  the  accused,  not 
having  been  allowed  counsel  to  speak  in  their  defence,  except  in 
trials  for  high  treason,  the  officers  of  government  have  always  been 
at  liberty  to  put  their  own  construction  on  the  law,  and  urge  it  on 
the  jury  as  the  only  correct  one,  without  fear  of  being  contradicted 
or  gainsayed.  Thus,  the  old  maxims  have  been  repeated,  year 
after  year,  and  not  being  questioned,  their  correctness  has  remained 
undoubted,  both  in  and  out  of  the  legal  profession.  Can  any  one 
doubt,  that  had  those  insane  criminals,  who  have  been  condemned 
within  the  last  half  century,  been  defended  by  an  Erskine,  many  of 
them  would  have  been  acquitted,  and  a  great  advance  made  in  the 
law  of  insanity,  that  would  have  prevented  some  of  those  exhibi- 
tions of  presumptuous  ignorance,  which  will  one  day  be  universally 
regarded  with  feelings  of  disgust  and  pity  ? 


24  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

in  the  literal  sense  of  the  words  —  which  however  he  did 
not  deny  —  "then  no  such  madness  ever  existed  in  the 
world."  This  condition  of  mind  is  observed  only  in  idiocy 
and  fatuity,  and  its  unhappy  subjects  are  never  made  ac- 
countable to  the  laws.  In  proper  madness,  on  the  contrary, 
so  far  was  there  from  being  a  total  deprivation  of  memory 
and  understanding,  that  "  in  all  the  cases  that  have  filled 
Westminster  Hall,"  said  he,  "  with  the  most  complicated 
considerations,  the  lunatics  and  other  insane  persons,  who 
have  been  the  subjects  of  them,  have  not  only  had  memory 
in  my  sense  of  the  expression  —  they  have  not  only  had  the 
most  perfect  knowledge  and  recollection  of  all  the  relations 
they  stood  in  towards  others,  and  of  the  acts  and  circum- 
stances of  their  lives,  but  have,  in  general,  been  remarkable 
for  subtlety  and  acuteness.  Defects  in  their  reasonings 
have  seldom  been  traceable  —  the  disease  consisting  in  the 
delusive  sources  of  thought :  —  all  their  deductions,  within 
the  scope  of  their  malady,  being  founded  on  the  immovable 
assumptions  of  matters  as  realities,  either  without  any 
foundation  whatever,  or  so  distorted  and  disfigured  by  fancy, 
as  to  be  nearly  the  same  thing  as  their  creation."  Instead 
therefore  of  making  that  kind  of  insanity  which  would 
exempt  from  punishment  to  consist  in  the  absence  of  any  of 
the  intellectual  faculties,  he  lays  down  delusion  as  its  true 
character,  of  which  the  criminal  act  in  question  must  be  its 
immediate  unqualified  offspring.1  Here  was  a  great  step 


1  It  is  surprising  and  perfectly  unaccountable,  that  Mr.  Erskine, 
in  adverting  to  the  case  of  Arnold  (§  10),  should  have  declared, 
"  that  his  counsel  could  not  show,  that  any  morbid  delusion  had 
overshadowed  his  understanding."  !  If  it  were  no  delusion  in  Arnold 
to  believe  that  Lord  Onslow  was  the  cause  of  all  the  turmoils  and 
troubles  in  the  country  —  that  he  bewitched  him  in  particular  by 
getting  into  his  belly  and  bosom,  and  sending  his  devils  and  imps 
into  his  room  to  prevent  his  rest ;  it  surely  was  none  for  Hadfield  to 
imagine  that  he  had  constant  intercourse  with  God  —  that  the  world 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS.  25 

made  in  this  branch  of  medical  jurisprudence,  and  it  might 
have  been  expected,  that  the  victory,  thus  gained  over  pro- 
fessional prejudices  and  time-honored  errors,  would  be  felt 
in  all  subsequent  decisions.  But,  though  the  day  has  gone 
by,  when  such  insanity  only,  as  is  attended  by  total  depriva- 
tion of  memory  and  understanding,  can  be  admitted  in 
excuse  for  crime,  the  test  offered  by  Erskine  was  altogether 
too  simple  and  too  philosophical,  to  be  readily  adopted  by 
minds  that  delighted  in  subtleties  and  technicalities. 

§  15.  In  the  case  of  Bellingham,  for  instance,1  tried  for 
the  murder  of  the  Hon.  Spencelr  Percival,  in  1812,  it  ap- 
peared from  the  history  of  the  accused,  from  his  own 
account  of  the  transactions,  that  led  to  the  fatal  act,  and 
from  the  testimony  of  several  witnesses,  that  he  labored 
under  many  of  those  strange  delusions,  that  find  a  place 
only  in  the  brain  of  a  madman.  His  fixed  belief,  that  his 
own  private  grievances  were  national  wrongs';  that  his 
country's  diplomatic  agents  in  a  foreign  land  neglected  to 
hear  his  complaints  and  assist  him  in  his  troubles,  though 
they  had  in  reality  done  more  than  could  have  reasonably 
been  expected  of  them  ;  his  conviction,  in  which  he  was 
firm  almost  to  the  last,  that  his  losses  would  be  made  good 
by  the  government,  even  after  he  had  been  repeatedly  told, 
in  consequence  of  repeated  applications  in  various  quarters, 
that  the  government  would  not  interfere  in  his  affairs  ;  arid 
his  determination,  on  the  failure  of  all  other  means  to  bring 
his  affairs  before  the  country,  to  effect  this  purpose  by 
assassinating  the  head  of  the  government,  by  which  he  would 

was  about  to  come  to  an  end  —  and  that  be  was  to  sacrifice  himself 
for  its'  salvation,  by   taking  away  the  life  of  another.     Either  the 
able    advocate,  in  his   zeal  for  .his   client,  must  have   egregiously 
deceived  himself  respecting  the  facts   of  Arnold's  case,    or   have 
attached  some  ideas  to  delusion,  which  have  never  entered  into  the 
ordinary  conceptions  of  that  kind  of  belief. 
1  1  Collinson  on  Lunacy,  650. 
3 


26  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

have  an  opportunity  of  making  a  public  statement  of  his 
grievances  and  obtaining  a  triumph,  which  he  never  doubted, 
over  the  attorney-general ;  these  were  all  delusions,  as  wild 
and  strange,  as  those  of  seven-eighths  of  the  inmates  of  any 
lunatic  asylum  in  the  land.  And  so  obvious  were  they,  that 
though  he  had  not  the  aid  of  an  Erskine  to  press  them  upon 
the  attention  of  the  jury,  and  though  he  himself  denied  the 
imputation  of  insanity,  the  government,  as  if  virtually  ac- 
knowledging their  existence,  contended  for  his  responsibility 
on  very  different  grounds.  As  the  various  tests  of  this 
condition,  commonly  urged  on  such  occasions,  were  dwelt 
upon  with  unusual  earnestness  and  force,  and  with  strong 
expressions  of  confidence  in  their  value,  it  may  be  well  to 
examine  them  critically,  in  order  to  ascertain  to  how  much 
weight  they  are  really  entitled,  in  settling  the  question  of 
criminal  responsibility. 

§  16.  In  the  trial  of  Arnold,  already  noticed,  (§  10)  the 
jury  were  directed  to  settle  it  in  their  own  minds,  whether 
the  accused  was  capable  of  distinguishing  right  from  wrong, 
good  from  evil,  and  if  they  concluded  that  he  was,  that  they 
must  return  a  verdict  of  guilty.  In  Bellingham's  case,  the 
attorney-general  declared,  l<  upon  the  authority  of  the  first 
sages  in  the  country,  and  upon  the  authority  of  the  estab- 
lished law  in  all  times,  which  law  has  never  been  ques- 
tioned, that  although  a  man  may  be  incapable  of  conducting 
his  own  affairs,  he  may  still  be  answerable  for  his  criminal 
acts,  if  he  possess  a  mind  capable  of  distinguishing  right 
from  wrong."  !  Lord  Chief  Justice  Mansfield,  who  tried 
the  case,  echoed  the  same  doctrine  in  his  charge  to  the  jury. 
In  speaking  of  a  species  of  insanity,  in  which  the  patient 
fancies  the  existence  of  injury,  and  seeks  an  opportunity  of 
gratifying  revenge  by  some  hostile  act,  he  says,  "  if  such  a 
person  were  capable,  in  other  respects,  of  distinguishing 

1  Collinson  on  Lunacy,  657. 


PRELIMINARY     VIEWS.  27 

right  from  wrong,  there  was  no  excuse  for  any  act  of  atro- 
city, which  he  might  commit  under  this  description  of  de- 
rangement.1" !  Mr.  Russell,  in  his  work  on  criminal  law, 
includes  inability  to  distinguish  right  from  wrong  among  the 
characters  of  that  grade  of  insanity,  which  exempts  from  the 
punishment  of  crime. 2 

§  17.  That  the  insane  mind  is  not  entirely  deprived  of 
this  power  of  moral  discernment,  but  on  many  subjects  is 
perfectly  rational,  and  displays  the  exercise  of  a  sound  and 
well-balanced  mind,  is  one  of  those  facts  now  so  well  estab- 
lished, that  to  question  it  would  only  betray  the  height  of 
ignorance  and  presumption.  The  first  result,  therefore,  to 
which  the  doctrine  leads,  is,  that  no  man  can  ever  success- 
fully plead  insanity  in  defence  of  crime,  because  it  can 
be  said  of  no  one,  who  would  have  occasion  for  such  a  de- 
fence, that  he  was  unable  in  any  case  to  distinguish  right 
from  wrong.  To  show  the  full  merits  of  the  question,  how- 
ever, it  is  necessary  to  examine  more  particularly,  how  far 
this  moral  sentiment  is  affected  by,  and  what  relation  it 
bears  to  insanity.  By  that  partial  possession  of  the  reason- 
ing powers,  which  has  been  spoken  of  as  being  enjoyed  by 
maniacs  generally,  is  meant  to  be  implied  the  undiminished 
power  of  the  mind,  to  contemplate  some  objects  or  ideas  in 
their  customary  relations,  among  which  are  those  pertaining 
to  their  right  or  wrong,  their  good  or  evil,  tendency  ;  and  it 
must  comprise  the  whole  of  these  relations,  else  the  individ- 
ual is  not  sane  on  these  points.  A  person  may  regard  his 
child  with  the  feelings  natural  to  the  paternal  bosom,  at  the 


1  This  opinion  was  delivered  scarcely  a  dozen  years  after  the 
absurdity  of  its  principles  had  been  so  happily  exposed  in  a  few 
words,  by  Mr.  Erskine,  on  the  trial  of  Hadfield.     What  a  comment 
on  the  progress  of  improvement  in  the  medical  jurisprudence  of 
insanity  ! 

2  Russell  on  Crimes  and  Misdemeanors,  12. 


28  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

very  moment  he  believes  himself  commanded  by  a  voice 
from  heaven  to  sacrifice  this  child,  in  order  to  secure  its 
eternal  happiness,  than  which,  of  course,  he  could  not  ac- 
complish a  greater  good.  Our  belief  in  a  maniac's  sound- 
ness, on  certain  -subjects,  is  founded  in  part,  on  the  moral 
aspect  in  which  he  views  those  subjects  ;  for,  it  would  be 
folly  to  consider  a  person  rational  in  reference  to  his  parents 
and  children,  while  he  entertains  the  idea,  that  it  would  be 
doing  God's  service  to  kill  them  ;  though  he  may  talk  ra- 
tionally of  their  characters,  dispositions,  and  habits  of  life, 
their  chances  of  success  in  their  occupations,  their  past  cir- 
cumstances, and  of  the  feelings  of  affection,  which  he  has 
always  cherished  towards  them.  Before,  therefore,  an  indi- 
vidual can  be  accounted  sane  on  a  particular  subject,  it  must 
appear  that  he  regards  it  correctly,  in  all  its  relations  to 
right  and  wrong.  The  slightest  acquaintance  with  the  in- 
sane will  convince  any  one  of  the  truth  of  this  position.  In 
no  school  of  logic,  in  no  assembly  of  the  just,  can  we  listen 
to  closer  and  shrewder  argumentation,  to  warmer  exhorta- 
tions to  duty,  to  more  glowing  descriptions  of  the  beauty  of 
virtue,  or  more  indignant  denunciations  of  evil-doing,  than 
in  the  hospitals  and  asylums  for  the  insane.'  And  yet  many 
of  these  very  people  may  make  no  secret  of -entertaining 
notions  utterly  subversive  of  all  moral  propriety  ;  and,  per- 
haps, are  only  waiting  a  favorable  opportunity,  to  execute 
some  project  of  wild  and  cruel  violence.  The  purest  minds 
cannot  express  greater  horror  and  loathing- of  various  crimes, 
than  madmen  often  do,  arid  from  precisely  the  same  causes. 
Their  abstract  conceptions  of  crime,  not  being  perverted  by 
the  influence  of  disease,  present  its  hideous  outlines  as 
strongly  defined,  as  they  ever  were  in  the  healthiest  condi- 
tion ;  and  the  disapprobation  they  express  at  'the  sight 
arises  from  sincere  and  honest  convictions.  The  particu- 
lar criminal  act,  however,  becomes  divorced  in  their  minds 
from  its  relations  to  crime  in  the  abstract;  and,  being  re- 


PRELIMINARY     VIEWS.  29 

garded  only  in  connexion  with  some  favorite  object,  which 
it  may  help  to  obtain,  and  which  they  see  no  reason  to 
refrain  from  pursuing,  is  viewed,  in  fact,  as  of  a  highly 
laudable  and  meritorious  nature.  Herein,  then,  consists 
their  insanity,  not  in  preferring  vice  to  virtue,  in  applauding 
crime  and  deriding  justice,  but  in  being  unable  to  discern 
the  essential  identity  of  nature,  between  a  particular  crime 
and  all  other  crimes,  whereby  they  are  led  to  approve, 
what,  in  general  terms,  they  have  already  condemned.  It 
is  a  fact,  not  calculated  to  increase  our  faith  in  the  march 
of  intellect,  that  the  very  trait  peculiarly  characteristic  of 
insanity  has  been  seized  upon  as  conclusive  proof  of  sanity, 
in  doubtful  cases  ;  and,  thus,  the  infirmity  that  entitles  one 
to  protection  is  tortured  into  a  good  and  sufficient  reason  for 
completing  his  ruin. 

§  18.  If  this  power  of  distinguishing  right  from  wrong  do 
really  indicate  soundness  of  mind,  it  may  be  justly  com- 
plained, that  the  question  of  its  existence  is  never  agitated 
in  any  but  criminal  cases,  while  it  certainly  should  be  when- 
ever the  rights  and  liberties  of  the  insane  are  to  be  invaded. 
If  it  is  proper  to  make  those  who  possess  this  power  respon- 
sible for  their  criminal  acts,  how  unjust  and  absurd  is  it  to 
deprive  them  of  their  liberty,  and  seclude  them  from  their 
customary  scenes  and  enjoyments,  before  they  have  violated 
a  single  human  law.  Undoubtedly,  this  measure  would  be 
conducive  to  their  good,  by  taking  from  them  effectually  the 
opportunity  of  injuring  the  persons  or  property  of  themselves 
or  others  ;  and  so  it  would  be  for  every  other  unprincipled 
and  reckless  individual,  who  bids  fair  to  be  a  pest  to  society. 
But  if  it  is  alleged,  that  the  latter  are  morally  free,  and, 
therefore,  are  personally  free,  till  the  commission  of  some 
overt  act,  it  may  be  replied,  that  the  former,  on  the  hypo- 
thesis of  the  law,  which  makes  moral  freedom  consist  in  the 
power  of  distinguishing  right  from  wrong,  have  the  same 
claim  to  immunity  from  personal  constraint.  This  prepos- 
3* 


30  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

terous  .distinction,  between  civil  and  criminal  cases,  gives 
rise  in  practice,  to  one  of  the  most  curious  and  startling  in- 
consistencies, that  human  legislation  ever  presented.  While 
the  mental  impairment  is  yet  slight,  comparatively,  and  the 
patient -is  quiet  and  peaceable,  the  law  considers  him  inca- 
pable of.  managing  .himself  or  his  worldly  affairs,  and  pro- 
vides him  with  a  guardian 'and  a  place  in  the  wards  of  a 
hospital ;  but,  when  the  disorder  has  proceeded  to  such  a 
height  as  to  deprive  the  maniac  of  all  moral  restraint,  and 
precipitate  him  on  some  deed  of  violence,  he  is  to  be  con- 
sidered as  most  capable  of  perceiving  moral  distinctions, 
and,  consequently,  most  responsible  for  his  actions ! 

§  19.  The  qualifications,  with  which  some  of  the  latest 
writers  have  promulgated  this  test  of  responsibility,  encour- 
age the  hope,  that  it  will  ere  long  be  viewed  in  a  very  differ- 
ent aspect.  A  disposition  to  disregard  the  old  landmarks  on 
this  point  was  manifested,  not  long,  since,  by  Lord  Lynd- 
hurst,  in  the  case  of  the  King  v.  Orford,  when  he  directed 
the  jury  to  acquit  the  prisoner,  if  satisfied,  "  that  he  did  not 
know,  when  he  committed  the  act,  what  the  effect  of  it,  if 
fatal,  would,  be,  with  reference  to  the  crime  of  murder  ; " 
in  other  words,  they  were  to  satisfy  themselves,  before  ac- 
quitting him,  that  he  did  not  know,  that  the  act  would  be 
essentially  murder,  that  crime,  which  in  the  abstract  is 


1  5  Carrington  and  Payne,  168.  The  defendant,  in  this  case,  was 
tried  for  murder.  It  appeared,  that  he  entertained  the  notion,  that 
the  person  whom  he  shot  and  many  others  were  desirous  of  depriv- 
ing him  of  his  liberty,  and  had  accordingly  conspired  together,  to 
accomplish  their  purpose,  and,  under  the  influence  of  this  delusion, 
he  would  abuse  people  whom  he  met  in  the  streets,  though  wholly 
unacquainted  with  them.  In  his  pocket  was  found  a  paper  purport- 
ing to  be  "  a  List  of  Hadleigh  Conspirators  against  my  Life,"  in 
which  he  had  enrolled  the  names  of  the  deceased  and  his  family. 
Several  medical  witnesses,  who  heard  the  evidence,  deposed  that 
the  prisoner  was  affected  with  monomania. 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS.  31 

equally  abhorred  by  the  sane  and  the  insane.  Still,  how- 
ever, this  is  not  sufficient,  for  he  might,  like  Hadfield  and 
many  others,  have  recognized  the  wrong  and  illegality  of 
the  act  and  been  perfectly  conscious  of  its  consequences  to 
himself,  while  he  felt  impelled  to  its  execution  by  a  voice 
from  heaven,  or  by  a  strong  conviction  of  certain  great  ends 
which  it  was  to  promote,  and  thus  have  acted  the  part,  if 
the  expression  may  be  allowed,  of  an  insane  Abraham  or 
Brutus.  This  principle,  therefore,  is  far  from  being  univer- 
sally applicable,  though  if  it  had  been  admitted  in  the  case 
of  Bellingham,  it  would  have  produced  the  acquittal  of  that 
unfortunate  man.  The  criminal  act  which  he  committed 
was  riot  viewed  by  him  at  all  as  one  of  murder,  any  more 
than  the  killing  of  a  brute  for  the  same  purpose,  but  merely 
as  a  disagreeable  though  justifiable  method  of  bringing  his 
affairs  before  the  country,  and  obtaining  redress  for  his  man- 
ifold wrongs  and.  sufferings.  And  yet  Lord  Lyndhurst,  in 
this  very  case,  expressed  his  approbation  of  the  doctrines 
laid  down  by  Lord  Chief  Justice  Mansfield  on  the  trial  of 
Bellingham,  —  doctrines  which  he  had  found  it  necessary 
here  to  modify,  in  order  that  they  might  afford  to  an  inno- 
cent man  the  protection  to  which  he  was  entitled !  Mr. 
Chitty  seems  inclined  to  proceed  a  step  farther  on  this  point. 
"  The  substantial  question  presented  to  the  jury,"  he  ob- 
serves, "  is,  whether,  at  the  time  the  alleged  criminal  act 
was  committed,  the  prisoner  was  incapable  of  judging 
between  right  and  wrong,  and  did  not  then  know  he  was 
committing  an  offence  against  the  law  of  God  and  of  na- 
ture." '  By  some  late  Scotch  writers  on  criminal  law,  this 
test  of  responsibility  has  been  disapproved  of,  in  still  more 
explicit  terms.  Baron  Hume  disposes  of  it  in  the  following 
language  :  "•  Would  he  have  answered  on  the  question,  that 
it  is  wrong  to  kill  a  fellow  creature  ?  this  is  hardly  to  be. 

1  Medical  Jurisprudence,  354. 


32  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

considered  a  just  criterion  of  such  a  state  of  mind,  as  ought 
to  make  him  answer  to  the  law  for  his  acts.  Because  a  per- 
son may  happen  to  answer  in  this  way,  who  is  yet  so  abso- 
lutely insane  as  to  have  lost  all  power  of  observation  of  facts, 
all  discernment  of  the  good  or  bad  intentions  of  those  who 
are  about  him,  or  even  the  knowledge  of  their  persons. 
Besides,  the  question  is  put  in  another  and  a  more  special 
sense,  as  relative  to  the  act  done  by  the  panel,  and  his  know- 
ledge of  the  place  in  which  he  did  it.  Did  he  at  that  mo- 
ment understand  the  evil  of  what  he  did  ?  Was  he  im- 
pressed with  the  consciousness  of  guilt  and  fear  of  punish- 
ment ?  —  it  is  then  a  pertinent  and  a  material  question,  but 
one  which  cannot  be  rightly  answered,  without  taking  into 
consideration  the  whole  circumstances  of  the  situation. 
Every  judgment  in  the  matter  of  right  and  wrong  supposes 
a  case,  or  state  of  facts  to  which  it  applies.  And  though 
the  person  may  have  that  vestige  of  reason,  which  may 
enable  him  to  answer  in  the  general,  that  murder  is  a  crime, 
yet  if  he  cannot  distinguish  a  friend  from  an  enemy,  or  a 
benefit  from  an  injury,  but  conceives  everything  about  him 
to  be  the  reverse  of  what  it  really  is,  and  mistakes  the  ideas 
of  his  fancy  in  that  respect,  for  realities,  those  remains  of 
intellect  are  of  no  sort  of  service  to  him  in  the  government 
of  his  actions,  in  enabling  him  to  form  a  judgment  as  to 
what  is  right  or  wrong  on  any  particular  occasion."  x  From 
all  this,  Hume  draws  the  broad  conclusion,  that  the  judgment 
of  right  and  wrong  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  question  of 
responsibility.  This  view  of  the  subject  is  certainly  liberal 
enough,  and  increases  our  regret,  that  it  should  be  contrasted 
in  a  subsequent  stage  of  his  remarks,  by  one  of  those  vague 
and  senseless  notions,  that  seem  to  have  obtained  a  prescrip- 
tive place  in  the  books  on  criminal  law.  "  It  is  not  to  be 
understood,"  he  continues,  "  that  there  is  any  privilege  of 

1  Commentaries  on  the  Law  of  Scotland  respecting  Crimes,  I,  36. 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS.  33 

mere  weakness  of  intellect,  or  of  a  strange  and  moody  hu- 
mor, or  of  a  crazy  and  capricious,  or  irregular  temper  and 
habit.  None  of  these  things  either  are,  or  ought  to  be  law." 
When  all  these  traits  are  observed  .in  an  individual,  or  any 
one  of  them  in  a  remarkable  degree,  there'is  great  reason 
to  suspect  the  existence  of  insanity,  and  the  most  faithful 
means  should  be  resorted  to,  in  order  to  determine  this  fact. 
In  the  great  majority  of  cases,  the  suspicion  will  prove  to  be 
well  founded,  and  the  judgment  of  right  and  wrong  on 
"  particular  occasions"  to  be  completely  perverted.  These 
traits  of  character  must  not  be  considered,  as  they  too  gen- 
erally are,  in  and  by  themselves  exclusively,  and  uncon- 
nected with  the  previous  moral  and  intellectual  habits  of  the 
individual,  but  as  symptoms  of  a  deviation  from  the  normal 
condition  —  of  pathological  changes  in  the  action  of  the 
cerebral  organism.  When  viewed  in  this  light,  they  will  be 
examined  with  the  patience  and  intelligence,  necessary  to 
establish,  beyond  doubt,  the  existence  of  that  insanity,  of 
which  they  are  the  almost  certain  signs,  instead  of  being 
hastily  dismissed,  as  only  the  marks  of  an  ill-governed, 
malicious,  temper. 

§  20.  Mr.  Alison  lays  down  the  principle,  that  "  to 
amount  to  a  complete  bar  to  punishment,  the  insanity,  either 
at  the  time  of  committing  the  crime,  or  of  the  trial,  must 
have  been  of  such  a  kind  as  entirely  deprived  the  accused 
of  the  use  of  reason,  as  applied  to  the  act  in  question,  and 
the  knowledge  that  he  was  doing  wrong  in  committing  it."  ' 
This,  is  all  very  clear  and  rational,  but  a  subsequent  remark 
shows,  that  in  his  struggle  with  the  errors  of  the  law,  he  had 
not  completely  emancipated  his  mind  from  their  binding 
influence.  "Anything,"  he  observes,  "short  of  this  com- 
plete alienation  of  reason,  will  be  no  defence ;  and  mere 


1  Commentaries  on  the  Law  of  Scotland,  &c.,  645. 


34  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

oddity  of  manner,  or  half-craziness  of  disposition,  if  unac- 
companied by  such  an  obscuring  of  the  conscience,  will  not 
avail  the  prisoner."  The  idea  that  "  anything  short  of 
complete  alienation  of  reason  will  be  no  defence,"  is  not 
only  at  variance  with  his  previous  qualification,  that  this  loss 
of  reason  must  be  in  reference  "  to  the  act  in  question,"  but 
is  identically  the  doctrine  of  the  last  century,  the  fallacy  of 
which  was  clearly  exposed  by  Erskine  in  Hadfield's  case. 
What  is  precisely  meant  by  such  vague  phraseology,  as 
"  half-craziness  of  disposition,"  it  would  be  hardly  worth 
while  to  inquire ;  it  is  enough  to  say,  that,  taking  the  lan- 
guage in  its  most  natural  and  obvious  signification,  the 
mental  condition  expressed  by  it  is  one  utterly  unknown  in 
metaphysics  or  medicine.  Mr.  Alison  very  justly  disap- 
proves of  the  law,  as  laid  down  by  Chief  Justice  Mansfield, 
in  Bellingham's  case,  viz. ;  that  the  prisoner  was  account- 
able, because  he  could  distinguish  good  from  evil,  and  knew 
that  murder  was  a  crime ;  but  his  remark  respecting  it 
betrays  an  ignorance  of  insanity,  that  would  be  surprising 
were  it  not  so  common  in  discussions  upon  this  subject. 
"  On  this  case,"  says  he,  "  it  may  be  observed,  that  un- 
questionably the  mere  fancying  a  series  of  injuries  to  have 
been  received  will  not  serve  as  an  excuse  for  murder,  for 
this  plain  reason,  that,  supposing  it  true,  that  such  injuries 
had  been  received,  they  would  have  furnished  no  excuse  for 
the  shedding  of  blood ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  such  an 
illusion,  as  deprives  the  panel  of  the  sense  that  what  he  did 
was  wrong,  amounts  to  legal  insanity,  though  he  was  per- 
fectly aware  that  murder  in  general  was  a  crime ;  and, 
therefore,  the  law  appears  to  have  been  more  correctly  laid 
down,  in  the  cases  of  Hadfield  and  Bowler,  than  in  this 
instance."  Whether  the  insane  belief  have  reference  to  a 
matter  of  fact,  or  to  views  of  right  and  wrong,  it  ought 
equally  to  be  regarded  as  annulling  legal  responsibility.  If 
a  single  step  in  the  reasoning  which  leads  to  the  commission 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS.  35 

of  a  criminal  act,  be  the  offspring  of  insanity,  the  conclusion 
must  necessarily  be  vitiated  thereby.  If  this  be  the  law  by 
which  maniacs  are  to  be  tried,  few  will  escape  punishment 
for  criminal  acts  ;  for,  in  by  far  the  greater  proportion,  such 
acts  have  been  committed  in  consequence  of  a  fancying  of 
injuries  received.  One  man  kills  his  neighbor,  whom  he 
insanely  fancies  to  have  joined  a  conspiracy  to  defraud  him 
of  his  property  or  his  liberty ;  or  for  having  insulted  and 
exposed  him  to  scorn  arid  derision ;  or  for  standing  in  the 
way  of  his  attaining  certain  honors  or  estates ;  yet  the  in- 
sanity is  not  to  excuse  him,  unless  it  deprived  him  of  the 
consciousness,  that  he  was  doing  a  wrong  act.  The  exist- 
ence of  the  delusion  is  obvious  and  cannot  be  mistaken;  but 
what  may  be  the  views  of  the  maniac,  respecting  the  moral 
character  of  the  criminal  acts  which  he  commits  under  its 
influence,  can  never  be  exactly  known  ;  and,  therefore,  they 
ought  not  to  be  made  the  criterion  of  responsibility.  Even 
if  the  party  himself  acknowledge  that  he  knew  he  was  doing 
wrong,  the  very  fact  of  his  insanity  destroys  the  value  of  his 
confession  which  is  no  more  entitled  to  notice  than  his  most 
incoherent  ravings.  But  it  is  known,  that  one  of  the  most 
striking  and  characteristic  effects  of  insanity  on  the  mental 
operations  is,  to  destroy  the  relations  between  end  and 
means  —  between  the  object  in  view  and  the  course  neces- 
sary to  pursue  in  order  to  obtain  it  —  between,  as  in  the  cases 
just  instanced,  the  fancied  injury  and  the  measure  of  pun- 
ishment it  deserves.  It  was  in  accordance  with  these  views, 
that  Lord  Erskine  pronounced  delusion  to  be  the  true  test  of 
such  insanity  as  exempts  from  punishment,  and  that  the 
correctness  of  the  principle  was  recognized  by  the  Court. 
It  is  impossible,  therefore,  to  divine  why  Mr.  Alison  should 
say,  that  the  law  was  more  correctly  laid  down  in  Hadfield's 
case,  when  it  is  in  direct  conflict  with  his  own  opinions. 
Thus,  as  if  frightened  by  their  own  temerity  in  overthrowing 
one  ancient  landmark  on  the  domain  of  error,  it  would  seem 


36  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

as  if  'these'  writers  were  anxious  to  compound  with  their 
fears,  by  adhering  with  unusual  pertinacity  to  all  the  rest. 
The  radical  fault  of  this  test  of  responsibility  lies  in  the 
metaphysical  error  of  always  looking  on  right  and  wrong  in 
the  abstract,  —  as  things  having  a  positive  and  independent 
existence,  and  not  as  they  really  are,  mere  terms  expressing 
the  relations,  that  exist  between  actions  and  certain  faculties 
of  our  moral  nature.  That  they  express  the  same  relations 
in  nearly  all  men,  is  because  nearly -all  men  possess  the 
same  faculties;  but  when  these  faculties  are  absent,  as  in 
idiots,  or  when  their  action  is  perverted  by  disease,  as  in 
the  insane,  the  relations  of  right  arid  wrong  are  widely 
different. 

§  21.  Another  trait,  which  has  been  greatly  relied  on 
as  a  criterion  in  doubtful  cases?  is  the  design;  or  contrivance, 
that  has  been  manifested  in  the  commission  of  the  criminal 
act.  That  it  should  ever  have  been  viewed  in  this  light,  is 
an  additional  proof,  if  more  were  wanting,  of  the  deplorable 
ignorance,  that  characterizes  the  jurisprudence  of  insanity  ; 
for  the  slightest  practical  acquaintance  with  the  disease 
would  have  prevented  this  pernicious  mistake.  The  source 
of  this  error  is  probably  to  be  found  in  the  fact,  "  that, 
among  the  vulgar,  some  are  for  reckoning  madmen,  those 
only  who  are  frantic  or  violent  to  some  degree  ; "  *  the  vio- 
lence being  supposed  to  preclude  every  attempt  at  design, 
or  plan  of  operations.  In  the  trial  of  Bellingham,  ;the  attor- 
ney-general declared  that,  "  if  even  insanity  in  all  his  other 
acts  had  been  manifest,  yet  the  systematic  correctness^  with 
which  the  prisoner  contrived  the  murder,  showed  that  he 
possessed  a  mind,  at  the  time,  capable  of  distinguishing  right 
from  wrong."  2  In  Arnold's  case  (§  10),  great  stress  was 


1  Sir  John  Nicholl,  in  Dew  v.  Clark,  3  Addams's  Reports,  441. 
1  Collinson  on  Lunacy,  657. 


PRELIMINARY     VIEWS.  37 

laid  on  the  circumstances  of  his  having  purchased  shot  of  a 
much  larger  size,  than  he  usually  did  when  he  went  out  to 
shoot,  with  the  design  then  formed  of  committing  the  mur- 
der he  afterwards  attempted.  Mr.  Russell l  recognizes  the 
correctness  of  the  principle,  and  lays  it  down  as  part  of  the 
law  of  the  land.  If,  however,  the  power  of  design  is  really 
not  incompatible  with  the  existence  of  insanity,  this  pre- 
tended test  must  be  as  fallacious  as  that  already  adverted  to. 
What  must  be  thought  of  the  attainments  of  those  learned 
authorities,  in  the  study  of  madness,  who  see  in  the  power 
of  systematic  design  a  disproof  of  the  existence  of  insanity, 
when,  from  the  humblest  menial  in  the  service  of  a  lunatic 
asylum,  they  might  have  heard  of  the  ingenuity  of  contriv- 
ance and  adroitness  of  execution,  that  preeminently  charac- 
terize the  plans  of  the  insane  ?  If  the  mind  continues 
rational  on  some  subjects,  it  is  no  more  than  might  be  ex- 
pected, that  this  rationality  should  embrace  the  power  of 
design,  since  a  person  could  not  properly  be  called  rational 
on  any  point,  in  regard  to  which  he  had  lost  his  customary 
ability  to  form  his  plans  and  designs  for  the  future.  These 
views  are  abundantly  confirmed  by  every  day's  observation. 
The  sentiment  of  cunning,  too,  which  is  necessary  to  the 
successful  execution  of  one's  projects,  holds  but  a  low  place 
in  the  scale  of  the  mental  faculties  —  being  a  merely  ani- 
mal instinct  —  and  is  oftentimes  observed  to  be  rendered 
more  active  by  insanity,  so  as  to  require  the  utmost  vigi- 
lance to  detect  and  defeat  its  wiles.  One,  who  is  not  prac- 
tically acquainted  with  the  habits  of  the  insane,  can  scarcely 
conceive  of  the  cunning  which  they  will  practise,  when  bent 
on  accomplishing  a  favorite  object.  Those,  for  instance, 
whose  madness  takes  a  suicidal  direction,  are  known  to 
employ  wonderful  address,  in  procuring  and  concealing  the 


1  1  Russell,  on  Crimes  and  Misdemeanors,  13. 
4 


38  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

means  of  self-destruction  ;  pretending  to  have  seen  the  folly 
of  their  designs,  and  to  have  renounced  them  entirely, 
sending  away  their  keepers  after  thus  lulling  them  into 
security,  and,  when  least  expected,  renewing  their  suicidal 
attempts.  When  desirous  of  leaving  their  confinement  also, 
the  consummate  tact  with  which  they  will  set  suspicion  at 
rest,  the  forecast  with  which  they  make  their  preparations 
for  escape,  and  the  sagacity  with  which  they  choose  the 
time  and  place  of  action,  would  do  infinite  credit  to  the  con- 
ceptions of  the  most  sound  and  intelligent  minds,  Mr.  Has- 
lam  has  related  a  case  so  strikingly  illustrative  of  this  trait, 
that  it  is  well  worth  extracting  in  this  connexion.  An  Essex 
farmer,  after  having  so  well  counterfeited  recovery  as  to 
produce  his  liberation,  and  being  sent  back  again,  immedi- 
ately became  tranquil,  and  remonstrated  on  the  injustice  of 
his  confinement.  "  Having  once  deceived  me,  he  wished 
much,  that  my  opinion  should  be  taken  respecting  the  state 
of  his  intellects,  and  assured  his  friends  that  he  would  sub- 
mit to  my  determination.  I  had  taken  care  to  be  well  pre- 
pared for  this  interview,  by  obtaining  an  accurate  account 
of  the  manner  in  which  he  had  conducted  himself.  At  this 
examination,  he  managed  himself  with  admirable  address. 
He  spoke  of  the  treatment  he  had  received,  from  the  per- 
sons under  whose  care  he  was  then  placed,  as  most  kind 
and  fatherly  :  he  also  expressed  himself  as  particularly 
fortunate  in  being  under  my  care,  and  bestowed  many 
handsome  compliments  on  my  skill  in  treating  this  disorder, 
and  expatiated  on  my  sagacity  in  perceiving  the  slightest 
tinges  of  insanity.  When  I  wished  him  to  explain  certain 
parts  of  his  conduct,  and  particularly  some  extravagant 
opinions,  respecting  certain  persons  and  circumstances,  he 
disclaimed  all  knowledge  of  such  circumstances,  and  felt 
himself  hurt  that  my  mind  should  have  been  poisoned  so 
much  to  his  prejudice.  He  displayed  equal  subtlety  on 
three  other  occasions,  when  I  visited  him  ;  although,  by 
* 


PRELIMINARY     VIEWS.  39 

protracting  the  conversation,  he  let  fall  sufficient  to  satisfy 
my  mind  that  he  was  a  madman.  In  a  short  time  he  was 
removed  to  the  hospital,  where  he  expressed  great  satis- 
faction in  being  under  my  inspection.  The  private  mad- 
house, which  he  had  formerly  so  much  commended,  now 
became  the  subject  of  severe  animadversion  ;  he  said  that 
he  had  there  been  treated  with  extreme  cruelty  ;  that  he 
had  been  nearly  starved,  and  eaten  up  by  vermin  of  various 
descriptions.  On  inquiring  of  some  convalescent  patients, 
I  found  (as  I  had  suspected)  that  I  was  as  much  the  subject 
of  abuse,  when  absent,  as  any  of  his  supposed  enemies, 
although  to  my  face,  he  was  courteous  and  respectful. 
More  than  a  month  had  elapsed  since  his  admission  into  the 
hospital,  before  he  pressed  me  for  my  opinion  ;  probably 
confiding  in  his  address  and  hoping  to  deceive  <he.  At 
length  he  appealed  to  my  decision,  and  urged  the  correct- 
ness of  his  conduct  during  confinement,  as  an  argument  for 
his  liberation.  But,  when  I  informed  him  of  circumstances 
he  supposed  me  unacquainted  with,  and  assured  him,  that 
he  was  a  proper  subject  for  the  asylum  which  he  then  in- 
habited, he  suddenly  poured  forth  a  torrent  of  abuse  ; 
talked  in  the  most  incoherent  manner ;  insisted  on  the  truth 
of  what  he  formerly  denied  ;  breathed  vengeance  against 
his  family  and  friends  ;  and  became  so  outrageous  that  it 
was  necessary  to  order  him  to  be  strictly  confined.  He 
continued  in  a  state  of  unceasing  fury  for  more  than  fifteen 
months."  :  Even  the  purely  intellectual  power  of  com- 
bining a  series  of  acts  that  shall  accomplish  or  eventuate  in 
certain  results,  when  properly  carried  into  execution,  seems 
to  be  not  only  less  frequently  involved  in  the  mental  de- 
rangement, but  often  to  have  received  a  preternatural 
degree  of  strength  and  activity.  Pinel  speaks  of  a  maniac, 
who  endeavored  to  discover  the  perpetual  motion,  and,  in 

1  Observations  on  Madness,  53. 


40  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

the  course  of  his  attempts,  constructed  some  very  curious 
machines.  Esquirol  has  given  the  case  of  a  mad  general, 
who,  though  laboring  under  great  mental  excitement  and 
disorder,  conceived  of  an  improvement  in  the  construction 
of  a  military  weapon,  and  made  a  drawing  of  the  same. 
Having  expressed  a  desire  to  have  a  model  of  it  cast,  and 
given  his  word  of  honor  that  he  would  go  only  to  the  found- 
er's and  return  peaceably,  he  was  permitted  to  go.  He 
went  on  foot  to  the  founder's,  gave  him  the  drawing,  re- 
quested him  to  cast  a  model  of  it,  and  passed  an  hour  in  the 
shop,  without  the  founder's  once  suspecting  that  he  was 
dealing  with  a  maniac.  On  leaving,  he  remarked  that  he 
would  return  in  eight  days,  as  he  did,  although  a  period  of 
great  excitement  intervened  during  that  time.  On  the 
second  *visit,  he  found  the  model  executed,  and  gave  an 
order  for  fifty  thousand  to  be  cast,  which  was  the  only  cir- 
cumstance that  led  the  founder  to  suspect  the  general's 
disease.  It  is  observed  lhat  the  weapon  thus  improved  was 
subsequently  adopted  in  the  army.1  The  plans,  which  the 
brain  of  a  maniac,  who  imagines  himself  a  monarch,  is  per- 
petually hatching  for  the  management  of  his  kingdom,  will 
bear  to  be  compared  with  the  political  schemes  of  some 
rulers  who  are  supposed  to  have  the  advantage  of  sanity 
on  their  side. 

§  22.  If  then,  the  knowledge  of  good  and  evil,  of  right 
and  wrong,  and  the  power  of  design,  are  to  be  considered 
as  fallacious  tests  of  responsibility,  notwithstanding  they 
have  proved  the  death-warrant  of  many  a  wretched  maniac, 
let  us  come  back  to  that  proposed  by  Erskine  —  delusion  — 
and  see  if  that  will  bear  a  more  rigid  scrutiny,  when  viewed 
by  the  light  of  modern  discovery.2  Now,  if  it  were  a  fact, 


1  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  II.  190. 

8  The  use  of  this  test  of  irresponsible  insanity  has  been  sanctioned 
by  the  high  authority  of  Sir  John  Nicholl,  in  the  case  of  Dew  v. 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS.  41 

that  the  reason,  or,  to  speak  more  definitely,  the  intellectual 
powers,  are  exclusively  liable  to  derangement,  this  test 
would  be  unobjectionable,  and  would  furnish  an  easy  and 
satisfactory  clew  to  the  elucidation  of  doubtful  cases.1  But 
it  must  not  be  forgotten,  that  the  author  of  our  being  has 
also  endowed  us  with  certain  moral  faculties,  comprising 


Clark,  3  Addams,  79.  "  The  true  criterion,"  says  he,  "  the  true 
test,  of  the  absence  or  presence  of  insanity,  I  take  to  be  the  absence 
or  presence  of  what,  used  in  a  certain  sense  of  it,  is  comprisable  in 
a  single  term,  namely  —  delusion."  "  In  short  I  look  upon  delusion 
in  this  sense  of  it,  and  insanity  to  be,  almost  if  not  altogether,  con- 
vertible terms."  "  On  the  contrary,  in  the  absence  of  any  such 
delusion,  with  whatever  extravagances  a  supposed  lunatic  may  be 
justly  chargeable,  and  how  like  soever  to  a  real  madman  he  may 
either  think  or  act  on  some  one,  or  on  all  subjects  ;  still,  in  the 
absence,  I  repeat,  of  anything  in  the  nature  of  delusion,  so  under- 
stood as  above,  the  supposed  lunatic  is  in  my  judgment,  not  proper- 
ly, or  essentially  insane." 

1  Even  Mr.  Erskine  himself  has  furnished  an  exception  to  his 
own  rule,  in  a  case  he  has  related  of  a  young  woman  indicted  for 
murder,  who  was  acquitted  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  though  it  was 
not  pretended  that  she  labored  under  any  delusion  whatever.  "  It 
must  be  a  consolation,"  he  says, "  to  those  who  prosecuted  her,  that 
she  was  acquitted,  as  she  is  at  this  time  in  a  most  undoubted  and 
deplorable  state  of  insanity  ;  but  I  confess,  if  I  had  been  upon  the 
jury  who  tried  her,  I  should  have  entertained  great  doubts  and 
difficulties  ;  for,  although  this  unhappy  woman  had  before  exhibited 
strong  marks  of  insanity  arising  from  grief  and  disappointment  ;  yet 
she  acted  upon  facts  and  circumstances,  which  had  an  existence,- 
and  which  were  calculated,  upon  the  ordinary  principles  of  human 
action,  to  produce  the  most  violent  resentment.  Mr.  Errington 
having  just  cast  her  off,  and  married  another  woman,  or  taken  her 
under  his  protection,  her  jealousy  was  excited  to  such  a  pitch,  as 
occasionally  to  overpower  her  understanding ;  but  when  she  went 
to  Mr.  Errington's  house  where  she  shot  him,  she  went  with  the 
express  and  deliberate  purpose  of  shooting  him."  "  She  did  not 
act  under  a  delusion,  that  he  had  deserted  her  when  he  had  not, 
but  took  revenge  upon  him  for  an  actual  desertion."  Erskine's 
Speeches. 


42  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

the  various  sentiments,  propensities  and  affections,  which, 
like  the  intellect,  being  connected  with  the  brain,  are  neces- 
sarily affected  by  pathological  actions  in  that  organism. 
The  abnormal  condition  thus  produced  may  exert  an  astonish- 
ing influence  on  the  conduct,  changing  the  peaceable  and 
retiring  individual  into  a  demon  of  fury,  or,  at  the  least, 
turning  him  from  the  calm  and  quiet  of  his  lawful  and  inno- 
cent occupations,  into  a  career  of  shameless  dissipation  and 
debauchery,  while  the  intellectual  perceptions  seem  to  have 
lost  none  of  their  ordinary  soundness  and  vigor.  The 
existence  of  this  form  of  insanity  is  now  too  well  established, 
to  be  questioned  by  those  who  have  any  scientific  reputation 
to  lose  ;  and  though  the  proofs  of  this  will  be  furnished  in 
their  proper  place,  it  will,  for  the  present,  be  supposed  that 
the  assent  of  the  reader  has  been  obtained  without  them. 
In  this,  the  most  deplorable  condition,  to  which  a  human 
being  can  be  reduced,  where  the  wretched  patient  finds 
himself  urged,  perhaps,  to  the  commission  of  every  outrage, 
and  though  perfectly  conscious  of  what  he  is  doing,  unable 
to  offer  the  slightest  resistance  to  the  overwhelming  power 
that  impels  him,  the  responsibility  is  to  be  considered  as  not 
affected,  because  no  delusion  is  present  to  disturb  and  dis- 
tort the  mental  vision  !  In  short,  the  very  character,  that 
renders  this  mental  disorder  more  terrible  than  all  others,  is 
also  that  which  is  made  to  steel  the  heart  against  the  claims 
of  humanity  in  behalf  of  its  miserable  victim. 
^  §  23.  The  doctrine  of  moral  insanity  has  been  as  yet 
unfavorably  received  by  judicial  authorities,  not  certainly 
for  want  of  sufficient  facts  to  support  it,  but  probably  from 
that  common  tendency  of  the  mind,  to  resist  innovations 
upon  old  and  generally  received  views.  If,  a  quarter  of  a 
century  ago,  one  of  the  highest  law-officers  of  Great  Britain 
pronounced  the  manifestation  of  "  systematic  correctness  " 
of  an  action,  to  be  a  proof  of  sanity  sufficient  to  render  all 
others  unnecessary,  it  is  not  surprising,  that  the  idea  of 


PRELIMINARY  VIEWS.  43 

moral  insanity  has  been  considered  by  the  legal  profession,  as 
having  sprung  from  the  teeming  brains  of  medical  theorists. 
In  the  fulness  of  this  spirit,  Mr.  Chitty  declares,  that, 
"  unless  a  jury  should  be  satisfied  that  the  mental  faculties 
have  been  perverted,  or,  at  least,  the  faculties  of  reason  and 
judgment,  it  is  believed,  that  the  party  subject  to  such  a 
moral  insanity,  as  it  is  termed,  would  not  be  protected  from 
criminal  punishment;"1  and,  in  the  trial  of  Howison  for 
the  murder  of  the  widow  Geddes,  at  King's  Cramond,  Scot- 
land, two  or  three  years  since,  moral  insanity  which  was 
pleaded  in  his  defence,  was  declared  by  the  court  to  be  a 
"  groundless  theory."  2  Such  opinions,  from  quarters  where 
a  modest  teachableness  would  have  been  more  becoming 
than  an  arrogant  contempt  for  the  results  of  other  men's 
inquiries,  involuntarily  suggest  to  the  mind  a  comparison  of 
their  authors  with  the  saintly  persecutors  of  Galileo,  who 
resolved  by  solemn  statutes,  that  nature  always  had  operated 
and  always  should  operate  in  accordance  with  their  views 
of  propriety  and  truth. 

§  24.  It  appears  then,  that  as  a  test  of  responsibility, 
delusion  is  no  better  than  those  before  mentioned.  The 
truth  is,  there  is  no  single  character .  which  is  not  equally 
liable  to  objection.  Jurists  who  have  been  so  anxious  to 
obtain  some  definition  of  insanity,  which  shall  furnish  a 
rule  for  the  determination  of  responsibility,  should  under- 
stand, that  such  a  wish  is  chimerical  from  the  very  nature 
of  things.  Insanity  is  a  disease,  and,  as  is  the  case  with  all 
other  diseases,  the  fact  of  its  existence  is  never  established 
by  a  single  diagnostic  symptom,  but  by  the  whole  body  of 
symptoms,  no  particular  one  of  which  is  present  in  every 
case.  To  distinguish  the  manifestations  of  health  from 


1  1  Chitty,  Medical  Jurisprudence,  352. 

*  Simpson   on  Homicidal   Insanity,  in   a   Treatise  on  Popular 
Education.     Boston,  1834. 


44  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

those  of  disease  requires  the  exercise  of  special  learning 
and  judgment ;  and,  if  no  one  doubts  this  proposition, 
when  stated  in  reference  to  the  bowels,  the  lungs,  the 
heart,  the  liver,  the  kidneys,  &c.,  what  sufficient  or  even 
plausible  reason  is  there,  why  it  should  be  doubted  when 
predicated  of  the  brain  ?  The  functions  of  those  organs 
proceed  with  the  regularity  and  sameness  of  clock-work, 
compared  with  the  ever-varying  and  unequal  phenomena  of 
this  ;  and  yet  there  are  persons,  who  assume  a  magisterial 
tone  in  writing  or  talking  of  the  latter,  who  would  defer  to 
a  tyro's  judgment,  in  whatever  concerns  the  others.  If, 
when  anxious  to  know  all  we  can,  respecting  a  disease  of 
the  lungs  or  stomach,  we  repair  to  those  who  have  a  high 
and  well-founded  reputation,  in  the  pathology  of  these  parts, 
why  adopt  the  converse  of  this  rule  in  regard  to  diseases  of 
the  brain  ?  No  reasonable  person  would  desire  to  set  up  an 
insuperable  barrier,  between  the  domain  of  professional 
knowledge  and  that  of  common  sense  and  common  infor- 
mation ;  but,  it  is  not  too  much  to  insist,  that  facts  estab- 
lished by  men  of  undoubted  competence  and  good  faith, 
should  be  rejected  for  better  reasons  than  the  charge  of 
"  groundless  theory." 

§  25.  In  the  passage  taken  from  Lord  Hale  (§  8),  it  will 
be  observed,  that  he  considers  all  crime  to  be  the  offspring 
of  partial  insanity,  and  the  inference  he  meant  should  be 
drawn  from  it  is,  that  partial  insanity  furnishes  no  excuse 
for  crime.  It  is  a  curious  fact,  that  many  benevolent  people, 
in  their  desire  to  palliate  the  sins  of  criminals,  have  incul- 
cated the  same  principle,  for  the  purpose  of  drawing  from 
it  a  very  different  inference.  Says  the  former  :  crime  must 
be  punished  ;  but  all  crime  proceeds  from  madness,  there- 
fore madness  furnishes  no  exemption  from  punishment.  Say 
the  latter :  madmen  are  not  responsible  for  their  criminal 
acts  ;  but  madness  is  the  source  of  all  crime,  therefore  mad- 
men and  criminals  are  equally  irresponsible  and  exempt 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS.  45 

from  punishment.  Which  of  these  two  precious  specimens 
of  human  subtlety  can  claim  the  triumph  of  absurdity,  it 
would  not  be  easy  to  determine.  Crime  is  not  necessarily 
the  result  of  madness,  not  even  when  perpetrated  under  the 
excitement  of  fierce  and  violent  passions  ;  in  the  true  sense 
of  the  word,  it  is  never  so,  but  is  always  actuated  by  mo- 
tives ;  insufficient  it  may  be,  but  still  rational  motives,  hav- 
ing reference  to  definite  and  real  objects.  The  misfortune 
which  the  criminal  is  going  to  avert,  the  interest  which  he 
is  going  to  subserve,  the  revenge  he  is  about  to  gratify,  the 
insult  or  injury  he  is  about  to  repay,  are  real  injuries  and 
insults  and  interests,  however  much  they  may  be  exagger- 
ated, or  however  disproportionately  small  they  may  be  to 
the  crime  they  provoke  ;  and,  the  ends  to  be  obtained  by 
the  criminal  act,  are  real  and  have  an  appreciable  value. 
In  the  -most  violent  transports  of  passion,  he  never  wholly 
loses  his  knowledge  of  the  true  relations  of  things.  The 
person  whom  he  considers  his  enemy,  or  the  author  of  the 
insult,  is  really  such,  or  at  least,  he  has  some  ground  for 
believing  him  such  ;  and,  with  the  absence  of  the  object  of 
his  passion,  disappears  the  intention  to  offend.  Violent  pas- 
sions may  weaken  the  judgment,  and  diminish  its  power  of 
control,  but  they  do  not  vitiate  the  perceptions,  nor  deprive 
the  mind  of  its  powers  of  comparison.  All  this  is  very 
different  in  mental  derangement.  The  causes,  which  urge 
the  insane  to  deeds  of  violence,  are  generally  illusory  —  the 
hallucinations  of  a  diseased  brain  —  or  they  may  act  from 
no  motive  at  all,  solely  in  obedience  to  a  blind  impulse,  with 
no  end  to  obtain,  nor  wish  to  gratify.  Madness  too  is  more 
or  less  independent  of  the  exciting  causes,  that  have  given 
rise  to  it,  and  exists  long  after  those  causes  have  been  re- 
moved, and  after  the  paramount  wish  or  object  has  been 
obtained.  In  short,  madness  is  the  result  of  a  certain  pa- 
thological condition  of  the  brain,  while  the  criminal  effects 
of  violent  passions  merely  indicate  unusual  strength  of  those 


46  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

passions,  or  a  deficient  education  of  those  higher  faculties, 
that  furnish  the  necessary  restraint  upon  their  power.     It  is 
admitted,  that  strong  passions  do  deprive  the  individual  of 
the  power  of  calmly  deliberating,  and  perceiving  the  terri- 
ble consequences  of  his  fury  ;  and   legislators  have  wisely 
distinguished  homicide  committed  under  their  influence  from 
deliberate,  premeditated  homicide,  by  visiting  it  with  a  mi- 
nor degree  of  punishment.    In  drunkenness  the  same  effect 
is  sometimes  produced  to  such  a  degree  as  to  amount  to  tem- 
porary insanity  ;  but  neither  does  this  any  more  than  strong 
passions  exempt  from  all  punishment ;  for  the  plain  reason, 
that,  in  both  cases,  the  impairment  of  moral  liberty  is  the  vol- 
untary act  of  the  individual  himself  and  must  be  imputed  to 
him  as  a  fault.     If  the  remarks  on  this  point  may  seem  to 
be  unnecessarily  prolix,  it  can  only  be  observed,  by  way  of 
excuse,  that  where  opinions  are  handed  down,  as  they  are 
in  law,  from  one  generation  to  another,  they  attain  much  the 
same  kind  of  value  that  is  possessed  by  established  facts  in 
natural  science,  and  exert  an  influence  that  demands  for 
them  a  degree  of  consideration  which  their  intrinsic  merits 
do  not  deserve. 

§  26.  Enough  has  been  said,  it  is  believed,  to  convince 
every  unprejudiced  reader,  that,  in  Great  Britain,  the  law 
of  insanity,  especially  that  relative  to  criminal  cases,  is  still 
loose,  vacillating,  and  greatly  behind  the  present  state  of  our 
knowledge  of  that  disease.  If  we  carefully  examine  the 
cases  tried  within  the  last  hundred  years,  as  they  are  brought 
together  in  the  various  treatises  on  lunacy  and  on  criminal 
law,  the  utmost  respect  for  authority  will  not  prevent  us 
from  observing  the  want  of  any  definite  principle  as  the 
ground  of  the  difference  of  their  results.  Amid  the  mass 
of  theoretical  and  discordant  speculations  on  the  psycho- 
logical effects  of  insanity,  and  of  crude  and  fanciful  tests 
for  detecting  its  presence,  which  these  trials  have  elicited, 
the  student  who  turns  to  them  for  the  purpose  of  informing 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  47 

his  mind  on  this  branch  of  his  profession,  finds  himself  com- 
pletely disheartened  and  bewildered.     Instead  of  inquiring 
into  the  effect  produced  by  the  peculiar  delusions  of  the 
accused  on  his  ordinary  conduct  and   conversation,  and  es- 
pecially of  their  connexion  with  the  criminal  act  in  question, 
the  courts  in  these  cases,  have  been  contented  with  laying 
down  /metaphysical  dogmas  on   the  consciousness  of  right 
and   wrong,  of  good  and  evil,  and   the  measure  of  under- 
standing still  possessed  by  the  accused.    One  principle  after 
another  has  been  successively  abandoned  and  resumed  either 
with  the  strangest  disregard  of  consistency,  or  the  most  ex- 
traordinary ignorance  of  previous  decisions.     Thus,  the  old 
maxim  that  insanity  does  not  annul  criminal   responsibility 
in  one  who  retains  the   power  of  distinguishing  right   from 
wrong,  was  abandoned  in  the  case  of  Hadtield,  reaffirmed 
in  that  of  Bellingham,  (§  15),  again  abandoned   in  the  trial 
of  Martin,1  subsequently  modified  by  Lord  Lyndhurst  (§  19) 
and  again,  in  the  year  1837,  a  jury,  holding  in  their  hands 
the  life  of  a  fellow-man,  are  told  by  Mr.  justice  Park,  that, 
as  regards  the  effect  of  insanity  on  responsibility  for  crime, 
"  it  is  merely  necessary  that  the  party  should  have  sufficient 
knowledge  and   reason  to  discriminate   between   right,  and 
wrong"  2     Three  years  afterwards,  on  the   trial  of  Oxford 
for  shooting  at  the  Queen,  lord  chief  justice  Denman  told 
the  jury,  "that  the  question  for  them  to  decide  was,  whether 
the   prisoner  was  laboring   under  that  species  of  insanity 
which  satisfied  them  that  he  was  quite  unaware  of  the  na- 
ture, character,  and  consequences  of  the  act  he  was  commit- 
ting, or  in  other  words  whether  he  was  under  the  influence 
of  a  diseased  mind,  and  was  really  unconscious  at  the  time 

1  Report  of  the  trial  of  Jonathan  Martin  for  setting  fire  to   the 
York  Minster. 

2  Trial  of  Greensmith,  noticed  in  Medico.  Chirurg.  Review,  v.  28. 

p.  86,  N.  S. 


48  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

he  was  committing  the  act,  that  it  was  a  crime."1  On  the 
trial  of  McNaughton  for  killing  Mr.  Drummond,  in  1843, 
lord  chief  justice  Tindal  instructed  the  jury  that  before  con- 
victing him  they  must  be  satisfied  that,  when  committing  the 
criminal  act,  he  had  not  that  competent  use  of  his  under- 
standing as  that  he  knew  he  was  doing  a  wicked  and  wrong 
thing  —  that  he  was  sensible  it  was  a  violation  of  i\\e  law 
of  God  and  man.2  Soon  after  the  trial  of  McNaughton, 
who  was  acquitted,  the  English  house  of  lords  propounded 
certain  questions  relative  to  the  responsibility  of  the  insane, 
to  the  judges  of  the  law-courts,  and  their  reply  was  meant, 
no  doubt,  to  be  considered  as  the  law  of  the  land  by  which 
all  future  practice  is  to  be  regulated.  They  say,  that  to 
render  the  party  irresponsible  "  it  must  be  clearly  proved, 
that  at  the  time  of  committing  the  act,  the  party  accused 
was  laboring  under  such  a  defect  of  reason  from  disease  of 
the  mind,  as  not  to  know  the  nature  and  quality  of  the  act 
he  was  doing,  or  if  he  did  know  it,  that  he  did  not  know  he 
was  doing  what  was  wrong."  How  this  question  is  to  be  set- 
tled, and  what  is  to  be  done  with  those  cases  where  it  is 
impossible  to  ascertain  the  views  of  the  party  touching  the 
moral  quality  of  his  actSj  we  are  not  told. 

§  27,  Criminal  trials,  in  which  insanity  is  pleaded  in  de- 
fence, have  been  generally  so  little  known  beyond  the  place  of 
their  occurrence,  that  it  is  difficult  to  ascertain  on  what  par- 
ticular principles  of  the  common  law,  the  decisions  of  Ameri- 
can courts  have  been  founded,  though  from  all  that  can  be 
gathered,  it  appears  that  their  practice,  like  that  of  the  British, 
has  been  diverse  and  fluctuating.  In  the  trial  of  Lawrence, at 
Washington,  in  1835,  for  shooting  at  president  Jackson,  the 
jury  were  advised  by  the  court  to  regulate  their  verdict  by  the 


1  9  Carrington  &  Paine,  525. 

2  St.  James's  Chronicle,  March  7,  1843. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  49 

principles  laid  down  in  the  case  of  Hadfield,  which  had  been 
stated  to  them  by  the  district-attorney.1  In  the  case  of  The- 
odore Wilson,  tried  in  York  county,  Maine,  in  1836,  for  the 
murder  of  his  wife  in  a  paroxysm  of  insanity,  the  court 
charged  the  jury  that  if  they  were  satisfied  the  prisoner  was 
not  of  sound  memory  and  discretion  at  the  time  of  commit- 
ting the- act,  they  were  bound  to  return  a  verdict  of  acquit- 
tal. This  is  all  that  could  be  wished  ;  and  considering  that 
two  highly  respectable  physicians  had  given  their  opinion  in 
evidence  that  the  prisoner  had  some  consciousness  of  right 
and  wrong,  and  that  the  attorney-general,  though  he  ad- 
mitted the  existence  of  insanity  in  some  degree,  denied  that 
it  was  of  sufficient  extent  to  exempt  him  fr^om  punishment, 
supporting  his  assertion  on  the  authority  of  the  leading 
English  cases  relating  to  insanity,  this  decision  indicates  an 
advance  in  the  criminal  jurisprudence  of  insanity  that  does 
credit  to  the  humanity  and  intelligence  of  that  court.  In 
the  trial  of  Cory,  for  murdering  Mrs.  Nash,  in  New  Hamp- 
shire, 1829,  the  court,  chief  justice  Richardson,  stated  in  his 
charge  to  the  jury  that  the  only  question  for  them  to 
settle  was,  whether  he  was  of  sane  mind  when  the  deed 
was  done  ?  The  same  language  was  used  by  the  same 
court  on  the  trial  of  Prescott,  for  the  murder  of  Mrs.  Coch- 
ran,  in  1834.  On  the  trial  of  Rogers,  in  July,  1843,  for  the 
murder  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  in  the  State  Prison  of  Massachu- 
setts, the  court,  chief  justice  Shaw,  charged  the  jury,  that 
insanity  or  delusion  is  an  excuse  for  crime,  in  two  ways  ; 
first,  where  it  amounts  to  a  firm  belief  that  one  is  liable  to 
lose  his  own  life,  or  suffer  some  great  bodily  harm  ;  secondly, 
where  some  violent  outbreak  occurs  which,  taken  in  con- 
nexion with  former  acts,  indicates  that  the  will  was  over- 

1  Niles's  Register,  vol.  48,  p.  119.   The  principle  adopted  in  Had- 
field's  case  was,  that  a  person  is  not  responsible  for  whatever  crim- 
inal act  is  committed  under  the  influence  of  delusion. 
5 


50  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

borne.  The  questions  for  them  to  decide  were,  whether 
such  a  delusion  existed  in  the  mind  of  the  accused  ;  whether 
he  did  the  act  under  an  insane  but  firm  belief  that  the  de- 
ceased was  going  to  shut  him  up  with  some  dangerous  de- 
sign, or  not  for  a  slight  punishment ;  whether  the  facts  indi- 
cate that  the  deed  was  done  at  a  moment  when  the  delusion 
was  uncontrollable.1  On  the  trial  of  Abbot,  for  killing  his 
wife,  in  1841,  by  the  superior  court  of  Connecticut,  the  jury 
was  instructed  to  acquit  the  prisoner,  "  if  they  found  that, 
at  the  time  of  committing  the  act,  he  was  insane  —  had  not 
sufficient  understanding  to  distinguish  right  from  wrong,  and 
did  not  know  that  the  murder  of  his  wife  was  an  offence 
against  the  laws  of  God  and  nature."  *  Similar  language 
was  used  by  the  court  on  the  trial  of  Mercer  for  the  murder 
of  Heberton,  in  New  Jersey,  April  1843.3 

§  28.  The  frequency  with  which  insanity  is  pleaded  in  de- 
fence of  crime,  the  magnitude  of  its  consequences  to  the  par- 
ties concerned,  and  the  perplexity  in  which  the  discussions  it 
occasions  involve  the  minds  of  judges  and  jurors,  are  ample 
reasons  why  the  law  relative  to  insanity  should  be  simple  and 
easily  understood  —  a  result  that  can  only  be  obtained  by  di- 
rect legislative  enactments.  It  is  time  for  the  legislature  to 
determine  what,  amid  the  mass  of  conflicting  opinions  on  this 
subject,  shall  be  the  law  of  the  land  ;  and  thus  no  longer  per- 
mit the  lives  and  liberties  of  people  to  be  suspended  on  the 
dicta  of  men,  whose  knowledge  of  insanity  was  exceedingly 
imperfect,  and  which  have  not  even  the  merit  of  uniformity 
and  consistency.  It  may  be  well,  therefore,  to  see  what  has 
been  the  legislation  of  various  enlightened  nations,  in  refer- 
ence to  this  subject,  inasmuch  as  it  may  furnish  valuable 

1  MS.  notes  of  prisoner's  counsel,  George  Bemis,  Esq. 

2  MS.  notes  of  Hon.  H.  M.  Waite,  one  of  the  court,  kindly  fur- 
nished the  author. 

3  Dollar  Newspaper,  April  5,  1843. 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS.  51 

hints  for  our  own.  In  some,  the  legislator  has  been  con- 
tented with  indicating,  by  some  popular,  general  phrase,  that 
condition  of  mind  which  the  judge  may  consider  as  freeing 
from  responsibility.  The  Bavarian  code  (1813)  follows  this 
course,  as  well  as  the  code  of  Basle,  promulgated  in  1835. 
In  the  latter,  we  find  the  following  words  :  —  "  Minors,  and 
those  laboring  under  general  mania,  or  hallucination,  cannot 
be  punished  as  criminals,  nor  generally  speaking,  can  any 
others  be  punished,  who  have  committed  a  crime  while  de- 
prived of  the  use  of  their  minds."  Art.  2.  Very  nearly  the 
same  language  is  used,  in  describing  such  as  are  exempted 
from  punishment  by  reason  of  mental  disorders,  in  the  code 
of  Turin,  (1835)  Art.  63,  and  in  the  proposed  Hanoverian 
code,  Art.  83.  In  other  codes,  general  terms  alone  are 
used,  in  describing  the  mental  condition  of  such  as  are  irre- 
sponsible. Thus,  in  the  Saxon  code,  we  find  these  words  : 
—  "Responsibility  is  annulled  in  persons  who  are  deprived 
of  the  use  of  reason  by  mental  disease."  Art.  65.  It  is  a 
sufficient  objection  to  such  enactments  that  in  any  particular 
trial,  no  two  persons  could  be  found  to  agree  respecting  the 
practical  application  of  such  terms  as,  deprived  of  the  use 
of  reason,  bereft  of  understanding^  &c. ;  and  how  many 
judges  and  juries  would  see,  in  the  unfortunate  monomaniac 
before  them, —  who,  though  stained  with  the  blood  of  a  fel- 
low-man whom  some  wild  delusion  had  prompted  him  to  kill, 
is  still  correct  and  coherent  in  his  discourse,  staid  and  dig- 
nified in  his  demeanor,  ready  and  shrewd  in  his  replies, — 
a  being  deprived  of  the  use  of  his  reason,  or  bereft  of  his 
understanding  ?  We  have  seen  too  often  the  deplorable 
failure  of  such  general  terms  to  protect  the  miserable  sub- 
jects of  disease,  under  the  operation  of  the  English  common 
law,  to  recommend  their  use  to  the  legislator.  In  some 
codes  an  attempt  is  made  to  avoid  this  objection  to  general 
terms,  by  mentioning  various  mental  diseases  as  illustrations 


0/3  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

of  the  meaning  they  are  to  convey.1  Thus,  the  proposed 
Wurtemberg  code  contains  the  following  provision  :  —  "An 
illegal  act  is  exempt  from  punishment,  if  committed  in  a 
state  of  mind  in  which  the  use  of  reason  is  taken  away  ; 
to  this  state  belong,  chiefly,  general  mania,  general  and  par- 
tial hallucination,  entire  imbecility,  and  complete  confusion 
of  the  senses,  or  understanding."  Art.  91.  In  the  code  of 
the  grand  duchy  of  Hesse,  proposed  in  1836,  we  find  the 
following  provision  :  —  "  By  reason  of  their  impaired  respon- 
sibility, punishment  cannot  be  inflicted  on  those  who  commit 
penal  acts  in  a  state  of  sleep,  of  somnambulism,  of  general 
mania,  of  hallucination,  of  imbecility,  or  of  any  other  men- 
'tal  disorder,  which  either  takes  away  all  consciousness  re- 
specting the  act  generally  and  its  relation  to  penal  law,  or 
in  conjunction  with  some  peculiar  bodily  condition,  irresist- 
ibly impels  him,  while  completely  unconscious,  to  violent 
acts."  Art.  29.  In  the  code  of  the  grand  duchy  of  Baden, 
it  is  enacted  as  follows  :  —  "  Responsibility  is  annulled  in 
that  condition,  in  which,  either  a  consciousness  of  the  crim- 
inality of  the  offence,  or  the  free  will  of  the  offender  is 
taken  away."  Art.  65.  "To  the  condition  which  annuls 
responsibility  on  the  strength  of  the  65th  Art.  belong 
chiefly,  imbecility,  hallucination,  general  mania,  distraction, 
and  complete  confusion  of  the  senses,  or  understanding." 
Art.  69.  Somewhat  similar  is  the  phraseology  used  by  the 
code  of  Lucerne,  in  Switzerland.  This  method  is  liable  to 
precisely  the  same  objection  as  the  former,  for  the  difficulty 
will  be  as  great  in  the  one  as  in  the  other,  of  settling  the 
exact  meaning  of  the  particular  terms.  Many  a  case  will 
occur,  that  will  not  be  unanimously  referred  to  some  one  of 
the  above-mentioned  affections.  To  avoid  the  difficulties 


1  J.    C.   Mittermaier  :    De   principio   imputationis   alienationum 
mentis,  p.  24. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  53 

incumbent  on  the  use  of  such  terms,  and  to  bring  the 
wretched  subjects  of  mental  disease  under  the  protection  of 
the  law,  without  discrimination,  the  legislator  has,  in  some 
instances,  made  the  single  fact  of  the  presence  of  disease, 
sufficient  to  annul  criminal  responsibility.  In  Livingston's 
code,  it  is  provided  that  —  "  No  act  done  by  a  person  in  a 
state  of  insanity  can  be  punished  as  an  offence."  The 
revised  statutes  of  the  state  of  New  York  contain  the  same 
words.1  The  revised  statutes  of  Arkansas  provide  that  a 
lunatic,  or  insane  person,  without  lucid  intervals,  shall  not 
be  found  guilty  of  any  crime  or  misdemeanor  with  which 
he  may  be  charged.2  The  French  penal  code  is  equally 
simple.  "  There  can  be  no  crime  nor  offence,  if  the  ac- 
cused were  in  a  state  of  madness  at  the  time  ofc  the  act."3 
If  we  insert,  after  the  word  insanity,  the  following  words, 
or  any  other  condition  of  mind  in  which  the  person  is 
involuntarily  deprived  of  the  consciousness  of  the  true  na- 
ture of  his  acts,  in  order  to  protect  him  from  the  conse- 
quences of  acts  committed  in  a  state  of  sleep  or  somnambu- 
lism, it  may  be  doubted  whether  any  other  provision  would 
better  promote  the  purposes  of  justice,  than  that  of  Living- 
ston's code.  Under  this  law,  when  strictly  applied,  if  the 
existence  of  insanity  is  once  established,  the  responsibility 
of  the  party  is  taken  away  ;  and  all  nice  discussions  con- 
cerning the  effect  of  this  or  that  kind  or  degree  of  mental 
derangement,  and  the  exact  measure  of  reason  that  has  been 
left  or  taken  away,  are  thus  effectually  precluded.  It  can- 
not be  denied  that  an  insane  person  may  be  actually  guilty 
of  a  criminal  act,  his  insanity  being  very  partial,  and  the 
act  not  within  the  range  of  its  operation,  while  by  the  letter 
of  the  law,  he  must  be  acquitted.  The  only  way  of  avoid- 


1  Vol  II.  p.  697.  9.  Revised  Statutes  of  Arkansas,  236. 

3  Art.  64. 

5« 


54  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

ing  this  evil,  would  be  to  add  something  like  the  following ; 
— provided,  it-  cannot  be  proved  that  the  act  was  not  the  off- 
spring of  the  insanity.  True,  the  fact  of  insanity  would 
be  left,  as  it  now  is,  with  the  jury  to  decide  ;  but,  as  they 
would  no  longer  be  puzzled  with  metaphysical  distinctions 
between  total  and  partial  insanity,  and  engaged  in  nice  esti- 
mates of  the  knowledge  of  good  and  evil,  of  right  and 
wrong,  and  of  the  power  of  design  possessed  by  the  accused, 
their  inquiries  would  be  narrowed  down  to  the  single  fact  of 
mental  impairment  on  a  certain  point  —  a  duty  much  less 
remote  from  the  train  of  their  ordinary  habits  and  pursuits. 
Thus  a  great  object  would  be  gained,  for  the  more  that  is 
provided  by  statute  and  the  less  that  is  left  to  judicial  dis- 
cretion, the  greater  is  the  benefit  afforded  by  law. 

§  29.  As  the  conclusions  of  the  jury,  relative  to  the 
existence  of  insanity,  must  necessarily  be  founded  on  the 
testimony  offered  by  the  parties,  it  is  a  subject  of  the  utmost 
importance,  by  whom  and  in  what  manner,  this  testimony 
shall  be  given.  If  the  decision  of  this  point  were  purely 
a  matter  of  facts,  the  only  duty  of  the  jury  would  be  to 
see  that  they  were  sufficient  for  the  purpose  and  proceeded 
from  authentic  sources  ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  a  matter 
of  inference  to  be  drawn  from  certain  data,  and  this  is  a 
duty  for  which  our  juries,  as  at  present  constituted,  are 
manifestly  unfit.  That  a 'body  of  men,  taken  promiscuously 
from  the  common  walks  of  life,  should  be  required  to  decide, 
whether  or  not  certain  opinions  and  facts  in  evidence  prove 
derangement  of  mind,  or,  in  other  words,  to  decide  a  pro- 
fessional question  of  a  most  delicate  nature  and  involving 
some  of  the  highest  interests  of  man,  is  an  idea  so  prepos- 
terous that  one  finds  it  difficult,  at  first  sight,  to  believe 
that  it  ever  was  seriously  entertained.  Such,  however,  is 
made  their  business,  and,  in  the  performance  of  it,  there  is 
but  one  alternative  for  them  to  fojlow  ;  —  either  to  receive 
with  the  utmost  deference  the  opinions  of  those,  who  have 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  55 

a  professional  acquaintance  with  the  subject,  or  to  slight 
them  altogether,  and  rely  solely  on  their  own  judgment  of 
the  facts.  The  latter  course  has  sometimes  been  adopted, 
though  no  one,  probably,  personally  concerned  in  the  issue 
of  the  case,  would  congratulate  himself  on  their  choice, 
unless  specially  anxious  to  become  a  victim  of  ignorance 
and  obstinacy.  But,  in  the  larger  proportion  of  cases,  the 
medical  testimony,  which  is  given  in  the  shape  of  opinions, 
though  rather  an  anomaly  in  evidence,  that  courts  have  been 
sorely  puzzled  at  times  whether  to  admit  or  reject,  is  mostly 
relied  on,  and  determines  the  verdict  of  the  jury.  It  is, 
perhaps,  of  little  consequence,  who  testifies  to  a  simple  fact, 
that  it  requires  only  eyes  to  see,  or  ears  to  hear  ;  but  it  is 
all  very  different  with  the  delivery  of  opinions,  that  are  to 
shape  the  final  decision.  As  this  requires  an  exercise  of 
judgment  as  well  as  observation,  there  ought  to  be  some 
kind  of  qualification,  on  the  part  of  those  who  render  such 
opinions,  not  required  of  one  who  testifies  to  mere  facts. 
The  understanding  certainly  is,  that  their  habits,  pursuits, 
and  talents,  have  rendered  them .  peculiarly  competent  for 
this  high  duty,  for  in  the  absence  of  the  power  of  cross- 
examination,  these  constitute  the  only  pledge  that  can  be 
had  of  its  correct  and  faithful  performance.  But  as  the  law 
makes  no  exclusion,  and  the  witnesses'  stand  is  open  to  any 
one,  whom  the  parties  may  choose  to  call,  it  frequently 
happens,  that  the  witness  has  nothing  but  his  professional 
character  to  rely  on,  to  give  his  opinions  the  authority  they 
ought  to  possess.  And  even  when  he  may  have  been  pre- 
ceded by  the  shadow  of  a  great  reputation,  the  jury  may 
not  know,  nor  be  able  to  discover,  how  much  of  that  repu- 
tation is  a  factitious  one  ;  and,  in  consequence,  may  be 
induced  to  confide  in  opinions,  which,  from  a  different 
quarter,  they  would  have  listened  to  with  feelings  of  doubt 
and  distrust.  It  is  true,  the  law  requires  that  such  opinions 
should  be  founded  on  facts,  but  who  is  to  decide  whether 


56        MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

the  fact  is  a  sufficient  foundation  for  the  opinion,  or  indeed, 
has  any  relation  to  it  at  all  ? 

§  30.  It  is  not  enough,  that  the  standing  of  the  medical 
witness  is  deservedly  high  in  his  profession,  unless  it  is 
founded  on  extraordinary  knowledge  and  skill  relative  to 
the  particular  disease,  insanity.  Lunatic  asylums  and  re- 
treats for  the  insane  have  so  multiplied  in  our  country,  that 
patients  of  this  class  are  almost  entirely  taken  away  from 
the  management  of  the  private  physician,  and  consigned  to 
the  more  skilful  conductors  of  these  institutions ;  so  that 
many  a  medical  man  may  spend  a  life  of  full  practice, 
without  having  been  intrusted  with  the  care  of  a  dozen 
insane  persons.  To  such,  therefore,  a  practical  knowledge 
of  the  disease  is  out  of  the  question,  and  thus  the  principal 
inducement  is  wanting,  to  become  acquainted  with  the 
labors  of  those,  who  have  enjoyed  better  opportunities.  If 
a  particular  class  of  men  only  are  thought  capable  of  man- 
aging the  treatment  of  the  insane,  it  would  seem  to  follow, 
as  a  matter  of  course,  that  such  only  are  capable  of  giving 
opinions  in  judicial  proceedings  relative  to  insanity.  True, 
in  important  cases,  the  testimony  of  one  or  more  of  this 
class  is  generally  given  ;  but  it  may  be  contradicted  by  that 
of  others  utterly  destitute  of  any  knowledge  of  the  subject, 
on  which  they  tender  their  opinions  with  arrogant  confi- 
dence, and  the  jury  is  seldom  a  proper  tribunal  for  distin- 
guishing the  true  from  the  false,  and  fixing  on  each  its 
rightful  value.  An  enlightened  and  conscientious  jury, 
when  required  to  decide  in  a  case  of  doubtful  insanity, 
which  is  to  determine  the  weal  or  woe  of  a  fellow-being,  fully 
alive  to  the  delicacy  and  responsibility  of  their  situation, 
and  of  their  own  incompetence  unaided  by  the  counsels  of 
others,  will  be  satisfied  with  nothing  less  than  the  opinions 
of  those,  who  have  possessed  unusual  opportunities  for 
studying  the  character  and  conduct  of  the  insane,  and  have 
the  qualities  of  mind  necessary  to  enable  them  to  profit  by 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS.  57 

their  observations.  If  they  are  obliged  to  decide  on  pro- 
fessional subjects,  it  would'seem  but  just  and  the  dictate  of 
common  sense,  that  they  should  have  the  benefit  of  the  best 
professional  advice.  This,  however,  they  do  not  always 
have  ;  and,  consequently,  the  ends  of  justice  are  too  often 
defeated  by  the  high-sounding  assumptions  of  ignorance 
and  vanity. 

§  31.  It  may  at  first  sight  be  thought  impossible  to  rem- 
edy this  defect,  without  what  would  seem  to  be  an  engraft- 
ment  upon  our  judicial  system,  of  practices  not  in  perfect 
harmony  with  it ;  but  the  difficulty,  after  all,  may  not  be 
found  utterly  intractable,  if  names  are  not  allowed  to  usurp 
in  our  minds  the  place  of  things.  Instead  of  the  unqualified 
and  irresponsible  witnesses,  now  too  often  brought  forward 
to  enlighten  the  minds  of  jurymen  on  medical  subjects,  it 
would  be  far  better,  if  we  had  a  class  of  men,  more  or  less 
like  that  of  the  experts  l  of  the  French,  peculiarly  fitted  for 


1  The  term  experts  is  used  in  the  French  law,  to  designate  certain 
persons,  appointed  in  the  course  of  a  judicial  proceeding,  either  by 
the  court  or  by  the  agreement  of  the  parties,  to  make  inquiry  under 
oath,  in  reference  to  certain  facts,  and  to  report  thereon  to  the  court. 
They  are  not  examined  as  witnesses  ;  nor  have  they  the  power  of 
deciding  the  cause,  like  arbitrators  ;  their  functions  are  more  analo- 
gous to  those  of  a  master  in  chancery,  according  to  our  laws.  The 
following  extract  from  Pothier's  Treatise  on  Civil  Procedure  (Part 
I.  chap.  III.  art.  III.  §  I.)  will  give  an  idea  of  the  functions  of 
these  officers. 

"  The  decision  of  a  cause  frequently  depends  on  some  fact,  con- 
tested between  the  parties,  which  can  only  be  established  by  a  visit 
to  the  thing,  which  makes  the  object  of  the  contestation  ;  for  exam- 
ple, the  buyer  of  a  horse  brings  a  redhibitory  action  against  the 
seller,  to  compel  the  latter  to  take  back  the  horse,  on  account  of  some 
pretended  defect,  which  the  former  alleges  entitles  him  to  a  return ; 
if  the  seller  denies  the  existence  of  the  defect,  this  fact,  upon  which 
the  decision  of  the  cause  depends,  can  only  be  ascertained  by  an  ex- 
amination of  the  horse  by  experts  ;  and  the  judge,  therefore,  before 
rendering  a  definitive  judgment,  must  order  the  animal  to  be  ex- 


58  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

the  duty  by  a  course  of  studies  expressly  directed  to  this 
end.  They  might  be  appointed  by  the  government,  in  num- 
bers adapted  to  the  wants  and  circumstances  of  the  popula- 
tion, and  should  be  always  ready,  at  the  call  of  courts,  to 
examine  the  health  of  criminals,  draw  up  reports  touching 
the  same,  and  deliver  opinions.  When  the  courts  see  the 
minds  of  jurors  perplexed  and  confounded  by  the  contra- 
dictory opinions  of  medical  witnesses,  and  with  no  means  of 
satisfying  themselves  as  to  what  is  really  true,  it  should  be 
their  duty  to  submit  the  accused  to  the  examination  of  ex- 
perts, who  should  report  at  a  subsequent  period.  Some- 
thing like  this  is  often  done  in  France,  and  Germany,  and 
ought  to  be  provided  for  in  the  criminal  procedure  of  every 
country.1  Thus,  in  the  case  of  Henriette  Cornier,  in  Paris, 
for  murdering  a  neighbor's  child,  November  4,  1825,  the 
court,  at  the  request  of  the  prisoner's  counsel,  made  shortly 


amined  by  experts,  who  shall  report  whether  he  labors  under  the 
said  defect  or  not.  In  like  manner,  if  I  make  a  bargain  with  a 
workman,  to  do  certain  work  upon  a  house,  and  when  the  latter  de- 
mands the  agreed  price  of  me,  I  object  that  the  work  is  badly  done, 
and  therefore  not  receivable,  there  must  be  an  order  for  an  exami- 
nation by  experts." 

1  Fodere  (De  medicine  legale,  Tome  I.,  Introd.  p.  xlii.)  relates 
with  the  most  naive  astonishment,  that,  in  a  question  of  survivor- 
ship, arising  out  of  the  accouchement  of  Mrs.  Fischer  in  England, 
the  opinion  of  the  celebrated  Denman  was  rejected  by  a  jury,  that 
yielded  implicit  belief  in  the  testimony  of  one  Dallas,  who  was  not  a 
physician,  and  of  two  ignorant  women,  who  spoke  only  from  mem- 
ory, after  the  expiration  of  fourteen  years.  Many  readers  may 
recollect,  that,  in  the  case  of  Donellan,  tried  in  1781,  (see  2  Beck's 
Medical  Jurisprudence,  fifth  edition,  563,)  for  the  murder  of  Sir 
Theodosius  Boughton,  by  poisoning,  the  opinions  of  three  or  four 
physicians,  as  unknown  to  fame,  as  the  science  they  professed  to 
understand  seems  to  have  been  unknown  to  them,  far  outweighed 
with  the  court,  that  of  John  Hunter,  though  illustrated  by  his  vari- 
ous learning,  and  supported  by  his  reputation  for  unrivalled  talents 
and  original  research. 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS.  59 

before  the  trial,  which  was  ordered  to  take  place  February 
27,  1826,  appointed  a  committee  of  three  distinguished  phy- 
sicians, to  report,  after  due  examination,  whether  or  not  she 
was  a  fit  subject  for  trial.  Their  reports  not  being  satisfac- 
tory to  the  avocat-general  (attorney-general),  the  trial,  at 
his  request,  was  postponed  to  another  session,  and  the  pris- 
oner was  again  subjected  to  the  examination  of  the  com- 
mittee, who  reported  three  months  afterwards.1  What  a 
contrast,  does  this  calm  and  deliberate  inquiry  present  to 
the  indecent  haste,  with  which  the  legal  proceedings  were 
precipitated  against  Bellingham,  who  committed  his  offence, 
was  indicted,  tried,  hanged,  and  dissected  all  within  the  space 
of  eight  days.  In  this  case,  there  was  a  strong  disinclination 
manifested  by  the  court,  to  listen  to  the  plea  of  insanity  ;  as  if 
it  were  a  fiction  set  up  by  counsel,  in  the  absence  of  any  other 
ground  of  defence  ;  and  the  earnest  request  of  his  counsel 
for  a  little  delay,  that  he  might  obtain  witnesses  from  the 
part  of  the  country  where  the  accused  had  lived  and  was 
well  known,  who  would  substantiate  the  fact  of  his  insanity, 
of  which  there  was  already  more  than  suspicion,  was  dis- 
regarded. Few,  it  is  believed,  at  this  period,  unbiased  by 
the  political  prejudices  of  the  times,  and  examining  the 
event  as  a  point  of  history,  will  read  the  report  of  Belling- 
ham's  trial,  without  being  forced  to  the  conclusion,  that  he 
was  really  mad,  or,  at  the  very  least,  that  the  little  evidence 
which  did  appear  relative  to  his  state  of  mind,  was  strong 
enough  to  have  entitled  him  to  a  deliberate  and  thorough 
investigation  of  his  case.  Mr.  Simpson,2  after  mentioning 
the  case  of  Howison,  who  was  tried  and  executed  for  the 
murder  of  the  widow  Geddes,  in  which  the  evidence  of  his 
insanity  was  so  strong,  that  it  is  almost  impossible  to  con- 
ceive what  additional  evidence  could  make  it  stronger,  states, 

1  Georget,  Discussion  medico-legale  sur  la  Folie,  71. 
*  Homicidal  Insanity,  222. 


60  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

that  "  application  was  made  without  success  to  the  secretary 
of  state,  by  Howison's  law-agent,  for  time  to  obtain  further 
evidence  of  his  insanity.     To  this  that  gentleman  was  em- 
boldened, by  receiving  the  concurring  opinions  of  some  of 
the  first  medical  men. in  Edinburgh,  who  had  not  been  cited, 
that  even  the  evidence  adduced  on  the  trial  was  sufficient; 
but  that,  when  several  post-judicial  facts  were  added,  there 
could  be  no  doubt  that  the  unhappy  man  was  not  a  fit  sub- 
ject for  punishment."     Cases  like  these  ought  to  convince 
us,  that  the  feelings  of  horror  and  vengeance,  excited  by 
the  bloody  deeds,  of  the  insane,  completely  unfit  the  popular 
mind  for  a  careful  and  impartial  investigation  of  the  plea  of 
insanity,  and  that  the  mental  condition  of  the  accused  should 
be  examined  by   men,  who    have  become  fitted  for  such 
duties,  by  a  peculiar  course  of  study  and  experience.     Is  it 
necessary  to  go  into  a  labored  argument  to  prove,  that  this 
method  of  determining  the  grave  and  delicate  question    of 
insanity  must  be   infinitely  more  satisfactory,  than  that  of 
summoning  medical  witnesses  to  the  trial  —  most  of  whom 
have  but  very  imperfect  notions  of  the  disease,  and  proba- 
bly have  not  had  the  least  communication  with  the  accused, 
—  and  forcing  out  their  evidence,  amid  the  embarrassment 
produced  by  the  queries  of  ingenious  counsel,  bent  on  puz- 
zling and  distracting  their  minds  ?     If  a  physician,  after  list- 
ening to  divers  vague  and   rambling  details,  concerning   a 
person's  ill-health,  and  looking  at  him  across  the  apartment, 
without  being  permitted  to  address  to  him  a  single  word,  or 
lay  a  finger  on  his  person,  should  then  be  required  to  say 
on  his  oath,  whether  or  not  the  individual  in  question  were 
laboring  under  inflammation  of  the  lungs,  bowels,  or  kidneys, 
he  would  scarcely  restrain  a  smile  at  the  stupidity,  which 
should  expect  a  satisfactory  answer.     And  yet,  absurd  and 
foolish  as  such  a  course   would  be  considered,  in  the  ab- 
stract, it  is  the  only  one  recognized  by  our  laws,  when  the 
disease  whose  existence  is  to  be  established,  happens  to  be 


.    PRELIMINARY  VIEWS.  61 

insanity.  Besides;  where  menial  derangement  is  suspected, 
there  are  many  physical  symptoms  and  numerous  other  cir- 
cumstances, that  cannot  be  investigated  in  an  hour  or  a  day, 
but  require  a  course  of  diligent  observation,  that  may  occupy 
weeks  or  months,  before  the  suspicion  can  be  confirmed  or 
disproved.  From  these  considerations,  the  general  conclu- 
sion is,  that  in  criminal  cases  where  insanity  is  pleaded  in 
defence,  the  ends  of  justice  would  be  best  promoted,  by  the 
appointment  of  a  special-commission,  consisting  of  men  who 
possess  a  well-earned  reputation  in  the  knowledge  and  man- 
agement of  mental  derangement,  who  should  proceed  to  the 
examination  of  the  accused,  with 'the  coolness  and  impar- 
tiality proper  to  scientific  inquiries.1 


1  It  may  be  proper,  perhaps,  to  inform  the  reader  that  the  exclu- 
sive competence  of  medical  men  to  give  opinions,  *as  experts,  in 
cases  of  doubtful  condition  of  mind,  has,  at  different  tim«s,  been 
warmly  disputed.  The  celebrated  Kant,  by  whom  the  dispute  was 
begun,  contended  that  such  cases  ought  more  properly  to.  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  Philosophical  Faculty.  (Jlnthropologie,  §  41.)  His 
arguments  were,  satisfactorily  answered  by  Metzger,  (Gerichtl. 
medic.  Jlbhand.  s.  74-)  Hoifbauer,  (Die  Psycologie  inihrenJLnwen- 
dungen  auf  die  Rechtspflege,  §  1,  not.  3,)  and  others,  and  the  contro- 
versy was  set  at  rest  until  the  trial  of  Henriette  Cornier,.'at  Paris, 
which  led  to  its  revival  with  renewed  vigor.  Coste,  a  French  phy- 
sician, (Journ.  univer.  des  Scien.  med.  t.  43,  p.  53,)  and  Regnault,  a 
Parisian  advocate,  who  wrote  a  book  on  the  subject,  (Du  degree  de 
competence  des  mddicins  dans  les  questions  relatives  dux  alienation 
mentales,  1828,)  have  hotly  contended  that  any  tolerably  sensible, 
well-informed  man,  is  as  competent  as  a  Pinel,  or  an  .Esquirol,  to 
form  opinions  for  judicial  purposeSj  relative  to  cases  of  doubtful 
condition  of  mind.  The  arguments  —  or,  more  properly  speaking, 
the  assumptions  and  declamation  —  of  these 'writers,  have  been  se- 
verely handled  by  their  opponents,  (Georget,  Nouvelle-  Discussion 
medico  Idgale  sur  lafolie,  p.  20  ;  North  American  Medical  and  Sur- 
gical Journal,  jlpril,  1828,  p.  457 ;  Friedreich,  Handbuch  der 
gericht.  Psycholgie  ;  Leuret,  JLnnals  d1  Hygiene,  i.  281 ;  Royer-  Col- 
lard  Journ.  hebd  ii.  181,)  and  the  controversy  may  be  considered  as 


62  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

§  32.  If  the  above  hasty  review  of  the  judicial  opinions 
and  practices,  that  have  hitherto  prevailed  relative  to  insan- 
ity, have  left  the  impression,  that  this  disease  is  as  yet  but 
imperfectly  understood,  as  well  in  the  medical  profession  as 
out  of  it,  an  explanation  of  this  fact  may  perhaps  be  de- 
manded ;  but,  as  it  would  be  hardly  relevant  to  the  present 
purpose,  to  enter  largely  into  a  discussion  of  this  point, 
nothing  more  will  be  attempted  than  merely  to  indicate  what 
seems  to  have  had  the  principal  share  in  producing  it.  To 
explain  the  little  progress,  comparatively  speaking,  that  has 
been  made  by  medical  men  in  the  knowledge  of  insanity, 
it  is  too  much  the  fashion  to  allege,  that  they  have  neglected 
the  study  of  mental  philosophy,  or  that  of  mind  in  the 
healthy  state,  which  is  indispensable  to  correct  notions  on 
the  disordered  condition  of  mind.  So  far,  however,  is  the 
fact  here  indicated  from  being  true,  generally,  that  one  can- 
not hesitate  to  say,  that  the  result  in  question  has  been  ow- 
ing to  the  undue  account,  that  physicians  have  made  of  the 
popular  philosophy  of  mind,  in  explaining  the  phenomena 
of  insanity,  and  that  they  have  failed,  in  consequence  of 
studying  metaphysics  too  much  instead  of  too  little.  While 
it  is  admitted,  that  the  knowledge  of  healthy  structure  and 
functions  is  necessary  to  a  thorough  understanding  of  dis- 
eased structure  and  functions,  there  is  every  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  the  converse  of  the  proposition  is  equally  true ; 
neither  can  be  successfully  studied  independently  of  the 
other.  In  the  prosecution  of  psychological  science,  this 
latter  truth  has  been  almost  entirely  disregarded,  and  there- 
fore it  is,  that  we  see  the  metaphysician  looking  for  his  facts 
and  his  theories  in  the  healthy  manifestations  of  the  mind, 

once  more  at  rest,  precisely  where  it  was  found.  We  have  not 
thought  it  worth  while  to  discuss  this  question,  for  the  simple  reason 
that  the  objections  against  receiving  the  opinions  of  physicians,  as 
experts,  are  altogether  founded  in  gross  ignorance,  misconception, 
and  prejudice,  without  even  a  plausible  show  of  support. 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS.  63 

and  directed  in  his  course  solely  by  his  own  self-conscious- 
ness, while  the  student  of  insanity,  after  collecting  his  facts 
with  commendable  diligence  and  discrimination,  amid  the 
disorder  and  irregularity  of  disease,  resorts  to  the  theories 
of  the  former,  for  the  purpose  of  generalizing  his  results, 
instead  of  building  upon  them  a  philosophy  of  his  own. 
Metaphysics,  in  its  present  condition,  is  utterly  incompetent 
to  furnish  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of 
insanity,  and  a  more  deplorable  waste  of  ingenuity  can 
hardly  be  imagined,  than  is  witnessed  in  the  modern  at- 
tempts to  reconcile  the  facts- of  the  one  with  the  specula- 
tions of  the  other.  In  proof  of  the  truth  of  these  assertions, 
it  is  enough  barely  to  mention,  that  the  existence  of  mono- 
mania, as  a  distinct  form  of  mental  derangement,  was  de- 
nied, and  declared  to  be  a  fiction  of  medical  men.  long  after 
it  had  taken  its  place  among  the  established  truths  of  science  ; 
because,  probably,  it  was  a  condition  of  mind  not  described 
by  metaphysical  writers.  All  this,  however,  is  in  accord- 
ance with  a  well-known  law  of  the  human  mind,  which  re- 
sists important  innovations  upon  the  common  modes  of  think- 
ing till  long  after  they  shall  have  been  required  by  the  gen- 
eral progress  of  knowledge.  The  dominant  philosophy  has 
prevailed  so  long  and  so  extensively,  and  has  become  so 
firmly  rooted  in  men's  minds  that  they  who  refuse  to  take  it  on 
trust  and  who  seriously  inquire  into  its  foundations,  and  after 
finding  them  too  narrow  and  imperfect,  are  bold  enough  to 
endeavor  to  remedy  its  defects  by  laying  foundations  of  their 
own,  are  stigmatized  as  visionaries  and  overwhelmed  with 
ridicule  and  censure.  The  only  metaphysical  system  of 
modern  times,  which  professes  to  be  founded  on  the  obser- 
vation of  nature,  and  which  really  does  explain  the  phe- 
nomena of  insanity,  with  a  clearness  and  verisimilitude,  that 
strongly  corroborate  its  proofs,  was  so  far  from  being  joy- 
fully welcomed,  that  it  is  still  confined  to  a  sect,  and  is  re- 
garded by  the  world  at  large,  as  one  of  those  strange  vaga- 


64  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

ries,  in  which  the  human  mind  has  sometimes  loved  to  in- 
dulge. So  true  it  is,  that,  in  theory,  all  mankind  are  agreed 
in  encouraging,  and  applauding  the  humblest  attempt  to 
enlarge  the  sphere  of  our  ideas,  while,  in  practice,  it  often 
seems,  as  if  they  were  no  less  agreed  to  crush  them,  by 
means  of  every  weapon,  that  wit,  argument,  and  calumny, 
can  furnish.  In  the  co.urse  of  this  -work,  the  reader  will 
have  frequent  occasions  to  see  how  the  popular  misconcep- 
tions, —  which  are  too  much  adopted  by  professional  men  — 
of  the  nature  of  various  forms  of  mental  derangement, 
have  been  produced  and  fostered  by  the  current  metaphy- 
sical doctrines,  and  thus  may  have  some  means  of  judging 
for  himself,  how  far  the  imperfect  notions  of  insanity,  that 
are  yet  prevalent,  may ;  be  attributed  to  the  cause  above 
assigned. 


CHAPTER    I. 


MENTAL    DISEASES    IN    GENERAL. 

§  33.  CORRECT  ideas  of  the  pathology  of  insanity  are  not 
unessential  to  the  progress  of  enlightened  views  respecting 
its  legal  relations.  If  it  be  considered  as  withdrawn  from 
the  influence  of  the  common  laws  of  nature,  in  the  produc- 
tion of  disease,  and  attributed  to  the  direct  visitation  of  God  ; 
if  the  existence  of  physical  changes  be  overlooked  or  denied, 
and  we  are  referred  exclusively  to  some  mysterious  affection 
of  the  immaterial  spirit,  for  its  cause  ;  then  is  it  in  vain  to 
hope,  that  such  a  condition  can  ever  be  the  object  of  dis- 
criminating, salutary  legislation.  In  the  prevalence  of  such 
views  in  past  times,  however,  we  may  look  for  the  cause  of 
much  of  the  error  and  absurdity,  that  pervade  the  law  of 
insanity,  and  that  are  equally  at  variance  with  the  principles 
of  science  and  the  dictates  of  humanity.  It  is  an  undoubted 
truth,  that  the  manifestations  of  the  intellect,  and  those  of 
the  sentiments,  propensities  and  passions,  or  generally,  of 
the  intellectual  and  affective  powers,  are  connected  with  and 
dependent  upon  the  brain.  It  follows,  then,  that  abnormal 
conditions  of  these  powers  are  equally  connected  with  ab- 
normal conditions  of  the  brain  ;  but  this  is  not  merely  a 
matter  of  inference.  The  dissections  of  many  eminent 
observers,  among  whom  it  is  enough  to  mention  the  names 
of  Greding,  Gall  and  Spurzheim,  Calmet,  Foville,  Falret, 
Bayle,  Esquirol,  and  Georget,  have  placed  it  beyond  a 
6* 


66  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

doubt ;  and  no  pathological  fact  is  better  established  — 
though  its  correctness  was  for  a  long  while  doubted  —  than 
that  deviations  from  the  healthy  structure  are  generally  pre- 
sented in  the  brains  of  insane  subjects.  In  the  few  cases, 
where  such  appearances  have  not  been  observed,  it  is  justly 
concluded  that  death  took  place  before  the  deviation  was 
sufficiently  great  to  be  perceptible,  —  a  phenomenon,  not 
rare  in  affections  of  other  organs. 

§  34.  These  pathological  changes  are  not  sufficiently 
definite  to  admit  of  classification,  or  of  practical  application 
in  the  treatment  of  the  various  kinds  of  insanity.  To  us 
they  are  chiefly  valuable,  as  showing  the  frequent  liability 
to  disease,  either  from  excessive  exertion-  or  disuse  of  its 
own  powers,  or  from  its  proneness  to  be  affected  by  morbid 
irritations  that  radiate  from  other  parts  of  the  body.  We 
learn  from  them,  also,  that  changes  of  structure  may  pro- 
ceed in  the  brain,  as  in  other  organs,  to  an  incurable  de- 
gree, without  giving  rise  to  much,  if  any,  very  perceptible 
disturbance  of  its  functions,  until  some  striking  and  unex- 
pected act  leads  the  enlightened  physician  to  suspect  its 
existence,  and  draws  down  upon  the  unfortunate  subject  the 
restraints  and  penalties  of  the  law. 

§  35.  A  natural  classification  of  the  various  forms  of 
insanity,  though  of  secondary  importance  in  regard  to  its 
medical  treatment,  will  be  of  eminent  service  to  the  legal 
inquirer,  by  enlarging  his  notions  of  its  phenomena,  and 
enabling  him  to  discriminate,  where  discrimination  is  neces- 
sary to  the  attainment  of  important  ends.  The  deplorable 
consequences  of  knowing  but  one  kind  of  insanity,  and  of 
erecting  that  into  a  standard,  whereby  every  other  is  to  be 
compared  and  tested,  are  too  common  in  the  records  of 
criminal  jurisprudence;  and  it  is  time  that  it  were  well 
understood,  that  the  philosophy  of  such  a  method  is  no 
better  than  would  be  that  of  the  physician,  who  shpuld 
recognize  no  diseases  of  the  stomach,  for  instance,  but  such 


MENTAL    DISEASES    IN    GENERAL. 


67 


as  proceed  from  inflammation,  and  reject  all  others  as 
anomalous  and  unworthy  of  attention.  The  various  diseases, 
included  in  the  general  term  insanity,  or  mental  derange- 
ment, may  be  conveniently  arranged  under  two  divisions, 
founded  on  two  very  different  conditions  of  the  brain  ;  the 
first  being  a  want,  of  its  ordinary  development,  and  the 
second,  some  lesion  of  its  structure  subsequent  to  its  devel- 
opment. In  the  former  of  these  divisions,  we  have  IDIOCY 
and  IMBECILITY,  differing  from  each  other  only  in  degree. 
The  various  affections,  embraced  in  the  latter  general  divi- 
sion may  be'arranged  under  two  subdivisions,  MANIA  and  DE- 
MENTIA, distinguished  by  the  contrast  they  present  in  the 
energy,  and  tone  of  the  mental  manifestations.  Mania  is 
characterized  by  an  exaltation  of  the  faculties,  and  may  be 
confined  to  the  intellectual,  or  to  the-  affective  powers,  or  it 
may  -involve  them  both,  and  these  powers  may  be  generally 
or  partially  deranged.  Dementia  depends  on  a  more  or  less 
complete  enfeeblement  of  the  faculties,  and  may  be  con- 
secutive to  injury  of  the  brain,  to  mania,  or  to  some  other 
disease  ;  or  it  may  be  connected  with  the  decay  of  old  age. 
These  divisions  will  be  more  conveniently  exhibited  in  the 
following  tabular  view.  • 


INSANITY. 


Defective 
develop- 
ment  of 
the  facul- 
ties.   • 


IDIOCY. 


IMBECILITY 


•I 


1 .  Resulting  from  congenital  defect. 

2.  Resulting  from  an  obstacle  to  the 

development  of  the  faculties, 
supervening  in  infancy. 

1 .  Resulting  from  congenital  defect. 

2.  Resulting  from  an  obstacle  to  the 

development  of  the  faculties, 
supervening  in  infancy. 


Lesion  of 
the  facul- 
ties  sub- 
sequent 
to  their 
develop- 
ment. 


MANIA. 


f  Intellectual. 


Affective. 


(  1.    General. 
(  2.  Partial. 

<" I.  General. 
t  2.  Partial.  • 


DEMENTIA. 


1 ..  Consecutive  to  mania,  or  in- 
juries of  the  brain. 
2.    Senile,  peculiar  to  old  age. 


68  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

§  36.  It  is  not  pretended,  that  any  classification  can  be 
rigorously  correct ;  for  such  divisions  have  not  been  made 
by  nature,  and  cannot  be  observed  in  practice.  Diseases  are 
naturally  associated  into  some  general  groups  only  ;  but  if 
these  be  ascertained  and  brought  into  view,  the  great  end  of 
classification  is  accomplished.  We  shall  often  find  them 
running  into  one  another,  and  be  puzzled  to  assign  to  a 
particular  disease  its  proper  place ;  but  since  such  is  the  or- 
der of  nature,  we  must  make  the  most  of  the  good  it  pre- 
sents, and  remedy  its  evils  in  the  best  manner  we  can.  The 
above  arrangement,  with  the  exception  of  some  slight  modi- 
fications, is  that  adopted  by  Esquirol,  and  has  this  advantage 
over  some  others,  that  it  preserves  the  divisions  made  by 
nature,  and  will  thus  be  serviceable  to  our  present  purpose. 
Several  other  conditions  of  mind  in  which  moral  freedom 
is  impaired,  will  also  be  considered,  though  they  cannot  be 
strictly  called  insanity. 


CHAPTER  II. 


IDIOCY. 

§  37.  IDIOCY  is  that  condition  of  mind,  in  which  the  re- 
flective, and  all  or  a  part  of  the  affective  powers,  are  either 
entirely  wanting,  or  .are  manifested  to  the  slightest  possible 
extent.  As  the  organic  defects,  on  which  idiocy  depends, 
are  various  in  kind  and  degree,  and  also  as  it  regards  the 
parts  of  the  brain  affected,  we  should  be  led  to  expect,  what 
observation  shows'  is  actually  the  case,  considerable  variety 
in  the  manifestations  of  this  condition..  The  individual  may 
hardly  rise  to  the  level  of  some  of  the  brutes,  his  movements 
being  confined  to  the  necessities  of  the  automatic  life  ;  or  he 
may  be  capable  of  performing  some,  useful  services,  of  ex- 
ercising some  talent,  or  of  displaying  some  of  the  higher 
moral  sentiments.  In  short,  there  -is  even  more  diversity, 
in  the  characters  of  the  idiotic  and  imbecile,  than  in  those 
of  the  sound,  and  this  truth  must  not  be  forgotten,  if  we 
wjould  avoid  the  flagrant-  error  of  regulating  judicial  decis- 
ions by  rules,  which,  though  perfectly  correct  in  regard  to 
one  case  or  set  of  cases,  may  be  wholly  incorrect  in  regard 
lo  others. 

§  38.  The  most  striking  physical  trait  of  idiocy,  and  one 
seldom  wanting,  is  the  diminutive  size  of  the  head,  particularly 
of  the  anterior-superior  portions,  indicating  a  deficiency  of 
the  anterior  lobes  of  the  brain.  Its  circumference,  meas- 
ured immediately  over  the  orbitar  arch  and  the  most  prom- 


70  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

inent  part  of  the  occipital  bone,  is  fixed  by  Gall,  whose 
observations  on  this  subject  are  entitled  to  great  confidence, 
at  between  11 J  and  14£  inches.1  The  brain  conse- 
quently equals  that  of  a  new-born  infant;  that  is,  about  one 
fourth,  one  fifth,  or  one  sixth  of  the  cerebral  mass  of  an 
adult's,  in  the  full  enjoyment  of  his  faculties.  The  above 
is  the  only  constant  character  observed  in  the  heads  of  con- 
genital  idiots;  —  their  forms  are  as  various  as  those  of 
heads  of  the  ordinary  size.  When  idiocy  supervenes  in 
early  infancy,  the  head  is  sometimes  as  remarkable  for  im- 
mense size,  as  in  the  former  case  it  is  for  its  diminutiveness. 
The  cause  of  this  enlargement  is  some  kind  of  morbid  action, 
preventing  the  development  of  the  cerebral  mass  and  pro- 
ducing serous  cysts,  immense  dropsical  effusions,  &c.  In 
idiocy  the  features  are  irregular ;  the  forehead  low,  retreat- 
ing and  narrowed  to  a  point ;  the  eyes  are  unsteady  and 
often  squint ;  the  lips  are  thick,  and  the  mouth  being  kept 
open,  the  saliva  is  suffered  to  escape,  and  their  spongy  gums 
and  defective  teeth  are  displayed ;  the  limbs  are  crooked 
and  feeble  and  limited  in  their  motions.  The  senses  are 
very  imperfect  at  best,  and  often  entirely  wanting.  Many 
are  deaf  and  dumb,  or  blind.  Many  are  incapable  of  per- 
ceiving odors,  and  have  so  little  taste  as  to  show  no  discrim- 
ination in  their  choice  of  food,  swallowing  whatever  comes 
to  hand.  Their  movements  are  constrained  and  awkward ; 
they  walk  badly,  easily  falling  down;  and  are  constantly 
dropping  whatever  is  placed  in  their  hands.  None  are  able 
to  articulate  more  than  a  few  words,  to  which  they  seem  to 
attach  no  meaning  ;  while  the  most  of  them  utter  only  cries 
or  muttered  sounds.  Some  make  known  their  most  im- 
portant wants  by  means  of  signs  or  sounds,  that  are  intel- 


1  Sur  les  Fonctions,  ii.  330. 


IDIOCY.  71 

ligible  to  those  who  have  the  care'  of  them.  Idiots  are 
generally  affected  with  rickets,  epilepsy,  scrofula,  or 
paralysis,  and  their  whole  physical  economy  indicates  a  de- 
praved and  defective  constitution.  Idiocy,  as  above  describ- 
ed, is  congenital,  or  begins  at  a  very  early  period,  and  is  in- 
curable. Its  wretched  subjects  seldom  live  beyond  their 
twenty-fifth  year,  continuing  all  their  lives  in  the  same 
brutish  condition,  utterly  unchanged  by  external  circumstan- 
ces, and  scarcely  indicating  the  species  to  which  they 
belong,  in  their  slu[  id,  brute-like  countenance,  in  their  dull, 
or  glaring  eyes,  gaping  mouth,  their  wild  and  hideous  laugh, 
their  inarticulate  sounds,  their  obtuse  sensations,  and  utter 
unconsciousness  of  social  and  domestic  relations. 

§39.  In  reasoning  power,  idiots  are  below  the  brute. 
Unable  to  compare  two  ideas  together,  nothing  leads  them 
to  act  but  the  faint  impressions  of  the  moment,  and  these 
are  often  insufficient  to  induce  them  to  gratify  even  their  in- 
stinctive wants.  It  frequently  happens,  however,  that  some 
one  or  more  of  the  intellectual  faculties,  always  excepting 
the  reflective,  are  manifested  in  more  or  less  perfection. 
Among  the  moral  sentiments,  it  is  not  uncommon  to  find 
self-esteem,  love  of  approbation,  religious  veneration,  and 
benevolence,  bearing  a  prominent  part,  if  not  constituting 
the  entire  character,  and  thus  producing  a  slight  approxima- 
tion to  humanity.  Rush1  speaks  of  one  who  was  remark- 
able for  kindness  and  affection,  and  spent  his  life  in  acts  of 
benevolence,  though  he  showed  no  one  mark  of  reason.  Dr. 
Combe2  saw  two,  who,  though  differing  much,  in  other  re- 
spects, agreed  in  evincing  a  strong  predilection  for  religious 
worship,  and  for  listening  to  sermons  and  prayers.  Some 
can  recollect  names,  numbers,  or  historical  facts;  some  are 


1  Medical  Inquiries. 

*  Observations  on  Mental  Derangement,  243. 


72  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

capable  of  repeating  what  they  have  frequently  heard  ; 
others  are  able  to  sing  a  few  airs,  and  even  to  play  on  musi- 
cal instruments.  Gall1  saw  one  at  Hamburgh,  sixteen  years 
old,  who  learned  names,  dates,  numbers,  history,  and  repeat- 
ed them  all  mechanically,  but  was  destitute  of  all  power 
of  combining  and  comparing  his  ideas,  and  was  incapable 
of  being  engaged  in  any  employment.  Various  propensi- 
ties, such  as  the  sexual  feelings,  cunning,  and  destructive- 
ness,  they  often  manifest  in  an  inordinate  degree  of  vigor 
and  activity. 

§40.  In  that  form  of  idiocy,  called  cretinism,  which  is 
endemic  in  the  Alps  and  some  other  mountainous  countries, 
opportunities  of  observing  its  phenomena  are  offered  on  a 
grand  scale.  The  difference  in  the  degrees  of  this  affection 
has  led  to  its  division  into  three  classes,  namely,  cretinism, 
semi-cretinism,  and  cretinism  of  the  third  degree.  In  the 
first,  life  seems  to  be  almost  entirely  automatic;  most  of  its 
subjects  are  unable  to  speak,  their  senses  are  dull,  if  not 
altogether  wanting,  and  nothing  but  the  most  urgent  calls  of 
nature,  excite  their  attention.  To  good  or  to  bad  treatment 
they  are  equally  insensible.  The  semi-cretins  show  some 
glimmering  of  a  higher  nature  ;  they  note  what  passes 
around;  they  remember  simple  events;  and  make. use  of 
language  to  express  their  wants.  They  are  capable  of  little 
else,  however,  for  they  have  no  idea  of  numbers.,  and, 
though  taught  to  repeat  certain  passages,  they  learn  nothing 
of  their  meaning.  The  actions  of  those  of  the  third  kind 
indicate  a  still  higher  degree  of  intellect ;  they  have  a 
stronger  memory  of  events,  and  they  learn  to  read  and 
write,  though  with  scarcely  any  conception  of  the  purposes 
of  either.  Particular  talents  are  often  displayed  by  them  in 
a  very  respectable  degree.  Music,  drawing,  painting 


Sur  les  Fonctions  I.  193. 


IDIOCY.  73 

machinery,  &c.,  have  each  had  its  followers  in  a  humble 
way,  among  these  cretins.  In  the  construction  of  some 
parts  of  a  watch,  they  are  often  employed  in  Geneva,  and 
their  work  is  characterized  by  neatness.  Others  have  ex- 
ecuted drawings  of  some  merit,  and  some  have  even  studied 
several  languages,  in  which  their  acquisitions  were  by  no 
means  insignificant ;  while  others  have  even  attempted  po- 
etry, though  succeeding  in  nothing  but  the  rhyme.  Though, 
in  all  degrees  of  idiocy,  the  intellectual  powers  are  so 
deficient  as  hardly  to  be  recognized,  and  therefore  these 
distinctions  can  be  of  little  practical  importance,  yet  they 
may  serve  to  teach  us  how  independent  of  one  another  are 
the  various  moral  and  intellectual  faculties,  and  lead  us  to 
be  cautious  how  we  infer  the  soundness  or  capacity  of  the 
whole  mind,  from  the  perfection  manifested  by  one  or  two 
of  its  faculties. 


CHAPTER  III. 


IMBECILITY. 

§  41.  BY  imbecility  is  meant  an  abnormal  deficiency 
either  in  those  faculties  that  acquaint  us  with  the  qualities 
and  ordinary  relations  of  things,  or  in  those  which  furnish 
us  with  the  moral  motives  that  regulate  our  relations  and 
conduct  towards  our  fellow-men  ;  and  frequently  attended 
with  excessive  activity  of  one  or  more  of  the  animal  pro- 
pensities. In  imbecility,  the  development  of  the  moral 
and  intellectual  powers  is  arrested  at  an  early  period  of  ex- 
istence. It  differs  from  idiocy  in  the  circumstance,  that 
while  in  the  latter,  there  is  an  utter  destitution  of  every- 
thing like  reason,  the  subjects  of  the  former  possess  some 
intellectual  capacity,  though  far  less  than  is  possessed  by  the 
great  mass  of  mankind.  Imbeciles  can  never  attain  that 
degree  of  knowledge  which  is  common  among  people  of 
their  own  rank  and  opportunities,  though  it  is-  very  certain 
that  they  are  not  entirely  unsusceptible  of  the  influences  of 
education.  They  are  capable  of  forming  a  few  simple 
ideas  and  of  expressing  them  in  language  ;  they  have  some 
memory  and  a  sense  of  the  conveniences  and  proprieties  of 
life.  Many  of  them  learn  to  read,  write,  and  count,  and 
make  some  progress  in  music,  though  for  the  most  part, 
they  are  untaught  and  employed  in  the  coarsest  and  rudest 
labors.  Their  moral  and  intellectual  character  presents  the 
same  infinite  variety  that  is  witnessed  in  the  normal  state  of 
the  mind.  While  some  are  changing  their  plans  and 


IMBECILITY.  75 

resolutions  with  the  fickleness  of  the  winds,  others  have 
some  favorite  project  which  they  are  bent  on  accomplishing  ; 
while  nothing  can  arrest  the  attention  of  some  for  a  moment, 
others  pertinaciously  retain  some  crotchet  that  occupies 
nearly  all  their  thoughts.  Some  engage  -in  certain  occupa- 
tions, and  manage  to  take  care  of  themselves  and. their 
property,  though  frequently  obliged  to  resort  to  others  for 
advice  and  assistance.  They  talk  but  little,  and  will  answer 
questions  correctly,  provided  they  are  not  without  the  circle 
of 'their  customary  thoughts  and  habits,  and  are  not  required 
to  follow  a  conversation.  They  are  particularly  deficient  in 
forethought,  and  in  strong  and  durable  affections,  and  they 
generally  labor  under  a  certain  uneasiness  and  restlessness 
of  disposition  that  unfit  them  for  steady  employment.  They 
are  thus  easily  induced  by  bad  men  to  assist  in  the  execution 
of  their  criminal  enterprises.  It  is  also  worthy  of  notice 
that  the  same  physical  imperfections  and  a  tendency  to  the 
same  diseases  which  accompany  idiocy,  are  generally  ob- 
served, though  in  a  less  degree,  in  imbecility. 

§  42.  Much  as  the  moral  and  intellectual  powers  vary  in 
the  different  cases,  .but  little  has  been  done  towards  distin- 
guishing the  various  degrees  of  imbecility,  by  a  system  of 
classification,  though  it  must  be  obvious  at  first  sight,  that 
something  of  this  kind  is  absolutely  necessary  before  its 
legal  relations  can  be  determined  with  much  correctness,  or 
consistency.  HofTbauer1  alone  has  made  an  attempt  to 
supply  this  want,  and  though  perhaps  not  perfectly  satisfac- 
tory, as  might  have  been  expected  from  the  nature  of  the 
subject,  yet  it  evinces  such  a  correct  appreciation  of  mental 
diversities,  and  so  much  ability  in  the  analysis  of  deficient 
understandings,  that  it  would  be  doing  injustice  to  the  sub- 
ject, to  neglect  giving  some  account  of  his  views,  in  this  place. 

1  Die  Psychologic  in  ihren  Hanptanwendungen  auf  die  Rechts- 
pflege,  §§  26  —  46. 


76  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

§  43.  Mental  deficiency  is  manifested  under  two  different 
forms,  which  Hoffbauer  designates  by  the  terms  imbecility 
(Blddsinn),  and  stupidity  (Dummheil).  The  former  con- 
sists in  a  defect  of  the  intensity ,  the  latter  in  a  defect  of  the 
extensity,  necessary  to  a  sound  and  healthy  mind.  By  in- 
tensity is  meant  the  power  of  the  mind  to  examine  the  data 
presented  to  it  by  the  senses  and  therefrom  to  deduce  cor- 
rect judgments  ;  by  its  extensity,  the  mind  perceives  and 
embraces  these  data,  and  suffers  none  to  escape,  —  one,  it 
may  be  added,  is  the  reflective ;  the  other,  the  perceptive 
power. 

"  In  reference  to  the  faculty  of  judgment,  it  may  be  ob- 
served, that  the  stupid  person  is  more  liable  than  the  imbe- 
cile to  form  erroneous  decisions  ;  the  latter  experiences  great 
difficulty  in  bringing  himself  to  any  conclusion.  Secondly, 
the  stupid  person  sometimes  judges  very  correctly  on  sub- 
jects to  which  his  attention  has  been  strongly  applied  ;  occa- 
sionally he  surpasses,  in  this  respect,  those  of  superior  intel- 
ligence. When  he  judges  wrongly,  it  is  through  neglect  of 
some  of  the  considerations  which  ought  to  have  formed  the 
groundwork  of  his  judgment,  and  he  will  say,  in  order  to 
excuse  himself,  that  ;  he  never  should  have  dreamt  of  this 
or  that  circumstance.'  To  the  imbecile,  on  the  contrary,  the 
most  simple  act  of  judgment  is  difficult.  A  lady,  for  instance, 
who  said  she  was  twenty-five  years  of  age,  and  had  been 
married  six  years,  could  not,  after  many  efforts,  tell  how  old 
she  was  at  the  period  of  her  wedding  ;  at  one  time,  calling 
it  twenty,  at  another,  twenty-two.  Thirdly,  the  stupid  man 
may  often  be  induced  to  correct  his  mistake  ;  some  simple 
reason,  or  particular  circumstance  being  suggested  to  him 
which  leads  to  its  detection.  The  imbecile  man  can  scarcely 
rectify  his  errors,  being  unable  sufficiently  to  concentrate  his 
attention  on  any  particular  subject.  Fourthly,  the  stupid 
man,  in  recovering  from  his  error,  frequently  falls  into  the 
opposite  extreme,  passing  from  the  blindest  confidence  to 


IMBECILITY.  77 

the  most  jealous  distrust,  because  he  views  every  subject  on 
One  side  only,  and  is  embarrassed  by  every  complex  idea. 

§  44.  "  In  relation  also  to  memory,  there  is  a  decided 
difference  between  the  stupid  and  the  imbecile.  The  latter 
appear  to  be  almost  entirely  deficient  in  this  faculty,  while 
the  former  recollect  after  a  long  interval  of  time,  and  with 
tolerable  accuracy,  some  insulated  circumstances. 

§  45.  "  Weakness  of  intellect  is  displayed  in  both  these 
classes,  when  their  defect  is  excessive,  by  a  propensity  to 
talk  to  themselves.  This  is  mostly  observable  when  the  in- 
dividual is  alone,  or  supposes  himself  alone.  In  reality,  we 
employ  words,  not  merely  for  purposes  of  intercourse,  but 
as  an  instrument  of  thought ;  and  when  the  mind  is  morbidly 
enfeebled,  the  silent  and  unperceived,  or  mental  employment 
of  words  is  insufficient ;  they  must  be  repeated  more  or  less 
audibly.  This  practice  is  not  uncommon  with  imbecile  and 
stupid  people,  but  when  in  company,  they  generally  perceive 
its  incongruity  arid  abstain  from  it.  If,  however,  such  indi- 
viduals talk  to  themselves,  knowing  that  they  are  in  the  pre- 
sence of  company,  it  is  a  proof  of  greater  deficiency. 

§  46.  "  Another  distinction  between  the  imbecile  and 
the  stupid  person  is,  that  the  latter  imagines  himself  equal, 
if  not  superior,  to  other  men  in  intelligence ;  whereas  the 
former  is  sensible  of  his  defect,  and  even  exaggerates  it. 
Hence  results  another  difference  between  the  stupid  and 
the  imbecile  person.  The  former  acts  precipitately  and 
without  reflection;  the  latter  never  can  make  up  his  mind, 
even  on  the  simplest  affair,  from  the  fear  that  there  may  be 
consequences  which  he  is  incapable  of  foreseeing.  The 
imbecile  is  frequently  timid,  and  even  misanthropic  ;  not 
only  because  he  is  conscious  of  his  deficiency,  but  because 
he  has  had  a  disagreeable  experience  of  the  superiority  of 
others.  When  this  is  the  cause  of  his  jealous  distrust,  we 
observe,  first,  that  he  reposes  unlimited  confidence  in  those 
whose  benevolence  he  has  experienced  ;  secondly,  that 
7* 


78  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

when  his  condition  in  society  places  him  beyond  the  reach 
of  injury,  he  has  none  of  this  misanthropy  of  which  we 
speak,  and  is  at  peace  with  all  the  world.  The  pusillanim- 
ity and  misanthropy  of  the  imbecile  lead  them  to  a  species 
of  devotion,  if  such  it  may  be  called  ;  for  it  is  natural  that, 
on  seeing  themselves  repulsed,  or  ill-treated  by  men,  they 
should  apply  to  the  deity  for  support.  The  stupid,  more 
confident  in  themselves,  fancy  that  they  acquire  merit  by 
their  devotions,  or  confer  an  honor  on  the  divinity." 

§  47.  Hoffbauer,  while  he  acknowledges  the  various 
and  almost  imperceptible  shades  of  difference  between  one 
case  of  imbecility  and  another,  has  reduced  its  numberless 
gradations  to  five  degrees,  and  those  of  stupidity  to  three. 
To  these,  as  described  and  explained  by  him,  he  looks  for 
the  means  of  a  consistent  arid  rational  application  of  the 
legal  principles  that  should  regulate  their  civil  and  criminal 
relations. 

"  The  first  degree  of  imbecility  manifests  itself  in  the 
inability  to  form  a  judgment  respecting  any  new  object, 
even  when  the  necessary  data  are  furnished,  and  the  ques- 
tion is  one  which  in  itself,  presents  no  difficulties.  In  this 
degree  of  the  affection,  the  individual  can  very  well  judge 
respecting  objects  to  which  he  is  daily  accustomed,  and  in 
familiarity  with  which  he  may  be  said  to  have  grown  up. 
In  the  pursuit  of  his  daily  concerns,  he  often  shows  a 
minute  exactness  that  appears  to  him  a  matter  of  absolute 
necessity.  His  memory  is  very  limited  ;  not  that  he  loses 
absolutely  the  remembrance  of  things,  but  because  he 
cannot  apply  his  recollections  according.to  his  wishes.  He 
scrupulously  observes  whatever  he  thinks  becoming  in  his 
situation,  because  he  fears  to  offend  by  neglecting  it.  When 
he  gives  himself  up  to  avarice,  there  is  observed  in  him 
rather  an  apprehension  of  losing  than  a  desire  of  accumula- 
ting. The  propensity  to  talk  to  himself,  and  the  species  of 
devotion  to  which  we  have  alluded,  is  seldom  to  be  met 


IMBECILITY.  79 

with  in  this  instance ;  the  former,  because  the  routine  of 
daily  occupations,  above  which  the  individual  seldom  raises 
himself,  makes  but  small  demands  on  his  intelligence  ;  the 
latter,  because  his  infirmity  is  not  so  remarkable  in  ordinary 
society  as  to  render.it  a  subject  of  general  observation,  and 
entail  upon  him  frequent  annoyance,  and  thus  make  him 
feel  the  necessity  of  seeking  support  elsewhere.  He  is 
very  subject  to  gusts  of  passion,  which  nevertheless  are  as 
easily  appeased  as  they  are  excited." 

The  description  of  the  second  degree  of  imbecility  applies 
to  the  subjects  of  dementia,  which  will  be  considered  in 
another  place ;  and  it  may  therefore  be  omitted  here. 

§  48.  "  A  person  affected  with  imbecility  in  the  third 
degree,  is  unfitted  for  all  -matters  that  require  more  than  a 
mechanical  rno.de  of  action  ;  but  he  preserves  sufficient 
intelligence  to  be  aware  of  his  weakness  and  of  the  intel- 
lectual superiority  of  others.  We  may  likewise  remark  in 
him  that  propensity  to  devotion  and  misanthropy  of  which 
we  have  spoken  above.  His  mind  is  not  completely  inactive, 
although  it  cannot  raise  itself  to  any  elevated  views  ;  hence 
he  has  the  propensity  to  talk  to  himself.  He  has  not  the 
power  of  seizing  an  idea  so  clearly  as  to  impress  it  on  his 
mind  ;  hence  a  very  marked  defect  of  memory  and  a  great 
propensity  to  pass  rapidly  from  one  topic  to  another.  He 
is  very  irritable  and  suspicious,  fancies  a  design  to  insult 
him  where  it  is  impossible,  because  his  state  yet  permits  him 
to  feel  and  resent  injuries  —  of  which  susceptibility  those 
about  him  often  take  advantage  in  order  to  annoy  him. 

§  49.  "  The  fourth  degree  of  imbecility  is  marked  by 
a  clouded  state  of  the  understanding  and  memory,  with  a 
great  insensibility,  which  nevertheless  leaves  the  patient  a 
confused  idea  of  his  weakness.  He  eagerly  seeks  excite- 
ment by  various  stimuli." 

§  50.  The  fifth  degree  of  imbecility,  as  described  by 
Hoffbauer,  corresponds  to  the  last  stage  of  dementia,  or  the 


80  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

fatuity  which  results  from  some  cerebral  diseases,  and 
therefore  does  not  belong  to  this  condition  of  mind  according 
to  the  arrangement  above  adopted. 

§  51.  Stupidity,  generally  speaking,  is  a  defect  less 
severe  than  imbecility,  according  to  the  definition  given 
of  each.  The  slightest  degree  of  imbecility,  however, 
indicates  an  imperfection  of  the  intellectual  powers,  less 
severe  than  the  greatest  degree  of  stupidity. 

"  In  the  first  degree  of  stupidity,  the  individual  is  only 
incapable  of  judging,  and  deciding,  when  it  is  necessary  to 
weigh  opposing  motives.  Then  he  feels  his  incapacity,  and 
resorts  to  the  intelligence  of  others,  unless  too  proud,  which 
often  happens.  If  he  acts  absurdly,  it  is  often  because  he 
applies  to  his  actions  a  rule  good  in  itself,  but  the  application 
of  which  requires  other  considerations. 

§  52.  "  The  subject  of  the  second  degree  of  stupidity 
judges  accurately  and  sometimes  even  promptly,  respecting 
things  by  which  he  is  habitually  surrounded  ;  but  he  com- 
mits serious  errors  whenever  it  is  necessary  to  exert  a 
certain  vigor  of  judgment.  He  is  embarrassed  in  any  train 
of  reasoning,  however  simple  it  may  be.  His  memory  is 
perhaps  faithful,  but  it  is  slow  ;  he  cannot,  without  great 
difficulty,  express  a  complex  idea,  if  it  is  the  result  of  his 
own  reflections,  and  has  not  been  received  from  another. 
When  his  faculties  have  been  somewhat  developed  by 
education,  he  is  an  obstinate  partisan  of  anything  which  is, 
as  we  say,  good  in  theory  but  useless  in  practice ;  because 
he  cannot  observe  the  circumstances  that  distinguish 
particular  cases,  and  appreciate  them  according  to  their 
just  value.  These  two  conditions  are  indispensable,  however, 
to  the  proper  application  of  general  rules. 

§  53.  "  In  the  highest  degree  of  stupidity  the  individual 
cannot  go  beyond  one  single  idea  ;  and  he  must  completely 
lose  that  one  before  he  can  pass  to  another.  Hence  he  is 
less  capable  of  judging  than  the  imbecile,  because  the  com- 


IMBECILITY.  81 

parison  of  several  ideas  is  necessary  to  form  a  judgment. 
Individuals  who  are  affected  with  stupidity  in  the  third  de- 
gree, often  express  themselves  in  half-uttered  words,  return 
incessantly  to  the  same  subject,  make  known  their  ideas  by 
sentences,  short,  incoherent,  and  unfinished,  like  children 
who  can  retain  words  but  do  not  know  how  to  connect  them 
together ;  they  often  express  the  subject  and  the  attribute 
without  connecting  the  one  to  the  other  by  the  affirmative 
or  negative.  If  they  wish  to  say,  '  the  rose  is  beautiful,' 
they  will  say,  '  rose  beautiful,'  or  only  'rose,'  or  '  beautiful,' 
according  as  the  subject  or  attribute  strikes  them  most. 
Often  they  reverse  the  natural  order  of  words,  and  say,  for 
example,  'rose  beautiful  is ;'  and  when  they  perceive  an 
omission  which  they  wish  to  repair,  they  become  still  more 
perplexed." 

§  54.  It  does  not  need  the  high  authority  of  Esquirol  to 
convince  us,  that  these  distinctions  are  drawn  with  a  minute- 
ness and  show  of  accuracy  that  savor  more  of  the  labors  of 
the  closet  than  of  the  rigid  and  faithful  observation  of  nature. 
This  objection,  however,  which  might  not  have  been  unsus- 
pected by  the  author  himself,  does  not  entirely  destroy  the 
utility  of  his  attempt,  so  long  as  it  is  admitted  to  be  an 
approximation  to  the  truth  ;  for,  with  all  its  defects,  it  estab- 
lishes the  important  fact  that  mental  deficiency  is  distin- 
guished by  various  grades  of  intensity,  instead  of  being  in- 
variably the  same  condition,  and  therefore  that  it  cannot 
properly  be  always  subjected  to  the  same  legal  regulations. 
It  is  a  material  defect  in  the  above  descriptions,  that  the 
state  of  the  moral  faculties  is  seldom  adverted  to,  though 
their  deviations  from  the  normal  condition  are  no  less  strik- 
ing than  those  which  the  intellectual  powers  exhibit.  What- 
ever may  be  their  character,  it  is  obvious  that  their  ordinary 
relations  to  the  intellect  must  be  affected,  and  thus  the  idea 
is  forced  upon  us,  that  as  accountable  beings,  the  subjects 
of  mental  deficiency  must  be  viewed  in  a  very  different 


82  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

light  from  that  in  which  we  are  accustomed  to  regard  those 
of  sound  and  well-developed  minds.  The  observations  of 
Georget  on  the  moral  faculties  of  imbeciles,  partially  supply 
this  defect  in  Hoffbauer's  descriptions,  and  therefore  are 
worthy  of  notice  in  this  connexion. 

§  55.  "  In  hospitals  for  the  insane,"  says  he,  "  there  is 
always  a  certain  number  of  imbeciles  who  do  the  coarser 
work  of  the  house,  or  serve  as  domestics  and  assistants  to 
the  regular  officers.  They  become  sufficiently  intelligent, 
at  last,  to  perform  their  duties  well,  to  sweep  the  courts, 
carry  burdens,  move  machines,  execute  simple  commis- 
sions, know  the  use  of  money,  and  procure  various  enjoy- 
ments. But  they  have  no  idea,  or  a  very  imperfect  one,  of 
society,  laws,  morality,  courts  and  trials  ;  and  though  they 
may  have  the-4dea  of  property,  they  have  no  conception  of 
the  consequences  of  theft.  They  may  have  been  taught  to 
refrain  from  injuring  others.,  but  they  are  ignorant  of  w"hat 
would  be  done  to  them  if  guilty  of  incendiarism  or  murder. 
Indeed,  it  is  well  known  how  common  theft  is  among  imbe- 
cile's and  idiots,  and  for  a  very  obvious  reason.  Some  of 
them  have  no  conception  of  property,  nor  of  the  distinctions 
of  meum  and  tuum;  their  conduct  is  actuated  solely  by  the 
fear  of  punishment,  when  capable  of  experiencing  this  sen- 
timent, and  by  their  own  desires.  Others  have  some  notions 
of  property,  but  neither  a  sense  of  morality,  nor  a  fear  of 
punishment  furnish  motives  sufficiently  powerful  to  prev.ent 
them  from  stealing.  The  sentiment  of  cunning,  too,  may 
be  very  much  developed,  while  the  other  faculties  are  more 
or  less  deficient.  Among  the  lower  orders  of  society,  are 
many  imbeciles  a  little  more  intelligent  than  these,  and  not 
considered  as  utterly  devoid  of  understanding,  who,  never- 
theless have  but  vague  and  imperfect  notions  of  social  duties 
and  of  justice.  They  engage  in  occupations  that  require  no 
great  extent  of  intellect,  and  even  in  the  simplest  of  the 
mechanic  arts.  If  they  do  not  pass  among  their  acquaint- 


IMBECILITY.  83 

ances  for  imbeciles,  they  are  at  least  regarded  as  singular 
beings,  with  feeble  understandings,  and  are  teazed  and  tor- 
mented in  innumerable  ways.  Many  of  them,  for  want  of 
some  powerfully  restraining  motive,  indulge  in  drinking,  and 
become  lazy,  drunken,  and  dissipated,  and  finally  fall  into 
the  hands  of  justice  in  greater  numbers  than  is  generally 
suspected.  They  steal  adroitly,  and  hence  are  consid- 
ered as  very  intelligent;  they  recommence  their  offences 
the  moment  -they  are  released  from  confinement,  and 
thus  are  believed  to  be  obstinately  perverse ;  they  are 
violent  and  passionate,  and  the  slightest  motive  is  sufficient 
to  plunge  them  into  deeds  of  incendiarism  and  murder. 
Those  who  have  strong  sexual  propensities,  soon  become 
guilty  of  outrages  on  female  chastity.  I  have  had  occasion 
to  see  many  examples  of  this  class  in  prisons,  who  had  been 
judicially  decided  to  be  rational,  but  whose  demi-imbecility 
was  manifest  enough  to  me."  l 

If  this  is  a  correct  representation  of  the  moral  character 
of  the  lesser  grades  of  imbecility — and  the  accuracy  and 
good  faith  of  Georget  are  not  to  be  doubted  —  it  may  be 
easily  imagined,  without  the  help  of  further  description, 
what  it  must  be  in  the  higher  degrees. 

§  56.  By  imbecility  is  ordinary  understood  a  deficiency 
of  intellect;  but  it  has  been  seen  above  (§  41)  that  its 
signification  is  here  extended,  in  order  to  include  that 
class  of  subjects  in  whom  the  mental  defect  consists  in 
a  great  deficiency,  if  riot  utter  destitution  of  the  higher 
moral  faculties,  the  intellectual,  perhaps,  not  being  sensibly 
affected.  The  following  case  will  illustrate  this  form  of  the 
disorder. 

E.  S.,  aged  thirty-four,  who  had  been  ten  years  an  inmate 

1  Discussion  mMico-legale  sur  la  Folie,  140 ;  and  Des  maladies 
mentales,  considerees  dans  leurs  rapports  avec  la  legislation  civile 
et  criminelle,  8. 


84  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

of  the  Richmond  Lunatic  Asylum,  in  Dublin,  was  brought 
before  Mr.  George  Combe,  during  a  visit  to  that  institution, 
on  the  20th  of  April,  1829,  to  be  subjected,  with  several 
others,  to  a  phrenological  examination.  A  few  months 
after,  Dr.  Crawford,  the  physician  of  the  asylum,  addressed 
a  letter  to  Mr.  Combe  respecting  this  patient,  from  which 
the  following  description  is  taken.  "  You  observe  in  your 
notes,  c  I  am  surprised  he  was  not  executed  before  he 
became  insane.'  This  would  lead  to  the  supposition  that 
he  had  been  afflicted  with  some  form  of  insanity,  in  addition 
to  a  naturally  depraved  character.  Such,  however,  is  by 
no  means  the  case  ;  he  never  was  different  from  what  he 
now  is ;  he  has  never  evinced  the  slightest  mental  incohe- 
rence on  any  one  point,  nor  any  kind  of  hallucination.  It 
is  one  of  those  cases  where  there  is  great  difficulty  in 
drawing  the  line  between  extreme  moral  depravity  and 
insanity,  and  in  deciding  at  what  point  an  individual  should 
cease  to  be  considered  as  a  responsible  moral  agent,  and 
amenable  to  the  laws.  The  governors  and  medical  gentle- 
men of  the  asylum  have  often  had  doubts  whether  they 
were  justified  in  keeping  E.  S,  as  a  lunatic^  thinking  him  a 
more  fit  subject  for  a  Bridewell.  He  appears,  however,  so 
totally  callous  with  regard  to  every  moral  principle  and 
feeling  —  so  thoroughly  unconscious  of  ever  having  done 
anything  wrong  —  so  completely  destitute  of  all  sense  of 
shame  or  remorse  when  reproved  for  his  vices  or  crimes  — 
and  has  proved  himself  utterly  incorrigible  throughout  life, 
that  it  is  almost  certain  that  any  jury  before  whom  he  might 
be  brought  would  satisfy  their  doubts  by  returning  him 
insane,  which,  in  such  a  case,  is  the  most  humane  line  to 
pursue.  He  was  dismissed  several  times  from  the  asylum, 
and  sent  there  the  last  time  for  attempting  to  poison  his 
father ;  and  it  seems  fit  he  should  be  kept  there  for  life  as 
a  moral  lunatic ;  but  there  has  never  been  the  least  symptom 


IMBECILITY. 


85 


of  diseased  action  of  the  brain,  which  is  the  general  con- 
comitant of  what  is  usually  understood  as  insanity" l 

§  57.  Nothing  can  be  more  certain  than  that  this  indi- 
vidual was  denied  by  nature  the  possession  of  those  moral 
faculties,  the  due  development  and  exercise  of  which  con- 
stitute an  essential  element  of  responsibility.  By  the  aid  of 
kind  and  intelligent  friends,  he  was  secluded  from  scenes,  in 
which  he  was  unfitted  to  mingle  ;  but  if,  on  the  contrary,  he 
had  been  suffered  to  go  at  large,  with  his  animal  propensities 
uncontrolled  by  the  higher  powers  of  our  moral  nature,  and 
constantly  meeting  with  opportunities  for  indulgence,  what 
else  could  have  been  expected  but  some  deed  of  violence, 
that  would  have  brought  upon  him  the  tender  mercies  of  the 
law  ?  Dr.  Crawford,  is  altogether  too  sanguine,  in  believing 
that  a  jury  would  have  pronounced  E.  S.  insane  ;  for  the 
melancholy  termination  of  the  cases  above  given,  teaches 
how  little  we  can  here  rely  on  the  intelligence  of  courts 
and  juries.  Had  he  committed  a  capital  crime,  he  would 
probably  have  been  condemned  and  executed,  while  the 
intelligent  and  the  educated,  the  philosopher  and  the  man  of 
the  worldj  would,  for  the  most  part,  have  joined  the  un 
thinking  populace,  in  thanking  God,  that  a  monster  of 
wickedness  had  fallen  beneath  the  arm  of  the  law. 

§  58.  In  a  class  of  cases,  by  no  means  unfrequent.  this 
moral  imbecility  is  particularly  manifested  in  a  morbid 
activity  of  the  destructive  propensity.  An  interesting  case 
of  this  kind  is  related  at  length  by  Parent  Duchatelet.8  Tbe 
subject  of  it  was  a  little  girl  fourteen  years  old,  who  lived 
with  her  grandmother,  a  very  respectable  and  religious 
woman,  till  the  age  of  seven,  when  she  returned  to  the 
charge  of  her  parents.  At  this  time,  she  is  described  as 
never  playing,  nor  crying,  nor  laughing.  She  had  been 

1  Edinburgh  Phrenological  Journal,  vi.  147. 

2  Annales  d'Hygiene,  7,  173. 

f 


86  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

taught  to  read  sew,  and  knit,  though  quite  averse  to  all 
instruction.  Her  mother  being  sick,  she  expressed  regret 
that  she  was  not  dead,  because  in  that  case  she  would 
inherit  her  mother's  clothes  which  she  would  alter  so  as  to 
wear  them  herself.  She  declared  that  she  would  have 
killed  her  while  sick  if  she  could  have  evaded  the  observa- 
tion of  the  attendants,  and  told  her  mother,  who  asked  how 
she  would  have  accomplished  her  purpose,  that  she  would 
have  plunged  a  poignard  into  her  bosom.  She  said  she  was 
aware  her  father  would  put  her  in  prison,  but  that  would  not 
deter  her.  A  few  months  afterwards,  on  the  occasion  of 
the  murder  of  a  child,  she  told  her  mother  that  if  she  had 
killed  her  with  a  knife  she  would  have  got  blood  on  her 
clothes  which  would  have  led  to  discovery,  and  therefore 
she  would  have  taken  care  to  undress,  before  committing  the 
act.  Subsequently  she  said,  she  would  use  poison,  in  order 
to  kill  her  mother.  She  frequently  declared  that  she  never 
loved  her  father,  nor  mother,  nor  grandmother.  It  appears 
that  from  the  age  of  four  years,  she  was  addicted  to  the 
practice  of  self-abuse,  and  no  precautions  nor  persuasions 
could  deter  her  from  this  dreadful  habit.  Such  was  the 
moral  state  of  this  child,  now  eight  years  old,  when  she  was 
examined  by  a  commissary  of  police,  and  sent  to  a  convent. 
At  the  age  of  fourteen,  she  appears  to  have  abandoned  her 
murderous  designs,  but  continued  dejected  and  silent. 

§  59.  This  form  of  insanity,  which  is  above  denominated 
moral  imbecility,  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from  that  in  which 
the  intellect  is  affected,  is  not  very  rare  in  receptacles  for 
the  insane,  and  is  more  common  in  society  than  is  generally 
suspected.  It  is  seldom  regarded  in  its  true  light,  and  when 
its  subjects  have  occupied  a  high  place  in  society,  and  thus 
been  enabled  to  indulge  more  freely  their  mischievous  pro- 
pensities, they  have  often  been  consigned  by  the  historian 
to  the  eternal  execrations  of  mankind.  Count  Charolais, 
brother  of  the  duke  de  Bourbon  Conde,  whose  sanguinary 


IMBECILITY.  87 

character  has  been  commemorated  by  Lacretelle,  was  un- 
doubtedly a  case  of  this  kind.  He  manifested  an  instinct 
of  cruelty  in  the  very  sports  of  his  childhood.  He  took  a 
pleasure  in  torturing  animals,  and  committing  the  most 
ferocious  acts  of  violence  against  his  domestics.  He  would 
stand  at  his  window  and  shoot  the  artisans  at  work  upon 
the  neighboring  buildings,  merely  for  the  pleasure  of  seeing 
them  tumble  from  the  roofs  and  ladders.  It  is  said  that  he 
loved  to  stain  even  his  debaucheries  with  blood,  and  com- 
mitted many  murders  from  no  motive  of  interest,  or  anger.1 
Dr.  Rush  says  that  in  the  course  of  his  life,  he  had  been 
consulted  in  three  cases  of  moral  imbecility ;  and  nothing 
can  better  express  the  true  characters  of  their  physiology, 
than  his  remark  respecting  them.  "  In  all  these  cases,"  he 
observes,  "  there  is  probably  an  original  defective  organiza- 
tion in  those  parts  of  the  body  which  are  occupied  by  the 
moral  faculties  of  the  mind,"  *  —  an  explanation  that  will 
receive  but  little  countenance  in  an  age  that  derives  its 
ideas  of  the  mental  phenomena  from  the  exclusive  observa- 
tion of  mind  in  a  state  of  acknowledged  health  and  vigor. 
To  understand  these  cases  properly,  requires  a  knowledge 
of  our  moral  and  intellectual  constitution,  to  be  obtained 
only  by  a  practical  acquaintance  with  the  innumerable 
phases  of  the  mind,  as  presented  in  its  various  degrees  of 
strength  and  weakness,  of  health  and  disease,  amid  all  its 
transitions  from  brutish  idiocy  to  the  most  commanding 
intellect. 

§  60.  The  prevalent  error  of  looking  at  mind  in  the 
abstract,  as  a  unique  principle  endowed  with  a  certain  ap- 
preciable measure  of  strength  and  activity,  has  been  the 
cause  of  much  dispute  and  discrepancy  of  opinion,  in  cases 
where  the  acts  of  persons  affected  with  Hoffbauer's  first 
-degree  of  imbecility,  have  been  made  the  object  of  judicial 

1  Histoire  de  France,  ii.  59.  2  Diseases  of  the  Mind,  357. 


88  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY, 

investigation.  One  witness  has  observed  a  range  and  tena- 
city of  memory  which  he  could  not  square  with  his  notions 
of  mental  weakness  ;  another,  perhaps,  has  seen  the  party 
whose  acts  are  in  question  conducting  himself  with  the  ut- 
most propriety,  and  observing  the  social  usages  proper  to 
his  station,  and  this  he  has  deemed  incompatible  with  imbe- 
cility of  mind ;.  while  another  has  heard  him  replying  to 
questions  on  common-place  subjects,  readily  and  appropri- 
ately, and  he  also  draws  similar  conclusions.  On  the  other 
hand,  he  is  seen  engaging  in  occupations  and  amusements, 
and  associating  wi*h  company  seemingly  below  the  dignity 
of  his  age,  or  station,  by  one  who  desires  no  further  proof 
of  an  imbecile  mind  ;  or  he  may  be  so  extravagantly  vain 
of  some  personal  accomplishments,  as  to  impress  another 
with  the  idea,  that  his  understanding  has  scarcely  the 
strength  of  a  child's.  And  it  is  worthy  of  notice,  that 
oftentimes  the  very  fact  which  furnishes  undoubted  proof  of 
imbecility  to  one  observer,  conveys  an  unshaken  conviction 
of  mental  soundness  to  another.  Few,  indeed,  are  capable 
of  sounding  the  depths  of  another's  intelligence,  because 
few  are  aware  of  the  necessity,  or  have  the  ability  if  they 
were,  of  scrutinizing,  not  one  act  or  trait  of  character  alone, 
but  every  intellectual  manifestation  as  it  appears  in  the  con- 
duct, conversation  and  manners,  as  the  only  means  of  ob- 
taining an  insight  into  his  real,  mental  capacity.  Scarcely 
a  case  comes  up  in  which  the  understanding  of  an  imbecile 
is  judicially  investigated,  that  does  not  furnish  striking  illus- 
trations of  this  fact,  as  might  be  shown  by  numerous  instan- 
ces in  point.  The  following,  however,  the  first  of  which 
was  adjudicated  in  1832,  may  serve  as  examples. 

§  61.  "  Miss  Bagster  was  a  young- lady  of  fortune,  and 
perpetrated  a  runaway-match  with  Mr.  Newton.  An  appli- 
cation was  made  by  her  family  to  dissolve  the  marriage,  on 
the  ground  that  she  was  of  unsound  mind.  The  facts  urged 
against  her  before  the  commissioners,  were,  that  she  had 


IMBECILITY.  89 

been  a  violent,  self-willed,  and  passionate  child  ;  that  this 
continued  till  she  grew  up  ;  that  she  was  totally  ignorant  of 
arithmetic,  and  therefore  incapable  of  taking  care  of  her 
property  ;  that  she  had  evinced  a  great  fondness  for  matri- 
mony, having  engaged  herself  to  several  persons  ;  and  that, 
in  many  respects,  she  evinced  little  of  the  delicacy  becom- 
ing her  sex.  Dr.  Sutherland  had  visited  her  four  times,  and 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  she  was  incapable  of  taking  care 
of  herself  or  of  her  property.  She  had  memory,  but  neither 
judgment  nor  reasoning  power.  Dr.  Gordon  did  not  consider 
her  capacity  to  exceed  that  of  a  child  of  seven  years  of  age. 
Several  non-medical  witnesses,  who  had  known  her  from  in- 
fancy, spoke  of  her  extremely  passionate,  and  occasionally 
indelicate  conduct.  On  her  examination,  however,  before 
the  commissioners,  her  answers  were  pertinent  and  in  a 
proper  manner.  No  indelicate  remark  escaped  from  her, 
Drs.  Morrison  and  Haslam  had  both  visited  her,  and  were 
not  disposed  to  consider  her  imbecile  or  idiotic.  She  con- 
fessed and  lamented  her  ignorance  of  arithmetic,  but  said 
that  her  grandfather  sent  excuses  when  she  was  at  school, 
and  begged  that  she  might  not  be  pressed.  Her  conversa- 
tion generally  impressed  these  gentlemen  in  a  favorable 
manner  as  to  her  sanity.  The  jury  brought  in  a  verdict, 
that  Miss  Bagster  had  been  of  unsound  mind  since  Novem- 
ber 1,  1830,  and  the  marriage  was  consequently  dissolved." J 
§  62.  There  would  seem  to  have  been  no  doubt  as  to 
the  existence  of  some  degree  of  mental  deficiency  in  this 
young  lady ;  the  question  was,  whether  it  was  consti- 
tutional, or  merely  the  result  of  a  neglected  education  and 
misplaced  indulgences,  and  consequently  capable  of  being 
remedied.  In  proof  of  its  constitutional  nature,  we  have 
the  opinion  of  a  respectable  physician,  that  she  was  incapa- 


1  1  Beck,  Medical  Jurisprudence,  579. 
8* 


90  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OP   INSANITY. 

ble  of  taking  care  of  herself  or  of  her  property ;  and  of 
another,  that  her  capacity  did  not  exceed  that  of  a  child 
seven  years  old,  which  opinion  is  corroborated  by  the  facts 
in  evidence,  that  she  was  extremely  passionate,  and  often 
indelicate  in  her  conduct ;  that  her  mind  ran  greatly  upon 
matrimony  ;  and  that  she  had  not  made  the  most  ordinary 
attainments  in  knowledge.  On  the  other  hand,  it  appears 
that  her  education  was  unquestionably  neglected  ;  that,  be- 
fore the  commissioners,  her  answers  were  pertinent  and  in 
a  proper  manner ;  and  that  two  eminent  physicians  were 
not  disposed  to  consider  her  idiotic  or  imbecile.  It  is  obvi- 
ous, that  in  cases  like  this,  the  opinions  of  the  medical  wit- 
nesses will  depend,  very  much,  if  not  altogether,  on  the 
extent  of  their  previous  acquaintance  with  the  manifestations 
of  the  mind,  both  in  its  normal  and  abnormal  conditions-. 
Hence  it  is  that  a  trait  by  no  means  incompatible  with  im- 
becility was  considered,  in  this  case,  as  indicative  of  a  proper 
soundness  of  mind.  Persons  laboring  under  far  more  im- 
becility than  Miss  Bagster,  are  capable,  on  occasions,  of  con- 
trolling themselves  and  concealing  their  more  prominent 
faults,  to  such  a  degree  that  a  stranger  finds  it  difficult  to 
believe,  that  in  point  of  understanding,  they  are  much  be- 
low the  level  of  ordinary  people.  It  should  be  recollected 
that  imbecility  is  manifested  in  the  conduct  and  manners, 
as  well  as  the  thoughts  and  language ;  and  when  it  is  con- 
sidered, that  persons  like  Miss  Bagster,  are  confessedly  of 
narrow  understandings,  and  often  of  defective  education,  it 
could  not  be  expected  that  strong  indications  of  imbecility 
would  be  observed  in  their  conversation  alone.  Her  answers, 
it  seems,  were  pertinent,  and  properly  delivered,  as  they 
might  well  have  been,  if  they  related  to  things,  in  which 
she  was  particularly  interested  and  were  not  beyond  her 
powers  of  comprehension,  and  she  still  have  been  imbecile 
or  stupid.  In  the  description  of  the  first  degree  of  imbe- 
cility, already  quoted  (§  47),  Hoff  bauer  expressly  says  that 


IMBECILITY.  91 

u  the  individual  can  very  well  judge  respecting  objects  to 
which  he  is  daily  accustomed,  and  in  familiarity  with  which 
he  may  be  said  to  have  grown  up."  It  may  be  also  added, 
that  their  answers  are  sometimes  not  only  pertinent,  but 
characterized  by  considerable  pith  and  shrewdness. 

Miss  Bagster's  education  was,  no  doubt,  grossly  neglected, 
but  this  circumstance  could  not  have  produced  so  much 
mental  deficiency  as  to  have  impressed  a  careful  and  intelli- 
gent observer,  with  the  conviction  that  her  capacity  did  not 
exceed  that  of  a  child  seven  years  old.  Neglected  or  vicious 
education  is  a  cause  of  ignorance,  but  can  never  degrade 
the  mind  into  a  state  of  imbecility  or  stupidity,  which  are 
always  either  congenital,  or  the  effect  of  disease.  Dr.  Mor- 
rison indeed  stated  under  oath,  that  he  would  undertake  to 
teach  her,  in  six  months,  arithmetic  and  the  use  of  money, 
but  his  success  would  have  been  far  from  disproving  the  ex- 
istence of  imbecility.  It  is  not  doubted  that  in  this  condi- 
tion of  mind,  there  is  some  susceptibility  of  education,  and 
the  cases  are  not  unfrequent,  where,  in  regard  to  one  or  two 
particular  powers,  the  individual  is  quite  on  a  level  with  his 
more  happily-endowed  fellow-men.1 

i 1  regret  that  the  drift  of  these  remarks  on  Miss  Bagster's  case 
has  been  entirely  misunderstood.  In  a  notice  of  this  work  in  the 
British  and  Foreign  Medical  Review  (July  1840),  they  are  pro- 
nounced to  be  in  contradiction  with  the  views  subsequently  ex- 
pressed in  the  chapter  on  Interdiction,  and  charged  with  favoring 
legal  oppression.  This  case  was  quoted  for  the  purpose  of  illustrat- 
ing that  discrepancy  of  opinion  and  irrelevancy  of  facts  so  often 
witnessed  in  medico-legal  investigations  of  cases  of  mental  imbe- 
cility which  is  the  subject  of  the  preceding  paragraph.  In  the 
comments  which  follow,  my -object  was  merely  to  examine  the  value 
of  certain  evidence  and  show  how  far  it  proved  or  disproved  mental 
imbecility  generally.  I  contend  that  certain  facts  alleged  in 
disproof  of  imbecility,  are  not  incompatible  with  that  condition, 
and  it  may  be  inferred,  no  .doubt,  from  my  remarks,  that  I  con- 
sidered Miss  B.  as  laboring  under  some  degree  of  imbecility,  a  point 


92  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

§  63.  In  the  case  of  Portsmouth  v.  Portsmouth,  which 
was  a  suit  of  nullity  of  marriage,  on  the  ground  of  the  men- 
tal unsoundness  (which  was,  in  fact,  imbecility  in  the  first 
degree)  of  the  husband,  the  Earl  of  Portsmouth,  numerous 
facts  were  deposed  to  by  witnesses,  in  proof  that  he  pos- 
sessed a  capacity  and  understanding  fully  equal  to  the  ordi- 
nary transactions  of  life.  It  appeared  that  when  at  school, 
he  evinced  a  very  good  memory,  and  made  respectable  pro- 
ficiency in  arithmetic  and  the  languages  ;  and  that,  after 
coming  of  age,  he  settled  accounts  with  his  agents ;  attended 
public  meetings  and  committees ;  prosecuted  an  offender, 
and  was  examined  as  a  witness ;  and  that  his  friends  had 
failed  in  making  him  the  object  of  a  commission  of  lunacy. 
In  regard  to  these  circumstances,  the  court,  Sir  John  Nicholl, 
observed  in  substance,  that  the  capacity  for  instruction  and 
improvement  is  possessed  even  by  the  brute  creation,  and 
therefore  did  not  of  itself  disprove  the  fact  of  imbecility ; 
that  when  he  appeared  as  a  witness  in  a  court  of  justice,  it 
was  only  a  simple  fact  he  had  to  state,  requiring  little,  if 

which  the  reviewer  himself  admits.  Whether  the  imbecility  were 
of  such  a  kind  as  to  incapacitate  her  from  being  a  party  to  the  mar- 
riage contract,  is  a  question  very  different  from  that  of  imbecility 
in  the  abstract,  and  one  which  I  did  not  pretend  to  discuss.  For 
anything  I  have  said  to  the  contrary,  it  may  have  been  the  height  of 
injustice  to  annul  this  marriage.  What  foundation,  then,  has  the 
reviewer  for  his  assertion,  that  the  author  "  comes  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  verdict  was  correct,  -and  that  this  lady  was  really  imbecile 
to  a  degree  requiring  legal  interference  ?  "  A  closer  examination  of 
my  remarks  on  this  case  would  have  satisfied  the  reviewer,  I 
think,  that  they  are  nowise  contradictory  to  the  general  principle 
prominently  set  forth  in  various  parts  of  this  work, —  that  the  legal 
consequences  of  the  various  forms  of  insanity,  are  to  be  determined 
by  no  general  arbitrary  rule,  but  always  in  reference  to  the  particu- 
lar act  in  question.  I  have  since  carefully  read  the  report  of  this 
case  in  the  Medical  Gazette,vol.  x.,  and  have  no  hesitation  in  con- 
cluding that  the  verdict  was  correct,  and  that  this  lady  was  really 
imbecile  to  a  degree  requiring  legal  interference. 


IMBECILITY.  93 

anything,  more  than  memory,  and  that  his  cross-examina- 
tion could  require  nothing  more  than  the  recollection  of 
facts  —  not  any  considerable  exercise  of  the  understanding 
and  of  the  reasoning  powers  ;  that  his  behavior  in  company, 
and  his  few  observations  on  the  state  of  the  weather,  horses, 
and  farming,  were  not  incompatible  with  great  imbecility  of 
mind,  because,  under  the  restraint  produced  by  formal  com- 
pany and  by  the  sense  of  being  observed,  the  more  promi- 
nent features  of  imbecility  would  be  shaded,  and  the  indi- 
vidual might  pass  as  possessing  a  considerable  degree  of 
understanding.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  satisfactorily  proved 
that  he  had  always  been  treated  by  his  family  as  one  of  fee- 
ble capacity,  and  by  a  family-arrangement,  he  was  married, 
when  thirty-two  years  of  age,  to  a  lady  of  forty-seven,  evi- 
dently for  the  purpose  of  saving  him  from  improper  con- 
nexions, and  obtaining  for  him  suitable  care  and  protection. 
It  appeared  that  his  servants  were  his  play-fellows,  and  that 
he  played  all  sorts  of  tricks  with  them  ;  that  he  was  fond  of 
driving  a  team,  and  that  his  wife  so  far  indulged  him,  as  to 
have  a  team  of  horses  kept  for  his  amusement  as  a  toy  and 
a  plaything,  with  which  he  carted  dung,  timber,  and  hay ; 
that  he  had  a  propensity  for  bell-ringing,  was  fond  of  slaugh- 
tering cattle,  arid  indulged  in  wanton  cruelty  towards  man 
and  beast,  never  expressing  regret,  but  merely  observing, 
"  serves  him  right,"  on  his  own  acts  of  cruelty.  It  also  ap- 
peared that  a  medical  man  was  taken  into  the  family,  to 
assist  in  superintending  the  earl,  and  that  he  obtained  com- 
plete ascendency  over  him,  the  mention  of  his  name  being 
sufficient  to  intimidate  him  and  exact  his  obedience.  This 
gentleman  at  last  thought  it  prudent  to  deliver  up  his  charge 
to  the  earl's  trustees  in  London,  one  of  whom,  within  one 
week  after,  married  him  to  his  own  daughter.  This  mar- 
riage was  declared  by  the  court  null  and  void.1  In  the  above 

1 1  Haggard,  359.     The  reader  who  wishes  to  extend  his  inquirias 
farther,  will  find  in  the  judgment  of  Sir  John  Nicholl,  in  Ingram  v. 


94  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

statement  a  few  facts  only  have  been  selected  from  a 
mass  of  evidence  given  by  one  hundred  and  twenty-four 
witnesses  ;  but  this  is  sufficient  to  illustrate  the  general  prin- 
ciple that  proof  of  imbecility  is  not  to  be  found  in  a  few  in- 
sulated facts,,  but  in  an  investigation  of  the  whole  character 
and  conduct  of  the  party. 


Wyatt,  1  Haggard  384,  some  excellent  observations  on  the  charac- 
ters of  imbecility,  besides  a  masterly  analysis  of  evidence  relative 
to  this  condition,  ranging  through  a  life  of  seventy-four  years. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    MENTAL    DEFICIENCY. 

§  64.  THE  general  principles  that  determine  the  legal  re- 
lations of  idiocy  are  so  obvious,  and  the  fact  of  its  existence 
so  easily  established,  that  little  occasion  has  been  afforded  for 
doubt  or  diversity  of  opinion.  The  maxims  of  the  law  have 
sprung  from  the  suggestions  of  common  sense,  and  its  pro- 
visions have  equal  reference  to  the  best  interests  of  its 
wretched  subjects  and  of  those  who  are  about  them.  It  may 
be  mentioned  as  a  curious  fact  however,  that  while  the  idiot 
is  denied  the  enjoyment  of  most  of  the  civil  rights,  he  is 
quietly  left  by  the  constitutions  of  the  several  states  of  the 
union,  in  possession  of  one  of  those  political  rights,  that  of 
suffrage,  the  very  essence  of  which  is  the  deliberate  and 
unbiased  exercise  of  a  rational  will.  How  this  anomaly 
has  arisen,  it  is  not  easy  to  conceive.  A  natural  jealousy  of 
any  attempt  to  encroach  upon  the  popular  right,  might  ap- 
prehend evils  to  this  institution,  in  allowing  the  mental  quali- 
fications of  voters  to  be  too  closely  scrutinized,  but  such 
fears  could  hardly  have  been  expected  in  view  of  the  un- 
limited control  maintained  by  the  law  over  the  property  and 
personal  liberty  of  idiots. 

§  65.  The  little  indulgence  shown  to  imbecility  in  crim- 
inal courts,  sufficiently  indicates  that  either  the  psychological 
nature  of  this  condition  of  mind  is  very  imperfectly  under- 
stood, or  the  true  ground  on  which  the  idea  of  responsibility 


96  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

reposes  is  not  clearly  perceived.  Whichever  it  may  be,  it 
may  no  doubt  be  attributed  to  the  prevalent  habit  of  study- 
ing the  moral  and  intellectual  phenomena  in  sound  and 
healthy  minds  only,  without  a  suspicion,  apparently,  of  the 
great  modifications  they  present,  when  the  development  of 
the  cerebral  organism  is  interrupted  by  disease.  It  will  be 
necessary,  therefore,  before  coming  to  any  positive  conclu- 
sions relative  to  the  legal  accountability  of  imbeciles,  to 
bring  into  view  some  considerations  on  this  point,  which 
have  been  too  much,  if  not  altogether,  overlooked. 

§  66.  Our  moral  and  intellectual  constitution  is  constructed 
in  harmony  with  the  external  world  on  which  it  acts  and  by 
which  it  is  acted  upon  ;  the  result  of  this  mutual  action  being 
the  happiness  and  spiritual  advancement  of  an  immortal 
being.  Thus  endowed  with  the  powers  of  performing  the 
part  allotted  us,  and  placed  in  a  situation  suitable  for  exer- 
cising and  developing  them,  we  become  accountable  for  the 
manner  in  which  they  are  used, — to  our  Maker,  under  all 
circumstances,  to  our  fellow-men,  when  the  institutions  of 
society  are  injured.  All  legal  responsibility,  therefore,  is 
founded  on  this  principle  of  adaptation,  and  ceases  whenever 
either  of  its  elements  is  taken  away.  The  intellect  must 
not  only  be  sufficiently  developed,  to  acquaint  the  individual 
with  the  existence  of  external  objects,  and  with  some  of  their 
relations  to  him,  but  the  moral  powers  must  be  sound  enough 
and  strong  enough  to  furnish,  each  its  specific  incentives,  to 
pursue  that  course  of  conduct  which  the  intellect  has  already 
approved.  It  is  nothing  that  the  mind  is  competent  to  dis- 
cern some  of  the  most  ordinary  relations  of  things,  and  is 
sensible  of  the  impropriety  of  certain  actions  ;  for  so  long 
as  the  individual  is  incapable  by  defect  of  constitution  of 
feeling  the  influence  of  those  hopes  and  fears  and  of  all 
those  sentiments  and  affections  that  man  naturally  possesses, 
an  essential  element  of  legal  responsibility  is  wanting,  and 
he  is  not  fully  accountable  for  his  actions. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES.  97 

• 

§  67.  In  the  normal  mind  the  idea  of  crime  is  associated 
with  those  of  injury  and  wrong;  can  we  then  impute  crime 
where  there  is  neither  intention  nor  consciousness  of- wrong  ? 
For  want  of  the  higher  and  nobler  faculties,  the  actions  of 
the  imbecile  are  contemplated  by.  him  solely  in  relation  to 
himself;  not  a  thought  enters  his  mind 'respecting  their  con- 
sequences to  others.  For  the  same  reason  that  he  puts  to 
death  a  brute,  that  of  mere  personal  gratification,  he  mur- 
ders a  fellow-being,  and  is  constitutionally  unable  to 'appre- 
ciate any  difference  in  the  moral  character  of  the  two  ac- 
tions. In  the  latter  case,  as  in  the  former,  he  has  a  selfish 
object  in  view,  and  is  restrained  from  pursuing  his  purpose 
by  none  of  the  considerations  that  actuate  the  sound  and 
well-developed  mind.  The  natural  right  of  every  one  to 
the  undisturbed  possession  of  his  own  life,  and  the  sentiment 
of  wrong  awakened  by  the  infliction  of  injury,  are  things  as 
far  beyond  the  sphere  of  his  contemplations,  as  the  most  diffi- 
cult problem  in  mathematics,  and  he  merely  feels  the  ani- 
mal impulse  —  which  to  him  has  the  strength  of  a  natural 
right,  —  to  appropriate  to  himself  whatever  will  conduce  to 
his  momentary  gratification.  The  thought  of  the  wounds 
inflicted  on  the  friends  and  connexions  of  his  victim  by  his 
decease,  cannot  restrain  him,  because  the  feelings  of 
benevolence  and  sympathy  which  they  suppose,  are  utter 
strangers- to  his  own  bosom;  and  it  would  be  preposterous 
to  expect  him  to  be  influenced  by  a  regard  to  feelings  which 
he  never  experienced  himself.  The  sense  of  future  ac- 
countability cannot  restrain  him,  for  the  idea  of  an  Almighty, 
All-seeing  Being,  ever  witnessing  his  actiorfs,  is  too  confus- 
ed and  too  limited  in  his  mind,  to  present  the  slightest  check 
to  the  indulgence  of  his  caprices  and  passions.  The  fear  of 
punishment  cannot  restrain  him,  because  his  intellect  can 
discern  no  necessary  connexion  between  his  crime  and  the 
penalty  attached  to  it,  even  if  he  were  aware  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  penalty.  To  make  such  a  person  responsible 
9 


98  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

» 

for  his  actions  to  the  same  degree  as  one  enjoying  the  full 
vigor  and  soundness  of  the  higher  faculties,  is  therefore 
manifestly  unjust ;  because  an  essential  element  of  respon- 
sibility is  a  power  to  refrain  from  evil-doing,  which  power  is 
furnished  by  the  exercise  of  those  faculties,  that  are  but  im- 
perfectly, if  at  all,  developed  in  the  imbecile.  The  law 
looks  only  to  the  intention,  not  to  the  amount  of  injury  com- 
mitted ;  and  since  there  can  be  no  criminal  intention  where 
there  is  no  consciousness  of  wrong,  it  cannot  properly  reach 
those  wretched  objects,  who,  to  use  the  expression  of  one  of 
them,  whose  case  will  be  shortly  noticed,  "  can  see  no  dif- 
ference between  killing  an  ox,  and  killing  a  man." 

§  68.  Many,  it  is  true,  find  it  hard  to  be  convinced  that 
one  who  labors  under  no  delusion,  and  enjoys  a  certain  de- 
gree, at  least,  of  moral  liberty,  may  still  not  be  responsible 
for  his  criminal  acts.  They  see  perhaps  that  he  has  intelli- 
gence enough  to  perform  the  inferior  kinds  of  employment, 
and  feel  assured  that  observation  must  have  made  him  ac- 
quainted with  the  consequences  of  such  acts,  even  though  a 
stranger  to  that  high  moral  power  which  instinctively  teaches 
the  distinctions  of  right  and  wrong.  "  He  knew  better," 
is  their  language,  "  and  therefore  justice  requires  his  punish- 
ment." The  error  of  this  reasoning  arises  in  the  vulgar 
habit  of  estimating  the  strength  and  extent  of  the  moral 
faculties  by  the  ability  to  go  through  certain  mechanical 
duties,  and  provide  for  the  wants  and  exigencies  of  the 
present  moment.  Not  only  has  this  ability  no  connexion 
with  the  moral  sentiments,  but  it  is  not  even  an  index  of  the 
measure  of  inteHigence  ;  any  more  than  the  skill  of  the  bee 
or  beaver  in  erecting  their  structures,  is  indicative  of  great 
intellectual  resources.  These  degraded  specimens  of  our 
race  are  not  without  the  capacity  of  being  educated  in  a 
limited  degree  ;  and  thus  like  those  inferior  animals  which 
man  has  made  conducive  to  his  comfort,  they  are  trained  to 
perform  some  kinds  of  service  with  tolerable  merit.  This, 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES.  99 

however,  no  more  proceeds  from  the  kind  of  intelligence 
that  discerns  moral  truth,  than  the  insolated  talent  for  music 
or  construction  not  unfrequently  met  with  in  the  complete 
idiot. 

§  69.  For  the  purpose  of  illustrating  and  confirming  the 
above  views,  some  account  will  now  be  given  of  a  few 
criminal  trials,  the  subjects  of  which  seem  to  have  been  affect- 
ed with  mental  imbecility,  stating  very  briefly  the  facts  as 
they  are  found  recorded,  and  accompanying  them  with  such 
reflections  as  the  particular  circumstances  of  the  case  re- 
quite. They  are  well  worth  the  consideration  of  every 
honest  and  unprejudiced  inquirer,  for  he  will  find  in  them  a 
kind  of  information  which  he  can  obtain  from  no  other 
quarter,  and  he  will  be  able  to  see  for  himself,  how  little  of 
true  philosophy  has  presided  over  this  department  of  crim- 
inal jurisprudence. 

§70.  In  November,  1821,  John  Schmidt,  aged  17, 
was  tried  at  Metz  for  parricide.  He  had  manifested,  from 
an  early  age,  a  proneness  to  mischief  and  even  cruelty. 
As  soon  as  he  was  old  enough  to  run  in  the  streets,  he  would 
amuse  himself  by  throwing  stones  into  the  rivulet,  that  ran 
through  the  village,  in  order  to  spatter  and  hurt  the  people 
who  were  passing  by,  many  of  whom  were  injured  by  him. 
They  contented  themselves,  however,  with  charging  his 
parents  to  take  care  of  him,  for  he  was  even  then  considered 
to  be  mad. 

The  first  count  in  the  indictment  charged  him  with 
wounding  on  the  head  his  sister-in-law,  in  one  of  their 
domestic  quarrels.  The  second  charged  him  with  an  at- 
tempt on  the  life  of  one  of  his  cousins,  whom  he  pushed 
into  the  water  while  fishing  by  the  side  of  a  pond,  and  then 
laughed  at  his  struggles  to  extricate  himself.  When  he 
finally  succeeded,  Schmidt  approached  him  and  asked  if 
he  were  wet,  and  if  the  water  had  reached  his  skin  ;  the 
hoy,  to  show  that  it  had,  opened  his  shirt,  when  Schmidt 


100  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

plunged  a  knife  in  his  bosom.     Happily,  the  wound   was 
not  severe. 

On  the  night  of  the  parricide,  the  father  was  boiling  pot- 
ashes. At  four  o'clock  in  the  morning  he  called  to  his  wife 
to  come  and  assist  him  in  lifting  the  kettle  from  the  fire,  but 
she  refused  and  ordered  John  to  go.  John  went  in  his  shirt, 
and  set  the  kettle  on  the  floor,  and  while  his  father  was 
bending  over  to  stir  the  potashes,  he  struck  him  a  blow  with 
a  hatchet  lying  near,  that  felled  him  senseless  to  the  ground. 
He  then  ascended  to  the  garret,  where  his  brother  and  sister 
were  sleeping,  and  severely  wounded  the  latter  with  'the 
hatchet.  On  being  seized  by  his  brother  soon  after,  he 
asked  to  see  his  father,  who  had  just  expired  ;  and  when 
gratified  in  this  wish,  he  uttered  these  remarkable  words  •  — 
"Ah,  my  dear  father,  where  are  you  now  ?  What  will  be- 
come of  me  ?  You  and  my  mother  are  the  cause  of  my 
misfortunes.  I  predicted  it  long  ago,  and  if  you  had  brought 
me  up  better,  this  would  not  have  happened."  When  asked 
what  had  induced  him  to  commit  such  an  atrocious  crime, 
he  replied  that  the  devil  undoubtedly  instigated  him.  He 
also  declared  that  the  itch  which  he  had  taken  from  his 
sister-in-law,  was  repelled,  and,  in  consequence,  frequently 
occasioned  a  mental  derangement  and  fits  of  fury  which 
impelled  him  to  sacrifice  everything.  Several  witnesses 
testified  that  he  had  always  been  remarkable  for  profound 
piety  and  religious  habits.  He  confessed  to  his  counsel  that 
whenever  he  saw  a  cutting  instrument,  such  as  a  hatchet,  a 
knife,  &c.,  he  felt  the  strongest  desire  to  seize  it,  and  wound 
the  first  person  that  came  in  his  way.  His  counsel  unsuc- 
cessfully pleaded  in  his  defence  mental  derangement,  though 
Schmidt  interrupted  him  by  declaring  that  he  was  not  mad. 
Shortly  before  the  fatal  hour,  food  was  brought  to  him,  but 
observing  it  to  be  meat,  he  refused  to  eat  it,  saying  that  in 
a  few  minutes  it  would  be  Friday.  As  he  walked  barefoot- 
ed to  the  place  of  execution,  his  confessor  asked  him  if  the 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES.  101 

pavement  did  not  hurt  him  ?  "  I  wish,"  he  replied,  they  had 
made  me  walk  on  thorns."  When  he  arrived  at  the  scaffold, 
they  cut  off  his  hand,  but  he  uttered  not  a  word  or  a  cry, 
and  remained  firm  to  the  last. 

§71.  Dr.  Marechal,  of  Metz,  who  communicated  this 
case,  observes  that  he  was  struck  with  the  smallness  of  the 
head,  and  its  singular  shape,  and  that  on  carefully  examining 
his  skull,  he  found  the  forehead  very  narrow  and  retreating, 
the  sinciput  tolerably  high,  and  a  marked  prominence  over 
the  ears.  He  said  it  had  the  same  shape  as  those  of  all  the 
idiots  mentioned  by  Pinel. 

§  72.  In  Schmidt  we  have  ample  confirmation  of  the  other 
indications  of  imbecility,  in  the  physical  structure,  which 
speaks  a  language  that  cannot  deceive.  If  his  cranium  were 
shaped  like  those  of  the  idiots  described  by  Pinel,  what  better 
manifestations  of  mind  or  morals  could  have  been  expected 
from  one  thus  stamped  by  nature  with  the  impress  of  inferi- 
ority ?  This  furnishes  an  explanation  of  his  early  indul- 
gence in  brutal  propensities,  to  such  a  degree,  as  to  be  re- 
garded mad  ;  and  gives  us  a  clew  to  the  cause  of  his  at- 
tempts on  life,  solely  for  the  momentary  gratification  they 
afforded  ;  of  the  motiveless  and  cold-blooded  murder  of  his 
father ;  and  of  that  regard  of  religious  observances  which 
had  no  better  foundation  than  the  merest  superstition.  His 
inclination  to  kill  on  seeing  a  cutting  instrument,  shows  some 
morbid  action  in  the  brain  not  uncommon  in  imbecility, 
which  is  also  indicated  by  the  paroxysms  of  fury  in  which 
he  felt  himself  urged  on  to  indiscriminate  slaughter.  These 
vehement  impulses,  even  the  slight  consciousness  of  wrong, 
denoted  by  his  exclamation  on  seeing  the  corpse  of  his 
father,  was  totally  unable  to  restrain  ;  and,  by  a  process 
unknown  to  himself,  and  which  he  could  only  explain  on  the 
popular  notion  of  the  instigation  of  the  devil,  they  would 
burst  forth  with  fatal  violence.  His  extraordinary  proneness 
to  mischief  and  cruelty,  and  the  early  age  at  which  it  began 
9* 


102  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE.  OF    INSANITY. 

to  appear,  point  distinctly  to  an  original  defect  of  constitu- 
tion, which,  though  not  attended  by  what  is  properly  called 
mania,  deprived  him  of  all  controlling  influence  over  the 
purely  animal  propensities.  Ferocity  of  disposition  in  im- 
beciles no  more  implies  responsibility  for  criminal  acts,  than 
it  does  in  the  brutes  ;  and  affords  but  an  indifferent  reason 
for  ridding  the  world  of  their  presence.  To  conclude  then, 
we  cannot  hesitate  to  believe  with  Dr.  Marechal  and  Ge.or- 
get,  that  Schmidt  was  one  of  those  wretched  beings  who  are 
disgraced  by  nature  from  their  very  birth,  and  whose  vicious 
propensities  are  counterbalanced,  neither  by  a  sense  of  jus- 
tice and  morality,  nor  a  fear  of  punishment. 

§  73.  Pierre  Joseph  Delepine,  aged  sixteen,  was  tried  at 
Paris  for  eight  different  incendiary  acts,  committed  in  the 
Faubourg  St.  Antoine,  in  1825.  The  first  time,  a  bird  with 
burning  tow  dipped  in  spirits  attached  to  its  tail,  was  let  loose 
in  a  garden  adjoining  that  of  the  accused.  At  another  time, 
August  17th,  a  fire  broke  out  in  the  adjoining  garden,  two 
heaps  of  straw  being  burnt  and  a  part  of  the  wall  destroyed. 
Three  days  afterwards,  a  grange  belonging  to  Delepine's 
garden  was  burned,  and  three  days  after  this,  a  cousin  of  his 
was  awakened  by  a  dense  smoke,  and  soon  discovered  that 
a  chest  containing  his  effects  was  on  fire.  The  next  night, 
a  person  passing  through  the  street,  observed  a  heap  of  straw 
in  flames  at  the  farther  end  of  the  garden  which  laid  on  the 
street.  He  sprang  over  into  the  garden  to  render  assistance, 
when  Delepine  and  his  family  rose  and  finally  extinguished 
the  fire.  While  this  was  doing,  a  bucket-full  of  burning 
charcoal  was  discovered  in  the  garret,  in  time  however  to 
be  extinguished.  In  the  morning  of  the  7th  September,  a 
piece  of  burning  canvass  was  found  in  a  wood-closet  under 
the  stair-case  ;  and  Delepine,  who  expressed  his  astonish- 
ment, helped  to  extinguish  the  flames.  Soon  after,  there 
was  found  under  the  two  mattresses  in  his  sister's  room,  a 
handful  of  burning  flax  by  which  the  bed-furniture  had  been 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES.  103 

already  set  on  fire,  and  some  was  also  discoverd  in  his  own 
chamber,  placed  under  his  pillow,  and  an  hour  or  two  after- 
wards, a  heap  of  straw  in  a  neighboring  garden  was  observed 
to  be  on  fire.  He  was  also  charged  with  having  committed 
several  thefts. 

§  74.  On  the  trial,  his  father  stated  that  the  prisoner's 
intellectual  faculties  were  not  what  might  have  been 
expected  from  one  of  his  age ;  and,  in  support  of  his  asser- 
tion, he  adduced  the  nature  of  the  criminal  acts  themselves, 
and  the  absence  of  sufficient  motives  to  excite  him  to  so 
many  attempts,  both  against  his  own  family  and  people  who 
were  indifferent  to  him.  He  also  produced  a  certificate 
signed  by  nine  of  his  neighbors,  which  purported  that 
Delepine's  thoughts  and  feelings  were  frequently  in  a 
disordered  condition  ;  that  he  would  often  wander  in  his 
conduct  and  conversation  ;  that  he  would  sometimes  strip 
himself  naked  and  run  like  a  madman  through  his  father's 
garden  ;  that  they  heard  his  parents  say  that  in  the  January 
previous,  he  attempted  to  hang  himself,  and  sometime  after, 
to  jump  into  a  well.  It  appears  from  the  evidence  that  he 
led  an  irregular  life,  was  jealous  of  his  brothers  and  sisters, 
and  caused  his  father  much  uneasiness.  At  various  times 
he  had  stolen  from  his  parents,  and  it  was  for  having  stolen 
a  horse  that  he  met  in  the  street,  without  its  owner,  that  he 
was  first  arrested  by  the  police. 

§  75.  On  his  trial,  Delepine  replied  to  the  questions  put 
to  him  with  calmness ;  his  countenance  was  devoid  of 
expression  and  presented  a  picture  of  stupidity;  He  denied 
the  facts  charged  in  the  indictment,  and  could  not  conceive 
how  they  happened.  The  newspapers  described  him  as 
having  a  low  forehead ;  and  all  the  witnesses  who  had  an 
opportunity  of  knowing,  agreed  in  believing  that  there  was 
some  singular  defect  in  his  mental  organization.  His  mother 
testified  that  for  some  time  previous  his  parents  had  had  occa- 
sion to  reprove  him  for  his  conduct,  and  that  they  had 


104  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANIT?. 

intended  to  seclude  him.  She  said  he  was  odd,  addicted  to 
the  strangest  tricks,  and  in  short,  showed  that  "  there  was 
something  wrong  about  his  head,"  though  he  was  not  mad 
nor  idiotic.  This  testimony  of  the  mother  was  confirmed 
by  that  of  eight  or  nine  other  witnesses,  who  agreed  in 
representing  him  as  having  been  always  very  odd  and 
strange  in  his  conduct,  and  addicted  to  mischief,  though  not 
mad,  nor  properly  speaking,  idiotic.  He  was,  notwithstand- 
ing, convicted,  and  condemned  to  death  ;  but  he  heard  the 
sentence  as  unmoved  as  he  had  continued  to  be  during  the 
trial. 

§  76.  In  a  memoir  addressed  to  the  king  by  his  counsel, 
M.  Claveau,  he  is  described  as  being  "  weak  in  body,  his 
face  pale,  his  eye  dull,  and  his  mind  infirm ;  as  manifesting 
no  disposition  for  employment,  wrapped  in  silence,  and 
subject  to  convulsive  agitations.  He  was  in  the  habit  of 
shunning  his  companions,  and  when  he  did  incline  to  join 
them,  he  proposed  only  the  most  frightful  sports.  Once,  in 
the  middle  of  the  night,  he  placed  baskets  on  his  head, 
wrapped  himself  in  the  bed-clothes,  and  ran  through  the 
garden,  uttering  the  most  fearful  bowlings.  On  one  occa- 
sion he  kindled  a  fire  in  a  stove  with  thirty  crackers,  and 
though  covered  with  the  ruins,  he  was  not  astonished  at  the 
result.  After  the  trial,  while  in  prison  and  in  irons,  and 
under  the  eyes  of  his  keepers,  he  contrived  to  place  burning 
coals  in  his  bed,  and  then  laid  down  upon  it  while  actually 
on  fire.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  he  is  enslaved  by  a 
passion  for  conflagrations,  incessantly  haunted  by  images  of 
flames,  cinders,  and  ruins,  and  would  not  mind  perishing 
himself,  provided  he  could  enjoy  the  sight  of  them,  in  the 
act.  He  belongs  to  that  class  of  wretched  beings  who  are 
doomed  from  the  cradle  ;  who  live  without  motives,  and  are 
cut  off  without  understanding  why."  In  consequence  of 
this  memorial,  his  punishment  was  commuted  for  that  of 
imprisonment  for  life. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES.  105 

§  77.  While  in  prison  he  amused  himself  with  scribbling 
his  name  in  every  variety  of  form  on  the  copy  of  the  indict- 
ment that  was  left  with  him  ;  by  writing  on  it  unmeaning  or 
disconnected  words,  or  words  formed  by  letters  put  together 
at  random ;  by  drawing  on  it  grotesque  figures,  and  changing 
the  letters  in  such  a  manner  that  some  parts  of  it  could 
scarcely  be  read.  Thus,  the  words,  "  Acte  d'accusation 
contre  Joseph  Delepine,"  were  changed  in  the  following 
manner  ;—Dacte  deaccusationiss  contre  Josep'hu  Delapine  ; 
and  the  first  page  is  filled  with  ink-spots,  and  detached  and 
insignificant  words,  such  as,  Marieux,  mecke,  a  mosire  non^ 
dacculer,  mosieur  je  dit,  bonjour  a  monsieur  leru"  &c. 
"Can  it  be  conceived,"  says  Georget,  "  that  a  person  who 
is  conscious  of  the  enormity  of  his  crime,  and  who  cannot 
be  without  some  anxiety  respecting  the  result  of  his  trial, 
should  be  absorbed  in  such  puerilities  ?  that  he  should  read 
such  grave  charges,  not  only  without  a  single  emotion  of 
horror,  but  even  with  the  most  perfect  indifference,  and  use 
the  paper  containing  them  for  his  amusement  ?  Such  con- 
duct not  only  displays  insensibility,  which  is  not  rare  in 
hardened  criminals,  but  betokens  the  mind  of  a  child.;  and 
in  a  lad  of  sixteen,  indicates  stupidity,  silliness  and  imbecili- 
ty." The  physical  characters  attributed  to  Delepine,  and 
his  manners,  as  described  by  those  who  were  in  the  habit  of 
frequently  seeing  him,  clearly  indicate  a  natural  deficiency 
of  his  moral  powers  ;  but  though  his  crimes  were  the  acts 
of  a  child  five  or  six  years  old,  his  imbecility  alone  may 
not  be  sufficient  to  account  for  the  particular  form  his 
offences  assumed.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  that  in  im- 
becility, as  in  other  abnormal  conditions,  there  is  not  only 
deficiency  and  irregularity,  but  also  a  great  tendency  to 
diseased  cerebral  action,  manifesting  itself  in  excessive,  un- 
controllable indulgence  of  some  one  or  more  propensities. 
In  Delepine,  it  assumed  the  form  of  that  monomania  which 
consists  in  a  morbid  impulse,  which  the  higher  powers  can- 


106  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

not  restrain,  to  acts  of  incendiarism.  That  the  incendiary 
acts  of  Delepine  arose  from  diseased  action  in  the  brain, 
and  not  from  mere  love  of  mischief,  is  abundantly  proved 
by  the  slightest  examination  of  their  nature.  To  let  loose  a 
bird  with  burning  tow  attached  to  it,  without  knowing  or 
caring  where  it  would  alight,  is  what,  perhaps,  might  have 
been  expected  from  a  low  and  simple,  though  sound  mind, 
deliberately  bent  on  mischief;  but  certainly,  nothing  less 
than  genuine,  unequivocal  insanity,  can  account  for  his 
setting  his  own  bed  on  fire,  and  then  calmly  lying  down 
upon  it.  If  too  he  had  been  actuated  by  malice  or  a  pure 
love  of  mischief,  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  he  would  have 
chosen  his  own  home  for  its  objects,  and  thus  deliberately 
endeavored  to  deprive  himself  of  a  shelter,  as  well  as  those 
on  whom  he  depended.  In  short,  the  fact  of  imbecility, 
combined  with  mania,  is  so  plainly  written  on  the  history  of 
this  singular  case,  that  it  would  be  hopeless,  by  any  addi- 
tional comments,  to  make  it  more  clear  to  those  who  cannot 
read  it  for  themselves.1 

§  78.  Abraham  Prescott  was  tried  at  Concord,  New 
Hampshire,  in  September  1834,  for  the  murder  of  Mrs. 
Sally  Cochran.2  On  the  morning  of  June  23,  1833,  he  left 
home  with  the  deceased,  who  was  the  wife  of  his  employer, 
for  the  purpose  of  picking  strawberries  in  a  neighboring 
pasture.  An  hour  and  a  half  afterwards,  the  family  heard 
a  whining,  moaning  sound  in  the  barn,  which  was  found  to 
proceed  from  Prescott,  who,  on  being  asked  what  was  the 


1  The  facts  in  the  above  cases  are  taken  from  Georget's  work, 
already  referred  to,  entitled,  Discussion  medico-legale  sur  la  Folie, 
130,  144. 

9  The  facts  of  this  case  are  derived  from  the  report  of  the  trial, 
published  at  Concord,  in  1834,  and  from  an  article  in  the  Boston 
Statesman  of  January  9th,  183G,  entitled  "Execution  of  Abraham 
Prescott." 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES.  107 

matter  with  him,  said  that  che  had  struck  Sally  [Mrs. 
Cochran]  with  a  stake  and  killed  her."  He  then  went  with 
them  and  showed  them  the  body,  which  they  found  had 
been  dragged  a  little  distance  from  the  place  where  the 
murder  was  committed,  and  concealed  among  some  bushes. 
On  his  way  thither  he  asked  the  husband  if  he  would  hang 
him  ;  he  showed  no  disposition  to  escape,  though  not 
arrested  till  several  hours  afterwards,  and  slept  soundly 
the  succeeding  night.  He  was  eighteen  years  old,  had 
lived  three  years  in  Mr.  Cochran's  family,  by  which  he 
had  been  always  kindly  treated,  and  his  conduct  had  been 
uniformly  correct  and  satisfactory.  No  misunderstanding 
had  occurred  between  him  and  any  other  member  of  the 
family,  and  they  reposed  unlimited  confidence  in  his 
fidelity  and  attachment,  though  on  one  occasion  it  was 
strongly  tried.  On.  the  6th  of  January  1833,  that  is,  about 
six  months  previously,  he  arose  in  the  night,  procured  an 
axe  from  the  shed,  went  to  the  bed  where  Mr.  and  Mrs. 
Cochran  were  sleeping  and  struck  each  of  them  some 
severe  blows  on  the  side  of  the  head,  which  left  them 
senseless.  He  then  went  to  an  adjoining  room  where  Mr. 
Cochran's  mother  slept,  and  told  her,  he  "  believed  he  had 
killed  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Cochran."  They  recovered,  however, 
and  warmly  repelled  every  suspicion  of  the  truth  of  his  own 
statement  that  he  committed  the  act  in  his  sleep,  uncon- 
sciously, though  he  had  never  been  known  to  walk  in  his 
sleep  before.  For  several  months  after  the  murder,  he  con- 
tinued to  explain  his  conduct  in  regard  to  it,  by  saying  that 
while  in  the  pasture  he  had  the  toothache,  that  he  sat  down 
ona  stump,  and  fell  asleep,  and  that  was  the  last  he  knew, 
until  he  found  he  had  killed  Mrs.  Cochran.  On  being  much 
pressed  by  the  coroner  and  warden  to  confess  the  whole 
truth,  for  they  did  not  believe  that  he  acted  without  a  motive, 
and  assured  by  them  that  he  would  stand  a  better  chance 
of  being  pardoned  if  he  confessed,  he  told  these  officers, 


108  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

that  he  made  an  insulting  proposal  to  Mrs.  Cochran,  which 
she  resented,  and  threatened  to  tell  her  husband  of  and  get 
him  punished  ;  that  he  supposed  he  should  have  to  go  to 
prison,  and  thinking  he  would  rather  be  hanged  than  go 
there,  he  took  up  a  stake  and  killed  her.  Subsequently,  he 
stated  that  he  did  not  make  such  proposals  to  Mrs.  Cochran, 
and  uniformly  denied  that  he  had  ever  so  confessed  ;  but 
declared  that  the  coroner  and  warden  had  troubled  him  so 
much  that  he  did  not  know  what  he  told  them.  To  the 
keeper  of  the  jail,  and  the  clergymen  who  visited  him,  he 
invariably  stated,  "  that  he  attempted  to  .kill  Mr.  Cochran 
and  his  wife,  in  January,  1833,  in  order  to  get  possession  of 
their  property;  and  that  when  he  found  he  had  not  des- 
patched them,  he  feigned  that  he  had  been  asleep  when  he 
did  it.  In  June,  his  intentions  were,  first  to  kill  Mrs.  Coch- 
ran in  the  hollow,  and  then  call  down  Mr.  Cochran  and  kill 
him." 

§  79.  His  counsel  set  up  in  defence  the  plea  of  homici- 
dal insanity,  which  they  supported  by  quoting  numerous 
cases  of  this  disorder,  and  citing  the  opinions  of  high  medi- 
cal authorities  and  witnesses  ;  and  in  short,  nothing  was 
omitted  by  them  that  could  help  to  render  the  defence  satis- 
factory to  the  jury.  Chief  Justice  Richardson,  in  his  charge, 
strongly  inclined  to  the  belief  of  his  insanity,  and  observed 
that  if  the  prisoner  "  had  been  all  the  time  sane,  his  conduct- 
had  certainly  been  most  extraordinary.  And  on  the  other 
hand,  if  he  had  been  otherwise  than  sane,  it  was  a  most  ex- 
traordinary case  of  insanity." 

§  80.  There  certainly  are  strong  reasons  for  believing 
that  Prescott  was  utterly  unconscious  of  what  he  was  doing 
when  he  murdered  Mrs.  Cochran,  but,  on  the  contrary,  a 
careful  examination  of  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case 
presents  us  with  still  stronger  reasons  for  thinking  that  he 
did  know  well  enough  what  he  was  doing.  It  appears  per- 
fectly evident  that  he  belonged  to  that  wretched  class  of 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES.  109 

men,  in  whom  mental  imbecility  is  accompanied  by  more  or 
less  perversion  of  the  moral  faculties.  Upon  any  other  than 
this  view  of  his  mental  condition,  it  is  impossible  to  furnish 
a  satisfactory  explanation  of  his  conduct  and  the  circum- 
stances attending  it.  His  original  statement  that  he  was 
unconscious  when  he  committed  the  murder-,  is  opposed  by 
his  subsequent  confessions  that  he  was  actuated  by  certain 
motives  ;  so  that  we  are  presented,  in  the  outset,  with  the 
very  unusuai  case  of  a  criminal  defended  on  the  ground  of 
insanity,  who  denies  that  he  was  insane,  and  furnishes  ra- 
tional motives  for  his  conduct.  There  is  good  ground  for 
believing  that  his  last  confession  was  the  true  one,  first,-  be- 
cause he  could  have  had  no  reason  then  for  inculpating  him- 
self falsely,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  hope  of  escaping 
punishment  was  a  sufficient  reason  for  his  fabricating  the 
story  which  he  told  at  first ;  and  secondly,  because  it  fur- 
nished the  same  motive  for  the  attempt  to  kill  in  January, 
and  this  establishes  a  consistent  and  satisfactory  relation  be- 
tween these  two  acts.  To  remove  the  only  doubt  in  his  fa- 
vor, that  of  his  sanity,  and  confess  a  fictitious  motive  for  his 
conduct,  is  of  itself,  considering  the  circumstances  of  the 
case,  strongly  indicative  of  mental  imbecility.  We  are 
obliged  therefore  to  believe  that  he  was  actuated  by  a  motive, 
and  that  this  motive  was  a  desire  of  gain  ;  and  nothing  can 
more  strongly  show  the  imbecility  of  his  mind  than  the  means 
which  he  took  to  obtain  his  object.  It  seerns  that  the  idea 
haunted  his  mind  that  the  death  of  the  Cochrans  would  put 
him  in  possession  of  their  property  ;  and  with  this  view, 
"  he  thought,"  as  he  said,  "  a  thousand  times  of  killing  them 
along  through  the  fall,  before  the  attempt  on  their  lives  in 
January."  When  asked  .if  he  did  not  know  that  the  prop- 
erty would  descend  to  the  children,  he  replied  "  that  he 
knew  it  would  so  descend,  but  he  did  not  think  of  it  at  that 
moment."  In  fact  he  was  not  even  the  most  distantly  re- 
lated to  the  Cochrans,  and  had  no  reason  whatever  for  sup- 
10 


110  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

posing  that  they  hnd  made  testamentary  dispositions  in  his 
favor.  His  imbecility  is  also  strikingly  manifested  in  the 
feebleness  of  spirit  and  want  of  resolution  which  character- 
ized his  criminal  attempts  He  kills,  as  he  supposes,  both 
husband  and  wife  in  their  bed  ;  but  when  he  returns  to  their 
room  and  finds  them  still  living,  instead  of  completing  his 
work  by  an  additional  blow,  as  the  cool  assassin  would  have 
done,  he  goes  and  arouses  the  rest  of  the  family  and  the 
neighbors,  and  tells  them  what  he  has  done.  Again,  instead 
of  taking  an  opportunity  when  both  his  victims  might  be 
finished  together,  with  some  shade  of  secrecy,  he  despatches 
one  in  open  day,  almost  within  call  of  help,  intending  to 
trust  to  his  chance  of  overpowering  the  other  under  similar 
circumstances.  The  latter  part  of  this  plan —  that  of  call- 
ing Mr.  Cochran  and  killing  him  —  he  abandons  the  mo- 
ment he  has  murdered  the  wife  ;  and  seems  then  for  the 
first  time  to  have  thought  of  concealing  the  body  and  his 
own  share  in  the  bloody  act.  This  purpose  too,  he  but  half 
performs,  and  finally  goes  and  discloses  the  whole  transac- 
tion to  the  very  person  most  interested  in  knowing  it.  Such 
conduct  is  perfectly  inexplicable  on  the  supposition  of  his 
possessing  a  soundly-acting  mind  ;  but  it  is  a  fair  specimen 
of  that  vacillation  of  purpose,  feebleness  of  resolution,  and 
capriciousness  of  design,  which  are  among  the  most  com- 
mon features  of  imbecility.  Had  he  belonged  to  the  class 
of  ordinary  criminals,  he  certainly,  after  obtaining  the  ob- 
ject he  had  in  view  in  committing  the  murder,  would  either 
have  fled,  or  taken  some  means  of  turning  suspicion  from 
himself  and  provided  for  his  escape  in  this  last  resort.  But 
he  was  an  imbecile,  and  because  he  was  an  imbecile,  he 
immediately  proclaims  his  own  agency  in  the  act,  relying 
for  his  safety  on  the  very  suspicious  excuse  of  being  uncon- 
scious of  what  he  was  doing,  —  an  excuse  which,  at  best, 
would  not  have  saved  him  from  much  tedious,  perhaps 
perpetual  confinement,  and  the  ineffaceable  stigma  of  ha v- 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES.  112 

ing  murdered  a  fellow  being.  Even  the  motive  he  assigned 
to  the  coroner  and  warden,  and  on  which  the  attorney-gene- 
ral rested  the  burden  of  his  argument  against  him,  supposing 
it  were  actually  the  true  one,  would  only  strengthen  this 
view  of  his  mental  condition  ;  for  none  but  an  imbecile  or 
an  idiot  would  ever  have  imagined  that  he  would  be  sent  to 
jail  for  offering  an  insulting  proposal  to  a  woman,  or  would 
have  preferred  hanging  to  temporary  imprisonment,  and 
then  added  murder  to  insult  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  his 
preference.  Nothing  that  appears  in  what  is  said  of  him 
during  his  confinement,  gives  any  higher  idea  of  his  moral 
and  intellectual  powers.  The  utmost  efforts  of  zealous  and 
judicious  clergymen  failed  to  impress  him  with  a  sense  of  his 
awful  situation,  or  inspire  him,  in  the  least  degree,  with 
those  cheering  hopes  which  even  the  most  abandoned  crim- 
inals often  entertain.  This  did  not  arise  from  a  spirit  of 
bravado,  nor  from  the  utter  recklessness  sometimes  mani- 
fested by  the  hardened  victims  of  the  law  ;  but  from  stupid 
indifference,  or  sheer  inability  to  comprehend  the  simple 
truths  of  religion,  or  imagine  anything  beyond  the  present 
worse  than  the  annoyances  to  which  he  was  subjected.  In 
short,  so  obvious  was  his  imbecility,  that  the  writer,  from 
whose  statement  the  foregoing  account  is  partly  taken,  ob- 
serves that  "  no  one  who  has  had  any  intercourse  with  Pres- 
cott  has  come  to  the  conclusion  that  he  is  or  has  been  insane, 
but  they  all  consider  him  to  have  been  deficient  in  intellect 
or  common  sense.1  The  signs  of  imbecility  were  not  want- 

1  It  is  true,  that  one  witness,  with  whom  the  accused  lived  a  year 
and  a  half  previous  to  living  with  the  Cochrans,  described  him  as 
'*  intelligent,"  and  another,  who  had  been  acquainted  with  him  from 
a  child,  said,  "  he  was  as  intelligent  as  boys  in  general ;  "  but  when 
we  bear  in  mind  how  ill-qualified  most  persons  are  to  estimate  the 
intellectual  capacity  of  others,  and  that  with  them  intelligence  gene- 
rally means  only  manual  skill,  or  a  tolerable  aptness  in  performing 
the  coarser  labors  of  the  farm  and  the  work-shop,  we  shall  place 


112  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

ing  even  in  his  physical  constitution.  A  medical  witness, 
who  had  been  physician  of  a  private  asylum  for  the  insane 
for  fifteen  years,  speaking  of  his  appearance  at  the  bar, 
said,  "  the  motion  of  his  eye  is  idiotic,  dull,  lazy,  indifferent ; 
no  appearance  of  fear  or  anxiety  in  his  countenance.  I 
noticed  no  agitation,  nor  anxiety  in  the  prisoner  during  the 
examination  of  the  first  two  government  witnesses."  It  is 
also  worthy  of  notice,  that  insanity  had  been  a  common 
disease  in  the  Prescott  family  ;  that  his  mother  was  fifty- 
six  years  old  when  he  was  born,  and  his  father  but  one 
year  younger  ;  and  that  the  prisoner,  when  a  child,  had  a 
scrofulous  or  rickety  affection,  for  which  they  used  cold 
bathing  and  some  external  remedies.  Stronger  predispos- 
ing causes  of  imbecility  than  these  when  combined,  do  not 
exist.1 

Surch  are  the  reasons  that  induce  the  belief,  that  Prescott 
was  a  subject  of  imbecility,  not  mania  —  that  he  belonged 
to  that  unfortunate  class  described  by  Georget  (<§  55)  who 
know  no  other  incentive  than  the  gratification  of  animal 
passion ;  and  who  are  restrained  from  evil-doing  by  no 
higher  sentiment  than  the  fear  of  punishment.  This  conse- 
quence he  certainly  should  have  been  made  to  suffer  in  a 


little  reliance  on  these  representations,  more  especially  too,  as  they 
are  not  sustained  by  other  testimony.  The  keeper  of  the  jail  and 
his  wife,  who  seem  to  have  been  particularly  interested  in  him,  and 
to  have  had  considerable  intercourse  with  him,  both  testified  that 
they  considered  him  "not  as  intelligent  as  boys  in  general." 

1  Before  dismissing  this  case,  it  is  gratifying  to  be  able  to  add, 
that  the  knowledge  of  the  phenomena  of  insanity  in  its  various  forms, 
evinced  by  the  court  and  by  the  counsel  for  the  prisoner,  and  the 
general  correctness  of  their  notions,  were  exceedingly  creditable  to 
them,  and  present  a  remarkable  contrast  to  the  crude  and  narrow 
views  so  commonly  taken  by  men  in  similar  situations,  who  yet 
have  had  far  ampler  means  of  obtaining  information  on  this  branch 
of  medical  jurisprudence. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES.  113 

limited  degree ;  but  to  mete  it  out  to  him  in  the  same  meas- 
ure that  is  bestowed  on  ordinary  criminals,  was  manifestly 
contrary  to  the  principles  of  natural  juslice. 

§  81.  On  the  14th  of  May,  1833,  a  young  man,  John 
Barclay,  was  executed  at  Glasgow,  for  the  murder  of  Sam- 
uel Neilson,  for  whom  he  had  previously  showed  some 
affection.  He  took  from  him  three  one-pound  notes  and  a 
watch,  to  obtain  possession  of  which  seems  to  have  been  the 
cause  of  the  murder.  So  little  sense  had  he  of  having  done 
wrong,  or  of  his  own  situation,  that  he  hovered  about  almost 
without  disguise,  and,  while  going  to  spend  part  of  the 
money  with  the  first  person  he  spoke  to,  he  dropped  first 
one  and  then  another  note  at  his  feet,  as  a  child  would  have 
done.  He  was  devoid  of  natural  affection,  and  evinced  no 
sorrow  for  what  had  happened.  When  questioned,  he  said 
he  could  see  no  difference  between  killing  a  man,  and  kill- 
ing an  ox,  except  that  he  "  would  never  hear  him  fiddle 
again  ; "  and  so  little  did  he  know  of  the  nature  of  the 
watch,  that  he  regarded  it  as  an  animal,  and  when 
it  stopped  from  not  having  been  wound  up,  believed  it  had 
died  of  cold  from  the  glass  being  broken.  His  only  idea  of 
God  was,  that  he  was  a  muckle  horse.  He  had  no  idea  of 
time,  and  did  not  know  the  number  of  days  in  a  week.  So 
obvious  was  Barclay's  mental  deficiency,  that  the  court  of 
justiciary,  before  whom  he  was  brought,  declined  proceeding 
to  his  trial  till  it  was  decided  by  medical  evidence,  that  he 
was  a  fit  subject  for  trial.  In  his  parish,  he  was  familiarly 
known  as  "  daft  Jock  Barclay  ;"  and  the  clergyman  who 
knew  him  well,  "  always  regarded  him  as  imbecile,  and  had 
never  been  able  to  give  him  any  religious  instruction,  and 
did  not  consider  him  a  responsible  being."  Notwithstand- 
ing the  fact  that  Barclay's  weakness  of  mind  was  recognized 
by  all  parties  from  the  judge  downwards,  and  that  the  jury 
strongly  recommended  him  to  mercy  on  that  account,  he 
10* 


114  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

was  condemned  and  executed.1  It  appears  that  much  stress 
was  laid  on  Barclay's  knowing  right  from  wrong,  as  afford- 
ing indisputable  proof  of  his  being  a  moral  agent.  The 
reader  is  left  to  judge  for  himself,  how  extensive  and 
accurate  must  have  been  the  notions  on  this  point,  of  one 
who  thought  a  watch  was  a  live  creature,  and  could  see  no 
difference  between  killing  an  ox  and  killing  a  man. 

In  the  above  cases  the  imbecility  was  congenital,  and  re- 
sulted from  an  imperfect  development  of  the  cerebral  organ- 
ism. In  the  following,  it  was  the  effect  of  disease,  pervert- 
ing the  normal  action  of  the  brain. 

§  82.  Louis  Lecouffe,  aged  twenty-four  years,  was  tried 
at  Paris,  llth  December,  1823,  for  the  murder  of  a  woman, 
whom  he  robbed  of  a  quantity  of  plate.  It  appears  that  he 
was  an  epileptic  from  infancy ;  and  those  who  were  in  the 
habit  of  associating  with  him  always  regarded  him  as  an 
idiot  or  fool.  He  had  some  disease  of  the  head  when  very 
young.  At  fifteen,  he  showed  manifest  signs  of  insanity  ; 
and  affirmed  that  God,  from  time  to  time,  came  to  visit  him. 
His  mother,  whom  he  strongly  accused,  and  seriously  com- 
promised by  his  disclosures,  declared,  even  while  she  stig- 
matized him  as  a  monster  and  a  villain,  that  he  had  always 
been  in  bad  health,  and  hardly  ever  in  possession  of  his 
senses.  At  his  first  examination  he  denied  the  charge,  but 
subsequently  he  confessed,  for  the  following  reason.  He 
stated  that  on  the  preceding  night,  while  still  awake,  the 
spirit  of  his  father  appeared  to  him,  with  an  angel  at  his 
right  hand,  and  commanded  him  to  confess  his  crime  ;  that 
God  immediately  after,  placed  his  hand  upon  his  heart,  and 
said  to  him,  "  I  pardon  thee,"  and  ordered  him  to  confess 
everything  within  three  days.  It  appears  that  his  mother, 
of  whom  he  stood  greatly  in  awe,  had  refused  her  consent 
to  a  marriage  he  was  anxious  to  contract;  that  she  refused 

1  Edinburgh  Phrenological  Journal,   x.  33. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES.  115 

him  again  on  another  occasion,  and,  according  to  his  con- 
fession, she  long  teased  him  to  commit  the  murder  and  rob- 
bery, and  decided  his  resolution  by  promising  no  longer  to 
oppose  his  marriage.  The  plate  was  pawned  for  two  hun- 
dred and  thirty  francs,  of  which  his  mother  gave  him  only 
forty  to  defray  the  expenses  of  his  marriage.  He  declared 
that  his.  victim  was  fond  of  him,  and  that  he  deserved  her 
good  will  by  having  rendered  her  many  little  services.  On 
being  confronted  with  his  mother,  he  did  not  retract  his  as- 
sertions, but  only  showed  some  hesitation,  saying  he  was  not 
himself,  and  experienced  a  violent  nervous  attack.  He  said, 
next  day,  that  if  placed  again  in  the  presence  of  his  mother, 
he  would  be  unable  to  answer  for  himself  ;  that  she  would 
give  him  the  lie,  and  he  would  not  have  firmness  enough  to 
maintain  the  truth.  Her  unbounded  influence  and  authority 
over  him,  which  were  deposed  to  by  several  witnesses,  were 
such,  that  he  did  whatever  she  ordered  him,  and  absolutely 
deprived  himself  of  everything  to  support  her,  giving  her  all 
his  earnings,  without  daring  to  retain  a  single  sous.  The 
keeper  of  the  prison  testified  that  he  talked  incoherently, 
and  that  he  seemed  idiotic'al  and  weak-minded.  The  chief 
keeper  said,  that  he  had  often  seen  the  accused  with  haggard 
looks,  and  eyes  filled  with  tears,  complaining  of  headache, 
but  without  manifesting  any  true  derangement  of  mind. 
During  the  trial  he  had  very  frequent  violent  attacks  of  con- 
vulsions, and  he  stated  that  when  he  felt  vexed,  a  kind  of 
flame 'or  flash  passed  before  his  eyes.1 

§  83.  The  facts  here  related  may  seem  to  some,  to 
establish  the  imbecility,  or  mania,  or  both,  of  LecoufFe,  be- 
yond a  reasonable  doubt ;  but  not  so  thought  the  court  or 
jury,  and,  accordingly,  he  was  condemned  and  executed  with 
his  mother.  Certainly,  nothing  short  of  great  weakness  of 
mind  can  account  for  the  entire  submission  of  a  man  twenty- 

1  Georget,  Examen  des  proces  crim. 


116  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

four  years  old  to  the  despotic  rule  of  his  mother,  to  whom 
he  yielded  the  last  sous  of  his  earnings,  sacrificed  his  matri- 
monial schemes,  on  which  he  was  strongly  bent,  and  from 
whom  he  received  only  forty  of  the  two  hundred  and  thirty 
francs,  for  which,  at  her  instigation,  he  had  murdered  his 
benefactress.  That  this  mental  weakness  amounted  to  im- 
becility, is  satisfactorily  proved  by  the  fear  and  convulsive 
agitations  which  he  experienced  when  brought  into  her 
presence  ;  by  the  common  opinion  of  those  who  were  in  the 
habit  of  associating  with  him  ;  and  by  the  well-known 
effects  of  this  disease  on  the  understanding  of  its  subjects. 
If  Lecouffe,  after  suffering  the  disease  his  whole  life,  had 
still,  possessed  a  sound  mind,  it  would  have  been  a  fact 
almost,  if  not  altogether,  without  a  parallel ;  but  that  he  did 
not  escape  its  deteriorating  effects,  is  abundantly  proved  by 
the  evidence  adduced.  Occasionally,  his  mental  affection 
took  the  form  of  proper  mania,  as  was  indicated  by  the 
wildness  and  disorder  of  his  looks,  by  talking  incoherently 
to  himself,  by  his  groanings  and  mournful  cries  in  the  night, 
observed  by  one  of  the  witnesses,  by  his  nocturnal  appari- 
tions, and  by  the  testimony  of  his  own  mother,  that  he  was 
almost  never  in  possession  of  his  senses. 

§  84.  Against  all  this  array  of  evidence,  the  advocate- 
general  had  nothing  to  offer  but  the  idle  declamation  usually 
resorted  to  on  such  occasions.  The  attempts  of  the  prison- 
er's counsel  to  establish  the  existence  of  imbecility  and 
mania,  he  reprobated  in  the  severest  terms,  as  dangerous  to 
society,  subversive  of  social  order,  destructive  of  morality 
and  religion,  and  affording  a  direct  encouragement  to  crime. 
It  forms  no  part  of  the  plan  of  this  work,  to  show  the  utter 
groundlessness  of  these  assertions  ;  and  they  are  mentioned 
here,  merely  that  the  reader  may  see  what  powerful  con- 
siderations succeeded  in  invalidating  the  evidence  in  favor 
of  Lecouffe,  and  consigning  him  to  an  ignominious  end. 

§  85.    If  the  principles  above  laid  down  (§§  62,  63,  64,) 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES.  117 

are  not  entirely  incorrect,  it  follows  that  the  persons  whose 
cases  have  been  related,  were  not  fit  subjects  for  criminal 
punishment  —  at  least,  not  that  of  death.  The  usual  treat-, 
ment  of  such  offenders,  it  is  to  be  feared,  is  prompted  more 
by  prejudice  and  excited  feelings,  than  by  enlarged  views 
of  human  nature  and  of  the  ends  of  criminal  jurisprudence. 
While  the  public  feeling  has  become  too  refined  to  tolerate 
the  infliction  of  blows  and  stripes  on  the  imbecile  and  the 
mad  in  the  institutions  where  they  are  confined,  and  is 
inclined  to  discountenance  altogether  the  idea  of  punishment 
as  applied  to  the  insane,  it  can  still  be  gratified  by  gazing 
on  the  dying  agonies  of  a  being  unable  to  comprehend  the 
connexion  between  his  crime  and  the  penalty  attached  to  it, 
and  utterly  insensible  of  the  nature  of  his  awful  situation. 
The  voice  of  reason  and  humanity  which  speaks  successfully 
in  the  first  instance  is,  in  the  last,  drowned  by  the  more 
imperious  tones  of  prejudice  and  passion.  When  imbeciles 
are  convicted  on  a  charge  of  great  criminal  offences,  the 
only  rational  course  to  be  pursued  with  them,  is  that  of 
perpetual  confinement,  which  at  once  secures  society  from 
their  future  aggressions,  and  is  most  conducive  to  their 
mental  and  bodily  welfare. 

§  86.  It  has  been  already  mentioned  (§  54,)  as  an 
essential  defect  in  Hoffbauer's  description  of  the  various 
grades  of  imbecility  and  .stupidity,  that  he  has  almost 
entirely  left  out  of  view  the  state  of  the  moral  faculties,  — 
an  omission  that  is  fatal  to  the  value  of  the  principles  which 
he  lays  down  relative  to  the  legal  consequences  of  this 
mental  condition  in  connexion  with  crime.  The  ground 
above  taken  (§§  62,  63,)  obliges  us  to  consider  the  principle 
he  has  adopted,  of  graduating  criminal  responsibility  by  the 
strength  and  extent  of  the  intellect  alone,  as  exceedingly 
partial  and  unjust  in  its  operation.  The  Only  conditions  of 
culpability  which  he  recognizes,  are,  first,  a  knowledge  that 
the  act  is  contrary  to  law ;  and  secondly,  that  the  act  is 


118  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

precisely  the  one  prohibited  by  the  law.  In  the  first  degree 
of  imbecility  —  for  in  the  third,  all  legal  culpability  is 
annulled  —  the  absence  of  these  conditions  may  be  alleged 
in  excuse  ;  but  only,  first,  when  the  violated  law  neither 
forms  a  part  of  those  general  relations  which  concern  him- 
self in  common  with  other  members  of  society,  nor  belongs 
to  his  own  particular  condition  or  circumstances ;  and 
secondly,  when  the  action  forbidden  by  the  law  is  not  con- 
trary to  the  law  of  nature.  Accordingly,  he  considers 
4<  that  inattention  or  absence  of  mind,  want  of  foresight,  &c. 
are  not  to  be  received  in  excuse  when  they  have  regard  to 
objects  universally  known,  as  to  fire,  or  to  those  which  are 
familiarly  used  by  the  imbecile,  as  the  tools,  &c.  of  his  pro- 
fession. In  all  other  instances  his  fault  loses  the  degree  of 
culpability  that  belongs  to  it,  in  abstracto,  according  to  the 
expression  of  jurists.  This  is  also  the  case  when  the  act  is 
the  result  of  sudden  anger  or  fear,  to  which  weak  persons 
are  prone."  : 

^  87.  In  determining  the  civil  responsibilities  and  rela- 
tions of  the  imbecile,  HofFbauer's  descriptions  are  not  so 
unsuitable  for  practical  application  ;  as  these  must  chiefly 
be  determined  by  the  condition  of  the  intellect  alone.  As 
his  observations,  however,  have  reference  in  a  great  measure 
to  the  legal  regulations  of  his  own  country,  they  will  be 
noticed  no  farther  than  merely  to  state  his  opinion  that  when 
imbecility  reaches,  or  approaches  the  third  degree,  the 
party  can  no  longer  be  considered  capable  of  taking  care  of 
his  property,  or  of  bequeathing  it  by  will. 

§  88.  No  cases  subjected  to  legal  inquiry  are  more 
calculated  to  puzzle  the  understandings  of  courts  and  juries, 
to  mock  the  wisdom  of  the  learned,  and  baffle  the  acuteness 
of  the  shrewd,  than  those  connected  with  questions  of  imbe- 


1  Op.  cit.  sup.  §  55. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES.  119 

cility.  Much  of  the  difficulty  consists,  no  doubt,  in  a  want 
of  that  practical  tact  which  is  obtained  by  experience,  in 
unravelling  their  intricacies,  and  of  that  knowledge  of  the 
psychological  nature  of  this  condition  of  mind,  which  directs 
the  attention  exclusively  to  the  real  question  at  issue,  and 
abstracts  whatever  is  extraneous,  or  without  any  direct 
bearing  on  its  merits.  It  is  impossible  to  specify  any  par- 
ticular rules  for  ascertaining  the  mental  capacity  of  imbecile 
persons  ;  for  circumstances  always  proper  to  be  taken  into 
the  account,  are  constantly  varying  with  each  individual 
case.  The  education  of  the  party,  the  sphere  of  life  in 
which  he  has  moved,  his  capacity  of  acquirement,  his  ex- 
posure to  improper  influences,  and  especially  the  nature  of 
the  act  in  question,  —  are  points  which  require  a  close  and 
thorough  consideration.  In  questions  of  interdiction  which 
present  the  greatest  difficulty,  some  overt  acts  of  extrava- 
gance, or  indiscretion  generally  appear  in  evidence,  when 
the  party  is  really  incapable  of  managing  his  affairs,  which 
will  remove  the  doubts  that  a  direct  investigation  of  his 
intelligence  and  capacity  may  have  left  behind.  It  ought  to 
be  considered  as  a  general  rule,  that  when  no  acts  of  this 
kind  have  been  committed,  notwithstanding  the  management 
of  his  property  has  been  entirely  in  his  own  hands,  beyond 
the  control  of  others,  the  party  ought  not  to  be  interdicted 
on  the  score  of  imbecility.  In  all  cases  it  will  be  indispen- 
sably necessary,  as  Mr.  Haslam  advises,  to  investigate  his 
comprehension  of  numbers,  without  which  the  nature  of 
property  cannot  be  understood.  But  the  assertion  of  this 
writer,  that  "  if  a  person  were  capable  of  enumerating 
progressively  to  the  number  ten,  and  knew  the  force  and 
value  of  the  separate  units,  he  would  be  fully  competent  to 
the  management  of  property," 1  is  by  no  means  to  be 
admitted  as  true  ;  for  it  is  very  certain  that  a  large  propor- 

1  Medical  Jurisprudence,  as  it  relates  to  Insanity,  347. 


120  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

tion  of  those  whose  mental  capacity  is  unquestionably  inade- 
quate to  the  management  of  property,  have  nevertheless 
these  arithmetical  acquirements.  Cases,  even,  are  occasion- 
ally met  with  of  imbeciles  who  possess  surprising  powers  of 
calculation,  but  have  not  the  competency  of  children  to 
manage  pecuniary  affairs  of  any  extent.  No  doubt,  the 
converse  of  the  proposition,  in  reference  to  people  of 
doubtful  capacity,  comes  nearer  the  truth.  When  there 
exists  this  inability  of  comprehending  the  value  of  numbers, 
the  individual  ought  to  be  considered,  in  all  questions  of 
property,  as  legally  non  compos  mentis,  notwithstanding  we 
might  hesitate  to  adopt  this  conclusion,  after  an  investigation 
of  his  intellectual  capacity  in  regard  to  the  general  nature 
and  relations  of  property  and  business  transactions. 

§  89.  Imbeciles  in  the  third  degree  are  evidently  incapa- 
ble of  making  wills ;  but  not  necessarily  so,  Hoff  bauer 
thinks,1  are  imbeciles  in  the  first  degree,  even  when  sub- 
jected to  a  curator.  The  purpose  of  this  guardianship  is  to 
protect  them  from  the  damage  they  might  do  themselves  if 
left  with  the  administration  of  their  affairs,  and  to  prevent 
them  from  entering  into  engagements  which  they  would  find 
it  impossible  to  perform.  But  as  testamentary  dispositions 
depend  on  a  single  arrangement  and  one  which  the  testator 
may  have  taken  time  to  think  upon  and  mature,  they  do  not 
require  the  same  degree  of  intelligence  as  the  administration 
of  property,  and  therefore  the  validity  of  a  will  ought  not 
to  be  considered  as  necessarily  incompatible  with  the  inter- 
diction of  the  testator.  As  a  general  principle,  the  correct- 
ness of  Hoffbauer's  doctrine  may  be  admitted,  because  it 
places  no  arbitrary  restriction  on  the  exercise  of  a  natural 
right,  the  abuse  of  which  can  be  sufficiently  prevented  by 
judicial  interference  ;  and  because,  if  it  be  rejected,  we  may 
have  the  curious  spectacle  of  a  person  debarred  from  having 

1  Op.  cit.  sup.  §  73. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF   IMBECILITY.  121 

any  voiee  in  the  final  disposition  of  his  property  —  in  an  act 
which  really  comes  within  the  reach  of  his  understanding, 
—  while  in  the  management  of  his  property,  a  judicious 
committee  is  constantly  paying  all  the  deference  to  his  wishes 
and  suggestions  which  their  reasonahleness  deserves.  It  can- 
not be  denied  that  the  nature  and  consequences  of  a  testa- 
ment may  be  sufficiently  understood  by  many  an  imbecile 
who  is  utterly  incapable  of  discerning  the  complicated  rela- 
tions that  are  involved  in  the  management  of  property.  For 
this  reason  it  is  said  that,  "  if  a  man  be  of  a  mean  under- 
standing, neither  of  the  wise  sort,  nor  of  the  foolish,  but 
indifferent  as  it  were,  betwixt  a  wise  man  and  a  fool,  yea, 
though  he  rather  incline  to  the  foolish  sort,  so  that  for  his 
dull  capacity,  he  might  worthily  be  called  grossum  caput,  a 
dull  pate  or  a  dunce  ;  such  a  one  is  not  prohibited  'to  make 
a  testament."  ]  Nothing  can  be  more  natural  than  that  he 
should  be  attached  to  those  who  have  rendered  him  impor- 
tant services,  and  perhaps  have  well-founded  claims  on  his 
bounty  ;  and  if  anxious  to  leave  some  substantial  token  of 
his  regard,  no  legal  impediment  ought  to  prevent  him  from 
bequeathing  them  a  reasonable  portion  of  his  property.  The 
danger  anticipated  from  such  an  exercise  of  the  testamentary 
power,  is  probably  more  imaginary  than  real ;  for  it  can 
hardly  be  conceived  that  testamentary  dispositions,  which 
turn  the  descent  of  property  altogether  from  its  natural 
channels,  to  heap  it  up  in  the  lap  of  a  stranger  or  a  favorite, 
would  not  be  attended  by  appearances  of  fraud  or  circum- 
vention, that  would  inevitably  destroy  their  validity.  All 
that  is  required  to  establish  the  wills  of  people  of  weak 
understandings  is  that  they  should  have  been  capable  of 
comprehending  their  nature  and  effect2  —  a  point  entirely 


1  Swinburne  on  Wills,  part  2,  s.  4. 
8  Shelford  on  Lunacy,  275. 
11 


122  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

independent  of  the  accidental  circumstance  of  interdiction. 
Much  injustice,  therefore,  might  be  committed  by  depriving 
all  interdicted  imbeciles  of  the  testamentary  power,  com- 
pared with  which  the  temporary  inconvenience  that  would 
arise  from  the  absence  of  any  statutory  provisions  on  the 
subject,  is  hardly  to  be  mentioned.  Of  course,  the  slightest 
appearance  of  interference,  or  improper  influence,  should  be 
closely  scrutinized,  and  as  much  less  evidence  required  to 
substantiate  its  existence,  as  the  party  is  more  likely  to  have 
been  affected  by  it.  The  propriety  of  the  practice  here 
advocated  was  recognized  on  the  14th  of  February,  1808, 
by  the  Royal  Court  of  Aix,  who  confirmed  the  will  of  the 
Sieur  Beauquaire,  a  person  of  weak  understanding  (though 
at  the  time  of  making  it  he  was  under  the  surveillance  of  a 
curator)  ;  for  the  reasons  that  the  dispositions  of  the  will 
were  rational,  and  that  the  mind  of  the  testator  was  capable 
of  understanding  them,  though  too  weak  to  be  intrusted  with 
the  management  of  his  property.1  The  French  tribunals, 
according  to  Georget,  have  ever  shown  themselves  the  pro- 
tectors of  the  right  of  making  wills,  taking  into  considera- 
tion the  mental  condition  of  the  testator  and  the  dispositions 
of  the  will  itself. 

§  90.  It  would  seem  to  be  reasonable  that  the  validity  of 
the  contracts  of  imbecile  persons  not  under  guardianship, 


1  Sirey,  Recueil  gen.  ties  lois  et  des  arre"ts.  viii.  315.  In  coming 
to  this  decision,  the  Court  considered  the  testator  to  be  one  of  those 
persons  whose  case  is  contemplated  in  the  following  article  (499)  of 
the  Civil  Code,  in  which  the  power  of  making  a  will  is  not  men- 
tioned among  the  civil  acts,  which  they  are  rendered  unable  to  per- 
form. "  In  rejecting  a  petition  for  interdiction,  the  court  may, 
nevertheless,  if  circumstances  require,  decree  that  the  defendant  is 
henceforth  incapable  of  appearing  in  suits,  of  making  contracts,  of 
borrowing,  receiving  payment  for  debts  or  giving  a  discharge,  alien- 
ating or  pledging  his  property,  without  the  aid  of  a  council  which 
shall  be  appointed  in  the  same  judgment." 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    IMBECILITY.  123 

should  be  determined  by  the  same  principles,  as  that  of 
their  wills.  This,  however,  is  not  the  doctrine  of  the  law, 
which  does  not  recognize  imbecility  as  a  form  of  insanity. 
Whatever  may  be  the  nature  or  magnitude  of  the  contract, 
the  question  at  lasv  is  one,  not  of  capacity  or  incapacity, 
but  of  soundness  or  unsoundness  of  mind  ;  and  on  this 
question,  the  law  "  makes  no  distinction  between  important 
and  common  affairs,  large  or  small  property." ]  Courts  of 
law  have  always  refused  to  invalidate  the  contracts  of  im- 
beciles and  others  of  weak  understanding,  and  courts  of 
equity  have  declined  to  interfere,  except  on  the  ground  of 
fraud.2  There  is  this  strong  objection  to  this  doctrine,  that 
we  have  no  rule,  and  cannot  have  in  the  nature  of  things, 
by  which  the  question  of  compos  or  non  compos  can  be 
uniformly  determined  ;  for  one  court  or  jury  for  instance, 
rnay  range  through  the  whole  life  and  conversation  of  the 
party,  while  another  may  think  itself  obliged  not  to  go 
beyond  the  particular  act  in  question.  A  surer  and  safer 
principle  is,  that  if  the  imbecile  person  is  capable  of  com- 
prehending the  nature  of  the  particular  act,  then  has  he  all 
the  capacity  which  the  case  requires,  and  the  act  should  be 
established  ;  and  vice  versa.  Indeed,  whether  the  question 
be  one  of  capacity  or  soundness,  regard  must  always  be  had 
to  the  nature  of  the  subject  to  which  the  mind  is  applied, 
and  the  utmost  respect  for  technical  rules  and  definitions 
cannot  prevent  us  from  being  governed  by  this  rule,  in  the 
majority  of  cases.  Nothing  can  be  more  unjust  than  to 
infer  imbecility  in  general,  from  facts  that  establish  its  ex- 
istence merely  in  regard  to  certain  subjects  or  relations. 
No  one  imagines  a  general  or  a  statesman  to  be  necessarily 
non  compos,  because  the  one  may  have  shown  himself  inca- 

1  4  Dane's  Abridgment,   561.     This  point  is  discussed  at  some 
length,  in  Jackson  v.  King,  4  Cowen,  207. 

2  1  Story,  Commentaries  on  Equity,  238. 


124  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

pable  of  conducting  a  campaign,  and  the  other  of  controll- 
ing the  destinies  of  an  empire.  And  nothing  can  be  more 
absurd,  as  well  as  unjust,  than  to  conclude  that  because  a 
weak-minded  person  can  be  shown  to  have  acted  shrewdly 
in  small  and  familiar  matters,  he  must  possess  a  legal  ca- 
pacity for  the  transaction  of  the  most  important  and  com- 
plicated affairs.  Many  an  imbecile  is  perfectly  competent 
to  purchase  the  necessaries  of  life,  or  make  contracts  rela- 
tive to  personal  service,  who  could  not  be  trusted  with  the 
disposal  of  an  estate,  or  with  making  an  investment  of 
tnoney.  We  cannot  help  concluding  therefore  that  the  uni- 
versal application  of  the  rule,  compos,  or  non  compos,  is  re- 
pugnant to  the  most  obvious  principles  of  justice. 

§  91.  Imbeciles  in  the  third  degree,  and  others  of  what- 
ever grade  under  interdiction,  are  legally  incapable  of  con- 
tracting marriage,  for  since  they  are  presumed  to  be  inca- 
pable of  transacting  business  of  the  smallest  amount,  they 
must  be  equally  so  of  becoming  a  party  to  a  contract  which 
is  not  only  to  affect  their  pecuniary  interests,  but  their  whole 
future  happiness  and  comfort.  When,  however,  the  mental 
deficiency  has  not  been  sufficient  to  provoke  interdiction, 
though  plain  enough  to  be  generally  recognized,  it,  very 
properly,  constitutes  no  legal  impediment  to  marriage,  but 
on  proof  of  fraud  or  circumvention  the  marriage  has  been 
pronounced  by  the  courts,  null  and  void.1  It  is  obvious  that 
no  general  rule  can  be  applied  to  all  such  cases,  for  while 
marriage  might  conduce  to  the  interests  of  each  party  in 
one  case  ;  in  another,  it  might  be  equally  ruinous  to  the 
interests  of  one  or  both  parties.  Every  case  should  be 
judged  on  its  own  merits,  and  only  annulled  when  the  mind 
of  either  party  is  proved  to  have  been  operated  on  by  im- 
proper influences. 

1  1  Haggard  Ecc.  Rep.  355.     Portsmouth  v.  Portsmouth  ;  Miss 
Bagster's  case,  Ante,  §  61. 


CHAPTER  V. 


PATHOLOGY    AND    SYMPTOMS    OF    MANIA. 

§  92.  WHILE  medical  literature  is  far  from  being  defi- 
cient in  works  on  Insanity  considered  as  one  of  the  most 
serious  maladies  to  which  man  is  liable,  the  popular  notions 
respecting  it  are  peculiarly  loose  and  incorrect.  As  these, 
however,  are  the  source  of  many  of  the  faults  in  the 
jurisprudence  relating  to  this  affection,  it  is  necessary  to 
enter  somewhat  into  its  medical  history,  and  to  discuss  points 
which  might  seem,  at  first  sight,  to  be  of  an  exclusively  pro- 
fessional nature,  but  a  proper  understanding  of  which  is 
absolutely  necessary  to  save  us  from  gross  mistakes  on  this 
subject.  Certainly  no  greater  absurdity  can  be  imagined 
than  that  of  fixing  the  legal  relations  of  persons  in  a  par- 
ticular state  of  mind,  while  entertaining  the  most  imperfect 
notions  of  what  that  state  really  is,  —  unless  it  may  be  that 
of  pertinaciously  clinging  to  those  notions  and  discouraging 
every  attempt  to  correct  them,  after  the  progress  of  scien- 
tific knowledge  has  shown  them  to  be  erroneous.  Before 
describing  the  phenomena  of  mania,  it  should  be  distinctly 
understood  that  it  is,  first,  a  disease  of  the  brain  ;  and 
secondly,  that  in  its  various  grades  and  forms,  it  observes 
the  same  laws  as  diseases  of  other  organs.  The  importance 
of  these  propositions  makes  it  proper  to  state  the  grounds 
on  which  they  rest ;  for  until  they  are  clearly  recognized 
and  appreciated,  it  will  be  in  vain  to  expect  any  improve- 
ments in  the  medical  jurisprudence  of  insanity. 
11* 


126  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

§  93.  I.  Mania  arises  from  a  morbid  affection  of  the 
brain.  The  progress  of  pathological  anatomy  during  the 
present  century,  has  established  this  fact  beyond  the  reach 
of  a  reasonable  doubt.  It  can  hardly  be  necessary  at  the 
present  time,  to  prove  the  fact  of  the  dependence  of  the 
mind  on  the  brain  for  its  external  manifestations  —  that,  in 
short,  the  brain  is  the  material  organ  of  the  intellectual  and 
affective  powers.  Whatever  opinion  may  be  entertained  of 
the  nature  of  the  mind,  it  is  generally  admitted  —  at  least 
by  all  enlightened  physiologists  —  that  it  must  of  necessity 
be  put  in  connexion  with  matter,  and  that  the  brain  is  the 
part  of  the  body  by  means  of  which  this  connexion  is 
effected.  Little  as  we  know  beyond  this  single  fact,  it  is 
enough  to  warrant  the  inference  that  derangement  of  the 
structure,  or  of  the  vital  actions  of  the  brain,  must  be  fol- 
lowed by  abnormal  manifestations  of  the  mind ;  and  con- 
sequently, that  the  presence  of  the  effect  indicates  the 
existence  of  the  cause.  Whether  the  morbid  action  arises 
in  the  digestive,  or  some  other  system,  and  is  reflected 
thence  to  the  brain  by  means  of  the  nervous  sympathies,  or 
arises  primarily  in  the  brain,  the  soundness  of  the  above 
principle  is  equally  untouched.  This  leads  us  to  the  source 
of  the  hesitation  that  has  been  evinced  by  pathologists  to 
consider  the  brain  as  the  seat  of  insanity. 

§  94.  From  the  fact  that  organic  lesions  are  not  always 
discoverable  after  death  in  the  brains  of  the  subjects  of  in- 
sanity, it  has  been  inferred  that  the  brain  is  not  the  seat  of 
this  disease;  though,  if  this  fact  were  true  —  it  being  also 
true  that  no  other  organ  in  the  body  invariably  presents 
marks  of  organic  derangement  in  insanity  —  the  only  legiti- 
mate inference  would  have  been,  that,  in  some  cases,  it  is 
impossible  to  discover  such  lesions  by  any  means  in  our 
power.  The  strangest  theoretical  error  which  this  apparent 
soundness  of  the  brain  in  some  cases,  has  occasioned,  is  that 
of  denying  the  existence  of  any  material  affection  at  all, 


PATHOLOGY    AND    SYMPTOMS    OF   MANIA.  127 

and  attributing  the  disease  entirely  to  an  affection  of  the  im- 
material principle.  If  the  same  pathological  principles  had 
guided  men's  reasoning  respecting  this  disease,  that  they 
have  applied  to  the  investigation  of  others,  this  error  would 
never  have  been  committed.  It  will  scarcely  be  contended, 
at  the  present  day  at  least,  that  the  structural  changes, 
found  after  death  from  any  disease,  are  the  primary  cause 
of  the  disturbances  manifested  by  symptoms  during  life  ;  or 
that  if  the  interior  could  be  inspected  at  the  beginning  of  the 
disease,  any  of  these  structural  changes  would  he  discover- 
ed. It  is  now  a  well-recognized  principle,  that  such  changes 
must  be  preceded  by  some  change  in  the  vital  actions  of  the 
part  where  they  occur.  This  vital  change  is  now  generally 
expressed  by  the  term  irritation,  and  nothing  is  implied  by 
it  relative  to  the  nature  of  this  change,  more  than  an  exalta- 
tion of  action.  Irritation  then  is  the  initial  stage  of  disease, 
—  the  first  in  the  chain  of  events,  of  which  disorganization 
is  the  last. —  and,  of  course,  nothing  can  be  more  unphilo- 
sophicalthan  to  attribute  disturbances  of  function,  exclusive- 
ly to  any  structural  changes  that  may  take  place  during  the 
progress  of  these  successive  stages.  The  departure  from 
the  normal  course  of  vital  action,  which  is  probably  as  un- 
exceptionable a  definition  of  irritation  as  can  be  given,  is 
sufficient  to  derange  the  functions  of  the  part  in  which  it 
occurs,  without  producing  any  visible. change  in  its  appear- 
ance ;  and  hence,  we  may  oftentimes  explore  the  dead  body 
with  the  utmost  minuteness  and  skill,  without  being  enabled 
to  infer  from  anything  we  find,  an  adequate  cause  of  death. 
Before  this  can  be  found,  the  initial  stage  must  have  continu- 
ed more  or  less  time  ;  and  though  it  always  tends  to  pass 
into  the  subsequent  stages,  yet  death  may  take  place  from 
various  causes,  before  they  are  developed  and  before  a  trace 
of  their  existence  can  be  detected. 

§  95.  There  is  this  peculiarity  in  the  pathology  of  insan- 
ity, that  while  the  irritation  deranges  the  mental   functions 


128  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

so  as  to  be  manifest  to  every  observer,  its  sympathetic 
effects  upon  the  rest  of  the  system  are  so  slight  that  they 
contribute  but  little  comparatively,  by  their  reaction,  to  de- 
velop the  stage  of  inflammation.  The  consequence  is,  that 
cerebral  irritation,  sufficient  to  produce  insanity,  may  en- 
dure for  years,  and  death  occur  at  last  from  other  causes, 
without  our  being  able  to  discover  any  morbid  appearances. 
Thus  their  existence,  instead  of  being  essential  to  the  dis- 
ase,  is  entirely  the  result  of  accidental  circumstances.  The 
probability  of  finding  inflammation  or  any  of  its  products, 
will  depend  on  the  duration  of  the  disease,  and  the  share 
which  it  had  in  causing  the  death  of  the  patient.  If  it  have 
existed  for  a  short  time  only,  or  death  have  been  occasioned 
by  some  other  cause,  examination  will  be  likely  to  disclose 
no  traces  of  morbid  action  ;  but  on  the  contrary,  if  it  have 
been  of  long  standing  and  have  killed  the  patient  by  the 
constitutional  disturbances  it  has  produced,  they  will  gener- 
ally be  found  more  or  less  abundantly.  From  not  properly 
attending  to  these  considerations,  pathologists  have  been  led 
into  an  egregious  error  by  the  absence  of  morbid  changes, 
—  no  less  a  one  than  that  of  denying  the  disease  to  be  an 
affection  of  matter,  and  jumping  at  the  absurd  conclusion, 
that  it  is  the  spiritual  principle  alone  that  suffers. 

§  96.  It  is  not  now  denied,  however,  that  the  traces  of 
disease,  when  they  do  occur,  are  oftener  found  in  the  brain 
than  in  any  other  organ  ;  nor  that,  in  a  very  large  propor- 
tion of  the  whole  number  of  cases,  the  brain  actually  does 
show  evident  marks  of  having  been  diseased.  And  when 
we  bear  in  mind  the  limited  knowledge  of  the  cerebral 
structure  which  pathologists  have  possessed  till  quite  lately, 
and  consequently,  the  difficulty  they  must  have  experienced, 
in  detecting  changes  from  the  healthy  condition,  it  may  well 
be  concluded  that  the  absence  of  these  changes  might  be 
attributed,  in  not  a  few  instances,  to  the  fault  of  the  inquirer 
rather  than  to  the  nature  of  the  disease.  Certain  it  is,  that 


PATHOLOGY    AND    SYMPTOMS    OF    MANIA.  129 

as  we  have  become  better  acquainted  with  the  anatomy  of 
the  brain  and  with  its  sensible  qualities,  and  been  more 
thorough  and  persevering  in  our  examinations,  the  rarer  it 
has  become  to  find  a  case  of  insanity  presenting  no  organic 
changes  after  death.  The  very  same  observers  who  once 
could  find  nothing  satisfactory  in  their  pathological  re- 
searches in  the  brains  of  the  insane,  have  changed  their 
views,  as  their  field  of  observation  has  enlarged,  and  their 
acquaintance  with  the  whole  subject  has  been  increased  with 
time  and  practice,  so  that  some  have  examined  hundreds  of 
subjects  without  finding  one  entirely  free  from  some  appre- 
ciable change. 

§  97.  II.  Insanity  observes  the  same  pathological  law 
as  other  diseases.  Notwithstanding  the  air  of  mystery 
which  ignorance  and  superstition  have  thrown  around  this 
disease,  it  cannot  be  said  to  present  anything  very  strange 
or  peculiar ;  nor  are  the  discussions  concerning  it  involved 
in  the  obscurity  which  is  generally  imagined.  It  arises  from 
a  morbid  affection  of  organic  matter,  and  is  just  as  much, 
and  no  more,  .an  event  of  special  providence,  as  other  dis- 
eases ;  and  to  attribute  it  to  the  visitation  of  God  in  a  pecu- 
liar sense,  is  a  questionable  proof  of  true  piety  as  well  as 
of  sound  philosophy.  It  follows  the  same  course  of  incu- 
bation, development,  and  termination  in  cure  or  death,  as 
other  diseases  ;  sometimes  lying  dormant  for  months  or 
even  years,  obscure  to  others,  and  perhaps  unsuspected  by 
the  patient  himself;  at  others,  suddenly  breaking  out  with 
little  premonition  of  its  approach  ;  and  again,  after  being 
repeatedly  warded  off  by  precautions  and  remedies,  finally 
establishing  itself  in  its  clearest  forms  ;  just  as  consumption, 
for  instance,  sometimes  begins  its  ravages  so  slowly  and 
insidiously  as  to  be  perceptible  only  to  the  most  practised 
observer,  for  years  together,  while  in  another  class  of  pa- 
tients, it  proceeds  from  the  beginning  with  a  progress  as 
rapid  as  it  is  painfully  manifest.  But  its  presence  no  one 


130  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

thinks  of  denying  in  the  former  case,  merely  because  its 
victim  enjoys  a  certain  degree  of  health  and  activity,  though 
it  would  be  no  greater  error  than  to  deny  the  existence  of 
insanity  while  the  operations  of  the  mind  are  not  so  deeply 
disturbed  as  to  be  perceptible  to  the  casual  observer.  When 
fully  developed  too,  it  may,  like  other  diseases,  give  rise  to 
severe  constitutional  disturbance,  or  it  may  scarcely  affect 
the  system  at  large  ;  as  inflammation  of  the  digestive  organs 
may  occasion  fever  and  intolerable  pain,  or  lead  its  victim 
slowly  to  the  grave,  hardly  aware  of  its  presence,  and  in 
the  enjoyment  of  comparative  health.  Like  other  diseases, 
insanity  is  made  the  object  of  remedial  treatment  and  often 
yields  to  judicious  administration  of  medicines,  —  a  sufficient 
proof  of  its  material  origin,  for  though  the  rationale  of  the 
operation  of  bathing,  bleeding,  and  digitalis,  is  perfectly  ob- 
vious in  cerebral  disease,  it  is  not  so  clear  how  they  restore 
the  spiritual  principle  to  its  natural  vigor.  It  may  proceed 
through  its  successive  stages  with  a  severity  ever  increasing 
to  the  end,  or  like  many  other  affections  of  the  nervous  sys- 
tem, its  progress  may  be  interrupted  by  periods,  more  or  less 
long,  of  relaxation  of  its  ordinary  force,  —  from  a  mere 
abatement  of  the  constitutional  excitement  and  mental  ex- 
travagance, to  complete  intermission  of  the  disease,  when 
the  patient  is  apparently  restored  to  all  his  original  sound- 
ness. In  its  causes  also,  insanity  is  under  the  dominion  of 
no  extraordinary  pathological  laws.  It  never  arises  in  a 
mysterious  way,  as  if  abstracted  from  the  ordinary  relations 
of  cause  and  effect,  as  it  would  do,  were  it  an  affection  of 
an  immaterial  principle  ;  but  its  origin  may  be  readily  ac- 
counted for  in  the  same  way  as  that  of  other  diseases. 
Whether  proceeding  from  hereditary  predisposition,  or  ma- 
ternal influences  during  gestation  ;  from  the  cerebral  irrita- 
tion produced  by  disease  in  other  parts,  or  by  external  inju- 
ries ;  from  excessive  or  deficient  exercise  of  the  mind  ;  from 
great  predominance  or  indulgence  of  some  faculties  with  a 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS    OF    MANIA.  131 

small  endowment  or  neglect  of  the  rest ;  from  improper  or 
insufficient  nourishment  or  air  ;  from  the  unbridled  license 
of  the  passions  ;  or  the  habitual  use  of  intoxicating  drinks  ; 
we  see  the  influence  of  causes  precisely  analogous  to  those 
which  give  rise  to  other  diseases.  Mania  also  furnishes  an 
illustration  of  a  well  known  pathological  law,  in  its  tendency 
to  be  affected  by  remedies,  in  proportion  to  the  recency  of 
its  attack  —  a  fact  which  is  totally  inexplicable  on  the  sup- 
position of  the  mind  itself  being  idiopathically  diseased.  In 
common  with  other  diseases  it  is  benefited  by  proper  air 
and  exercise,  cheerful  conversation,  friendly  sympathy  and 
attention,  and  employments  which  furnish  a  healthful  play 
to  the  actions  of  the  whole  system,  and  abstract  the  patient 
from  the  contemplation  of  his  own  condition.  In  short, 
throughout  the  whole  history  of  mania,  in  its  various  forms, 
we  clearly  discover  the  evidence  of  a  bodily  disease —  of  a 
suffering  organ  ;  and  in  not  a  fact  respecting  it  can  we  dis- 
cover anything  anomalous  or  at  variance  with  the  principles 
of  diseased  action.  If  this  truth  be  steadily  borne  in  mind, 
it  will  be  a  faithful  light  to  our  steps  ;  and  no  one  at  all 
acquainted  with  the  subject,  can  question  the  importance  of 
the  influence,  which  it  will  exert  on  judicial  investigations. 
§  98.  Mania  then  being  a  disease  and  governed  by  the 
same  pathological  laws  as  other  diseases,  it  will  be  incum- 
bent on  us  to  give  same  account  of  its  symptoms  ;  and, 
since  we  consider  a  well-settled  conviction  of  the  above 
views  as  having  an  important  bearing  on  the  course  of  legal 
decisions,  no  further  reason  will  be  necessary  for  going 
more  fully  into  this  part  of  the  subject,  than  at  first  blush, 
might  seem  proper  for  our  purpose.  So  closely  are  sound- 
ness and  unsoundness  of  mind  allied,  that  we  are  met  at  the 
outset  by  the  difficulty  already  hinted  at,  of  discriminating 
in  some  cases  between  mental  manifestations  modified  by 
disease,  and  those  that  are  peculiar  though  natural  to  the 
individual.  Madness  is  not  indicated  so  much  by  any  par- 


132  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

ticular  extravagance  of  thought  or  feeling,  as  by  a  well- 
marked  change  of  character,  or  departure  from  the  ordinary 
habits  of  thinking,  feeling  and  acting,  without  any  adequate 
external  cause.  To  lay  down,  therefore,  any  particular 
definition  of  mania  founded  on  symptoms,  and  to  consider 
every  person  mad  who  may  happen  to  come  within  the 
range  of  its  application,  might  induce  the  ridiculous  conse- 
quence of  making  a  large  portion  of  mankind  of  unsound 
mind.  Some  men's  ordinary  habits  so  closely  resemble  the 
behavior  of  the  mad,  that  a  stranger  would  be  easily  de- 
ceived ;  as  in  the  opposite  case,  where  the  confirmed  mono- 
maniac, by  carefully  abstaining  from  the  mention  of  his  hal- 
lucinations, has  the  semblance  of  a  perfectly  rational  man. 
Hence,  when  the  sanity  of  an  individual  is  in  question, 
instead  of  comparing  him  with  a  fancied  standard  of  men- 
tal soundness,  as  is  too  commonly  the  custom,  his  natural 
character  should  be  diligently  investigated,  in  order  to  de- 
termine whether  the  apparent  indication  of  madness  is  not 
merely  the  result  of  the  ordinary  and  healthy  constitution 
of  the  faculties.  In  a  word,  he  is  to  be  compared  with  him- 
self, not  with  others,  and  if  there  have  been  no  departure 
from  his  ordinary  manifestations,  he  is  to  be  judged  sane  ; 
although  it  cannot  be  denied  that  striking  peculiarities  of 
character,  such  as  amount  to  eccentricity,  furnish  strong 
ground  of  suspicion  of  predisposition  to  madness. 

§  99.  For  the  first  announcement  of  this  great  princi- 
ple, that,  in  doubtful  cases,  the  mind  of  the  supposed  lunatic 
should  be  compared  with'  his  own  when  in  its  natural, 
habitual  state,  we- are  indebted  to  the  late  Dr.  Gooch,1 
though  it  has  been  since  developed  and  illustrated  with  an 
ability  worthy  of  its  importance,  by  Dr.  Andrew  Combe. 
If  the  truths  contained  in  the  following  extract  are  faithfully 


1  London  Quarterly  Review,  42,  355. 


PATHOLOGY   AND   SYMPTOMS    OF    MANIA,  133 

considered  by  the  medical  student,  he  may  be  spared  many 
an  awkward  mistake,  which  he  might  otherwise  have  com- 
mitted, and  may  save  many  a  sound  and  worthy  individual 
from  incalculable  pain  and  annoyance,  "  In  investigating 
the  nature  of  insanity,  the  first  caution  to  be  observed  is,  not 
to  confound  disorders  of  mental  functions  with  natural  qual- 
ities, which  sometimes  strongly  resemble  them.  Many  men 
in  the  full  enjoyment  of  health  are  remarkable  for  peculiar- 
ities and  idiosyncrasies  of  thought  and  feeling,  which  con- 
trast strongly  with  the  general  tone  and  usages  of  society  ; 
but  they  are  not  on  that  account  to  be  held  as  insane,  be- 
cause the  singularity  for  which  they  are  distinguished  is 
with  them  a  natural  quality,  and  not  the  product  of  disease  ; 
and,  from  the  very  unlikeness  of  their  manifestations  to  the 
modes  of  feeling  and  acting  of  other  men,  such  persons  are, 
in  common  language,  said  to  be  eccentric.  It  is  true  that, 
on  the  principle  already  explained,  of  excess  in  size  of 
some  organs  over  the  rest  being  favorable  to  the  production 
of  insanity,  eccentricity  involves,  all  other  things  being 
equal,  a  greater  than  usual  susceptibility  to  mental  derange- 
ment ;  but  still  it  is  not  mere  strangeness  of  conduct  or  sin- 
gularity of  mind  which  constitutes  its  presence.  It  is  the 
prolonged  departure,  without  an  adequate  external  cause, 
from  the  state  of  feeling  and  modes  of  thinking  usual  to  the 
individual  when  in  health,  that  is  the  true  feature  of  disor- 
der in  mind ;  and  the  degree  at  which  this  disorder  ought 
to  be  held  as  constituting  insanity,  is  a  question  of  another 
kind,  on  which  we  can  scarcely  hope  for  unanimity  of  senti- 
ment and  opinion.  Let  the  disorder,  however,  be  ascertained 
to  be  morbid  in  its  nature  and  the  chief  point  is  secured,  viz.  a 
firm  basis  for  an  accurate  diagnosis  ;  because  it  is  impossible 
that  such  derangement  can  occur  unless  in  consequence  of,  or 
in  connexion  with,  a  morbid  condition  of  the  organ  of  mind  ; 
and  thus  the  abstract  mental  states,  which  are  justly  held  to 
indicate  lunacy  in  one,  may,  in  another,  speaking  relatively 
12 


134  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

to  health,  be  the  strongest  proofs  of  perfect  soundness  of 
mind.  A  brusque,  rough  -manner,  which  is  natural  to  one 
person,  indicates  nothing  but  mental  health  in  him  ;  but  if 
another  individual,  who  has  always  been  remarkable  for  a 
deferential  deportment  and  habitual  politeness,  lays  these 
qualities  aside,  and  without  provocation  or  other  adequate 
cause,  assumes  the  unpolished  forwardness  of  the  former, 
we  may  justly  infer,  that  his  mind  is  either  already  de- 
ranged, or  on  the  point-  of  becoming  so.  Or,  if  a  person 
who  has  been  noted  all  his  life,  for  prudence,  steadiness, 
regularity  and  sobriety,  suddenly  becomes,  without  any 
adequate  change  in  his  external  situation,  rashj  unsettled, 
and  dissipated  in  his  habits,  or  vice  versa,  every  one  recog- 
nizes at  once  these  changes,  accompanied  as  they  then  are 
by  bodily  symptoms,  as  evidences  of  the  presence  of  disease 
affecting  the  mind,  through  the  instrumentality  of  its  organs. 
It  is  therefore,  I  repeat,  not  the  abstract  act  or  feeling  which 
constitutes  a  symptom  ;  it  is  the  departure  from  the  natural 
and  healt-hy  character,  temper  and  habits,  that  gives  it  this 
meaning ;  and,  in  judging  of  a  man's  sanity,  it"  is  conse- 
quently as  essential  to  know  what  his  habitual  manifesta- 
tions were,  as  what  his  present  symptoms  are."  * 

§  100.  Mania,  under  whatever  form  it  may  appear,  is 
generally  preceded,  except  when  produced  by  injuries  or 
moral  shocks,  by  a  change  in  the  natural  condition  desig- 
nated by  writers  as  the  period  of  incubation.  In  the  fol- 
lowing paragraphs  by  Georget,  we  have  a  most  accurate 
and  graphic  description  of  this  state.  "  Sometimes,"  says 
he,  "  the  action  of  the  cause  is  strong  and  rapid  ;  at  other 
times,  more  moderate  and  slow.  In  the  first  case,  madness 
breaks  out  at  the  end  of  some  hours  or  some  days,  after  a 
state  of  anxiety  and  uneasiness,  with  headache,  sleepless- 


1  Observations  on  Mental  Derangement,    196. 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS   OF    MANIA.  135 

ness,  agitation  or  depression,  and  threatening  of  cerebral 
congestion  ;  the  patient  begins  to  babble,  cry,  sing,  and 
becomes  agitated  and  wild.  He  is  then  often  taken  for  a 
person  in  a  state  of  intoxication,  and  the  mistake  becomes 
apparent  only  after  examining  the  previous  circumstances 
and  the  duration  of  the  malady.  In  the  other  case,  thought 
only  becomes  affected  gradually,  and  often  very  slowly  ; 
the  patient  is  generally  conscious  of  some  disorder  in  his 
intellectual  faculties ;  he  is  beset  by  new  and  odd  notions, 
and  by  unusual  inclinations ;  he  feels  himself  changing  in 
his  affections  ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  he  preserves  a  con- 
sciousness of  his  condition,  is  vexed  at  it,  and  tries  'to  con- 
ceal it ;  he  continues  his  occupations  as  much  as  he  can  ; 
and  lastly,  as  many  people  do  in  the  first  stage  of  intoxi- 
cation, he  makes  every  effort  to  appear  reasonable.  Mean- 
time, his  health  continues  to  give  way,  and  he  either  sleeps 
less  or  loses  sleep  altogether ;  the  appetite  diminishes  or 
disappears ;  sometimes  digestion  is  difficult,  and  constipa- 
tion supervenes ;  embonpoint  decreases,  the  features  alter, 
the  monthly  discharge  becomes  irregular,  weak,  and  at  last 
is  suspended.  At  the  same  time,  there  is  observed  some- 
thing unusual  and  even  extraordinary,  in  the  tastes  of  the 
patient,  in  his  habits,  his  affections,  his  character  and  apti- 
tude for  business ;  if  he  was  gay  and  communicative,  he 
becomes  sad,  morose,  and  averse  to  society  ;  if  he  was 
orderly  and  economical,  he  becomes  confused  and  prodigal ; 
if  he  had  long  abstained  from  the  pleasures  of  love,  he 
becomes  the  victim  of  insatiable  desires,  and  either  seeks 
to  associate  with  the  other  sex,  or  has  recourse  to  disgrace- 
ful practices ;  if  he  was  moderate  in  his  political  and  reli- 
gious opinions,  he  passes  to  an  extreme  exaggeration  in 
both ;  if  he  was  open  and  candid,  he  becomes  suspicious 
and  jealous  ;  if  a  wife,  she  regards  her  husband  and  child- 
ren with  indifference  ;  the  merchant  neglects  his  business  ; 
tears  and  laughter  succeed  each  other  without  apparent 


136  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF  INSANITY. 

motive  ;  the  exterior  of  candor  and  modesty  gives  place  to 
an  air  of  conceit  and  assurance,  which,  especially  in  wo- 
men, astonishes  us.  But  all  these  phenomena  are  less 
prominent  than  they  may  appear  to  be  here,  and  unless  the 
individual  have  been  insane  before,  no  one  may  suspect 
the  nature  of  the  ailment  which  torments  him  ;  all  the  ques- 
tions put  to  him  lead  to  no  results,  except  that  of  fatiguing 
and  giving  him  pain,  for  the  ignorance  that  prevails  relative 
to  madness  leads  the  friends  to  indulge  in  offensive  insinu- 
ations, and  to  charge  him  with  frivolous  accusations,  from 
not  perceiving  that  he  is  under  the  influence  of  disease,  and 
not  of  reason.  Sometimes  the  appetite  either  remains 
entire,  or  is  speedily  recovered,  as  well  as  digestion,  nutri- 
tion, &c.  and  it  is  in  these  circumstances  that  the  conduct 
of  the  patient  gives  rise  to  a  host  of  interpretations  on  the 
part  of  his  relatives  and  the  public." 

§  101.  "  This  period  of  incubation  of  mental  alienation, 
during  which  the  true  state  of  the  patient  is  generally  mis- 
understood, or  not  appreciated,  may  last  a  long  time.  Pinel 
relates,  that  a  man  who  believed  his  wife  to  have  been  ill 
only  six  months,  the  period  of  the  invasion  of  furious  de- 
lirium, admitted,  after  a  multiplicity  of  questions,  that  the 
disease  must  have  been  going  on  fifteen  years.  The  same 
author  mentions  elsewhere,  that  in  several  instances  the 
maniacal  or  melancholic  state,  has  begun  four,  six,  ten,  or 
even  fifteen  or  twenty  years  previously.  It  is  often  easy  to 
go  back  months,  or  years,  in  this  way  ;  and  we  finally  disco- 
ver that  circumstances,  taken  for  causes  by  the  friends,  are 
frequently  only  the  consequences  of  unobserved  disease.  In 
fact,  it  often  happens  at  that  period  of  the  malady,  that  a 
slight  contradiction,  or  paroxysm  of  anger,  or  some  cause 
equally  insignificant  to  a  person  in  good  health,  provokes 
the  immediate  and  complete  subversion  of  reason,  and  gives 
rise  to  mistakes  as  to  its  true  cause  and  duration."  l 

1  Dictionnaire  de  M6decine,  art.  Folie. 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS    OF    MANIA.  137 

§  .102.  Sooner  or  later  this  disorder  of  the  cerebral 
functions  becomes  of  a  more  obvious  and  positive  character. 
The  struggle  between  the  convictions  of  his  sounder  reason, 
and  the  impulses  of  this  new  condition,  ceases,  and  the 
patient;  instead  of  contending  any  longer  against  the 
approaches  of  disease,  or  of  concealing  his  thoughts,  now 
believes  in  their  reality,  and  openly  and  strenuously  avows 
them,  except  when  induced  by  powerful  reasons  to  pursue 
a  contrary  course.  The  governing  principle  in  the  mind  is 
gone ;  ideas  and  perceptions  occur  in  the  utmost  confusion 
and  rapidity, and  are  connected  by  unnatural  and  incongruous 
relations.  The  attention  is  constantly  wandering  from  one 
idea  or  object  to  another ;  external  impressions  have  lost 
their  ordinary  power,  being  overlooked  or  disregarded  amid 
the  turmoil  that  prevails  within.  The  individual  is  excited 
to  action  by  strange  and  extraordinary  motives,  or  by  im- 
pulses that  he  finds  himself  unable  to  resist.  His  passions 
are  easily  aroused  and  almost  instantly  reach  their  maximum 
of  strength  and  activity.  The  higher  affections  are  dormant, 
while  all  his  relations  to  his  fellow  men  are  viewed  through 
a  medium  of  fear,  suspicion,  jealousy  and  distrust.  His 
friends  and  relatives  especially,  are  objects  of  his  suspicions, 
and  nothing  can  induce  him  to  view  them  in  any  other  light, 
than  as  enemies  to  his  moral  apd  physical  welfare.  Not- 
withstanding the  disorder  that  pervades  the  ideas  of  the 
maniac,  and  his  insensibility  to  outward  impressions,  he  is 
always  conscious  of  perceiving  them.  Maniacs,  when  they 
recover,  sometimes  remember  all  the  scenes  and  occurrences 
of  their  disorder.  They  can  tell  what  they  saw,  heard  arid 
felt,  and  explain  the  motives  that  governed'their  conduct. 
In  some  cases,  however,  the  exercise  of  memory  seems  to 
be  more  or  less  suspended  during  the  active  stage  of  the 
disease,  and  the  patient  may  recover'  his  senses,  like  one 
awakening  from' a  deep  sleep,  unconscious  of  the  lapse  of 
time,  and  everything  that  has  happened. 
12* 


138  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

§  103.  The  symptoms  of  physical  derangement  are  also 
striking  and  numerous.  A  febrile  excitement  pervades  the 
system,  The  pulse  is  accelerated,  the  eye  has  a  wild  and 
glassy  look,  the  sensations  have  become  either  more  acute 
or  more  obscure,  besides  being  frequently  erroneous,  and 
the  patient  complains  of  pain  in  the  head,  sense  of  weight, 
giddiness,  ringing  in  the  ears.  The  countenance  greatly 
changes,  and  though  varying  differently  in  the  different  forms 
of  insanity,  yet  in  all  it  generally  bears  the  expression  of 
physical  pain,  or  mental  disquiet.  A  singular  insensibility 
to  external  impressions  is  often  witnessed  in  this  stage  of 
mania,  by  means  of  which,  exposure  to  intense  cold,  heat, 
hunger  and  thirst,  is  borne  to  a  wonderful  degree,  without 
producing  uneasiness,  or  even  consciousness  of  the  fact. 
The  muscular  power  is  sometimes  inordinately  developed, 
the  waking  moments  being  a  scene  of  almost  constant  rest- 
lessness  and  agitation  ;  while  at  others,  there  is  an  equally 
unnatural  sluggishness  and  indisposition  to  move  about. 
Hunger  and  thirst  are  seldom  unaffected,  the  patient  either 
taking  immense  quantities  of  food,  or  scarcely  sufficient  to 
supply  the  wants  of  nature.  The  maniacal  patient  sleeps 
less,  and  his  slumbers  are  disturbed  by  frightful  dreams. 

§  104.  Although  the  course  of  a  maniacal  attack  is  or- 
dinarily such  as  is  represented  above,  yet  sometimes, 
especially  on  the  application  of  a  powerfully  exciting  cause, 
it  breaks  out  suddenly  and  terminates  in  death  or  recovery 
within  ten  or  fifteen  days.  When  cases  of  this  descrip- 
tion are  subjected  to  judicial  inquiry,  it  is  often  difficult  to 
satisfy  a  jury  of  the  genuineness  of  the  disease.  The 
proofs,  though  sufficient  for  those  who  are  much  conversant 
with  insanity,  are  very  far  from  striking  others  with  equal 
force.  A  case,  still  fresh  in  the  public  mind,  was  probably 
one  of  this  kind.  In  March,  1843,  Mercer  was  tried  by 
the  court  of  oyer  and  terminer,  of  New  Jersey,  for  the 
murder  of  Heberton,  on  the  10th  of  February  previous. 


PATHOLOGY    AND    SYMPTOMS    OP    MANIA.  139 

He  was  defended  by  his  counsel  on  the  plea  of  insanity,  and 
acquitted,  though  it  does  not  appear  that  the  acquittal  was 
on  this  ground.  We  shall  only  notice  such  facts,  which  ap- 
peared in  evidence,  as  have  any  bearing  on  Mercer's  mental 
condition.  On  the  8th  of  February  he  was  informed  of  the 
seduction  of  his  sister,  a  young,  simple-minded  girl,  by 
Heberton,  a  practised  libertine.  The  communication  made 
a  powerful  impression  upon  his  feelings,  attended  with  mani- 
festations of  the  highest  mental  excitement.  During  the 
greater  part  of  the  day,  he  was  strongly  agitated  —  crying 
and  cursing — sitting  still  and  silent  for  a  minute  or  two, 
and  then  violently  striding  through  the  room  —  insisting  on 
calling  his  father  to  come  and  shoot  his  sister,  who  had 
ruined  and  disgraced  them  all  —  declaring  that  he  would  go 
and  kill  her  himself,  and  abusing  his  friends  for  keeping 
him  in  the  room.  He  did  not  seem  to  understand  or  appre- 
ciate anything  that  was  said  to  him,  nor  know  what  he  him- 
self said  or  did.  On  being  told  that  the  law  could  not  hold 
Heberton,  he  became  quite  furious  and  wild.  His  face  had 
a  mottled  appearance,  and  his  eyes  were  wild  and  staring. 
He  complained  that  his  head  was  burning,  and  bound  around 
it  a  wet  handkerchief.  This  conduct  continued  in  the 
evening.  Of  his  condition  during  the  next  day  we  hear 
nothing  from  the  witnesses,  until  late  in  the  evening,  when 
he  accosted  the  captain  of  the  watch,  in  an  oyster-cellar, 
and  without  any  previous  acquaintance  with  him,  insisted  on 
telling  him  the  whole  story  of  his  sister's  disgrace.  He  said 
his  sister  was  crazy,  his  father  was  crazy,  his  mother  was 
crazy,  and  they  were  all  ruined.  He  imagined  that  some 
trunks  he  saw  in  the  street  were  Heberton's,  and  wished  to 
watch  them,  lest  he  might  elude  him.  His  manner  was  wild, 
and  his  countenance  haggard.  He  called  for  food  and  drink, 
but  scarcely  tasted  of  either.  Another  witness,  who  saw 
him  the  same  evening,  described  his  manner  as  being  very 
wild  and  agitated.  He  said  somebody  was  running  away 


140  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

with  his  sister.  On  the  10th  he  passed  by  an  acquaintance 
without  seeming  to  notice  him ;  on  meeting  him  a  second 
time  and  being  addressed,  he  looked  with  a  vacant  stare, 
turned  and  walked  away  in  a  wild  and  hurried  manner. 
Another  witness  saw  him  walking  up  and  down  the  street, 
his  face  red  on  one  side  and  white  on  the  other,  looking 
wild  and  agitated.  Witness  spoke  to  him  about  some 
business  Mercer  and  his  son  had  together,  hoping  thereby 
to  call  his  attention,,  but  his  answers  were  quite  strange  and . 
irrelevant.  He  spoke  of  men  with  whom  he  had  no 
acquaintance.  .While  walking  in  the  streets  he  frequently 
changed  his  course,  and  looked  around  anxiously,  as  if  ex- 
pecting to  see  some  one.  That  evening  he  shot  Heberton, 
while  sitting  in  his  carriage  in  the  ferry-boat.  He  immedi- 
ately confessed  the  act  and  made  no  attempt  to  escape. 
Soon  after  he  asked  several  different  persons  for  a  fiddle, 
that  he  might  have  a  dance.  Daring  the  coroner's  inquest 
the  same  night,  he  sat  resting  his  head  on  his  arms  over  the 
back  of  a  chair,  recognizing  no  one.  In  the  night,  he  said 
his  sister  was  in  the  insane  asylum.  Shortly  after  his  com- 
mittal he  was  visited  by  a  physician  who  had  been  previous- 
ly acquainted  with  him.  By  him,  Mercer  was  considered 
insane  on  the  strength  of  the  following  facts.-  His  face,  was 
flushed,  his  eye  wild  and  wan'dering,  his  manner  restless, 
his  conversation  was  incoherent  and  rambling,  and  he  mis- 
called persons  and  things,  (this  fact  was  testified  to  by  sev- 
eral other  witnesses.)  For  two  or  three  days  he  complain- 
ed of  a  pain  "in  his-head,  and  was  much  constipated.  Es- 
sentially the  same  was  the  testimony  of  two  other  witnesses 
(not  medical,)  one  of  whom  thought  he  was  not  quite 
himself,  till  the  18th.1 

§  105.     The  nature  of  the  exciting  cause  in  this  case/,  ren- 
ders it  not  very  strange  that  Mercer  should  have  become 

1  The  Dollar  Newspaper. 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS    OF    MANIA.  141 

insane,  and  the  circumstances  above  related,  touching  his 
appearance,  furnish  no  light  proof  that  such  was  actually  the 
fact.  It  certainly  is  not  very  far  from  the  ordinary  line  of 
occurrences,  that,  a  high-spirited,  nervous  young  man,  sud- 
denly hearing  of  the  ruin  of  a  beloved  sister,  should  be  com- 
pletely overwhelmed  and  driven  from  his  propriety  —  that 
reason  should  depart,  and  the  passions  rage  with  intense  ex- 
citement. Why  the  disease  should  have  run  its  course  so 
rapidly,  we  know  not.  It  is  a  common  opinion,  however, 
that  this  character  of  short  duration  is  oftener  witnessed  in 
cases  which,  like  this,  have  been  attended  by  some  dreadful 
deed  of  violence.  Unquestionably,  Mercer  was  in  a  tower- 
ing passion,  and  to  a  certain  degree,  at  least,  he  acted  as  if 
under  its  influence.  But  a  storm  of  passion  seldom,  if  ever, 
continues  three  or  four  days  together.  After  the  first  out- 
break which  spends  its  fury  in  a  few  hours,  the  mind  set- 
tles down  into  a  state  of  fixed,  decided  determination,  form- 
ing its  plans,  and  steadily  and  consistently  pursuing  them. 
How  different  from  this  was  Mercer's  case  !  At  no  time, 
between  hearing  of  his  sister's  infamy  and  revenging  her 
wrongs,  did  he  act  with  calmness,  deliberation  and  co- 
herence. That  he  was  under  a  high  degree  of  mental  ex- 
citement, is  undeniable  ;  that  he  had  also  lost  his  reason,  or, 
in  scientific  language,  was  laboring  under  a  pathological 
irritation  of  the  brain,  is  shown  by  some  facts  that  cannot  well 
be  explained  upon  any  other  ground.  To  talk  wildly  and 
incoherently,  to  imagine  that  a  pile  of  trunks  he  happened  to 
see  in  the  streets,  were  Heberton's  ;  that  his  family  were  all 
crazy,  and  his  sister  in  a  hospital ;  to  be  constantly  miscall- 
ing persons  and  things  ;  to  talk  familiarly  of  men  whom  he 
did  not  know  ;  to  return  irrelevant  answers  to  questions  on 
business,  and  finally,  after  accomplishing  the  terrible  act  of 
revenge,  to  call  for  a  fiddle  that  he  might  have  a  dance  — 
these  things  are  strongly  indicative  of  insanity.  In  a  large 
portion  of  cases  recently  attacked,  which  come  into  hospitals 


142  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

for  the  insane,  the  proofs  of  insanity  are  not  more  strong 
and  abundant  than  they  were  in  Mercer's  case.  Very  often 
the  disease  is  evinced,  not  so  much  by  any  particular  word 
or  act,  as  by  incoherent  and  disjointed  discourse,  and  by  a 
course  of  conduct  and  demeanor  at  variance  with  the  natural 
character  of  the  individual.  In  this  case  too,  if  the  testi- 
mony may  be  relied  upon,  there  were  delusions,  and  these, 
if  genuine,  can  only  spring  from  insanity.1 

§  106.  Very  similar  to  the  above,  in  many  of  its  features, 
was  the  case  of  Wood,  who  was  tried  for  the  murder  of  his 
daughter,  the  30th  of  September,  1839,  in  Philadelphia. 
It  appears  from  the  testimony,  that  Wood,  who  was  a  con- 
fectioner, and  considered  an  upright,  industrious  man,  had 
for  the  last  fifteen  years  suffered  much  from  diseases  of  a 
nervous  character,  such  as-  neuralgia,  -dyspepsia,  and  con- 
stipation, and  exhibited  much  mental  irritability.  About  a 
year  before  this  event,  while  making  some  alterations  in  his 
house,  he  interfered  with  his  workmen  in  a  very  unreason- 
able manner,  frequently  rubbing  his  hands  together,  and 
exclaiming,  he  was  rurned.  Just  before  the  event,  he  went 
to  New  York,  where  he  was  disposed  to  make  some  strange 
business  arrangements  ;  but  suddenly  left  the  city,  neglect- 
ing to  pay  his  board  and  to  meet  an  engagement  with  a 
person  whom  he  had  engaged  to  see.  On  the  27th  of 
September,  he  heard  of  the  marriage  of  his  daughter  with 
a  man  whom  he  regarded  as  a  great  villain,  and  was  much 

1  In  the  above  remarks,  on  Mercer's  case,  I  do  not  mean  to  express 
the  opinion  that  he  was-undoubtedly  insane.  The  observations  of 
the  witnesses  which  furnish  the  proofs  of  his  insanity,  even  those  of 
the  medical  men,  were  not  sufficiently  close,  accurate  and  thorough, 
to  form  the  basis  of  a  scientific  opinion.  Yet,  however  unsatis- 
factory they  may  be,  in  this  respect,  they  unquestionably  throw 
strong  doubts  on  Mercer's  sanity,  and  therefore  the  jury  cannot  be 
blamed  for  shrinking  from  a  conviction.  In  the  following  case  of 
Wood,  the  evidence  relative  to  insanity  is  liable  tp  similar  ob- 
jections. 


PATHOLOGY    AND    SYMPTOMS    OF    MANIA.  143 

agitated  by  the  communication.  He  walked  the  room  in 
great  distress,  crying  and  moaning,  and  exclaiming  that  he 
was  a  lost,  ruined  man.  He  then  shut  up  his  shop  and 
went  running  through  the  streets.  When  he  returned  home, 
he  refused  for  half  an  hour  to  sit  down,  and  when  he'  did, 
he  kept  moving  his  head  backwards  and  forwards.  So 
strangely  did  he  appear,  that  his  neighbors  requested  his 
wife  to  remove  his.  razors,  and  offered  to  watch  him  through 
the  night.  In  the  middle  of  the  night  he  ordered  his  wife 
to  go  to  'the  front  window,  and  call  his  daughter  by  name, 
for  he  heard  her  in  the  street  crying  to  get  in.  On  the  28th, 
he  was  very  importunate  to  see  his  daughter,  who'  had  not 
been  at  home  since  her  marriage.  When  she  appeared,  he 
raised  his  hands,  uttered  a  wild  scream,  and  fell  down  in 
a  sort  of,  fit,  gnashing  his  teeth,  and  appearing  to  be  in  great 
agony.  He  manifested  no  anger  towards  her,  but  treated 
her  with  his  usual  affection,  and  on  parting,  they  kissed 
•each  other.  In  the  afternoon  he  went  into  the  streets,  look- 
ing wild  and  agitated,  as  the  day.  before.  A  colored  man, 
whom  he  knew,  he  requested  to  come  to  his  house  the  next 
day,  though  it  was  Sunday,  as  he  was  to  entertain  a  large 
party.  In  the  night  he  arose,  went  to  his  daughter's  room, 
laid  his  head  down  by  the  side  of  hers,  crying  violently  and 
manifesting  the  most  intense  fondness  of  her.  On  the  29th, 
he  was  met  in  the  street,  walking  rapidly  along,  by  his 
family  physician,  who,  noticing  his  strange  conduct,  beckon- 
ed him  to  come  to  him,  but  he  merely  put  up  his  hand, 
made  a  rapid  motion  with  it,  turned  round  and  went  in  the 
opposite  direction.  On  the  morning  of  the  30th,  he  appear- 
ed quite  weak,  and  drank  two  or  three  glasses  of  brandy. 
While  his  wife  and  a  man-servant  were  talking  in  the 
kitchen  about  confining  him,  he  proceeded  to  his  daughter's 
chamber  and  shot  her  dead  with  a  pistol.  He  made  no  at- 
tempt to  escape,  and  confessed  that  he  was  the  murderer, 
sauntering  about  the  room  apparently  quite  unconcerned. 


144  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

Shortly  he  laid  down  upon  a  bed  and  moaned  heavily. 
When  told  that  his  daughter  was  dead,  he  expressed  himself 
as  satisfied  ;  said  he  should  not  long  survive,  and  requested 
to  be  buried  in  the  same  grave.  He  then  described  the 
manner  in  which  he  had  accomplished  the  bloody  act.  It 
appeared  also,  that  he  was  a  kind,  amiable  man,  very  fond 
of  his  children,  not  intemperate,  nor  accustomed  to  drink 
spirituous  liquors  at  all,  and  that  on  the  27th,  28th,  29th,  he 
took  no  food,  except  a  very  little  on  the  evening  of  the  29th. 
On  his  mental  condition  subsequently,  the  testimony  throws 
no  light.  He  was  acquitted  on  the  ground  of  insanity.1 

§  107.  This  case  differs  from  Mercer's  in  the  important 
fact  that,  for  some  time  previous,  Wood  had  been  laboring 
under  a  certain  degree  of  mental  impairment,  and  was 
apparently  on  the  verge  of  insanity.  In  this  state  he  hears 
of  the  marriage  of  his  daughter,  which,  in  his  mind,  was 
equivalent  to  her  ruin  and  the  dishonor  of  himself  and 
family.  Overpowered  by  the  shock,  his  nervous  system 
becomes  violently  agitated,  and  reason  soon  ceases  to  con- 
trol his  movements.  In  this  slate  of  bewilderment  and 
confusion,  he  wanders  about,  without  aim  or  object,  till  at 
last,  when  the  powers  of  nature  are  about  to  yield  from  pure 
exhaustion,  impelled  by  no  passion,  and  actuated  by  no 
rational  motive,  he  takes  the  life  of  his  beloved  child.  That 
he  did  not  act  from  passion,  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  he 
had  evinced  no  anger  towards  her,  but  on  the  contrary,  had 
shown  the  strongest  affection.  The  only  passion  which 
could  have  actuated  him  at  that  moment  was  revenge,  and 
in  that  case,  the  object  of  his  fury  would  have  been  the 
daughter's  husband.  It  may  be  supposed,  perhaps,  that 
the  bloody  deed  was  perpetrated  under  the  influence  of  the 
liquor  he  drank  ;  or,  at  any  rate,  that  it  would  not  otherwise 
have  been  done.  This,  no  doubt,  is  possible,  but  the  true 

1  Spirit  of  the  Times,  Philadelphia. 


PATHOLOGY    AND    SYMPTOMS    OF    MANIA.  145 

question  at  issue  is,  whether  or  not  he  was  insane  for  two  or 
three  days  previous  to  the  criminal  act.  If  he  were,  then 
the  intoxication  was  the  effect  of  insanity,  and  he  was  no 
more  accountable  for  the  former  than  for  the  latter.  A  fond- 
ness of  strong  drinks  is  a  not  uncommon  accompaniment 
of  mania,  and  a  person  may  drink  while  insane,  who  never 
drank  before.  The  conditions  of  this  case  were  all  favor- 
able to  the  production  of  insanity  —  a  highly  irritable,  ner- 
vous temperament,  a  morbid  apprehension  of  coming  ills, 
and  a  powerfully  exciting  cause  of  the  disease.  Where  is 
the  wonder,  then,  that  Wood  should  have  become  insane,  and 
while  so,  that  he  should  have  committed  any  imaginable 
folly  or  crime  ? 

§  108.  The  mental  disorders  are  of  course  as  numerous 
and  various  as  the  mental  constitutions  of  the  insane  them- 
selves ;  and  to  consider  any  particular  association  of  them 
as  characteristic  of  the  stale  of  mind  called  mania,  would 
be  only  to  blend  things  together  that  have  no  uniform  nor 
necessary  relations  to  one  another  ;  and  would  convey  no 
more  really  valuable  information,  than  it  would  to  marshal 
forth  every  symptom  that  has  at  any  time  been  observed  in 
the  countless  disorders  of  digestion,  as  the  symptoms  of 
diseased  stomach.  The  only  use  which  the  physician 
makes  of  the  latter  is  to  refer  them  as  they  occur,  to  some 
particular  derangement  of  that  organ,  and  thus  establish  the 
ground  for  an  appropriate  and  efficient  treatment.  There 
is  no  reason,  why  the  same  process  should  not  be  pursued 
in  mania  ;  and  it  is  because  a  different  one  has  been  follow- 
ed, that  the  common  notions  of  this  disease  are  so  loose 
and  incorrect,  as  not  only  to  be  of  little  service  in  judicial 
discussions,  but  absolutely  in  the  way  of  arriving  at  just 
and  philosophical  conclusions.  To  furnish  any  light  on  the 
subject,  it  would  be  our  duty  to  analyze  the  various  pheno- 
mena of  mania,  associate  them  by  some  natural  relations, 
and  refer  them,  as  far  as  our  knowledge  will  permit,  to  par- 
13 


146  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

ticular  faculties.  It  is  proposed  therefore,  following  this 
idea  as  closely  as  possible,  to  consider  mania  as  affecting 
either  the  intellectual,  or  the  affective  faculties  ;  meaning 
by  the  former,  those  which  make  us  acquainted  with  the 
existence  and  qualities  of  external  objects  and  the  relations 
of  cause  and  effect,  and  conduct  us  to  the  knowledge  of 
general  truths  ;  and  by  the  latter,  those  sentiments,  propen- 
sities and  passions  necessary  to  man  as  a  social  and  account- 
able being.  It  is  not  intended  to  convey  the  idea  that  mania 
is  invariably  confined  to  one  or  the  other  of  these  two  divis- 
ions of  our  faculties ;  for  though  they  may  sometimes  be 
separately  affected,  the  one  presenting  a  chaos  of  tumult 
and  disorder,  while  the  other  apparently  retains  its  wonted 
soundness  and  vigor,  yet  more  frequently,  they  are  both  in- 
volved in  the  general  derangement.  But  unless  we  study 
these  disorders  separately,  and  recognize  their  independent 
existence  —  and  this  effect  it  is  the  tendency  of  the  above 
classification  to  produce,  —  we  never  shall  be  able  to  refer 
them  to  their  true  source,  nor  discover  their  respective  in- 
fluence over  the  mental  manifestations. 


CHAPTER.    VI. 


INTELLECTUAL    MANIA. 

§  109.  INTELLECTUAL  MANIA  is  characterized  by  certain 
hallucinations,1  in  which  the  patient  is  impressed  with  the 
reality  of  facts  or  events  that  have  never  occurred,  and  acts 
more  or  less  in  accordance  with  such  belief;  or  having 
adopted  some  notion  not  altogether  unfounded,  carries  it  to 
an  extravagant  and  absurd  extent.  It  may  be  general,  in- 
volving all  or  the  most  of  the  operations  of  the  understand- 
ing ;  or  partial,  being  confined  to  a  particular  idea,  or  train 
of  ideas. 


SECTION.    I. 

.  General  Intellectual    Mania. 

§  110.  The  general  description  of  mania  is  equally  appli- 
cable to  the  acute  state  of  this,  and  sometimes  of  other  forms 
of  the  disease.  It  is  not  generally  till  after  the  excitement 
has  somewhat  subsided,  that  the  distinctive  features  of  each 


1  This  term,  though  it  has  long  held  a  place  in  medical  language, 
has  always  been  used  with  remarkable  diversity  and  vagueness  of 
meaning.  Without  troubling  the  reader  with  an  array  of  nosological 
definitions,  it  will  be  sufficient  to  say,  that  in  this  treatise,  it  is  used 
as  a  general  designation  of  all  those  notions  which  are  indicative  of 
derangement,  either  of  the  reflective  or  perceptive  powers. 


148  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF  INSANITY. 

become  very  manifest.  In  this  stage  of  general  intellectual 
mania,  many  glimpses  of  natural  soundness  may  be  discov- 
ered amid  the  intellectual  disorder.1  Questions  on  indifferent 
subjects  may  be  appropriately  answered  ;  many  of  the  pa- 
tient's relations  to  surrounding  circumstances  may  still  be 
perceived  ;  and  no  little  acuteness  and  ingenuity  are  often 
manifested  in  accommodating  the  real  and  true  to  the  delu- 
sions under  which  he  labors.  The  difficulty  is  to  fix  the 
attention  on  a  particular  point,  the  mind  constantly  running 
from  one  idea  to  another,  or  absorbed  in  the  thoughts  which 
happen,  for  the  moment,  to  predominate  over  every  other. 
§  111.  In  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge  of  the  mental 
constitution,  it  is  not  strange  to  find  considerable  diversity 
of  opinion  respecting  the  nature  or.cause  of  hallucinations  of 
the  senses ;  yet  in  a  medico-legal  point  of  view  it  is  important 
that  they  should  be  correctly  understood.  Hoffbauer2  says 
that  they  consist  in  a  vicious  relation  between  the  imagina- 
tion and  the  senses,  in  consequence  of  which  the  patient 
mistakes  the  creations  of  the  one  for  objects  really  perceived 
by  the  others.  Esquirol,  not  entirely  satisfied  with  this  ex- 
planation, divides  them  into  two  classes,  termed  by  him, 
illusive  sensations,  and  hallucinations.3  The  first  arise  in 
the  senses,  as  when  a  maniac  mistakes  a  window  for  a  door, 
passes  through  it  and  is  precipitated  to  the  ground  ;  or  takes 
the  clouds  which  he  sees  in  the  sky  for  contending  armies  ; 
or  believes  his  legs  are  made  of  glass  ;  or  his  head  turned 
round.  In  all  these  instances,  the  error  refers  to  the  real 
impression  which  is  ill-perceived  ;  there  is  an  error  of  sensa- 
tion, a  vicious  relation  between  the  sense  which  actually 
perceives  and  the  intellect  which  judges  falsely  of  the  exter- 
nal object.  In  the  second,  on  the  contrary,  the  senses  have 


1  Pinel,  Traite  sur  1'  alienation  mentale,  142,  §  148. 
8  Op.  cit.  sup.  §  84.  3  Idem,  §  82,  note. 


GENERAL    INTELLECTUAL    MANIA.  149 

no  share ;  the  imagination  alone  is  exalted  ;  the  brain  is 
exclusively  the  seat  of  the  disturbance  ;  the  patient  mistak- 
ing the  creations  of  his  imagination  for  objects  actually 
present  to  his  senses.  He  sees  images  and  apparitions  amid 
the  thickest  darkness  ;  hears  sounds  and  voices  in  the  most 
perfect  silence  ;  and  smells  odors  in  the  absence  of  all  odor- 
ous bodies.  This  distinction  does  not  seem  to  be  well  sup- 
ported. That  the  functions  of  the  senses  are  sometimes 
greatly  perverted,  there  can  be  no  question  ;  but  it  needs 
more  evidence  than  we  yet  have,  to  prove  that  such  per- 
versions bear  much  if  any  part  in  producing  these  illusions ; 
more  especially  as  Esquirol  admits,  that,  in  what  he  terms 
hallucinations,  an  exalted  imagination  is  sufficient  of  itself 
to  produce  a  very  similar  effect.  In  old  age,  where,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  decay  of  the  senses,  wrong  impressions  are 
being  constantly  received,  they  nevertheless  give  rise  to 
none  of  these  delusions.  When  the  hero  of  Cervantes  did 
battle  with  the  sheep  and  the  windmills,  it  will  not  be  con- 
tended that  he  was  laboring  under  any  special  optical  infirm- 
ity which  conveyed  false  impressions  of  outward  objects, 
because  on  most  occasions,  the  action  of  his  senses  was  un- 
equivocally sound.  Ready  as  he  was  to  mistake  a  company 
of  peaceable  shepherds  for  the  creations  of  his  disordered 
intellect,  he  never  imagined  Sancho  to  be  any  other  than 
his  faithful  squire,  for  the  reason  that  his  reflective  faculties 
were  not  so  far  subverted  as  to  be  incapable  of  any  healthy 
action.  Besides,  if  erroneous  sensation  has  anything  to  do 
with  producing  these  illusions,  we  must  go  the  length  of  as- 
serting, that  at  such  times  all  the  senses  are  disordered,  or 
deny  that  the  errors  of  one  may  be  corrected  by  the  others. 
It  is  not  so  strange  that  vision  should  sometimes  be  so  affected 
as  to  deceive  a  person  with  the  idea  that  his  legs  are  made 
of  glass  or  butter,  but  it  certainly  is  very  strange,  that  on 
such  occasions,  the  other  senses  should  all  return  equally 
false  impressions ;  the  touch  being  unable  to  distinguish  the 
13* 


150  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

feel  of  flesh  and  blood,  and  the  hearing  the  sound  produced 
by  striking  them,  while  they  retain  this  power  in  regard  to 
every  other  part  of  the  body.  These  illusions  appear  to 
result  from  a  morbid  excitement  of  the  perceptive  faculties, 
whereby  they  are  stimulated  by  outward  impressions  to  in- 
voluntary and  irresistible  activity,  while  a  coexistent  impair- 
ment of  the  reflective  faculties  prevents  them  from  being 
considered  as  illusions  and  not  actual  realities.  The  physi- 
cian will  not  unfrequently  hear  a  patient  complaining  of 
seeing  colors  of  the  utmost  beauty  and  variety  of  combina- 
tion passing  and  repassing  before  his  eyes,  or  forms  of  ob- 
jects of  every  possible  description,  whether  his  eyes  be  open 
or  shut,  the  room  dark  or  light.  His  understanding  being 
sound,  he  is  not  deceived,  but'  believes  them  to  be  what 
they  actually  are,  merely  illusions  ;  but,  if,  on  the  contrary, 
it  were  unsound,  then  these  illusions  would  be  taken  for  re- 
alities, and  he  would  conduct  accordingly.  Ben  Jonson 
would  keep  awake  an  entire  night,  gazing  at  armies  of  Turks 
and  Tartars,  Carthaginians  and  Romans  contending  around 
his  great  toe  ;  in  which  amusement  there  is  no  evidence  of 
mania,  but  merely  of  a  morbid  activity  of  the  internal  percep- 
tive organs.  The  apparitions  of  Nicolai  of  Berlin,  and 
others  of  a  similar  kind,  arose,  no  doubt,  from  the  same 
cause.  Indeed  unnatural  excitement  of  these  organs  in  in- 
sanity is  sometimes  so  obvious  and  well-marked,  as  to.be 
immediately  recognized  and  properly  understood.  Rush 
gives  the  case  of  a  young  woman  who  delighted  her  visiters 
with  her  efforts  in  singing  and  poetry,  though  previously  she 
had  never  manifested  any  talent  for  either;  and  the  author 
once  attended  an  insane  patient  of  feeble  intellect  and  defect- 
ive education,  who  occupied  much  of  her  time  in  making 
verses,  though  she  had  not  shown  the  slightest  trace  of  such 
a  power  before  the  invasion  of  her  disease.  The  faculty  of 
construction  too  is  occasionally  heightened  to  a  wonderful 
degree.  Pinel  speaks  of  a  maniac  who  believed  he  had  dis- 


GENERAL    INTELLECTUAL    MANIA.  151 

covered  the  perpetual  motion ;  and  in  the  course  of  his  re- 
searches he  constructed  some  very  ingenious  machines. 
The  common  and  essential  element  then,  in  the  production 
of  hallucinations  and  illusive  sensations,  is  an  impairment  of 
the  reflective  faculties  accompanied  by  morbid  activity  of 
the  perceptive  faculties.  The  only  real  difference  between 
them  is,  that  in  the  latter,  the  morbid  activity  of  the  percep- 
tive faculties,  requires  to  be  excited  by  outward  impressions, 
while  in  the  former,  this  effect  is  produced  by  the  remem- 
brance of  past  impressions,  —  a  distinction  that  can  be  of 
but  little  if  any  importance,  in  judicial  investigations.  We 
have  been  thus  particular  in  showing  the  true  origin  of  hal- 
lucinations, that  any  mistake  arising  from  wrong  views  of 
their  nature  might  be  avoided, —  an  event  not  altogether 
beyond  the  limits  of  possibility,  for  one  instance  has  come 
to  our  own  knowledge,  where  it  was  attempted  in  a  court  of 
justice,  in  a  neighboring  state,  to  measure  the  extent  of  the 
insanity  by  the  comparative  number  of  the  senses  supposed 
to  be  deranged  in  the  hallucination. 

$  112.  Hallucinations  of  the  senses  occur  in  a  large  pro- 
portion of  maniacs.  In  the  early  stage  of  acute  mania  they 
are  generally  numerous  and  changing,  and  somewhat 
masked  by  the  more  conspicuous  symptoms.  In  chronic 
mania  they  are  more  simple,  uniform  and  obvious.  Occa- 
sionally, however,  this  rule  is  reversed,  the  hallucinations 
being  very  distinct  and  vivid  from  the  beginning  of  the  dis- 
ease. And  it  should  be  borne  in  mind,  that  when  it  is  the  pre- 
dominant feature  of  the  mental  disorder,  the  patient  is  dis- 
posed to  conceal  it  from  others  as  long  as  he  retains  suffi- 
cient control  over  his  thoughts.  A  little  strangeness  of 
demeanor  may,  for  months,  be  the  only  perceptible  deviation 
from  the  natural  condition,  the  reason,  in  the  mean  while, 
struggling  with  the  suggestions  of  the  hallucinated  sense, 
till  it  finally  yields,  and  the  patient,  in  obedience  to  some 
voice  or  vision,  commits  a  sudden  and  fearful  act  of  vio- 


152  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

lence.  In  the  stillness  of  night  they  are  more  common  and 
often  more  vivid  than  during  the  day.  For  the  most  part 
their  occurrence  is  irrespective  of  times  and  seasons,  and 
whether  in  solitude,  in  the  church,  in  the  gay  assembly,  in 
the  midst  of  animated  conversation,  in  the  pursuit  of  plea- 
sure or  of  business,  the  attention  may  be  arrested  at  once, 
and  the  whole  soul  engrossed  by  the  powerful  appeal  to  the 
senses.  When  the  patient  describes  his  hallucinations,  there 
is  a  remarkable  air  of  sincerity  and  frankness  in  his  manner, 
which  no  art  of  simulation  can  successfully  imitate. 

§  113.  To  determine  exactly  what  mental  impairment  it 
is  which  is  essential  to  insanity,  metaphysicians  and  physi- 
ologists have  long  and  anxiously  labored  with  hardly  the 
shadow  of  success.  The  various  definitions  and  explana- 
tions to  which  their  inquiries  have  given  rise,  display  some 
ingenuity,  but  would  scarcely  be  worth  considering  in  this 
place,  were  they  not  capable  of  an  injurious  application  in 
judicial  investigations.  It  has  been  said  that  insanity  con- 
sists essentially  in  diseased  perception,  —  that  this  is  the 
common  attribute  of  its  various  kinds  and  degrees.  We 
have  seen  above,  however,  that  in  a  state  of  perfect  mental 
soundness,  the  perceptions  may  be  deeply  disordered,  inso- 
much as  to  give  rise  to  strange  and  most  extraordinary  im- 
pressions, while  many  a  madman  may  be  found  who  evinces 
no  one  single  error  of  perception.  The  doctrine  that  in- 
sanity consists  in  false  judgments,  conveys  no  more  satisfac- 
tory notion  of  its  essential  characters,  for  though  there  most 
certainly  is  false  judgment  in  every  case  of  insanity,  it  is 
far  from  being  confined  to  this  condition  of  the  mind. 
Every  one  is  occasionally  guilty  of  some  gross  error  of  judg- 
ment on  which  he  may  reason  accurately  and  arrive  at  spe- 
cious conclusions,  without  being  considered  at  the  time  mad- 
der than  his  neighbors.  Locke,  as  if  strongly  impressed  with 
the  curious  fact  of  the  coexistence  of  absurd  fancies  with 
the  power  of  reasoning  smartly  and  pertinently  to  a  certain 


GENERAL    INTELLEHTUAL    MANIA.  153 

extent,  which  is  occasionally  observed  in  the  insane,  re- 
marked that  they  did  not  seem  to  have  lost  the  faculty  of 
reasoning,  "  but  having  joined  together  some  ideas  very 
wrongly,  they  mistake  them  for  truths,  and  they  err  as  men 
do  that  argue  right  from  wrong  principles." l  If  Locke  had 
possessed  any  practical  acquaintance  with  insanity,  if  he 
had  even  spent  an  hour  in  a  well-managed  hospital  for  the 
insane,  he  never  would  have  adopted  this  opinion,  for  nothing 
can  be  farther  from  the  truth,  than  the  idea  that  generally 
madmen  reason  correctly  from  wrong  premises.  The  lady 
who  imagined  that  a  tooth  which  a  dentist  had  removed,  had 
slipped  from  his  fingers  and  stuck  in  her  throat,  and  insisted 
that  she  could  not  swallow  a  morsel,  while  she  ate  and  drank 
heartily,  was  as  wrong  in  her  conclusion  as  she  was  in  her 
premises ;  and  the  man  who,  like  Bellingham,  imagines  that 
the  government  has  been  culpably  negligent  of  his  private 
interests,  and  thence  proceeds  to  take  the  life  of  a  person 
whom  he  believes  to  be  perfectly  innocent,  in  order  that  he 
may  have  an  opportunity  of  bringing  his  affairs  before  the 
country,  errs  in  every  stage  of  his  reasoning.  Indeed,  it  is 
matter  of  common  observation,  that  maniacs  display  their 
insanity,  not  more  in  the  delusions  which  they  entertain, 
than  in  the  course  they  pursue  in  order  to  accomplish  their 
objects.  The  last  and  most  ably-supported  speculation  on 
this  subject  is  that  of  Dr.  Conolly,  who  makes  insanity  to 
consist  in  "  the  impairment  of  any  one  or  more  of  the  fac- 
ulties of  the  mind,  accompanied  with,  or  inducing,  a  defect 
in  the  comparing  faculty."  *  There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
this  power  of  comparison  is  often,  perhaps,  generally, 
affected  in  insanity  ;  but  it  may  be  questioned  whether  this 
author  has  not  referred  many  phenomena  to  this  faculty  of 
the  mind,  which  more  properly  belong  tc  some  other.  And 

1  On  the  Human  Understanding,  Book  II.  ch.  xi.  §  13. 
3  Indications  of  Insanity,  300. 


154  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    TNSATNHT5T. 

even  when  the  mental  disturbance  dpes  unquestionably  flow 
from  defect  in  the  comparing  power,  it  would  seem  as  if  this 
defect  were  but  the  consequence  of  one  affecting  more 
deeply  the  secret  springs  of  thought.  It  is  said  that  the 
celebrated  Pascal  sometimes  believed  that  he  was  near  the 
brink  of  a  fearful  precipice,  and  that  his  attendants,  to  allay 
his  apprehension  of  falling  down  it,  were  accustomed  to 
place  a  chair  near  him,  in  the  direction  of  the  supposed  pre- 
cipice. "  He  then  compared  what  was  done  with  what  ap- 
peared to  him,"  says  Dr.  Conolly,  "  and  drew  the  just  con- 
clusion, that  a  chair  could  not  stand  upon  air,  beyond  the 
brink  of  a  precipice,  and  that  he  was  not  therefore  in  real 
danger."  "  Whenever  the  comparison  could  not  be  made," 
he  adds,  "  the  delusion  yet  remaining,  he  was  not  sane  on 
the  subject  of  the  precipice."  Now  it  cannot  be  denied 
that  in  both  instances,  Pascal  saw  the  chair,  and  was  sensi- 
ble that  it  was  in  the  direction  of  the  precipice,  and  that  the 
real  difference  between  them  was,  that  in  the  former,  he 
could,  in  the  latter,  he  could  not,  draw  the  just  conclusion 
that  a  chair  could  not  stand  upon  air.  It  is  evident  that,  in 
this  case  at  least,  and  there  is  much  reason  to  believe  the 
fact  is  a  general  one  —  the  faculty  of  the  mind  primitively 
affected  was  that  which  recognizes  the  relations  of  cause 
and  effect.  We  might  multiply  examples  of  this  fondness 
for  definitions,  but  enough  has  been  said  on  this  point,  to 
convince  the  student  of  legal  medicine  how  barren  of  all 
practical  benefit,  such  speculations  are,  and  to  place  him  on 
his  guard  against  their  admission  in  judicial  investigations, 
as  tests,  or  criteria  of  insanity. 

§  114.  It  is  not  to  be  understood  that,  in  this  form  of 
mania,  the  derangement  is  confined  to  the  intellectual  fac- 
ulties, the  moral  continuing  to  be  exercised  with  their  ordi- 


Indications  of  Insanity,  316. 


PARTIAL    INTELLECTUAL    MANIA.  155 

nary  soundness.  On  the  contrary,  the  moral  faculties  sel- 
dom escape  its  influence  ;  and  one  of  the  earliest  symptoms 
of  the  disease  is  an  unaccountable  change  in  the  patient's 
social  and  domestic  feelings.  He  becomes  indifferent  to 
those  whom  he  loved  the  most ;  the  mother  thinks  no  longer 
of  her  children,  or  regards  them  with  loathing  ;  the  child 
forgets  his  parents  ;  the  husband  is  insensible  to  the  endear- 
ments of  his  wife  ;  and  love,  attachment  and  friendship  are 
replaced  by  hatred,  jealousy  and  indifference.  These  traits, 
however,  are  not  so  prominent  as  the  intellectual  disorders, 
(except  in  the  earliest  stage  of  the  disease)  and  besides,  are 
very  different  from  those  which  characterize  that  form  of 
mental  derangement  to  be  presently  described  under  the 
title  of  moral  mania. 

SECTION  II. 
Partial  Intellectual  Mania. 

§  115.  By  the  ancients  this  form  of  the  disease  was  called 
MELANCHOLIA,  on  the  supposition  that  it  was  always  attended 
by  dejection  of  mind  and  gloomy  ideas.  This  term  was 
used  and, so  understood  by  modern  writers,  till  Esquirol 
proved  its  improper  application  by  showing  that  the  ideas 
are  not  always  gloomy,  but  frequently  of  a  gay  and  cheer- 
ful nature.  He  substituted  the  term  MONOMANIA,  which  is 
now  in  general  use  ;  and  though  possessing  a  more  correct 
and  definite  signification,  it  embraces,  besides  the  cases 
which  come  under  the  present  division,  a  class  that  will  be 
treated  of  under  a  different  head.  Still,  for  convenience' 
sake,  the  use  of  the  term  will  be  continued,  with  the  under- 
standing that  it  always  refers  to  that  form  of  insanity  which 
is  the  immediate  subject  of  discussion. 

§  116.  Monomania  is  often  described  as  a  derangement 
of  any  one  or  few  of  the  intellectual  faculties,  but  incor- 


156  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

rectly,  upon  our  views  of  the  constitution  of  those  faculties, 
many  of  which  may  be  simultaneously  deranged  by  the 
action  of  disease,  without  necessarily  producing  insanity. 
This  point  has  been  already  established,  when  speaking  of 
those  affections  of  the  perceptive  faculties  which  give  rise 
lo  apparitions,  and  change,  to  appearance,  the  outward 
qualities  of  objects.  (§111)  A  multitude  of  cases  are  re- 
corded, in  which  the  faculty  of  language  too  has  been 
wholly  or  partially  lost,  while  the  soundness  of  the  reason- 
ing powers  remained  unimpaired  ;  indeed  there  is  not  a 
single  perceptive  faculty,  whose  functions  have  not  been 
sometimes  obliterated  or  diminished,  without  being  accom- 
panied by  insane  delusion.  It  is  evident  that  before  a  per- 
son can  be  insane,  partially  or  generally,  the  mental  faculty 
or  faculties  must  be  deranged,  by  which  we  discern  the  re- 
lations of  things,  and  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of  general 
truths. 

§  117.  The  most  simple  form  of  this  disorder  is  that  in 
which  the  patient  has  imbibed  some  single  notion  contradic- 
tory to  common  sense  and  to  his  own  experience,  and  which 
seems  to  be,  and  sometimes  no  doubt  really  is,  attended  by 
errors  of  sensation.  Thus,  thousands  have  believed  their 
legs  were  made  of  glass,  or  that  snakes,  fish,  or  eels  had 
taken  up  their  abode  in  their  stomach  or  bowels.  In  many 
such  cases  the  hallucination  is  excited  and  maintained  by 
impressions  propagated  from  diseased  parts,  the  presence  of 
which  has  been  revealed  by  dissection  after  death.  Esqui- 
rol,  in  a  memoir  read  before  the  institute,1  a  few  years  since, 
has  related  numerous  cases  in  proof  of  this  proposition, 
among  which  is  that  of  a  woman  who  insisted  she  was  preg- 
nant with  the  devil,  in  whose  womb,  there  was  found  after 
death,  a  mass  of  hydatids  ;  of  another,  in  the  Salpetriere, 
who  imagined  that  a  regiment  of  soldiers  lay  concealed  in 

1  Des  Maladies  mentales,  ii.  211-213. 


PARTIAL    INTELLECTUAL    MANIA.  157 

her  belly,  and  that  she  could  feel  them  struggling  and  fight- 
ing with  each  other  ;  and  of  another,  who  believed  that  the 
apostles  and  evangelists  had  taken  up  their  abode  in  her 
bowels  and  were  occasionally  visited  by  the  pope  and  the 
patriarchs  of  the  old  testament,  in  both  of  whom,  the  intes- 
tines were  found  agglutinated  together  in  consequence  of 
chronic  peritonitis.  That  these  hallucinations  are  not  always 
connected  with  corporeal  impressions  of  this  kind,  seems  to 
be  proved  by  the  fact,  that  they  are  sometimes  dissipated  by 
the  skilful  application  of  arguments,  or  manoeuvres,  by 
which  the  patients  are  made  to  believe  themselves  cured  of 
their  complaint.  The  story  of  the  "Turned  Head,"  in  the 
14  Diary  of  a  physician,"  ludicrous  as  it  is,  is  scarcely  a 
caricature  of  the  truth  ;  and  one  of  M.  Manry's  patients, 
who,  after  thinking  himself  cured  of  a  serpent  in  his  bowels 
by  means  of  a  pretended  surgical  operation,  suddenly  took 
up  the  idea,  that  the  creature  had  left  its  ova  behind  ready 
to  be  hatched  into  a  brood  of  young  ones,  was  again  restored 
by  the  dexterous  reply  of  his  physician,  that  the  snake  was 
a  male.1  In  this  class  of  cases,  the  mind  is  not  observed  to 
have  lost  any  of  its  original  vigor,  and  its  soundness  on  every 
other  topic  remains  unimpaired,  though  there  unquestionably 
does  exist  some  derangement  in  the  reflective  faculties. 

§  118.  In  another  class  of  cases,  the  monomania  takes  a 
little  wider  range,  involving  a  train  of  morbid  ideas,  instead 
of  being  limited  to  a  single  point.  The  patient  imbibes 
some  notion  connected  with  the  various  relations  of  persons, 
events,  time,  space,  resistance,  &c.  of  the  most  absurd  and 
unfounded  nature,  and  endeavors,  in  some  measure,  to  reg- 
ulate his  conduct  accordingly  ;  though,  in  most  respects,  it 
is  grossly  inconsistent  with  his  delusion.  It  is  certainly  not 
one  of  the  least  curious  phenomena  of  our  mental  constitu- 
tion, that  these  hallucinations  will  sometimes  continue  for 

1  Medico-Chirurgical  Review,  N.  S.  xxi.  524. 
14 


158  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

years  together,  unaffected  by  time,  and  proceeding  parallel, 
as  it  were,  with  the  most  sound  and  healthy  operations  of 
the  mind,  though  more  often,  the  predominant  idea  instead 
of  .enduring  in  this  manner  is  frequently  changing,  one  in- 
sane notion  disappearing  to  give  place  to  another  and  another. 
Rush  says  that  he  knew  one  clergyman  and  had  heard  of 
another,  who  were  deranged  at  all  times,  except  when  they 
ascended  the  pulpit,  where  they  discovered,  in  their  prayers 
and  sermons,  all  the  usual  marks  of  a  sound  and  correct 
mind  ;  and  he  speaks  of  a  judge  who  was  rational  and  sen- 
sible upon  the  bench,  but  constantly  insane  when  off  it.1 
The  celebrated  case  of  the  Rev.  Simon  Browne  is  another 
remarkable  instance  of  this  kind.  For  many  years  before 
his  death,  he  entertained  the  belief  that  "he  had  lost  his 
rational  soul,"  though  during  that  time  he  evinced  great 
ability  both  in  his  ordinary  conversation  and  in  his  writings. 
Having  discontinued  all  public  or  private  worship,  he  ex- 
plained to  his  friends,  that  "  he  had  fallen  under  the  sensible 
displeasure  of  God,  who  had  caused  his  rational'  soul  gradu- 
ally to  perish,  and  left  him  only  an  animal  life  in  common 
with  brutes  ;  that  it  was  therefore  profane  in  him  to  pray, 
and  incongruous  to  be  present  at  the  prayers  of  others."  In 
a  book  of  some  merit  which  he  dedicated  to  the  queen  he 
speaks  of  himself  as  "  once  a  man  ;  and  of  some  little 
name  ;  but  of  no  worth,  as  his  present  unparalleled  case 
makes  but  too  manifest ;  for  by  the  immediate  hand  of  an 
avenging  God,  his  very  thinking  substance  has  for  more  than 
seventeen  years  been  wasting  away,  till  it  is  wholly  perished 
out  of  him,  if  it  be  not  utterly  come  to  nothing."  * 

§  119.  The   operations  of  the   understanding,  even   on 
subjects  connected  with  the  insane  belief,  are  sometimes  not 

1  On  Diseases  of  the  Mind,  204. 

1  An  account  of  this  case  may  be  found  in  the  Gentleman's  Mag- 
azine, 1762. 


PARTIAL    INTELLECTUAL    MANIA.  159 

impaired  in  an  appreciable  degree ;  on  the  contrary,  we  are 
occasionally  struck  with  the  acuteness  of  the  reasoning 
power  displayed  by  monomaniacs.  Muratori  relates  the 
case  of  a  Jesuit,  named  Sgambari  who  believed  himself  a 
cardinal,  and  claimed  to  be  addressed  by  the  title  of  emi- 
nence. A  friend  was  anxious  to  convince  him  of  his  error, 
and  obtained  a  patient  hearing  of  his  remarks.  When  he 
had  finished,  the  madman  replied  ;  "  either  you  consider 
me  insane  or  rational ;  on  the  latter  supposition,  you  do 
me  injustice  by  your  remonstrances ;  on  the  former,  I 
hardly  know  which  is  most  mad,  I,  for  believing  myself  a 
cardinal,  or  you,  for  thinking  to  cure. a  madman  by  such 
reasonings."  l 

§  120.  Though  monomaniacs  are  generally  ready  enough 
to  declare  their  predominant  idea,  yet  when  sufficient  in- 
ducement exists,  such  as  interest,  fear  of  ridicule,  &c.  they 
will  occasionally  conceal  it ;  and  this  too  without  the  occur- 
rence of  a  lucid  interval,  and  while  they  believe  in  its  reality 
as  firmly  as  ever.  Chambeyron,  the  French  translator  of 
Hoffbauer's  treatise,  speaks  of  "  a  woman  who  on  her  ad- 
mission to  the  Salpetriere  told  one  of  the  overseers,  4  that  she 
was  an  apostle,  and  that  Louis  XVIII.  had  remembered  her 
in  his  will.'  "  The  next  day,"  says  he,  "  at  my  visit,  I 
asked  her  reasons  for  entering  the  hospital.  '  If  I  tell  you,' 
said  she,  '  you  will  think  me  mad.'  On  my  protesting  to  the 
contrary  however,  she  replied,  '  well  I  am  remembered  in 
the  will  of  Louis  XVIII.'  Of  the  other  notion  whose  absurd- 
ity was. more  palpable,  she  said  not  a  word.  Now  [a  few 
days  after]  she  denies  that  she  ever  entertained  either  no- 
tion, though  her  conduct  and  conversation  prove  that  she  still 
believes  them  both."  .  Some  cases  of  a  similar  kind  are  also 
related  in  Erskine's  speech  in  the  defence  of  Hadfield. 
Georget  speaks  of  a  lady  who  thought  she  'was  deprived 

1  Hoffbauer,  Op.  cit.  sup.  §  86,  note. 


160  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

of  the  power  of  sensation,  and  professed  to  feel  neither 
fatigue  nor  the  ordinary  wants  of  nature,  comparing  her- 
self to  a  machine  moved  by  springs.  Believing  she  never 
should  recover,  she  made  several  attempts  at  suicide  ;  at 
times  she  was  greatly  agitated,  and  abused  her  female 
companion.  And  yet  this  lady  received  visits,  and  some- 
times passed  whole  evenings  with  persons  of  her  acquaint- 
ance without  manifesting  the  slightest  disorder  in  her  mental 
faculties.1 

§  121.  It  has  just  been  stated,  (§  115)  that  any  one  of 
the  perceptive  faculties  might  be  disordered,  without  any 
derangement  of  the  reflective,  or  reasoning  powers.  The 
true  nature  of  these  cases  is  generally  quite  obvious,  but  as 
those  in  which  the  faculty  of  language  is  affected,  might,  by 
the  careless  or  incompetent  observer,  be  mistaken  for  insan- 
ity, they  require  a  particular  notice  in  this  place.  It  is  a 
curious,  though  well-established  fact,  instances  of  which  are 
related  numerous  enough  to  fill  a  volume,  that  the  faculty  of 
language,  of  the  power  of  representing  thoughts  by  appro- 
priate articulate  or  written  signs,  may  be  utterly  or  partially 
lost,  the  other  mental  powers  remaining  sound.  This  dis- 
order either  arises  from  slight  congestion  in  the  brain,  or 
is  the  sequel  of  traumatic  or  pathological  lesions  of  this  or- 
gan, especially  of  apoplexy.  The  patient  is  observed  to  be 
more  or  less  incapable  of  communicating  his  thoughts  and 
feelings  by  spoken  or  written  language,  the  words  appearing 
to  be  arbitrary  signs  totally  unconnected  with  ideas.  When 
a  word  is  pronounced  slowly  and  distinctly,  he  may  be  able 
to  repeat  it  once  or  twice,  seldom  oftener,  or  he  may  be 
unable  to  articulate  at  all.  In  some  cases  the  power  of  lan- 
guage is  soon  and  completely  regained  ;  in  some,  a  slight 
stammering,  or  hesitancy  is  observed,  as  long  as  they  live  ; 


Nouvelle  discussion  medico,  leg.  23. 


.   PARTIAL  INTELLECTUAL  MANIA.  161 

while  in  a  few  the  power  never  spontaneously  returns,  the 
person  being  obliged  to  learn  to  read  and  write,  as  if  he  had 
never  known  how  before.  Mr.  Hood  relates  a  case l  in  which 
the  patient,  a  blacksmith,  lost  the  memory  of  all  words  ex- 
cept yes  and  no,  while  he  comprehended  distinctly  whatever 
was  said  to  him.  Though  able  to  understand  what  was  read 
to  him  from  a  book,  he  could  not  himself  read.  When  a 
name  was  pronounced,  "he  would  repeat  it  once  or  twice,  but 
before  he  could  do  it  a  third  time,  it  was  utterly  gone.  Within 
a  few  days  of  the  first  attack,  he  would  go  to  his  shop 
and  attend  to  his  workmen,  but  though  he  lived  three  years 
afterwards,  his  power  of  language  though  much  improved, 
was  always  greatly  impaired.  Another  case  has  been  re- 
lated *  where  the  patient  received  an  injury  on  the  head  by 
falling  from  a  coach-box,  one  effect  of  which  was  the  loss 
of  the  use  of  all  language,  but  the  word  oui.  In  other  re- 
spects his  mind  was  entirely  sound.  In  some  cases,  this  loss 
of  the  memory  of  words  is  confined  to  common  and  proper 
nouns.  This  happened  to  the  celebrated  naturalist  Brous- 
sonnet  who  entirely  recovered  from  an-  attack  of  apoplexy, 
except  'that  he  could  never  after  utter  nor  write  the  names 
of  persons  or  things,  though  other  parts  of  speech  were  at 
his  command  in  abundance.  When  he  wished  to  designate 
an  individual,  he  described  his  figure,  his  qualities,  and  oc- 
cupation. He  recognized  the  name  at  once,  when  pointed 
out  to  him  in  a  book,  though  it  never  would  occur  sponta- 
neously to  his  memory.3  In  other  cases  of  this  kind,  the 
patient  is  observed  to  have  forgotten  everything  but  substan- 
tives. One  is  mentioned  whose,  "apprehension  of  the  use 
and  importance  of  substantives  was  keen  and  unimpaired, 
but  he  could  not  succeed  in  perceiving  the  modifying  influ- 

1  Phrenological  Transactions,  255. 
8  Jour,  de  la  Soc.  Phrenol.  no.  2,  art.  5. 
'  Cuvier  Eloges  historiques,  i.  341. 
14* 


162  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OP   INSANITY. 

ence  of  articles,  adjectives,  or  adverbs.  Of  verbs  he  had  a 
very  imperfect  recollection."  l  Esquirol  had  a  patient  who 
recollected  no  words  but  substantives,  and  but  few  of  them, 
using  generally  abstract  terms  corresponding  to  states  of  the 
mind,  the  ordinary  events  of  life,  &c.  but  not  indicating  the 
objects  by  which  he  was  surrounded,  or  those  presented  to  his 
senses.  Thus  when  asked  how  he  was,  he  would  reply  :  — 
"  malheur,  injustice,  audacite,  courage,  piete,  mort." 2 

§  122.  In  the  simplest  form  of  monomania,  the  under- 
standing appears  to  be,  and  probably  is,  tolerably  sound,  on 
all  subjects  but  those  connected  with  the  hallucination. 
When,  however,  the  disorder  is  more  complicated,  involving 
a  longer  train  of  morbid  ideas,  we  have  the  high  authority 
of  Georget  for  believing,  that  though  the  patient  may  reason 
on  many  subjects  unconnected  with  the  particular  illusion 
on  which  the  insanity  turns,  the  understanding  is  more  ex- 
tensively deranged,  than  is  generally  suspected.  If  we 
could  follow  these  people  to  the  privacy  of  their  own  dwell- 
ings, narrowly  observe  their  intercourse  with  their  friends 
and  neighbors,  and  converse  with  them  on  the  subjects 
nearest  to  their  thoughts,  we  should  generally  detect  some 
perversity  of  feeling  or  action,  altogether  foreign  to  their 
ordinary  character.  Cases  illustrative  of  this  remark  will 
frequently  occur  to  the  reader  in  the  course  of  this  work  ; 
and  it  is  not  necessary  to  insist  on  the  importance  of  this 
fact  in  estimating  the  degree  of  criminal  responsibility 
remaining  in  monomaniacs.  It  is  a  fact  that  must  never 
be  forgotten,  that  the  phenomena  of  insanity  do  not  lie  on 
the  surface,  any  more  than  those  of  other  diseases,  but 
oftentimes  can  be  discovered  only  by  means  of  close  and 
patient  examination. 

1  W.  A.  F.  Browne.     Edin    Phrenol.  Jour.  viii.  415. 
8  Idem. 


CHAPTER    VIL 


MORAL    MANIA. 

§  123.  THUS  far  mania  has  been  considered  as  affecting 
the  intellectual  faculties  only ;  but  a  more  serious  error  on 
this  subject  can  scarcely  be  committed,  than  that  of  limiting 
its  influence  to  them.  It  will  not  be  denied  that  the  propen- 
sities and  sentiments  are  also  integral  portions  of  our  mental 
constitution ;  and  no  enlightened  physiologist  can  doubt 
that  their  manifestations  are  dependent  on  the  cerebral 
organism.  Here  then  we  have  the  only  essential  conditions 
of  insanity,  —  a  material  structure  connected  with  mental 
manifestations ;  and  until  it  is  satisfactorily  proved  that  this 
structure  enjoys  a  perfect  immunity  from  morbid  action,  we 
are  bound  to  believe  that  it  is  liable  to  disease,  and  conse- 
quently, that  the  affective,  as  well  as  intellectual  faculties 
are  subject  to  derangement.  To- moral  mania,  as  a  distinct 
form  of  the  disease,  the  attention  of  the  profession  was  first 
directed  by  the  celebrated  Pinel  in  the  beginning  of  the 
present  century.  Previously  to  that  time  it  was  a  matter  of 
universal  belief,  that  insanity  is  always  accompanied  by 
derangement  of  the  reasoning  powers,  and  a  recognition  of 
this  fact  entered  into  every  definition  of  the  disease.  Parti- 
cipating in  the  common  belief,  he  found,  to  his  great 
surprise,  on  resuming  his  researches  at  the  Bicetre  that 
there  were  many  maniacs  who  betrayed  no  lesion  whatever 
of  the  understanding,  but  were  under  the  dominion  of 
instinctive  and  abstract  fury,  as  if  the  affective  faculties 


164  MEDICAL  .JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

alone  had  sustained  injury.  This  form  .of  mental  disorder, 
he  designated  as  manie  sans  delire.  The  examples  which 
he  gives,  being  chiefly  characterized  by  violent  anger  and 
unbounded  fury,  by  no  means  furnished  suitable  illustrations 
of  the  affection  now  styled  moral  insanity,  though  they  do 
illustrate  a  particular  form  of  that  disorder.  This  defect 
however  has  been  amply  supplied  by  the  researches  of 
others,  which  have  made  us  acquainted  with  a  great  number 
and  variety  of  cases,  in  which  the  affective  faculties,  either 
singly  or  collectively,  were  deranged,  independently  of  any 
appreciable  lesion  of  the  intellect.  The  reality  and  import- 
ance of  this  distinction  which  thus  establishes  two  classes  of 
mania,  is  now  generally  acknowledged  by  practical  observers, 
among  whom  it  is  sufficient  to  mention  Esquirol,  Georget, 
Gall,  Marc,  Rush,  Reil,  Hoffbauer,  Andrew  Combe,  Conolly 
and  Prichard,  though  some  of  them  are  inclined  to  doubt 
whether  the  integrity  of  the  understanding  is  so  fully  pre- 
served in  moral  mania,  as  Pinel  believed.  Still,  its  apparent 
soundness,  and  the  difficulty,  at  least,  of  establishing  the. 
existence  of  any  intellectual  derangement,  while  the  moral 
powers  are  unequivocally  and  deeply  deranged,  render  it  no 
less  important  in  its  legal  relations,  than  if  the  understanding 
were  unequivocally  affected.  It  is  defined  by  Prichard,  who 
has  strongly  insisted  on  the  necessity  of  assigning  it  a  more 
distinct  aryl  conspicuous  place,  than  it  has  hitherto  received, 
as  "  consisting  in  a  morbid  perversion  of  the  natural  feelings, 
affections,  inclinations,  temper,  habits,  and  moral  dispositions, 
without  any  notable  lesion  of  the  intellect  or  knowing  and 
reasoning  faculties,  and  particularly  without  any  maniacal 
hallucination."  x  We  shall  distinguish  it  into,  first,  general, 
where  the  whole  moral  nature  presents  a  scene  of  chaotic 
disturbance ;  secondly,  partial,  where  one  or  two  only  of 
the  moral  powers  are  perverted.  . 

1  Cyclopsedia  of  Practical  Medicine^  Art.  Insanity,  825. 


GENERAL    MORAL      MANIA.  165 

SECTION  I. 

General  Moral  Mania. 

§  124.  This  condition  is  thus  vividly  described  by  Prich- 
ard.  "  There  are  many  individuals  living  at  large,  and  not 
entirely  separated  from  society,  who  are  affected  in  a  certain 
degree  by  this  modification  of  insanity.  They  are  reputed 
persons  of  singular,  wayward,  and  eccentric  character.  An 
attentive  observer  may  often  recognize  something  remark- 
able in  their  manner  of  existence,  which  leads  him  to  enter- 
tain doubts  of  their  entire  sanity,  and  circumstances  are 
sometimes  discovered  on  inquiry  which  assist  in  determining 
his  opinion.  In  many  instances  it  is  found  that  there  is  an 
hereditary  tendency  to  madness  in  the  family,  or  that  sev- 
eral relatives  of  the  person  affected  have  labored  under  dis- 
eases of  the  brain.  The  individual  himself  is  discovered  in 
a  former  period  of  life  to  have  sustained  an  attack  of  mad- 
ness of  a  decided  character.  His  temper  and  dispositions 
are  found  on  inquiry  to  have  undergone  a  change  ;  to  be  not 
what  they  were  previously  to  a  certain  time  ;  he  has  become 
an  altered  man  ;  and  this  difference  has  perhaps  been  noted 
from  the  period  when  he  sustained  some  reverse  of  fortune, 
which  deeply  affected  him,  or  since  the  loss  of  some  beloved 
relative.  In  other  instances,  the  alteration  in  his  character 
has  ensued  immediately  on  some  severe  shock  which  his 
bodily  constitution  has  undergone.  This  has  either  been  a 
disorder  affecting  the  head,  a  slight  attack  of  paralysis,  a 
fit  of  epilepsy,  or  some  fever  or  inflammatory  disorder, 
which  has  produced  a  perceptible  change  in  the  habitual 
state  of  the  constitution.  In  some  cases  the  alteration  in 
temper  and  habits  has  been  gradual  and  imperceptible,  and 
it  seems  only  to  have  consisted  in  an  exaltation  or  increase 
of  peculiarities  which  were  always  more  or  less  natural  or 


166  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

habitual."  "  Individuals  laboring  under  this  disorder  are 
capable  of  reasoning  or  supporting  an  argument,  on  any 
subject  within  their  sphere  of  knowledge  that  may  be  pre- 
sented to  them,  and  they  often  display  great  ingenuity  in 
giving  reasons  for  their  eccentric  conduct,  and  in  accounting 
for  and  justifying  the  state  of  moral  feeling,  under  which 
they  appear  to  exist.  In  one  sense  indeed,  their  intellectual 
faculties  may  be  termed  unsound,  but  it  is  the  same  sense  in 
which  persons  under  the  influence  of  strong  passions  may 
be  generally  said  'to  have  their  judgment  warped,  and  the 
sane  or  healthy  exercise  of  their  understandings  impeded. 
They  think  and  act  under  the  influence  of  strongly  excited 
feelings  and  a  person  sane  is  under  such  circumstances  pro- 
verbially liable  to  error  both  in  judgment  and  conduct."  l  It 
was  this  class  of  persons  undoubtedly,  that  suggested  the 
following  description  in  a  work  published  in  the  beginning  of 
the  present  century.  "  Among  the  varieties  of  maniacs  met 
with  in  medical  practice,  there  is  one,  which,  though  by  no 
means  rare,  has  been  little  noticed  by  writers  on  this  subject : 
I  refer  to  those  cases  in  which  the  individuals  perform  most 
of  the  common  duties  of  life  with  propriety,  and  some  of 
them,  indeed,  with  scrupulous  exactness,  who  exhibit  no 
strongly  marked  features  of  either  temperament,  no  traits  of 
superior  or  defective  mental  endowment,  but  yet  take  violent 
antipathies,  harbor  unjust  suspicions,  indulge  strong  propen- 
sities, affect  singularity  in  dress,  gait,  and  phraseology ;  are 
proud  conceited  and  ostentatious  ;  easily  excited  and  with 
difficulty  appeased  ;  dead  to  sensibility,  delicacy,  and  refine- 
ment ;  obstinately  riveted  to  the  most  absurd  opinions  ;  prone 
to  controversy,  and  yet  incapable  of  reasoning  ;  always  the 
hero  of  their  own  tale,  using  hyperbolic,  high-flown  language 
to  express  the  most  simple  ideas,  accompanied  by  unnatural 
gesticulation,  inordinate  action,  and  frequently  by  the  most 

1  Op.  cit.  sup.  p.  826. 


GENERAL    MORAL    MANIA.  .    167 

alarming  expression  of  countenance.  On  some  occasions 
they  suspect  sinister  intentions  on  the  most  trivial  grounds  ; 
on  others  are  a  prey  to  fear  and  a  dread  from  the  most  ridic- 
ulous and  imaginary  sources  ;  now  embracing  every  oppor- 
tunity of  exhibiting  romantic  courage  and  feats  of  hardihood, 
then  indulging  themselves  in  all  manner  of  excesses.  Per- 
sons of  this  description,  to  the  casual  observer,  might  appear 
actuated  by  a  bad  heart,  but  the  experienced  physician 
knows  it  is  the  head  which  is  defective.  They  seem  as  if 
constantly  affected  by  a  greater  or  less  degree  of  stimulation 
from  intoxicating  liquors,  while  the  expression  of  counten- 
ance furnishes  an  infallible  proof  of  mental  disease.  If 
subjected  to  moral  restraint,  or  a  medical  regimen,  they 
yield  with  reluctance  to  the  means  proposed,  and  generally 
refuse  and  resist,  on  the  ground  that  such  means  are  un- 
necessary where  no  disease  exists  ;  and  when,  by  the  system 
adopted,  they  are  so  far  recovered,  as  to  be  enabled  to  sup- 
press the  exhibition  of  the  former  peculiarities,  and  are 
again  fit  to  be  restored  to  society,  the  physician,  and  those 
friends  who  put  them  under  the  physician's  care,  are  gen- 
erally ever  after  objects  of  enmity  and  frequently  of  re- 
venge." 

§  125  Heinroth  and  Hoff  bauer  both  recognize  a  form  of 
mental  alienation  consisting  exclusively  of  morbid  excitement 
of  the  passions  and  feelings.  "  It  is  clear,"  says  the  latter, 
"  that  mania  may  exist  uncomplicated  with  mental  delusion  ; 
it  is  in  fact  only  a  kind  of  moral  exaltation,  (tollheit)  a  stata 
in  which  the  reason  has  lost  its  empire  over  the  passions  and 
the  actions  by  which  they  are  manifested,  to  such  a  degree 
that  the  individual  can  neither  repress  the  former,  nor  abstain 
from  the  latter.  It  does  not  follow  that  he  may  not  be  in 
possession  of  his  senses  and  even  his  usual  intelligence,  since, 
in  order  to  resist  the  impulses  of  the  passions,  it  is  not  suffi- 

1  Cox,  J.  M.,  Practical  Observations  on  Insanity.     London,  1804. 


168  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

cient  that  the  reason  should  impart  its  counsels ;  we  must 
have  the  necessary  power  to  obey  them.  The  maniac  may 
judge  correctly  of  his  actions  without  being  in  a  condition  to 
repress  his  passions,  and  to  abstain  from  the  acts  of  violence 
to  which  they  impel  him."1  Subsequently  he  observes, 
that  when  mania  proceeds  from  inordinate  passions,  "  its 
more  immediate  cause  lies  in  the  physical  temperament,  or 
in  certain  moral  affections  which  induce  frequent  occasions 
of  anger.  In  every  other  respect,  the  maniac  may  be  mas- 
ter of  his  propensities  and  the  actions  to  which  they  lead ; 
he  may  judge  and  act  rationally.  He  is  irrational  only  in 
his  paroxysms  of  fury,  and  then  his  errors  of  judgment  are 
rather  the  effect  than  the  cause  of  his  furious  transports." a 

§  126.  The  contrast  presented  in  moral  mania  between 
the  state  of  the  intellectual  and  that  of  the  moral  faculties, 
is  one  of  its  most  striking  features.  These  patients  can  rea- 
son logically  and  acutely  on  any  subject  within  their  know- 
ledge and  extol  the  beauties  of  virtue,  while  their  conduct 
is  filled  with  acts  of  folly,  and  at  war  with  every  principle 
of  moral  propriety.  Their  moral  nature  seems  to  have 
undergone  an  entire  revolution.  The  sentiments  of  truth, 
honor,  honesty,  benevolence,  purity,  have  given  place  to 
mendacity,  dishonesty,  obscenity  and  selfishness,  and  all 
sense  of  shame  and  self-control  have  disappeared,  while  the 
intellect  has  lost  none  of  its  usual  power  to  argue,  convince, 
please  and  charm.  In  nothing  indeed  is  the  intellectual 
soundness  more  strikingly  evinced  than  in  the  ingenuity  with 
which  these  persons  endeavor  to  explain  the  folly  and  ab- 
surdity of  their  acts  and  reconcile  them  to  the  ordinary  rules 
of  human  action.  By  denying  entirely  some  alleged  cir- 
cumstances in  a  particular  transaction,  adding  a  little  to  one 
and  subtracting  a  little  from  another,  and  giving  a  peculiar 


Op.  cit  sup.  §  122.  s  Ibid.  §  126. 


GENERAL    MORAL    MANIA.  169 

coloring  to  the  whole,  they  will  convince  the  unguarded  ob- 
server that  there  is  some  mistake  about  the  matter,  —  that 
they  acted  precisely  as  any  one  else  would  under  similar 
circumstances,  arid  that  they  are  the  victims  of  misrepre- 
sentation and  unkindness. 

§  127.  There  is  unquestionably  a  great  tendency  in  this 
affection  to  pass  into  intellectual  mania,  which  we  have  seen 
is  no  less  strongly  characterized  by  moral  perversities  than 
by  hallucinations  ;  and  Georget  actually  describes  it  as  be- 
longing to  the  initiatory  stage  or  incubation  of  the  latter  dis- 
order. Without  stopping  to  discuss  the  correctness  of  this 
view,  the  fact  that  it  may  continue  for  an  indefinite  length 
of  time  and  become  the  object  of  judicial  investigation,  gives 
it  incalculable  importance  in  a  medico-legal  point  of  view, 
and  entitles  it  to  a  prominent  place  in  a  work  like  the 
present. 

§  128.  The  form  of  mental  disorder  which  we  are  now 
considering,  has  been  so  little  noticed  by  writers,  until  quite 
recently,  while  an  ample  knowledge  of  its  phenomena  is  es- 
sential to  the  correct  administration  of  justice,  that  no  farther 
apology  is  needed  for  illustrating  it  with  several  examples 
collected  from  the  observations  of  others.  The  first  is  re- 
lated by  Pinel  as  belonging  to  his  manie  sans  delire.  "  An 
only  son  of  a  weak  and  indulgent  mother  was  encouraged 
in  the  gratification  of  every  caprice  and  passion  of  which 
an  untutored  and  violent  temper  was  susceptible.  The  im- 
petuosity of  his  disposition  increased  with  his  years.  The 
money  with  which  he  was  lavishly  supplied  removed  every 
obstacle  to  the  indulgence  of  his  wild  desires.  Every  in- 
stance of  opposition  or  resistance  roused  him  to  acts  of  fury. 
He  assaulted  his  adversaries  with  the  audacity  of  a  savage  ; 
sought  to  reign  by  force,  arid  was  perpetually  embroiled  in 
disputes  and  quarrels.  If  a  dog,  a  horse,  or  any  other 
animal  offended  him,  he  instantly  put  it  to  death.  If  ever  he 
went  to  a  fete  or  any  other  public  meeting,  he  was  sure  to 
15 


170  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

excite  such  tumults  and  quarrels  as  terminated  in  actual 
pugilistic  encounters,  and  he  generally  left  the  scene  with 
a  bloody  nose.  This  wayward  youth,  however,  when  un- 
moved by  passions,  possessed  a  perfectly  sound  judgment. 
When  he  became  of  age,  he  succeeded  to  the  possession  of 
an  extensive  domain.  He  proved  himself  fully  competent 
to  the  management  of  his  estate,  as  well  as  to  the  discharge 
of  his  relative  duties,  and  he  even  distinguished -himself  by 
acts  of  beneficence  and  compassion.  Wounds,  law-suits, 
and  pecuniary  compensations  were  generally  the  consequen- 
ces of  his  unhappy  propensity  to  quarrel.  But  an  act  of 
notoriety  put  an  end  to  his  career  of  violence.  Enraged 
with  a  woman  who  had  used  offensive  language  to  him,  he 
precipitated  her  into  a  well.  Prosecution  was  commenced 
against  him  ;  and  on  the  deposition  of  a  great  many  witnesses 
who  gave  evidence  to  his  furious  deportment,  he  was  con- 
demned to  perpetual  confinement  in  the  Bicetre."1  In  this 
instance  there  was  something  more  than  the  unrestrained 
indulgence  of  strong  passions,  though,  no  doubt,  the  passions 
of  this  person  were  naturally  remarkably  strong  and  active  ; 
the  understanding,  though  sound,  was  incapable  of  restrain- 
ing their  impulses,  for  the  reason  that  they  were  excited  by 
disease  and  therefore  beyond  its  control.  The  constant  ex- 
citement of  passions  already  too  much  developed  by  means 
of  a  vicious  education,  led  to  that  condition  of  mind  in  which 
the  healthy  balance  of  the  affective  and  intellectual  faculties, 
is  destroyed,  —  in  other  words,  to  moral  mania.  A  case  of 
a  very  similar  character  to  this,  and  to  which  the  rank  of  the 
person  and  the  disastrous  results  of  the  affection  have  given 
a  melancholy  preeminence  over  all  others  in  the  medico-legal 
history  of  the  disease,  is  that  of  Earl  Ferrers,  who  was  ex- 
ecuted in  1760,  for  the  murder  of  his  steward.  It  differs 
from  the  above  in  exhibiting  a  more  advanced  stage  of  the 

1  Sur  1'Alienation  Mentale,  156,  §  159. 


GENERAL    MORAL    MANIA.  171 

disease,  and  in  more  distinctly  revealing  its  approximation  to 
intellectual  mania  by  the  unfounded  notions  which  the 
patient  had  imbibed.  Though  his  reasoning  powers  were 
sound  and  his  conversation  rational,  he  imagined  that  his 
relatives  had  formed  a  conspiracy  against  him  in  which  his 
victim  was  an  accomplice  ;  and  his  conduct  in  many  respects 
was  so  wild  and  strange,  as  to  excite  in  those  who  were  in 
the  habit  of  meeting  him,  a  suspicion,  and  even  conviction 
of  his  insanity.1 

§  129.  The  following  case  from  Metzger  is  cited  by 
HofFbauer,  who  observes  that  the  patient  labored  under  no 
delusion,  properly  speaking,  but  was  only  not  master  of  his 
actions. 

A  Russian  colonel  came  to  Konigsberg  to  receive  an 
inheritance,  and  committed  there  so  many  acts  of  violence, 
that  he  was  summoned  before  the  tribunal  of  justice.  His 
conduct  before  the  magistrates  was  equally  unreasonable. 
He  had  become  so  much  an  object  of  dread  at  Konigsberg, 
that  nobody  would  execute  any  commission  for  him  —  the 
very  chimney-sweepers  required  a  guard  if  sent  to  sweep 
his  chimneys.  At  last,  after  several  complaints  made 
against  him,  he  was  arrested  because  he  had  threatened  to 
stab  his  landlord  with  a  pitchfork  for  demanding  his  rent, 
and  pursued  him  with  that  intent.  "  In  going  into  the 
prison,"  says  Metzger,  "  I  saw  an  old  man  with  white  hair, 
of  a  respectable  appearance,  who  received  me  politely.  I 
first  inquired  concerning  his  health.  '  I  am  ill,  through  old 

1  A  report  of  Earl  Ferrers's  trial  may  be  found  in  Hargrave's  State 
Trials,  and  it  is  noticed  at  considerable  length  in  Smollet's  Continua- 
tion of  Hume's  History  of  England.  Some  valuable  comments  on 
this  case,  are  contained  in  Combe's  Observations  on  Mental  Derange- 
ment, 204,  to  which  every  reader  is  referred,  who  is  more  anxious 
to  enlighten  his  mind  by  correct  facts  and  philosophical  views,  than 
to  confirm  his  errors  and  gratify  his  prejudices  by  obstinately  shut- 
ting his  eyes  against  the  progress  of  scientific  improvement. 


172  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

age,'  he  replied,  '  and  tormented  with  gout,  with  the  stone, 
and  with  the  scurvy,  evils  for  which  I  can  have  no  remedy.' 
He  desired  to  know  who  had  sent  me  to  see  him  ;  I  told  him 
it  was  the  tribunal.  CI  ought  to  be  judged,'  he  replied,  c  by 
a  French  tribunal,'  and  he  pretended  that  I  should  find  proof 
of  what  he  said  in  a  writing  which  he  forced  me  to  take. 
At  last  I  informed  him  of  the  reason  of  his  arrest.  His  eyes 
then  sparkled,  and  he  said  in  French,  with  much  volubility, 

that  M.    M. and were  his   mortal  enemies ; 

that  they  had  several  times  tried  to  ruin  him  ;  that  he  had 
experienced  much  injustice  and  opposition  om  the  part  of 
the  tribunal ;  and  that  they  had  disposed,  as  they  pleased, 
of  his  brother's  inheritance.  Being  asked  what  were  his 
occupations,  he  replied,  c  that  he  was,  as  every  honest  man 
should  be,  free  and  content,  even  in  prison ;  that  he  amused 
himself  with  poetry,  and  copied  verses  relating  to  his  situa- 
tion.' "  l 

§  130.  The  following  cases  are  taken  from  Prichard. 
"  I.  K.,  a  farmer,  several  of  whose  relatives  had  been  the 
subjects  of  mental  derangement,  was  a  man  of  sober  and 
domestic  habits,  and  frugal  and  steady  in  his  conduct,  until 
about  his  forty-fifth  year,  when  his  disposition  appeared  to 
have  become  suddenly  changed  in  a  manner  which  excited 
the  surprise  of  his  friends  and  neighbors,  and  occasioned 
grief  and  vexation  in  his  family.  He  became  wild,  excita- 
ble, thoughtless,  full  of  schemes  and  absurd  projects.  He 
would  set  out  and  make  long  journeys  into  distant  parts"of 
the  country  to  purchase  cattle  and  farming-stock,  of  which 
he  had  no  means  of  disposing  ;  he  bought  a  number  of 
carriages,  hired  an  expensive  house  ready  furnished,  which 
had  been  inhabited  by  a  person  much  above  his  rank,  and 
was  unsuitable  to  his  condition  ;  he  was  irascible  and  impet- 
uous, quarreled  with  his  neighbors,  and  committed  an 

1  Op.  cit.  sup.  §  126. 


GENERAL   MORAL    MANIA.  173 

assault  upon  the  clergyman  of  the  parish,  for  which  he  was 
indicted  and  bound  to  take  his  trial..  At  length  his  wife 
became  convinced  that  he  was  mad,  and  made  application 
for  his  confinement  in  a  lunatic  asylum,  which  was  conse- 
quently effected.  The  medical  practitioners  who  examined 
him  were  convinced  of  his  insanity,  by  comparing  his  late 
wild  habits  and  unaccountable  conduct  with  the  former  tenor 
of  his  life,  taking  into  consideration  the  tendency  to  disease 
which  was  known  to  prevail  in  his  family.  The  change  in 
his  character  alone  had  produced  a  full  conviction  of  his 
madness  in  his  friends  and  relatives.  When  questioned  as 
to  the  motives  which  had  induced  him  to  some  of  his  late 
proceedings,  he  gave  clear  and  distinct  replies,  and  assigned 
with  great  ingenuity  some  plausible  reason  for  almost  every 
part  of  his  conduct." 

§  131.  "  Abraham  B.,  a  working  tradesman  of  industri- 
ous and  sober  habits,  conducted  himself  with  propriety  until 
about  forty-six  years  of  age,  and  had  accumulated  a  con- 
siderable property  from  the  fruits  of  his  exertions.  About 
that  period  he  lost  his  wife,  and  after  her  death  became 
more  and  more  penurious.  At  length,  he  denied  himself 
the  comforts,  and  in  a  great  measure,  the  necessaries  of  life, 
and  became  half-starved  and  diseased  ;  his  body  was  ema- 
ciated and  beset  with  scaly  eruptions.  Mr.  S.,  a  gentleman 
who  had  long  known  him,  hearing  of  the  condition  into 
which  he  had  sunk,  sent  a  medical  practitioner  to  visit  him, 
by  whose  advice  B.  was  removed  from  a  miserable  dirty 
lodging  to  a  lunatic  asylum.  Mr.  S  ,  who  was  present  on 
the  occasion,  observed  that  Abraham  B.,  previously  to  his 
quitting  the  room  in  which  he  had  immured  himself,  kept 
his  eyes  fixed  on  an  old  trunk  in  the  corner  of  the  apart- 
ment. This  was  afterwards  emptied  of  its  contents,  and  in 
it  were  found,  in  the  midst  of  various  articles,  dirty  bank- 
notes, which  had  been  thrown  into  it  apparently  at  different 
times,  to  the  value  of  more  than  a  thousand  pounds.  Abra- 
15* 


174  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

ham  B.,  after  his  removal  to  an  asylum  where  he  had 
wholesome  food  and  exercise,  soon  began  to  recover  from 
his  bodily  infirmities,  and  at  length  became  anxious  to  be  at 
large.  The  writer  of  this  article  visited  him  and  conversed 
with  him  for  some  time,  in  order  to  ascertain  his  mental 
condition.  He  betrayed  no  sign  of  intellectual  delusion, 
nor  did  it  appear  that  anything  of  that  description  had  ever 
been  a  part  of  his  complaint.  His  replies  to  questions  were 
rational  according  to  the  extent  of  his  natural  capacity.  He 
was  determined  to  go  and  manage  his  property,  and  get  a 
wife  who  should  take  care  of  him.  In  a  few  days  after  his 
release  he  was  married  to  a  servant  belonging  to  the  lunatic 
asylum  where  he  had  been  confined.  His  new  wife  found 
after  some  months  that  it  was  impossible  to  endure  the 
strange  conduct  of  her  husband,  and  after  various  expedi- 
ents, brought  him  back  to  the  asylum,  with  a  certificate 
from  a  medical  man,  who  had  examined  him  and  declared 
him  to  be  insane.  He  still  remains  in  confinement,  and  his 
derangement  is  now  more  complete  than  formerly,  as  it 
plainly  involves  his  intellect." ; 

§  132.  These  are  no  uncommon  instances  of  that  con- 
dition of  mind  so  often  mistaken  for  anything  rather  than 
what  it  really  is  —  mental  derangement.  Its  true  nature 
was  here  recognized  by  intelligent  practitioners  who  looked 
beyond  the  circle  of  a  definition,  and  might  have  been  re- 
cognized, perhaps,  by  others  of  narrower  views,  in  a  calm 
investigation  for  therapeutical  purposes  ;  but,  amid  the  ex- 
citement produced  by  great  criminal  acts,  and  the  struggles 
between  knowledge  and  ignorance,  truth  and  prejudice,  that 
spring  up  in  judicial  investigations,  how  seldom,  alas,  has 
it  been  discerned.  The  following  cases,  in  which  this  per- 
version of  the  moral  faculties  was  accompanied  by  a  single 


1  Op.  cit.  sup.  831. 


GENERAL    MORAL    MANIA.  175 

insane  belief,  will  serve  to  complete  our  proofs  of  the  inti- 
mate connexion  of  moral  with  intellectual  mania. 

§  133.  "  Mr.  H.  P.  had  been  for  many  years  confined 
in  a  lunatic  asylum,  when,  an  estate  having  devolved  upon 
him  by  inheritance,  it  became  necessary  to  subject  him  anew 
to  an  investigation.  He  was  examined  by  several  physicians 
who  were  unanimous  in  the  opinion  that  he  was  a  lunatic  ; 
but  a  jury  considered  him  to  be  of  sound  understanding,  at- 
tributing his  peculiarities  to  eccentricity,  and  he  was  conse- 
quently set  at  liberty. 

"  The  conduct  of  this  individual  was  the  most  eccentric 
that  can  be  imagined  :  he  scarcely  performed  any  action  in 
the  same  manner  as  other  men  ;  and  some  of  his  habits,  in 
which  he  obstinately  persisted,  were  singularly  filthy  and 
disgusting.  For  every  peculiar  custom  he  had  a  quaint  and 
often  ludicrous  reason  to  allege,  which  indicated  a  strange 
mixture  of  shrewdness  arid  absurdity.  ^It  might  have  been 
barely  possible  to  attribute  all  these  peculiarities,  as  well  as 
the  morbid  state  of  temper  and  affections,  to  singularity  in 
natural  character  and  to  the  peculiar  circumstances  under 
which  this  person  had  been  placed.  But  there  was  one  con- 
viction deeply  fixed  on  his  mind,  which,  though  it  might 
likewise  be  explained  by  the  circumstances  of  his  previous 
history,  seemed  to  constitute  an  instance  of  maniacal  de- 
lusion. Whenever  any  person  whom  he  understood  to  be  a 
physician  attempted  to  feel  his  pulse,  he  recoiled  with  an  ex- 
pression of  horror,  and  exclaimed,  "  If  you  were  to  feel  my 
pulse,  you  would  be  lord  paramount  over  me  for  the  rest  of 
my  life."  The  result  has  proved  that  confinement  is  not 
always  necessary  in  cases  of  this  description.  Mr.  H.  P. 
has  remained  at  liberty  for  many  years,  and  his  conduct, 
though  extremely  singular,  has  been  without  injury  to  him- 
self or  others."  l 

1  Prichard,  Op.  cit,  sup.  834. 


176  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

§  134.  There  is  another  form  of  moral  insanity  deeply 
interesting  in  its  medico-legal  relations,  that  has  been' almost 
entirely  overlooked.  It  is  a  fact  well-established  in  this 
country  at  least,  that  masturbation,  or  self-pollution  is  a  pro- 
lific cause  of  mental  derangement  in  young  subjects.  It 
deserves  our  esp.ecial  attention  for  the  reason,  that  although 
the  intellect  finally  suffers  deeply  and  rapidly,  yet  in  its  ini- 
tiatory stage,  the  moral  and  affective  powers  may  be  seri- 
ously perverted,  while  the  conduct  and  conversation  of  the 
individual  may  be  outwardly  marked  by  his  usual  propriety. 
Long  before  any  intellectual  aberration  is  observed,  and 
while  the  patient  is  merely  moody  and  reserved,  his  mind 
may  be  tortured  by  fears  and  suspicions  that  mar  his  peace 
and  sometimes  lead  him  to  acts  of  violence.  Dr.  Bell,  the 
accomplished  physician  of  the  McLean  Asylum,  Massa- 
chusetts, observes  that  he  knew  "  a  pious,  intelligent  student, 
pursuing  his  daily  avocations  to  the  satisfaction  of  his  friends 
and  instructers,  who  nightly  slept  with  a  weapon  under  his 
pillow  to  protect  himself  from  an  attack  from  one  whom -he 
had  scarcely  seen,  and  to  wHom  he  had  never  spoken ;  and 
when  convinced  of  his  delusion  by  proofs  so  overpowering 
that 'his  mind  was  obliged  to  acknowledge  its  assent,  he 
merely  transferred  his  suspicions  to  another  equally  innocent 
individual."  Had  this  young  man  met  the  object  of  his- 
suspicions  and  shot  him  dead,  how  few  could  have  been 
brought  to  believe  that  he  acted  under  the  influence  of  in- 
sanity, and  was  consequently  irresponsible  !  How  feeble 
would  have  been  any  evidence  of  his  insanity  but  such  as 
had  reference  expressly  to  the  particular  form  under  which 
he  was  laboring !  Such  a  case  as  this  should  make  a  strong 
impression  on  the  mind  of  the  medical  jurist.  When  an  act 
of  violence  is  committed  by  a  young  subject  without  any 
apparent  motive,  and  without  any  obvious  signs  of  insanity, 
it  should  always  be  ascertained,  if  possible,  whether  he  has 
been  addicted  to  masturbation,  and  whether  he  has  shown 


GENERAL    MORAL    MANIA.  177 

any  of  those  changes  of  temper  and  habit  which  generally 
accompany  the  incipient  stage  of  this  form  of  mental  de- 
rangement. If  it  appear  that  he  has  practised  this  vice,  and 
especially  if  he  have  also  manifested  its  usual  moral  effects, 
then  is  there  strong  ground  for  believing  that  his  mind  was 
possessed  by  a  delusion  which  farther  inquiry  may  bring  to 
light.  This  form  of  disease  is  not  yet,  perhaps,  sufficiently 
understood,  to  warrant  us  in  furnishing  an  exact  detail  of  its 
phenomena.  Reference  must  be  had  to  the  opinions  of  tho^e 
who  have  had  opportunities  of  observing  it,  and  to  the  few 
valuable  contributions  that  have  been  made  to  the  subject.1 
§  135.  A  very  common  feature  of  moral  mania  is  a 
deep  perversion  of  the  social  affections,  whereby  the  feelings 
of  kindness  and  attachment  that  flow  from  the  relations  of 
father,  husband,  and  child,  are  replaced  by  a  perpetual  incli- 
nation to  tease,  worry  and  embitter  the  existence  of  others. 
The  ordinary  scene  of  its  manifestations  is  the  patient's  own 
domestic  circle,  the  peace  and  happiness  of  which  are 
effectually  destroyed  by  the  outbreakings  of  his  ungovern- 
able temper,  and  even  by  acts  of  brutal  ferocity.  Frederic 
William  of  Prussia,  father  of  Frederic  the  Great,  undoubt- 
edly labored  under  this  form  of  moral  mania  ;  and  it  fur- 
nishes a  satisfactory  explanation  of  his  brutal  treatmento  f 
his  son  and  his  utter  disregard  of  the  feelings  or  comfort  of 
any  other  member  of  his  family.  About  a  dozen  years 
before  his  death,  his  health  gave  way  under  his  constant  de- 
bauches in  drunkenness,  he  became  hypochondriacal,  and 
redoubled  his  usual  religious  austerities.  He  forbade  his 
family  to  talk  of  any  subject  but  religion,  read  them  daily 

1  An  Hour's  Conference  with  Fathers  and  Sons  in  relation  to  a 
common  and  fatal  Indulgence  of  Youth.  By  L.  V .  Bell,  M.  D  ,  Super- 
intendent of  the  McLean  Asylum,  1840.  Hints  to  the  Young,  in  re- 
lation to  Health  of  Body  and  Mind.  By  S.  Woodward,  M.  D.,  Super- 
intendent of  the  Mass.  Lun.  Hospital.  See  also  Dr.  Bell's  last  Re- 
port, (1843)  pp.  39,  40. 


178  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

sermons,  and  compelled  them  to  sing,  punishing  with  the 
utmost  severity  any  inattention  to  these  exercises.  The 
prince  and  his  eldest  sister  soon  began  to  attract  a  dispropor- 
tionate share  of  his  hostility.  He  obliged  them  to  eat  and 
drink  unwholesome  or  nauseous  articles,  and  would  even  spit 
in  their  dishes,  addressing  them  only  in  the  language  of  in- 
vective, and  at  times  endeavoring  to  strike  them  with  his 
crutch.  About  this  time  he  attempted  to  strangle  himself, 
alid  would  have  accomplished  his  design,  had  not  the  queen 
come  to  his  assistance.  His  brutality  towards  the  prince  at 
last  arrived  to  such  a  pitch,  that  he,  one  morning,  seized 
him  by  the  collar  as  he  entered  his  bed-chamber,  and  began 
beating  him  with  a  cane  in  the  cruelest  manner,  till  obliged 
to  desist  from  pure  exhaustion.  On  another  occasion,  shortly 
after,  he  seized  his  son  by  the  hair  and  threw  him  on  the 
ground,  beating  him  till  he  was  tired,  when  he  dragged  him 
to  a  window  apparently  for  the  purpose  of  throwing  him  out. 
A  servant  hearing  the  cries  of  the  prince,  came  to  his  assist- 
ance, and  delivered  him  from  his  hands.  Not  satisfied  with 
treating  him  in  this  barbarous  manner,  he  endeavored, 
though  unsuccessfully,  by  a  similar  course  of  conduct,  to 
make  him  sign  an  act  renouncing  his  claim  to  the  succession 
of  the  Prussian  throne,  in  favor  of  his  brother.  To  obtain 
this  end,  though  in  a  different  manner,  he  connived  at  the 
prince's  attempts  to  escape  from  his  tyranny,  in  order  that 
he  might  procure  from  a  court-martial,  a  sentence  of  death, 
and  this  even  he  was  anxious  to  anticipate,  by  endeavoring 
to  run  him  through  the  body  with  his  sword.  Not  succeed- 
ing in  procuring  his  death  by  judicial  proceedings,  he  kept 
him  in  confinement,  and  turned  all  his  thoughts  towards 
converting  him  to  Christianity.  At  this  time,  we  first  find 
mention  of  any  delusion  connected  with  his  son,  though  it 
probably  existed  before.  In  his  correspondence  with  the 
chaplain  to  whom  he  had  entrusted  the  charge  of  converting 
the  prince,  he  speaks  of  him  as  one  who  had  committed 


GENERAL    MORAL    MANIA.  179 

many  and  heinous  sins  against  God  and  the  king,  as  having 
a  hardened  heart  and  being  in  the  fangs  of  satan.  Even 
after  he  became  satisfied  with  the  repentance  of  the  prince, 
he  showed  no  disposition  to  relax  the  severities  of  his  con- 
finement. He  was  kept  in  a  miserable  room,  deprived  of 
all  the  comforts  and  many  of  the  necessaries  of  life,  denied 
the  use  of  pens,  ink,  and  paper,  and  allowed  scarcely  food 
enough  to  prevent  starvation.  His  treatment  of  the  prin- 
cess was  no  less  barbarous.  She  was  also  confined,  and 
every  effort  used  to  make  her  situation  thoroughly  wretched, 
—  and  though,  after  a  few  years,  he  relaxed  his  persecution 
of  his  children,  the  general  tenor  of  his  conduct  towards  his 
family  and  others,  evinced  little  improvement  in  his  disorder, 
till  the  day  of  his  death.1 

§  136.  There  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  affection  above 
described,  is  far  more  common  in  the  ordinary  walks  of 
society,  than  is  generally  imagined.  It  is  so  imperfectly 
understood,  however,  that  those  singular  freaks  of  conduct 
and  whimsical  notions  which  would  unquestionably  subject 
a  person  to  the  imputation  of  insanity,  were  there  the  slight- 
est aberration  of  reason,  are  set  down  to  eccentricity  of 
temper,  or  inherently  vicious  dispositions.  The  suspicion 
that  they  spring  from  insanity,  is  immediately  dispelled  by 
calling  to  mind  the  general  correctness  of  his  views,  and  the 
steadiness  and  sagacity  with  which  he  pursues  his  daily  avo- 
cations. And  so  intimately  connected  are  the  ideas  of  in- 
sanity and  delusion  in  the  common  mind,  that  it  requires  no 
little  courage  and  confidence  on  the  part  of  the  practitioner 
who  ventures,  in  a  given  case,  to  declare  the  existence  of 
the  former,  independently  of  the  latter.  The  consequences 
of  these  erroneous  views  are  often  strikingly  and  painfully 


1  Lord  Dover's  Life  of  Frederic  II.  King  of  Prussia,  vol.  1,  B.  1, 
chap.  2,  3,  4,  5,  6.  7. 


180  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

exhibited,  when  a  person  thus  affected  becomes  the  object 
of  a  legal  procedure.  While  he  may  be  described  by  one, 
as  acute  and  methodical  in  his  business,  and  rational  in  his 
discourse,  and  believed  to  be  perfectly  sane  ;  another  will 
testify  to  the  strangest  freaks  that  ever  a  madman  played, 
and  thence  deduce  the  conviction  of  his  insanity  ;  while  one 
represents  him  as  social  and  kindly  in  his  disposition,  ready 
to  assist  and  oblige,  and  to  accommodate  himself  to  the 
varying  humors  of  those  about  him,  it  will  be  testified  by 
another,  that  in  his  domestic  relations,  his  former  cheerful- 
ness has  given  way  to  gloom  and  moroseness,  that  equa- 
nimity of  temper  has  been  replaced  by  frequent  gusts  of 
passion,  and  that  the  warm  affections,  which  spring  from  the 
relations  of  parent  arid  child,  husband  and  wife,  have  been 
transformed  into  indifference  or  hate.  These  are  the  cases 
that  confound  the  wise  and  defy  the  scrutiny  of  the  skilful, 
while  they  tempt  the  superficial  and  conceited  to  betray 
their  ignorance,  under  the  delusion  of  superior  penetration  ; 
which  tarnish  many  a  professional  reputation,  and  expose 
even  the  pretensions  of  true  science  to  popular  mockery  and 
derision.1 

SECTION  II. 
Partial  Moral  Mania. 

§  137.  In  this  form  of  insanity,  the  derangement  is  con- 
fined to  one  or  a  few  of  the  affective  faculties,  the  rest  of 
the  moral  and  intellectual  constitution  preserving  its  ordinary 

1  Many  striking  cases  of  moral  mania  might  have  been  related 
which  have  come  under  the  author's  own  observation,  but  as  this 
could  not  be  done  without  giving  pain,  probably,  to  the  patients 
themselves  or  their  friends,  it  was  deemed  advisable  to  draw  en- 
tirely from  foreign  sources. 


PARTIAL  MORAL  MANIA.  181 

integrity.  An  exaltation  of  the  vital  forces  in  any  part  of 
the  cerebral  organism,  must  necessarily  be  followed  by  in- 
creased activity  and  energy  in  the  manifestations  of  the  fac- 
ulty connected  with  it,  and  which  may  even  be  carried  to 
such  a  pitch  as  to  be  beyond  the  control  of  any  other  power, 
like  the  working  of  a  blind,  instinctive  impulse.  Accord- 
ingly, we  see  the  faculty  thus  affected,  prompting  the  indi- 
vidual to  action  by  a  kind  of  instinctive  irresistibility,  and 
while  he  retains  the  most  perfect  consciousness  of  the  im- 
propriety and  even  enormity  of  his  conduct,  he  deliberately 
and  perseveringly  pursues  it.  With  no  extraordinary  temp- 
tations to  sin,  but  on  the  contrary,  with  every  inducement  to 
refrain  from  it,  and  apparently  in  the  full  possession  of  his 
reason,  he  commits  a  crime  whose  motives  are  equally  inex- 
plicable to  himself  and  to  others.  The  ends  of  justice  re- 
quire that  this  class  of  cases  should  be  viewed  in  their  true 
light ;  and  while  "it  is  -not  denied  that  their  similarity  to  other 
cases  in  which  mental  unsoundness  is  never  supposed  to 
have  existed,  renders  such  a  view  difficult,  yet  this  very 
difficulty  is  a  fresh  reason  for  extending  our  inquiries  and 
increasing  our  information.  In  the  account  now  to  be  given 
of  partial  moral  mania,  those  forms  of  it  only  will  be  noticed 
which  have  the  most  important  legal  relations. 

§  138.  Instances  of  an  irresistible  propensity  to  steal, 
unaccompanied  by  any  intellectual  alienation,  are  related  on 
good  authority  and  are  by  no  means  rare.  "  There  are 
persons,"  says  Dr.  Rush,  "  who  are  moral  to  the  highest 
degree  as  to  certain  duties,  but  who,  nevertheless,  live  under 
the  influence  of  some  one  vice.  In  one  instance,  a  woman 
was  exemplary  in  her  obedience  to  every  command  of  the 
moral  law  except  one,  —  she  could  not  refrain  from  stealing. 
What  made  this  vice  more  remarkable  was,  that  she  was  in 
easy  circumstances,  and  not  addicted  to  extravagance  in 
anything.  Such  was  the  propensity  to  this  vice,  that  when 
she  could  lay  her.  hands  .on  nothing  more  valuable,  she 
16 


182  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

would  often  at  the  table  of  a  friend,  fill  her  pockets  secretly 
with  bread.  She  both  confessed  and  lamented  her  crime."  * 
Cases  like  this  are  so  common,  that  they  must  have  come 
within  the  personal  knowledge  of  every  reader  who  has  seen 
much  of  the  world,  so  that  it  will  be  unnecessary  to  mention 
them  more  particularly.2  It  would  be  difficult  to  prove  di- 
rectly, that  this  propensity,  continuing  as  it  does  during  a 
whole  life,  and  in  a  state  of  apparently  perfect  health,  is, 
notwithstanding,  a  consequence  of  diseased  or  abnormal 
action  in  the  brain,  but  the  presumptive  evidence  in  favor  of 
this  explanation  is  certainly  strong.  First,  it  is  very  often 
observed  in  abnormal  conformations  of  the  head,  and  accom- 
panied by  an  imbecile  condition  of  the  understanding.  Gall 
and  Spurzheim  saw  in  the  prison  of  Berne  a  boy  twelve 
years  old,  who  could  never  refrain  from  stealing.  He  is 
described  as  "  ill-organized  and  rickety."  At  Haina  they 
were  shown  an  obstinate  robber,  whom  no  corporal  punish- 
ment could  correct.  He  appeared  about  sixteen  years  of 
age,  though  he  was  in  fact  twenty-six  ;  his  head  was  round, 
and  about  the  size  of  a  child's  one  year  old.  He  was  also 
deaf  and  dumb,  a  common  accompaniment  of  mental  im- 
becility. An  instructive  case  has  been  lately  recorded  in 
which  this  propensity  seemed  to  be  the  result  of  a  rickety 
and  scrofulous  constitution.3  Secondly,  this  propensity  to 
steal  is  not  unfrequently  observed  in  undoubted  mania.  Pinel 
says  it  is  a  matter  of  common  observation,  that  some  mani- 
acs who,  in  their  lucid  intervals,  are  justly  considered  models 
of  probity,  cannot  refrain  from  stealing  and  cheating  during 
the  paroxysm.4  Gall  mentions  the  case  of  two  citizens  of 

1  Medical  Inquiries  and  Observations,  1. 

1  In  Gall's  large  work,  On  the  Functions  of  the  Brain,  iv.  131, 
Boston  edition,  the  reader  will  find  a  considerable  number  of  these 
cases  related. 

3  Phrenological  Journal,  x.  453. 

4  Op.  cit.  sup.  §  132. 


PARTIAL    MORAL    MANIA.  183 

Vienna,  who,  on  becoming  insane,  were  distinguished  in  the 
hospital,  for  an  extraordinary  propensity  to  steal,  though 
previously  they  had  lived  irreproachable  lives.  They  wan- 
dered over  the  house  from  morning  to  night,  picking  up 
whatever  they  could  lay  their  hands  upon, — straw,  rags, 
clothes,  wood,  &c.  which  they  carefully  concealed  in  their 
room.1  A  propensity  to  theft  is  recognized  by  Prichard,  as 
being  often  a  feature  of  moral  mania,  and  sometimes,  the 
leading  if  not  the  sole  character  of  the  disease,  and  he  men- 
tions a  lunatic  who  would  never  eat  his  food,  unless  he  had 
previously  stolen  it,  and  accordingly  his  keeper  was  obliged 
to  put  it  into  some  corner  within  his  reach,  in  order  that  he 
might  discover  and  take  it  furtively.8  Thirdly,  it  has  been 
known  to  follow  diseases  or  injuries  of  the  brain,  and  there- 
fore to  be  dependent  on  morbid  action.  Acrel  mentions  the 
case  of  a  young  man,  who  after  receiving  a  severe  wound 
on  the  temple  for  which  he  was  trepanned,  manifested  an 
invincible  propensity  to  steal,  which  was  quite  contrary  to 
his  ordinary  disposition.  After  committing  several  larcenies, 
he  was  imprisoned  and  would  have  been  punished  according 
to  law,  had  not  Acrel  declared  him  insane,  and  attributed 
his  unfortunate  propensity  to  a  disorder  of  the  brain.  In  the 
Journal  de  Paris,  March  29th,  1816,  appeared  the  following 
paragraph  :  "  An  ex-commissary  of  police,  at  Toulouse, 
Beau-Conseil,  has  just  been  condemned  to  eight  years  con- 
finement and  hard  labor,  and  to  the  pillory,  for  having  while 
in  office,  stolen  some  pieces  of  plate  from  an  inn.  The 
accused  persisted  to  the  last  in  an  odd  kind  of  defence  ;  he 
did  not  deny  the  crime,  but  attributed  it  to  mental  derange- 
ment produced  by  wounds  he  had  received  at  Marseilles  in 
1815." 3  The  late  Dr.  Smith,  of  New  Haven,  Connecticut, 
once  observed  a  similar  effect  consecutive  to  an  attack  of 


1  Op.  cit.  sup.  iv.  131.  2  Op.  cit.  sup.  829. 

3  Quoted  by  Gall  in  Op.  cit.  sup.  141. 


184  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

typhus  fever.  "  One  patient  in  particular,  who  had  been 
extremely  sick  with  this  disease,  after  his  recovery,  had  a 
strong  propensity  to  steal,  and  did  in  effect  take  some  arti- 
cles of  clothing  from  a  young  man  to  whom  he  was  under 
great  obligations  for  the  care  which  he  had  taken  of  him 
during  his  sickness.  He  at  length  stole  a  horse  and  some 
money,  was  detected  and  punished.  I  took  some  pains  to 
inquire  into  the  young  man's  former  character,  and  found  it 
good,  and  that  his  family  were  respectable."  !  Fourthly, 
this  propensity  to  steal  is  sometimes  followed  by  general 
mania.  Fodere  relates  the  case  of  a  female  servant  in  his 
o\v'n  family,  who  could  not  help  stealing  secretly  from  him- 
self and  others,  articles,  even  of  trifling  value  ;  though  she 
was  intelligent,  modest  and  religious,  and  was  all  the  while 
conscious  of  and  admitted  the  turpitude  of  her  actions.  He 
placed  her  in  a  hospital,  considering  her  insane,  and  after 
apparent  restoration  and  a  long  trial,  he  again  took  her  into 
his  service.  Gradually,  in  spite  of  herself,  the  instinct  again 
ma'stered  her,  and  in  the  midst  of  an  incessant  struggle 
between  her  vicious  propensity  on  the  one  hand  and  a  con- 
scientious horror  of  her  condition  on  the  other,  she  was  sud- 
denly attacked  with  mania,  and  died  in  one  of  its  parox- 
ysms.2 Fifthly,  this  propensity  is  sometimes  produced  by 
certain  physiological  changes  in  the  animal  economy.  Gall 
met  with  four  examples  of  women  who,  when  pregnant, 
were  violently  impelled  to  steal,  though  perfectly  upright  at 
other  times.  Friedreich  gives  the  case  of  a  pregnant  woman 
who,  otherwise  perfectly  honest  and  respectable,  suddenly 
conceived  a  violent  longing  for  some  apples  from  a  particular 
orchard,  two  or  three  miles  distant.  Notwithstanding  the 
entreaties  of  her  parents  and  husband  not  to  risk  her  char- 
acter and  health,  and  their  promises  to  procure  the  apples 


1  Medical  and  Surgical  Memoirs,  62. 

2  Traite  de  medicine  legale,  i.  237. 


PARTIAL    MORAL    MANIA.  185 

for  her  in  the  morning,  she  started  off  in  company  with  her 
husband,  at  nine  o'clock  of  a  cold  September  night,  and  was 
detected  by  the  owner  in  the  act  of  stealing  the  apples.  She 
was  tried  and  convicted  of  theft,  but  subsequently  a  medical 
commission  was  appointed  by  the  supreme  court  to  examine 
and  report  upon  her  case.  Their  inquiries  resulted  in  the 
opinion  that  she  was  not  morally  free,  and  consequently  not 
legally  responsible  while  under  the  influence  of  those  desires 
peculiar  to  pregnancy  ;  adding  that  if  Eve  had  been  in 
the  condition  of  the  accused,  when  she  plucked  the  forbidden 
fruit  from  the  tree,  the  curse  of  original  sin  would  never 
have  fallen  on  the  race.1 

§  139.  An  inordinate  propensity  to  lying  is  also  of  no 
uncommon  occurrence  in  society ;  and  most  of  the  readers 
of  this  work  have  probably  met  with  instances  of  it  in  peo- 
ple, whose  morals  in  other  respects  were  irreproachable, 
and  whose  education  had  not  been  neglected.  The  maxim 
of  Jeremy  Bentham,  that  it  is  easier  for  men  to  speak  the 
truth,  and  therefore  they  are  more  inclined  to  do  so  than  to 
utter  falsehood,  seems,  in  them,  to  be  completely  reversed, 
for  they  find  nothing  more  difficult  than  to  tell  the  truth. 
In  repeating  a  story  which  they  have  heard  from  others,  they 
are  sure  to  embellish  it  with  exaggerations  and  additions, 
till  it  can  scarcely  be  recognized,  and  are  never  known  to 
tell  the  same  story  twice  alike.  Not  even  is  the  slightest 
groundwork  of  truth  necessary,  in  order  to  call  forth  the 
inventions  of  their  perverted  minds  ;  for  they  as  often  flow 
spontaneously,  in  the  greatest  profusion,  as  when  based  on 
some  little  foundation  in  fact.  This  propensity  seems  to 
result  from  an  inability  to  tell  the  truth,  rather  than  from 
any  other  cause  ;  as  it  can  be  traced  to  no  adequate  motive, 
and  is  often  indulged  when  truth  would  serve  the  interests 
of  the  individual  better.  Like  that  last  mentioned,  it  is 


1  Handbuch  der  gericht.  Psychologie,  691. 
16* 


186  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

liable  to  degenerate  into  unequivocal  mania,  of  which  it  is 
sometimes  a  preliminary  symptom,  and  is  also  quite  a  com- 
mon feature  in  this  disease  —  a  circumstance  which  Rush 
considers  as  proof  of  its  physical  origin. 

§  140.  We  are  not  prepared  to  go  the  length  of  referring 
all  the  instances  of  these  two  propensities  thus  manifested, 
to  the  influence  of  disease,  but  they  cannot  all  be  attributed 
to  faults  of  education,  to  e'vil  example,  or  to  innate  depravity, 
without  doing  violence  to  the  testimony  of  every  day's  ex- 
perience. It  may  be  difficult  no  doubt,  in  many  cases,  to 
distinguish  them  in  respect  to  their  physical  or  moral  origin, 
but  the  distinction  is  no  less  real  on  that  account ;  the  same 
principles  are  to  guide  us  that  regulate  our  decision  in  ques- 
tions touching  any  other  form  of  insanity ;  and  if  common 
sense  and  professional  intelligence  preside  over  our  delibe- 
rations, the  final  judgment  will  no.t  often  be  wrong.  Where 
the  propensity  to  steal  is  manifested  in  a  person  whose 
moral  character  has  previously  been  irreproachable,  and 
whose  social  position  and  pecuniary  means  render  indul- 
gence in  this  vice  peculiarly  degrading  and  unnecessary, 
his  plea  of  having  committed  the  larceny  while  deprived, 
in  a  measure,  of  his  moral  liberty,  deserves  to  be  respect- 
fully considered.  If  the  object  stolen  is  of  trifling  value, 
or  incapable  of  being  turned  to  any  purpose  of  use  or  orna- 
ment ;  if  the  offence  have  been  preceded  by  others  of  a 
similar  kind  ;  and  especially  if,  in  addition  to  these  circum- 
stances, the  individual  be  a  woman  in  a  state  of  pregnancy, 
there  can  scarcely  be  a  doubt  that  the  plea  should  be  ad- 
mitted. We  must  not  overlook  the  fact,  however,  that 
objects  which  are  utterly  valueless  to  some  men,  are  exceed- 
ingly prized  by  others ;  and  it  is  a  lamentable  truth  that 
some  persons,  in  their  eagerness  to  get  possession  of  certain 
objects  that  gratify  a  favorite  passion  or  taste,  seem  to  lose 
sight  all  at  once  of  the  ordinary  distinctions  of  meum  and 
tuum.  A  celebrated  anatomist  of  irreproachable  character 


PARTIAL  MORAL  MANIA.  187 

was  so  anxious  to  enrich  his  cabinet  with  a  valuable  speci- 
men of  pathological  anatomy  which  had  smitten  his  fancy, 
that  he  actually  directed  one  of  his  pupils  to  visit  the  place 
and  steal  it  for  him.  The  commission,  however,  was  not 
executed.  "  If  the  larceny  had  been  attempted  only,"  says 
Marc,  who  relates  the  anecdote,  and  was  himself  the  pupil 
charged  with  the  commission,  "  and  the  attempt  had  been 
discovered,  neither  the  professor  or  the  pupil  could  have 
been  deemed  excusable." l 

§  141.  Morbid  activity  of  the  sexual  propensity  is  un- 
fortunately of  such  common  occurrence,  that  it  has  been 
generally  noticed  by  medical,  writers,  though  its  medico- 
legal  importance  has  never  been  so  strongly  felt  as  it  de- 
serves. '  This  affection,  in  a  state  of  the  most  unbridled 
excitement,  filling  the  mind  with  a  crowd  of  voluptuous 
images,  and  ever  hurrying  its  victim  to  acts  of  the  grossest 
licentiousness,  though  without  any  lesion  of  the  intellectual 
powers,  is  now  universally  known  and  described  by  the 
name  of  EROTIC  MANIA.  We  cannot  convey  a  better  notion 
of  the  phenomena  of  this  disorder,  than  by  quoting. a  few 
examples  from  Gall,  by  whom  it  was  first  extensively  ob- 
served and  its  true  nature  discovered.  Its  milder  forms  and 
early  stages,  when  not  beyond  the  control  of  medical  and 
moral  treatment,  are  illustrated  in  the  following  cases. 

§  142.  "  A  robust  and  plethoric  young  man  came  to 
reside  in  Vienna.  Having  no  liaisons,  he  was  unusually 
continent,  and  was  soon  attacked  with  erotic  mania."  Gall 
pursuing  the  treatment  indicated  by  his  peculiar  views  of 
the  origin  of  the  disease,  succeeded  in  restoring  him  in  a 
few  days  to  perfect  health. 

§  143.  "  A  well  educated,  clever  young  man,  who,  from 
his  infancy  almost,  had  felt  strong  erotic  impulses,  suc- 
ceeded in  controlling  them  to  a  certain  extent,  by  means  of 

1  Marc,  De  la  Folie,  &c.  ii.  259. 


188  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

equally  strong  devotional  feelings.  After  his  situation  per- 
mitted him  to  indulge  without  constraint  in  the  pleasures  of 
love,  he  soon  made  the  fearful  discovery,  that  it  was  often 
difficult  for  him  to  withdraw  his  mind  from  the  voluptuous 
images  that  haunted  it,  and  fix  it  on  the  important  and  even 
urgent  concerns  of  his  business.  His  whole  being  was 
absorbed  in  sensuality."  He  obtained  relief  by  an  assiduous 
pursuit  of  scientific  objects,  and  by  finding  out  new  occupa- 
tions. 

§  144.  "  A  very  intelligent  lady  was  tormented,  like  the 
subject  of  the  last-mentioned  case,  from  infancy,  with  the 
most  inordinate  desires.  Her  excellent  education  alone 
saved  her  from  the  rash  indulgences  to  which  her  tempera- 
ment so  violently  urged  her.  Arrived  at  maturity,  she 
abandoned  herself  to  the  gratification  of  her  desires,  but  this 
only  increased  their  intensity.  Frequently,  she  saw  herself 
on  the  verge  of  madness,  and  in  despair,  she  left  her  house 
and  the  city,  and  took  refuge  with  her  mother  who  resided 
in  the  country,  where  the  absence  of  objects  to  excite  desire, 
the  greater  severity  of  manners  and  the  culture  of  a  garden, 
prevented  the  explosion  of  the  disease.  After  having  changed 
her  residence  for  that  of  a  large  city,  she  was,  after  a  while, 
threatened  with  a  relapse,  and  again  she  took  refuge  with 
her  mother.  On  her  return  to  Paris,  she  came  to  me,  and 
complained  like  a  woman  in  perfect  despair.  4  Everywhere,' 
she  exclaimed, '  I  see  nothing  but  the  most  lascivious  images  ; 
the  demon  of  lust  unremittedly  pursues  me,  at  the  table, 
and  even  in  my  sleep.  I  am  an  object  of  disgust  to  myself, 
and  feel  that  I  can  no  longer  escape  either  madness  or 
death.' " ' 

§  145.  In  the  following  cases,  the  mind  was  finally  over- 
whelmed by  the  force  of  this  frightful  propensity,  and  sunk 
into  complete  and  violent  madness.  "  A  man  had  lived 

1  Sur  les  Fonctions,  iii.  317  —  319. 


PARTIAL  MORAL  MANIA.  189 

many  years  in  a  happy  and  fruitful  union,  and  had  acquired 
by  his  industry  a  respectable  fortune.  After  having  retired 
from  business  and  led  an  idle  life,  his  predominant  propen- 
sity gradually  obtained  the  mastery  over  him,  and  he  yielded 
to  his  desires,  to  such  a  degree,  that,  though  still  in  posses- 
sion of  his  reason,  he  looked  on  every  woman  as  a  victim 
destined  to  gratify  his  sensual  appetite.  The  moment  he 
perceived  a  female  from  his  window,  he  announced  to  his 
wife  and  daughters,  with  an  air  of  the  utmost  delight,  the 
bliss  that  awaited  him.  Finally,  this  partial  mania  degene- 
rated into  general  mania,  and  shortly  after,  he  died  in  an 
insane  hospital  at  Vienna." l 

§  146.  Pinel  has  related  a  very  similar  case.  "  A  man 
had  creditably  filled  his  place  in  society  till  his  fiftieth  year. 
He  was  then  smitten  with  an  immoderate  passion  for  vene- 
real pleasures ;  he  frequented  places  of  debauchery,  where 
he  gave  himself  up  to  the  utmost  excesses  ;  and  then  re- 
turned to  the  society  of  his  friends,  to  paint  the  charms  of 
pure  and  spotless  love."  His  disorder  gradually  increased  ; 
his  seclusion  became  necessary  ;  and  he  soon  became  a 
victim  of  furious  mania. 

Many  more  cases  like  these  might  be  quoted,  particu- 
larly from  the  writings  of  Esquirol,  Georget  and  Marc,  but 
the  above  are  sufficient  to  illustrate  a  truth  as  generally 
recognized  as  any  other  in  pathology,  and  to  convince  the 
most  skeptical  mind,  that  if  insanity  —  or,  in  more  explicit 
terms,  morbid  action  in  the  brain  inducing  a  deprivation 
of  moral  liberty  —  ever  exists,  it  does  in  what  is  called 
erotic  mania. 

§  147.  A  morbid  propensity  to  incendiarism,  or  pyro- 
mania,  as  it  has  been  termed,  where  the  person,  though 
otherwise  rational,  is  borne  on  by  an  irresistible  power,  to 
the  commission  of  this  crime,  has  received  the  attention  of 

1  Op.  cit  sup.  3,  320. 


190  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

medical  jurists  in  Europe,  by  most  of  whom,  it  has  been 
regarded  as  a  distinct  form  of  insanity,  annulling  responsi- 
bility for  the  acts  to  which  it  leads.  Numerous  cases  have 
been  related,  and  their  medico-legal  relations  amply  dis- 
cussed by  Platner,1  Vogel,8  Masius,3  Henke,4  Gall,5  Marc,6 
Friedreich,7  and  others.  In  a  few  of  these  cases  the  morbid 
propensity  is  excited  by  the  ordinary  causes  of  insanity  ;  in 
a  larger  class,  it  is  excited  by  that  constitutional  disturbance 
which  often  accompanies  the  menstrual  periods ;  but  in  the 
largest  class  of  all,  it  occurs  at  the  age  of  puberty,  and 
seems  to  be  connected  with  retarded  evolution  of  the  sexual 
organs.  The  case  of  Maria  Franc,  quoted  by  Gall  from  a 
German  journal,  who  was  executed  for  house-burning,  may 
be  referred  to  the  first  class.  She  was  a  peasant  of  little 
education,  and,  in  consequence  of  an  unhappy  marriage, 
had  abandoned  herself  to  habits  of  intemperate  drinking. 
In  this  state  a  fire  occurred  in  which  she  had  no  share. 
"  From  the  moment  she  witnessed  this  fearful  sight,  she  felt 
a  desire  to  fire  houses,  which,  whenever  she  had  drunk  a 
few  coppers'  worth  of  spirit,  was  converted  into  an  irresisti- 
ble impulse.  She  could  give  no  other  reason,  nor  show 
any  other  motive  for  firing  so  many  houses,  than  this  im- 
pulse which  drove  her  to  it.  Notwithstanding  the  fear,  the 
terror  and  the  repentance  she  felt  in  every  instance,  she 
went  and  did  it  afresh."  In  other  respects  her  mind  was 


1  Qnaestiones  Medicinae  Forensis,  1824. 

8  Beitr.  zur  gerichtsarztl  Lehre  d.  Zurechnungsfahigkeit,   p.  10. 
1825. 

3  System    der    gerichtlichen    Arzneykunde   fdr    Rechtsgelehrte, 
1818. 

4  Abhandl.  gerichtl.  Medic.  B.  iii.  1824. 

5  Sur  les  Fonctions,  iii  317-319. 

6  Annales  D'Hygiene,  x.  357. 

7  Handbuch  der  gericht.  Psychologic,  393-435. 


PARTIAL    MORAL    MANIA.  191 

sound.  Within  five  years  she  fired  twelve  houses,  and  was 
arrested  on  the  thirteenth  attempt.1 

§  148.  Among  numerous  other  cases  of  this  kind  that 
have  been  reported,  we  have  room  for  only  two  more.  Eve 
Schebomska,  twenty-two  years  of  age,  was  guilty  of  four 
incendiary  acts,  to  which  she  said  she  was  impelled  by  an 
inward  agitation  that  tormented  her.  This  agitation  which, 
however,  did  not  prevent  her  from  performing  her  domestic 
labors,  was  greatly  augmented,  according  to  the  testimony 
of  her  mistress,  when  she  had  been  some  time  without 
seeing  her  lover.2  A  peasant  girl,  named  Kalinovska, 
seventeen  years  of  age,  while  returning  from  a  dance, 
where  she  had  got  quite  heated,  was  suddenly  seized  with 
a  desire  to  burn  a  building.  She  struggled  with  the  desire 
for  three  days,  when  she  yielded,  and  she  declared  that  on 
seeing  the  flames  burst  out  she  experienced  a  joy  such  as 
she  had  never  felt  before.3 

§  149.  In  the  following  cases  the  incendiary  propensity 
was  excited  by  disordered  menstruation,  accompanied  in 
some  of  them  by  other  pathological  conditions.  A  servant 
girl,  named  Weber,  aged  twenty-two  years,  committed 
three  incendiary  acts.  Her  mistress  had  observed  that  she 
was  sad  ;  that  she  would  frequently  seem  as  if  buried  in 
thought,  arid  would  cry  out  in  her  sleep.  It  appeared  in 
evidence  that  she  had  had  a  disease  two  years  before,  that 
was  accompanied  by  violent  pains  in  the  head,  disordered 
circulation,  insensibility  and  epileptic  fits ;  and  that  since 
then  menstruation  had  ceased.4  The  servant  girl  of  a 
peasant,  seventeen  years  old,  that  had  been  guilty  of  two 
incendiary  acts,  declared  that  she  was  constantly  beset  by 
an  inward  voice  that  commanded  her  to  bum  and  then 
destroy  herself.  The  first  fire  she  regarded  with  calmness 


1  Op   cit  sup.  iv.  158.  2  Klein.  Annalen,  xvi.  141. 

3  Ibid.  B  xii.  53.  4  Ibid.  B.  xiii.  131. 


192  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

and  even  pleasure.  The  second  time,  she  gave  the  alarm 
herself,  and  immediately  after  tried  to  hang  herself.  She 
had  never  manifested  any  mental  disorder,  but  from  her 
fourth  year  she  had  been  subject  to  spasms  which  finally 
degenerated  into  epileptic  fits  that  were  unusually  violent 
whenever  they  coincided  with  the  menstrual  period.  A 
very  severe  fit  occurred  but  a  few  days  previous  to  the 
second  incendiary  act.  The  faculty  of  Leipzig,  who  were 
consulted  respecting  the  case,  terminate  their  report  with 
saying,  that  "  in  consideration  of  the  physical  state  of  the 
accused,  they  do  not  consider  it  probaWe,  that,  at  the  pe- 
riods when  she  committed  the  incendiary  acts,  she  enjoyed 
the  free  use  of  her  mental  faculties."  ] 

§  150.  The  following  examples  of  the  last  class  of 
cases  will  show  the  nature  of  the  .exciting  causes  of  the 
incendiary  impulse,  and  the  physical  imperfections  of  its 
subjects.  "  A  servant  girl  was  committed  for  two  incen- 
diary attempts  on  the  premises  of  her  master,  in  a  German 
village,  in  1830.  On  her  examination  before  the  magis- 
trate she  denied  the  charge,  but  subsequently  confessed  it 
while  in  prison.  She  assigned  no  reason  for  her  conduct, 
acknowledged  that  she  had  been  well  treated  by  her  em- 
ployers, and  they  expressed  themselves  perfectly  satisfied 
with  her.  It  appeared  in  evidence  that  she  was  in  her 
twentieth  year ;  that  she  had  never  menstruated  ;  that 
since  her  thirteenth  year,  she  had  frequently  had  epileptic 
fits,  two  of  which  occurred  on  the  day  these  attempts  were 
made,  one  in  the  interval  between  them,  the  other  after  the 
last  ;  and  that  for  several  days  subsequently  she  had  two 
fits  daily  in  prison.  It  also  appeared  that  she  had'  been 
guilty  of  other  incendiary  acts  when  in  the  service  of  a 
different  family.  On  one  occasion  she  declared  "  that  she 
felt  badly,  and  that  when  she  felt  so,  she  knew  not  what 

1  Plainer,  Op.  cit.  sup.  P.  ii. 


PARTIAL    MORAL    MANIA.  193 

she  did."  The  physicians  by  whom  she  was  examined, 
and  who  made  reports  to  the  proper  authorities,  stated  that 
she  was  quiet  in  her  demeanor,  betraying  no  indication  of 
a  malicious  disposition,  inclined  to  talk  to  herself,  and,  in 
regard  to  mental  capacity,  obviously  stupid  and  dull.  They 
concluded  that  she  was  not  responsible  for  criminal  acts, 
and  that  those  she  was  charged  with  proceeded  from  an 
incendiary  impulse  which  was  a  consequence  of  "inter- 
rupted physical  evolution."  She  was  accordingly  released 
by  the  court.  Under  appropriate  treatment  the  menses 
were  soon  established,  after  which  she  had  no  return  of  her 
epilepsy,  nor  her  pyromania.1 

A  girl,  fifteen  years  old,  named  Graborkwa,  while  suffer- 
ing from  nostalgia,  or  homesickness,  made  two  incendiary 
attempts  in  order  that  she  might  be  able  to  leave  the  service 
of  her  employers.  She  stated  that  from  the  moment  she 
entered  their  service,  she  was  unceasingly  beset  by  the  de- 
sire of  burning  buildings.  It  seemed  as  if  a  shade  that  was 
constantly  before  her,  impelled  her  to  acts  of  incendiarism. 
It  appeared  that  she  had  long  suffered  violent  pains  in  her 
head,  and  had  never  menstruated.2 

A  servant  girl,  seventeen  years  old,  was  guilty  of  incen- 
diarism, for  the  purpose,  as  she  stated,  of  being  sent  back 
to  her  parents.  She  exhibited  no  sign  of  mental  derange- 
ment, though  of  very  limited  capacity.  She  was  unusually 
short  in  stature,  the  sexual  organs  showed  no  signs  of  de- 
velopment, and  the  menses  had  never  appeared.3 

§  151.  That  the  evolution  of  the  sexual  functions  is  very 
often  attended  by  more  or  less  constitutional  disturbance, 
especially  in  the  female  sex,  is  now  a  well-established  physi- 
ological truth.  The  shock  seems  to  be  felt  chiefly  by  the 
nervous  system  which  experiences  almost  every  form  of 

1  Neues  Archiv  des  Criminalrechts.  xiv.  393. 

2  Klein,  Annalen,  xii.  126.  3  Platner,  Op.  cit  sup.  xv. 

17 


194  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

irritation,  varying  in  severity  from  the  slightest  hysteric 
symptoms,  to  tetanus,  St.  Vitus's  dance,  and  epilepsy.  And 
when  we  bear  in  mind  also,  that  general  mania  is  sometimes 
produced  by  this  great  physiological  change,  it  cannot  be 
deemed  an  extraordinary  fact  that  partial  mania,  exciting  to 
acts  of  incendiarism  or  murder,  should  be  one  of  its  effects. 
Still  we  would  not  be  understood  as  favoring  the  opinion 
that  every  youth  between  the  age  of  twelve  and  fifteen, 
guilty  of  incendiarism,  is  a  subject  of  pyromania.  The 
general  principle  of  the  power  of  the  change  in  question  to 
produce  this  disorder,  is  not  alone  sufficient.  It  is  neces- 
sary to  trace  the  connection  between  them  in,  the  particular 
case,  and  unless  this  can  be  done,  we  have  no  right  to  claim 
the  benefit  of  the  general  truth.  To  aid  us  in  the  investiga- 
tion of  this  point,  it  will  be  well  to  bear  in  mind  the  follow- 
ing considerations,  laid  down  by  Henke,1  and  adopted  by 
Marc,  in  his  excellent  paper  on  this  disorder. 2 

§  152.  1.  To  prove  the  existence  of  pyromania,  pro- 
duced by  the  sexual  evolution,  the  age  should  correspond 
with  that  of  puberty,  which  is  between  twelve  and  fifteen. 
Sometimes,  however,  it  may  occur,  especially  in  females,  as 
early  as  the  eleventh  or  tenth  year,  and  therefore  if  the 
symptoms  are  well  marked,  we  have  a  right  to  attribute 
them  to  this  cause. 

2.  There  should  be  present  symptoms  of  irregular  de- 
velopment ;  of  marked  critical  movements,  by  means  of 
which  nature  seeks  to  complete  the  evolution.  These  gen- 
eral signs  are,  either,  a  rapid  increase  of  stature,  or  a  less 
growth  and  sexual  development  than  is  common  at  the  age 
of  the  individual ;  an  unusual  lassitude  and  sense  of  weight 


1  Op.  cit.  sup. 

8  Considerations  medico-legales  sur  la  monomanie  et  particuliere- 
meiit  sur  la  monomanie  incendiaire.  Annales  D'Hygiene,  x.  357-473. 


PARTIAL    MORAL    MANIA.  195 

and  pain  in  the  limbs  ;  glandular  swellings ;  cutaneous  erup- 
tions, &c. 

3.  If,  within  a  short  time  of  the  incendiary,  act,  there  are 
symptoms  of  development  in  the  sexual  organs,  such  as 
efforts  of  menstruation  in  girls,  they  deserve  the  greatest 
attention.  .  They  will  strongly  confirm  the  conclusions  that 
might  be  drawn  from  the  other  symptoms,  that  the  work  of 
evolution  disturbed  the  functions  of  the  brain.     Any  irregu- 
larity whatever  of  the  menstrual  discharge,  is  a  fact  of  the 
greatest  importance  in  determining  the  mental  -condition  of 
incendiary  girls. 

4.  Symptoms  of  disturbance  in  the  circulating  system, 
such. as  irregularity  of  the  pulse,  determination  of  blood  to 
the  head,  pains  in  the  head,  vertigo,  stupor,  a  sense  of  op- 
pression and  distress  in  the  chest,  are  indicative  in  young 
subjects  of  an  arrest  or  disturbance  of  the  development  of 
the  sexual  functions,  and  therefore  require  attention. 

5.  For  the  same  reason,  symptoms  of  disturbance  in  the 
nervous  system,  such  as  trembling,  involuntary  motions  of 
the  muscles,  spasms  and  convulsions  of  every  kind,  even  to 
epilepsy,  are  no  less  worthy  of  attention, 

6.  Even  in  the  absence  of  all  other  symptoms,  derange- 
ment of  the  intellectual  or  moral  powers  would  be   strong 
proof,  in  these  cases,  of  the  existence  of  pyromania.     Of  the 
two,  the  latter  is  far  the  more  common,  and  is  indicated  by 
a  change  in  the  moral  character.     The  patient  is  sometimes 
irascible,  quarrelsome  ;  at-others,  sad,  silent,  and  weeping 
without  the  slightest  motive.     He  seems  to  be  buried  in  a 
profound   revery,  and  suddenly  starts  up  in  a  fright,  cries 
out  in  his  sleep,  &c.     These  symptoms  may  have  disap- 
peared and  reappeared,  or  degenerated  at  last,  into  intellect- 
ual mania. 

7.  The  absence  of  positive  symptoms  of  mental  disor- 
der, as  well  as  the  presence  of  those  which  appear  to  show 
that  the  reason  is  sound,  is  not  incompatible  with  the  loss  of 


196  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

moral  liberty.  The  remarks  of  Marc  on  this  point  deserve 
to  be  quoted  in  full.  "  Even  when,  previously  to  the  incen- 
diary act,  they  have  shown  no  evident  trace  of  mental  alien- 
ation, and  been  capable  of  attending  to  their  customary 
duties ;  when,  on  their  examinations,  they  have  answered 
pertinently  to  questions  addressed  to  them  ;  when  they  have 
avowed  that  they  were  influenced  by  a  desire  of  revenge  ; 
we  cannot  conclude  with  certainty,  that  they  were  in  pos- 
session of  all  their  moral  liberty,  and  that  consequently  they 
should  incur  the  full  penalty  of  the  crime.  These  unfortu- 
nates may  be  governed  by  a  single  fixed  idea,  not  discovered 
till  after  the  execution  of  the  criminal  act.  Pyromania  re- 
sulting from  a  pathological  cause,  may  increase  in  severity, 
its  this  cause  itself  is  aggravated,  and  suddenly  be  converted 
into  an  irresistible  propensity,  immediately  followed  by  its 
gratification."  v 

§  153.  If  the  above  considerations  are  carefully  pon- 
dered by  the  medical  jurist,  he  will  be  in  little  danger  of 
mistake,  in  determining  the  question  whether  or  not  the 
incendiary  act  is  excited  by  a  pathological  condition  of  the 
nervous  system,  incident  to  the  evolution  of  the  sexual  func- 
tions. If  it  be  decided  in  the  affirmative,  the  acquittal  of 
the  accused  should  follow  as  a  matter  of  course,  though  it 
might  not  square  with  the  technical  definitions  of  insanity, 
and  the  usual  subtleties  respecting  moral  liberty  and  free- 
dom of  the  will.  In  the  north  of  Germany,  where  pyroma- 
nia  in  young  subjects  is  remarkably  frequent,  the  court  is 
generally  governed  by  the  opinions  of  the  medical  experts, 
and  thus  the  accused  escapes  the  ignominious  fate  which  is 
almost  inevitable  wherever  the  spirit  of  the  English  com- 
mon law  prevails. 

§  154.  The  last  and  most  important  form  of  moral  mania 


1  Op.  cit.  sup.  457. 


PARTIAL    MORAL  -MANIA.  197 

that  will  be  noticed,  consists  in  a  morbid  activity  of  the 
propensity  to  destroy ;  where  the  individual,  without  provo- 
cation or  any  other  rational  motive,  apparently  in  the  full 
possession  of  his  reason,  and  oftentimes,  in  spite  of  his  most 
strenuous  efforts  to  the  contrary,  imbrues  his  hands  in  the 
blood  of  others  ;  oftener,  than  otherwise,  of  the  partner  of 
his  bosorn,  of  the  children  of  his  affections,  of  those,  in 
short,  who  are  most  dear  and  cherished  around  him.  The 
facts  here  alluded  to  are  of  painful  frequency,  and  the  gross 
misunderstanding  of  their  true  nature,  almost  universally 
prevalent,  excepting  among  a  few  in  the -higher  walks  of  the 
professions,  leads  to  equally  painful  results.  In  the  absence 
of  any  pathological  explanation  of  this  horrid  phenomenon, 
the  mind  seeks  in  vain,  among  secondary  causes,  for  a  ra- 
tional mode  of  accounting  for  it,  and  is  content  to  resort  to 
that  time-honored  solution  of  all  the  mysteries  of  human 
delinquency,  the  instigation  of  the  devil.  Of  the  double 
homicide  to  which  this  affection  gives  rise,  there  can  be  no 
question  which  is  most  to  be  deplored,  for  shocking  as- it  is, 
for  one  bearing  the  image  of  his  Maker  to  take  the  life  of  a 
fellow-being  with  brutal  ferocity,  how  shall  we  characterize 
the  deliberate  perpetration  of  the  same  deed,  under  the 
sanction  of  law  and  of  the  popular  approbation  ?  We  trust, 
however,  that  the  ample  researches  of  writers  of  unques- 
tionable veracity  and  ability,  which  are  now  just  reaching 
the  attention  of  the  legal  profession,  will  be  soon  followed 
by  a  conviction  of  past  errors,  and  a  more  rational  adminis- 
tration of  the  criminal  law.  For  the  purpose  of  contributing 
to  this  object,  it  will  be  necessary  to  bring  fully  before  the 
reader  the  results  of  these  researches,  and,  in  view  of  the 
importance  of  the  subject,  to  risk  the  charge  of  prolixity 
by  the  number  and  length  of  the  quotations. 

§  155.  The  form  of  disease  now  under  consideration  was 
first  distinctly  described  by  Pinel ;  and  though  its  existence 
as  a  distinct  form  of  monomania  was  for  a  long  time  after 
17* 


198  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

doubted,  it  has  subsequently  been  admitted  by  the  principal 
writers  on  insanity  ;  by  Gall  and  Spurzheim,  Esquirol,3 
Georget,  Marc,  Andral,  Orfila,  and  Broussais  in  France  ; 
by  Conolly,  Combe  and  Prichard  in  England  ;  by  HofFbauer, 
Platner,  Ethmuller,  Henke  and  Friedreich  in  Germany  ;  by 
Otto  of  Copenhagen  ;  and  by  Rush  in  this  country.  It  has 
received  the  various  appellations  of  monomanie-homicide, 
monomanie-meurtriere,  melancliolie-liomicide,  homicidal  in- 
sanity, instinctive  monomania.  Esquirol,  in  his  valuable 
memoir,  first  published  in  the  shape  of  a  note  in  the  French 
translation  of  Hoffbauer's  work,  observes  that  homicidal 
insanity,  or  monomanie-homicide,  as  he  terms  it,  presents 
two  distinct  forms,  in  one  of  which  the  monomaniac  is 
always  influenced  by  avowed  motives  more  or  less  irrational, 
and  is  generally  regarded  as  mad  ;  in  the  other,  there  are 
no  motives  acknowledged,  nor  to  be  discerned,  the  individ- 
ual being  impelled  by  a  blind,  irresistible  impulse.  It  is 
with  the  latter  only  that  we  are  concerned,  for  the  other  is 
clearly  a  form  of  partial  intellectual  mania  ;  but  as  this 
division  has  not  been  strictly  made  by  nature,  cases  often 
occurring  that  do  not  clearly  come  under  either  category, 
the  subject  will  be  better  elucidated  by  noticing  all  the  forms 
of  this  affection,  and  seeing  how  intimately  they  are  con- 
nected together. 

§  156.  In  the  first  group  of  cases  we  have  the  simplest 
form  of  homicidal  insanity,  —  that  in  which  the  desire  to 
destroy  life  is  not  only  prompted  by  no  motive  whatever, 
and  solely  by  a  violent  impulse,  but  without  any  appreciable 
disorder  of  mind  or  body. 


1  It  is  worthy  of  mention,  that  though  Esquirol,  in  his  article 
Manie,  in  the  Diet.  Med.  Sci.,  expressed  his  disbelief  in  the  existence 
of  homicidal  insanity  unconnected  with  other  mental  alienation,  he 
has  since  not  only  retracted  his  opinion,  but  has  published  the  very 
best  contribution  to  our  knowledge  of  the  subject. 


PARTIAL  MORAL  MANIA.  199 

"  In  a  respectable  house  in  Germany,  the  mother  of  the 
family  returning  home  one  day,  met  a  servant,  against  whom 
she  had  no  cause  of  complaint,  in  the  greatest  agitation  ;  she 
begged  to  speak  with  her  mistress  alone,  threw  herself  upon 
her  knees,  and  entreated  that  she  might  be  sent  out  of  the 
house.  Her  mistress,  astonished,  inquired  the  reason,  and 
learned  that  whenever  this  unhappy  servant  undressed  the 
lady's  child,  she  was  struck  by  the  whiteness  of  its  flesh  and 
experienced  the  almost  irresistible  desire  to  tear  it  in  pieces. 
She  felt  afraid  that  she  could  not  resist  the  impulse,  and 
preferred  to  leave  the  house."  "  This  circumstance,"  says 
the  narrator,  "  occurred  in  the  family  of  Baron  Humboldt, 
and  this  illustrious  person  permitted  me  to  add  his  testi- 
mony." ' 

§  157.  "  A  young  lady  who  had  been  placed  in  a  maison 
de  sante,  experienced  homicidal  desires,  for  which  she  could 
assign  no  motive.  She  was  rational  on  every  subject,  and 
whenever  she  felt  the  approach  of  this  dreadful  propensity, 
she  shed  tears,  entreated  to  have  the  strait-waistcoat  put  on 
and  to  be  carefully  guarded,  till  the  paroxysm,  which  some- 
times lasted  several  days,  had  passed." 2 

§  158.  "  M.  B,.,  a  distinguished  chemist  and  a  poet,  of  a 
naturally  mild  and 'sociable  disposition,  committed  himself  a 
prisoner  in  one  of  the  maisons  de  sante  of  the  faubourg  St. 
Antoine.  Tormented  by  the  desire  of  killing,  he  prostrated 
himself  at  the  foot  of  the  altar,  and  implored  the  divine 
assistance  to  deliver  him  from  such  an  atrocious  propensity, 
of  the  cause  of  which  he  could  give  no  account.  When  he 
felt  that  he  was  likely  to  yield  to  the  violence  of  this  inclina- 
tion, he  hastened  to  the  head  of  the  establishment,  and 
requested  him  to  tie  his  thumbs  together  with  a  ribbon. 
This  slight  ligature  was  sufficient  to  calm  the  unhappy  R. ; 


1  Marc,  consultation  medico-legale,  pour  H.  Cornier,  p.  52. 

2  Idem. 


200  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

who  subsequently  endeavored  to  kill  one  of  his  friends,  and 
finally  perished  in  a  fit  of  maniacal  fury."  ] 

§  159.  The  following  case  is  recorded  by  Gall,  who 
derived  it  from  a  German  paper  of  April  13th,  1820.  "A 
carrier,  belonging  to  the  bailiwick  of  Frendenstadt,  who  had 
quitted  his  family  in  perfect  health,  was  suddenly  attacked 
by  a  paroxysm  of  furious  madness,  on  the  route  between 
Aalen  and  Gemunde.  His  first  insane  act  was  to  shut  him- 
self up  in  the  stable  with  his  three  horses,  to  which  he  gave 
no  fodder;  and  when  departing  he  harnessed  only  two  of 
his  horses,  accompanying  the  carriage,  mounted  on  the  other. 
At  Moglengen  he  abused  a  woman ;  at  Unterbobingen,  he 
alighted,  and  walked  before  his  horses  with  a  hatchet  in  his 
hand.  On  the  route  between  the  last  place  and  Hussenhofen, 
the  first  person  he  met  with  was  a  woman,  whom  he  struck 
several  times  with  his  hatchet,  and  left  her  lying  in  a  ditch 
by  the  road  side.  Next,  he  encountered  a  lad  thirteen  years 
old,  whose  head  he  split  open ;  and  shortly  after,  he  split  the 
skull  of  a  man,  thirty  years  old,  and  scattered  his  brains  in 
the  road ;  and  after  hacking  the  body,  he  left  his  hatchet 
and  carriage,  and  thus  unarmed  proceeded  towards  Hus- 
senhofen. He  met  two  Jews  on  the  road,  whom  he  attacked, 
but  who,  after  a  short  struggle,  escaped  him.  Near  Hus- 
senhofen, he  assaulted  a  peasant,  who  screamed  till  several 
persons  came  to  his  aid,  who  secured  the  maniac  and  carried 
him  to  Gemunde.  They  afterwards  led  him  to  the  bodies 
of  his  victims,  when  he  observed,  4  It  is  not  I,  but  my  bad 
spirit,  that  has  committed  these  murders.'" 

§  160.  William  Brown  was  executed  at  Maidstone,  Eng- 
land, in  1812,  for  strangling  a  child,  whom  he  accidentally 
met  one  morning  while  walking  in  the  country.  He  took 
up  the  body  and  laid  it  on  some  steps,  and  then  went  and 
told  what  he  had  done,  requesting  to  be  taken  into  custody. 

1  Marc,  op.  cit.  65.  *  Sur  les  Fonctions,  &c.  iv.  103. 


PARTIAL  MORAL  MANIA.  201 

On  the  trial,  he  said  he  had  never  seen  the  child  before,  had 
no  malice  against  it,  and  could  assign  no  motive  for  the 
dreadful  act.  He  bore  an  exemplary  character,  and  had 
never  been  suspected  of  being  insane.1  It  is  needless  to  say 
that  he  was  hanged. 

§  161.  A  country  gentleman,  enjoying  good  health  and 
easy  circumstances,  consulted  Esquirol  in  regard  to  his 
singular  and  unhappy  condition.  He  related  that  he  had 
read  the  indictment  of  Henriette  Cornier,  which  however 
did  not  very  strongly  excite  his  attention.  In  the  course  of 
the  night  he  suddenly  awoke  with  the  thought  of  killing  his 
wife,  who  was  lying  beside  him.  He  left  his  wife's  bed  for 
a  time,  but  within  three  weeks  the  same  idea  seized  upon 
his  mind  three  times,  and  always  in  the  night.  During  the 
day,  considerable  exercise  and  occupation  preserved  him 
from  this  fearful  inclination.  He  evinced  not  the  slightest 
mental  disorder  ;  his  business  was  prosperous  ;  he  had  never 
experienced  any  domestic  chagrins  ;  and  he  had  no  cause  of 
complaint  or  jealousy  in  regard  to  his  wife,  whom  he  loved 
and  with  whom  he  never  had  had  the  least  disagreement. 
With  the  exception  of  a  light  headache  occasionally,  he  had 
always  been  well  and  free  from  pain.  He  is  sad  and  troubled 
about  his  condition,  and  has  quitted  his  wife  for  fear  lest  he 
might  yield  to  the  force  of  his  desire.8 

§  162.  In  most  cases  of  homicidal  insanity  the  presence 
of  some  physical  or  moral  disorder  may  be  detected  ;  and 
though  none  is  mentioned  in  those  above  related,  there  is 
reason  to  suppose  that  it  might  have  been  ascertained  by  a 
more  thorough  examination.  It  is  a  curious  fact,  however, 
that  homicidal  desires  of  the  intensest  kind  will  sometimes 
flit  through  the  mind,  while  the  individual,  though  capable 
of  judging  of  his  feelings,  is  unconscious  of  being  otherwise 


i  Knapp  and  B  Id  win's  Newgate  Calender,  iv.  80. 
*  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  ii.  830. 


202  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

than  perfectly  well.  Marc,  the  distinguished  medical  jurist, 
relates,  that  passing  over  a  bridge  in  Paris  one  day,  he 
observed  a  lad  sitting  on  the  parapet  of  the  bridge,  eating  his 
breakfast,  when  he  was  seized  with  an  almost  irresistible 
desire  to  push  him  over  into  the  river.  The  idea  was  but  a 
flash,  but  it  filled  him  with  such  horror,  that  he  rapidly 
crossed  over  to  the  opposite  trottoir,  and  got  out  of  the  way 
as  quick  as  possible.  Talma,  the  actor,  also  assured  him, 
on  hearing  the  story,  that  he  had  experienced  the  same  pro- 
pensity under  very  similar  circumstances.1  In  the  following 
group  of  cases  the  homicidal  fit  was  obviously  accompanied 
or  preceded  by  disease  or  physical  disorder  of  some  kind. 

§  163.  The  following  case  is  related  by  Gall,  who  ob- 
tained it  from  Dr.  Zimmermann  of  Krumback.  "  A  peasant, 
born  at  Krumback,  Swabia,  who  never  enjoyed  very  good 
health,  twenty-seven  years  old,  and  unmarried,  had  been 
subject  from  his  ninth  year  to  frequent  epileptic  fits.  Two 
years  ago,  his  disease  changed  its  character  without  any 
apparent  cause,  and  ever  since,  this  man,  instead  of  a  fit  of 
epilepsy,  has  been  attacked  with  an  irresistible  inclination  to 
commit  murder.  He  felt  the  approach  of  the  fit  many  hours, 
and  sometimes  a  whole  day,  before  its  invasion,  and  from 
the  commencement  of  this  presentiment,  he  begged  to  be 
secured  and  chained  that  he  might  not  commit  some  dread- 
ful deed.  '  When  the  fit  comes  on,'  says  he,  '  I  feel  under 
a  necessity  to  kill,  even  if  it  were  a  child.'  His  parents, 
whom  he  tenderly  loved,  would  be  the  first  victims  of  this 
murderous  propensity.  '  My  mother,'  he  cries  out  with  a 
frightful  voice,  *  save  yourself,  or  I  must  kill  you.'  Before 
the  fit  he  complains  of  being  exceedingly  sleepy,  without 
being  able  to  sleep ;  he  feels  depressed,  and  experiences 
slight  twitchings  of  the  limbs.  During  the  fit,  he  preserves 


1  Marc.     De  la  Folie  dans  ses  rapports  avec  les  questions  medico- 
judic,  ii.  478. 


PARTIAL    MORAL    MANIA.  203 

his  consciousness,  and  knows  perfectly  well  that  in  com- 
mitting a  murder,  he  is  guilty  of  an  atrocious  crime.  When 
he  is  disabled  from  doing  injury,  he  makes  the  most  fright- 
ful contortions  and  grimaces,  singing  or  talking  in  rhyme. 
The  fit  lasts  from  one  to  two  days.  When  it  is  over,  he 
cries  out,  '  Now  unbind  me.  Alas !  I  have  cruelly  suffered, 
but  I  rejoice  that  I  have  killed  nobody." 3 

§  164.  On  the  15th  February,  1826,  Jacques  Mounin, 
after  many  acts  of  violence  and  fury,  escaped  from  his 
family,  who  wished  to  restrain  him,  scaled  the  walls  of  seve- 
ral adjoining  properties,  and  took  to  the  fields,  without  shoes, 
hat,  or  weapons  of  any  kind.  His  flight  having  excited 
considerable  alarm,  as  after  some  epileptic  attacks  he.  had 
formerly  given  many  signs  of  a  blind  fury,  the  local  author- 
ities were  informed,  and  several  persons  despatched  after 
him  as  quickly  as  possible.  On  arriving  at  a  field,  where 
many  laborers  were  at  work  at  a  distance  from  one  another, 
Mounin  first  threatened  a  man  who  was  driving  a  cart,  and 
immediately  after  pursued  Joseph  Faucher  and  pelted  him 
with  stones.  The  latter  having  escaped,  he  then  approached 
an  old  man  almost  blind,  named  Mayet,  whom  he  knocked 
down  and  killed  by  beating  on  the  head  with  a  large  stone. 
He  next  attacked  a  man  who  was  digging  at  a  little  distance, 
and  killed  him  with  a  spade.  A  few  minutes  afterwards  he 
met  Propheti  on  horseback,  whom  he  struck  down  with 
stones,  but  was  obliged  to  leave  him  in  consequence  of  the 
cries  of  his  victim.  He  then  chased  some  children,  who 
saved  themselves  by  hard  running,  but  he  overtook  a  man 
at  work  and  slew  him.  On  being  questioned  during  his 
confinement,  Mounin  said  he  well  recollected  having  killed 
the  three  men,  and  especially  one,  a  relative  of  his  own, 
whom  he  greatly  regretted  ;  he  added  that  in  his  paroxysms 
of  phrensy  he  saw  nothing  but  flames,  and  that  blood  was 

1  Gall,  op.  cit.  iv.  104. 


204  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

then  most  delightful  to  his  sight.  At  the  end  of  a  few  days' 
imprisonment,  he  seemed  to  have  entirely  recovered  his 
reason,  but  subsequently  he  relapsed.  The  court  declined 
trying  him,  under  the  conviction  that  he  was  insane  while 
committing  the  murders  above  mentioned.1 

§  165.     "  Frederick   Jensen,    a   workman,    thirty-seven 
years  old,  had  for  some  time  suffered  from  fits  of  giddiness, 
which  always  obliged  him  to  seize  hold  of  the  nearest  ob- 
jects.    In  the  spring  of  1828,  he  lost  a  beloved  daughter, 
which  afflicted  him  very  much.     The  state  of  his  health 
was  nevertheless  perfect  in  mind  as  well  as  in  body,  when 
he  one  day  (Sunday,  28th  September,  1828)  after  dinner, 
told  his  wife  that  he  would  take  a  walk  with  his  son,  a  boy 
ten  years  old.     He  did  so,  and  went  with  him  to  the  green 
which  encircles  the  citadel.     When  he  came  there,  —  he 
now  relates,  '  a  strange  confusion  came  over  me  ; '  it  ap- 
peared like  a  matter  of  absolute  necessity  to  him  to  drown 
his  son  and  himself  in  the  waters  at  the  citadel.     Quite  un- 
conscious of  what  he  was  doing,  he  ran  towards  the  water 
with  the  boy  in  his  hand.    A  man,  surprised  at  his  behavior, 
stopped  him  there,  took  the  boy  from  him,  and  tried  to  per- 
suade him  to  leave  the  water ;  but  he  became  angry,  and 
answered  that   he   intended   to   take   a   walk,  and  asked, 
'  whether  any  body  had  a  right  to  forbid  him  to  do  so  ? ' 
The  man  left  him,  but  took  the  boy  along  with  him.     An 
hour  afterwards  he  was  taken  out  of  the  water,  into  which 
he  had  thrown  himself,  and  taken  to  prison.     As  he  still 
showed  symptoms  of  insanity,  he  was  bled  and  purged,  and 
two  days  after,  was  brought  into  the  hospital,  and  committed 
to  the  care   of  my  friend,  Dr.  Wendt,  who  has  perfectly 
cured  him,  and  who  kindly  afforded  me  the  opportunity  to 
see  and  to  speak  with  him.     He  now  very  quietly  tells  the 
whole  event  himself,  but  is  not  able  to  explain  the  cause  of 

1  Georget,  Discussion  medico-legale,  &c.  153. 


PARTIAL    MORAL    MANIA.  205 

the  suddenly  rising  desire  to  kill  himself  and  the  boy  whom 
he  loved  heartily.  This  cause  is  only  to  be  sought  in  con- 
gestion of  blood  to  the  brain,  the  same  which  before  had 
caused  his  giddiness  ;  and  whether  we  adopt  an  organ  of 
destructiveness  in  the  brain  or  not,  it  is  to  be  assumed  that 
the  propensity  to  kill  himself  and  the  son  arose  from  a  mor- 
bid excitation  of  a  certain  part  of  the  brain.  The  disposi- 
tion to  congestion  originated  from  a  fall  he  suffered  on  the 
head  in  1820."  ' 

§  166.  Another  curious  form  of  homicidal  insanity  oc* 
curs  in  women,  and  seems  to  be  connected  with  those 
changes  in  the  system  produced  by  parturition,  menstrua- 
tion and  lactation.  It  is  a  little  remarkable  that  with  few 
exceptions,  the  victim  selected  by  the  patient  is  always  her 
own,  or  some  other  young  child.  Among  several  cases 
which  Esquirol  has  related  at  length,  are  the  two  following, 
which  are  abridged  from  his  memoir. 

§  167.  Madam  N.,  whom  Esquirol  received  into  his 
hospital,  and  whom  he  describes  as  being  perfectly  rational 
in  her  conversation  and  conduct,  and  of  a  mild,  affable  and 
industrious  disposition,  very  calmly  related  to  him  the  cir- 
cumstances connected  with  a  strong  inclination  she  felt 
to  kill  her  child.  After  her  last  accouchement,  fourteen 
months  before,  she  had  several  hysterical  fits,  and  was 
much  troubled  with  pains  in  the  head,  stomach  and  bowels  ; 
with  vertigo  and  ringing  in  the  ears.  These  mostly  dis- 
appeared, but  she  then  became  exceedingly  capricious  in 
her  temper  and  affections,  being  alternately  gay  and  sad, 
confiding  and  jealous,  resolute  and  weak.  In  this  condition, 
she  heard  of  the  murder  committed  by  Henriette  Cornier, 
when  she  was  immediately  seized  with  the  idea  of  killing 
her  infant,  and  one  day  when  her  child  entered  the  room, 
she  felt  the  most  violent  desire  to  assassinate  it.  '  I  repelled 

1  Dr.  Otto,  in  the  Edinburgh  Phrenological  Journal,  vi.  611. 
18 


206  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

the  idea,'  said  she,  'and  coolly  inquired  of  myself,  why  I 
should  conceive  such  cruel  designs  —  what  could  put  them 
into  my  imagination  ?  I  could  find  no  answer.  The  same 
desire  returned ;  I  feebly  resisted  it,  was  overcome,  and 
proceeded  to  consummate  the  crime.  A  new  effort  arrested 
my  steps,  I  raised  the  knife  to  my  own  throat,  saying  to 
myself,  better  perish  yourself,  bad  woman.'  When  asked 
the  cause  of  these  evil  thoughts,  she  replied,  that 'something 
behind  her  back  urged  her  on.  During  the  first  fortnight 
of  her  stay  in  the  hospital,  she  was  afflicted  by  a  return 
of  the  physical  disturbances  with  which  she  was  at  first 
attacked,  but  at  the  end  of  six  weeks  was  so  much  better, 
in  consequence  of  a  proper  medical  treatment,  that  she  re- 
ceived her  husband  and  child  with  joy,  and  lavished  on 
the  latter  the  tenderest  caresses.  Suddenly  she  perceived 
a  cutting  instrument,  and  was  seized  with  the  desire  of 
snatching  it  up  and  committing  two  murders  at  once,  —  a 
thought  which  she  suppressed  only  by  flying  from  the 
room.  The  symptoms  of  physical  disturbance  now  again 
made  their  appearance,  during  which  she  was  informed  that 
her  child  was  sick,  and  while  extremely  distressed  and 
weeping  at  the  news,  c  she  felt  a  violent  desire,'  to  use  her 
own  expression,  Mo  stab  or  stifle  it  in  her  arms.'  After 
about  three  months'  residence  at  the  hospital,  she  went  away 
restored,  and  continued  well.1 

§  168.  A  girl  fourteen  years  old,,  of  strong  constitution 
and  difficult  temper,  enjoyed  apparently  good  health,  though 
she  had  not  menstruated.  Once  a  month  she  complained 
of  pain  in  the  head,  her  eyes  were  red,  she  was  irascible, 
gloomy  and  restless  ;  everything  went  wrong  with  her  and 
she  was  particularly  inclined  to  dispute  with  her  mother, 
who  was  always  the  object  of  her  threats  and  abuse  ;  and 
finally  she  became  most  violently  angr^,  sometimes  attempt- 

1  Des  Malad.  Ment.  ii.  821. 


PARTIAL    MORAL    MANIA.  207 

ing  her  own  life  and  sometimes  her  mother's.  When  the 
fit  arrived  to  this  degree,  the  blood  escaped  from  her  mouth, 
nose  or  eyes ;  she  wept  and  trembled ;  the  extremities 
became  cold  and  affected  with  convulsive  pains  ;  and  her 
mind  was  filled  with  distress.  The  fit  which  altogether  con- 
tinued one  or  two  days,  being  over,  she  recovered  her  affec- 
tion for  her  mother,  and  asked  her  forgiveness.  She  did  not 
recollect  all  the  circamstances  of  these  fits,  and  denied  with 
feelings  of  surprise  and  regret  some  of  the  particulars  which 
were  related  to  her.  At  the  age  of  sixteen  years,  these  fits 
of  anger  were  often  replaced  by  hysteric  convulsions  ;  the 
disease  diminished  progressively,  but  did  not  cease  till  she 
was  seventeen  years  old,  when  the  menses  appeared.  She 
afterwards  married  and  became  an  excellent  mother.1 

§  169.  Esquirol  relates  another  case  communicated  to 
him  by  Dr.  Barbier  of  Amiens,  which  will  be  briefly  noticed. 
This  lady,  Marguerite  Molliens,  twenty-four  years  old,  had 
suffered  for  three  years  past  pains  in  the  epigastrium,  and 
right  side  of  the  abdomen  ;  headache,  vertigo,  noise  in  the 
ears,  disturbance  of  vision,  palpitation  of.  the  heart,  con- 
strictions of  the  throat  and  trembling  of  the  limbs.  Her 
first  child,  which  lived  but  three  months,  she  loved  and 
deeply  regretted.  Nine  months  ago  she  had  another  child. 
On  the  fifth  day  of  her  confinement  she  heard  of  Cornier's 
case,  and  was  so  deeply  impressed  with  the  story  that  her 
thoughts  dwelt  upon  it,  and  from  that  moment  she  feared 
lest  she  also  might  be  similarly  tempted.  In  spite  of  all  her 
efforts,  she  gradually  familiarized  herself  with  the  idea  of 
killing  her  child.  One  day  while  dressing  it,  the  thought  of 
murdering  it  seized  upon  her  mind  and  became  a  violent 
desire.  She  turned  around,  and  perceiving  a  kitchen-knife 
on  a  table  near  her,  her  arm  was  involuntarily  carried 


Idem.  ii.  814. 


208  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

towards  it.  She  saw  that  she  could  no  longer  control  her- 
self, and  cried  out  for  assistance.  The  neighbors  came  in 
and  she  soon  became  calm.  Shortly  after  she  was  separated 
from  her  child  and  sent  to  a  hospital,  where  she  finally  re- 
covered. It  is  worthy  of  note  that  when  the  pains  in  the 
head  and  epigastrium,  from  which  she  suffered  greatly  in 
the  hospital,  were  worst,  then  the  bad  thoughts  appeared  to 
be  most  imperious.1 

§  170.  Dr.  Otto,  of  Copenhagen,  relates  that  a  female, 
who  was  received  into  a  lying-in-hospital  of  which  he  was 
physician,  requested  a  private  conference  with  him  pre- 
viously to  her  accouchement.  She  appeared  to  be  in  great 
agitation  and  embarrassment,  and  earnestly  begged  of  him 
that  she  might  not  be  left  in  the  same  chamber  with  other 
women  and  their  infants,  as  it  would  be  utterly  impossible 
for  her  to  resist  the  propensity  she  felt  to  destroy  the  latter. 
Her  request  was  granted  and  she  was  carefully  watched. 
Her  delivery  was  easy,  and  the  child  was  kept  from  her  and 
afterwards  sent  to  her  mother.  The  young  woman  on  leav- 
ing the  hospital  went  into  service,  and  would  not  return  to 
her  mother's,  lest  she  might  be  tempted  to  destroy  her  infant. 
She  declared  that  the  sight  of  a  very  young  infant  kindled 
up  an  irresistible  propensity  to  destroy  its  life.  This  woman 
was  a  peasant  who  had  been  seduced,  but  had  never  led  a 
dissolute  life  nor  was  in  any  way  of  corrupt  manners.  She 
had  not  been  reproached,  nor  ill-treated  by  her  parents, 
during  pregnancy,  nor  was  there  the  least  cause  for  anxiety 
on  account  of  the  child,  as  her  mother  had  engaged  to  pro- 
vide for  it.  She  entered  into  the  service  of  a  clergyman, 
and  enjoyed  good  health.  Sometime  afterwards  she  in- 
formed the  doctor  that  she  had  lost  nearly  all  propensity  to 
infanticide.8 

1  Des  Malacl.  Ment.  ii.  820. 

*  Medico-Chirurgical  Review,  O.  S.  xiii.  441. 


PARTIAL    MORAL    MANIA.  209 

§  171.  The  next  case  is  recorded-  by  Dr.  Michu.  "  A 
country  woman,  twenty-four  years  of  age,  of  a  bilious,  san- 
guine temperament,  of  simple  and  regular  habits,  but 
reserved  and  sullen  manners,  had  been  ten  days  confined 
with  her  first  child,  when  suddenly,  having  her  eyes  fixed 
upon  upon  it,  she  was  seized  with  the  desire  of  strangling  it. 
This  idea  made  her  shudder ;  she  carried  the  infant  to  its 
cradle,  and  went  out  in  order  to  get  rid  of  so  horrid  a 
thought.  The  cries  of  the  little  being  who  required  nourish- 
ment, recalled  her  to  the  house  ;  she  experienced  still  more 
strongly  the  impulse  to  destroy  it.  She  hastened  away 
again,  haunted  by  the  dread  of  committing  a  crime  so  hor- 
rible ;  she  raised  her  eyes  to  heaven,  went  to  the  church 
and  prayed.  The  whole  day  was  passed  by  this  unhappy 
mother  in  a  constant  struggle  between  the  desire  of  taking 
away  the  life  of  her  infant  and  the  dread  of  yielding  to  the 
impulse.  She  concealed  her  agitations,  until  evening,  when 
her  confessor,  a  respectable  old  man,  was  the  first  to  receive 
her  confidence.  He  soothed  her  feelings,  and  counselled 
her  to  have  medical  assistance.  '  When  we  arrived  at  her 
house,'  says  Michu,  *  she  appeared  gloomy  and  depressed, 
and  ashamed  of  her  situation.'  Being  reminded  of  the 
tenderness  due  from  a  mother  to  her  child,  she  replied;  'I 
know  how  much  a  mother  ought  to  love  her  child  ;  but  if  I 
do  not  love  mine,  it  does  not  depend  upon  me.'  She  soon 
after  recovered,  the  infant,  in  the  meantime,  having  been 
removed  from  her  sight."  l 

§  172.  Gall  says  he  knew  a  woman,  then  twenty-six 
years  old,  who  had  experienced,  especially  at  the  menstrual 
periods,  inexpressible  torture,  and  the  fearful  temptation  to 
destroy  herself,  and  to  kill  her  husband  and  children,  who 
were  exceedingly  dear  to  her.  She  shuddered  with  terror- 
as  she  described  the  struggle  that  took  place  within  her 

1  Memoire  sur  la  monomanie-homicide,  99. 
18* 


210  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

between  her  sense  of  duty  and  of  religion,  and  the  impulse 
that  urged  her  to  this  atrocious  act.  For  a  long  time,  she 
dared  not  bathe  her  youngest  child,  because  an  internal 
voice  constantly  said  to  her,  '  let  him  slip,  let  him  slip.* 
Frequently  she  had  hardly  the  strength  and  time  to  throw 
away  a  knife  which  she  was  tempted  to  plunge  into  her  own 
breast  and  her  children's.  Whenever  she  entered  the  cham- 
ber of  her  children,  or  husband,  and  found  them  asleep, 
she  was  instantly  possessed  with  the  desire  of  killing  them. 
Sometimes  she  precipitately  shut  behind  her  the  door  of 
their  chamber  and  threw  away  the  key,  to  remove  the  pos- 
sibility of  returning  to  them  during  the  night,  if  she  should 
fail  to  resist  this  infernal  temptation."  ' 

<§  173.  In  another  class  of  cases,  the  exciting  cause  of 
the  homicidal  propensity  is  of  a  moral  nature,  operating 
upon  some  peculiar  physical  predisposition,  and  sometimes 
followed  by  more  or  less  physical  disturbance.  Instead  of 
being  urged  on  by  a  sudden,  imperious  impulse  to  kill,  the 
subjects  of  this  form  of  the  affection,  after  suffering  for  a 
certain  period  much  gloom  of  mind  and  depression  of 
spirits,  feel  as  if  bound  by  a  sense  of  necessity  to  destroy 
life,  and  proceed  to  the  fulfilment  of  their  destiny  with  the 
utmost  calmness  and  deliberation.  So  reluctant  have  courts 
and  juries  usually  been  to  receive  the  plea  of  insanity  in 
defence  of  crime,  deliberately  planned  and  executed  by  a 
mind  in  which  no  derangement  of  intellect  has  ever  been 
perceived,  that  it  is  of  the  greatest  importance  that  the  na- 
ture of  these  cases  should  not  be  misunderstood.  They  are 
of  not  unfrequent  occurrence,  and  are  often  attended  by 
such  horrid,  heart-rending  circumstances,  that  nothing  but 
the  plainest  and  strongest  conviction  of  their  true  character 
can  ever  save  their  subjects  from  the  last  penalty  of  the  law. 
The  near  affinity  of  this  form  of  the  affection  to  those  already 

1  Op.  cit.  sup.  iv.  110. 


PARTIAL    MORAL    MANIA.  211 

described  will   be  manifest,  upon  a  careful  consideration  of 
the  few  cases  here  given. 

§  174.  The  following  is  related  by  Dr.  Otto  of  a  surgeon 
who  had  served  in  several  campaigns  against  the  French. 
"  He  always  appeared  of  a  lively  and  cheerful  disposition, 
till  certain  pecuniary  matters  ruffled  his  temper  and  made 
him  thoughtful  and  melancholy.  He  was  now  frequently 
observed  to  be  studying  the  scriptures,  and  reciting  passages 
from  the  bible.  He  was  happily  married  and  had  four 
children.  One  morning  he  summoned  his  wife  and  children 
into  the  court  of  the  house,  and  there  informed  them  that  it 
was  his  intention  to  kill  them  all,  and  afterwards  himself. 
He  descanted  coolly  on  the  propriety  of  homicide,  and  told 
his  wife  she  must  first  be  a  spectator  of  the  destruction  of 
her  children,  and  then  her  own  turn  would  come.  The 
woman  appears  to  have  possessed  great  presence  of  mind, 
and  acted  with  great  prudence  on  such  a  trying  occasion. 
She  entirely  coincided  in  the  justness  of  her  husband's  sen- 
timents, and  cheerfully  agreed  to  the  proposed  tragedy.  But 
she  appeared  suddenly  to  recollect  that  it  would  be  proper 
for  herself  as  well  as  the  children,  to  confess  and  take  the 
sacrament  previous  to  their  appearing  before  their  final 
judge, —  a  ceremony  which  would  necessarily  require  sev- 
eral days'  preparation.  The  monomaniac  replied  that  this 
was  a  reasonable  and  proper  procedure  ;  but,  in  the  mean- 
time, it  would  be  absolutely  necessary  that  he  took  some 
person's  life  that  day.  With  this  purpose  in  view,  he  in- 
stantly set  off  for  Salzbourg.  His  wife  having  placed 
the  children  in  security,  made  the  best  of  her  way  to  the 
above-mentioned  town,  and  went  directly  to  professor  O., 
the  friend  of  her  husband,  for  advice.  The  monomaniac 
had  already  been  there,  and  not  finding  the  professor  at 
home,  had  gone  away.  The  woman  now  recollected  and 
told  the  professor,  that  her  husband  had  threatened  his  life 
for  some  imaginary  slight ;  but  at  that  time  she  thought  he 


212  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

was  in  jest.  About  mid-day  the  monomaniac  came  back 
to  the  professor's  residence,  and  appeared  quite  calm  and 
peaceable.  -  The  professor  invited  him  to  go  and  see  the 
hospital  of  the  town,  where  he  had  a  curious  dissection  to 
make,  and  they  sat  down  to  eat  some  refreshments  be- 
fore proceeding  thither.  At  this  repast,  the  monomaniac 
informed  his  host  that  he  had  lately  been  most  immode- 
rately disposed  to  commit  homicide,  and  that  he  had  ac- 
tually murdered  a  peasant  that  morning  on  his  way  to- town. 
He  confessed  also  that  he  had  entered  a  coffee-house  for 
the  purpose  of  committing  a  second  act  of  this  kind,  but 
had  been  diverted  from  his  purpose.  The  murder  of  the 
peasant  was  a  fiction,  as  was  afterwards  proved.  The 
professor  now  turned  the  discourse  to  other  subjects,  and 
on  all  other  topics  the  monomaniac  was  perfectly  rational. 
They  now  set  off  for  the  hospital,  and  in  their  way  thither 
the  monomaniac  met  with  an  old  acquaintance  and  fellow- 
campaigner.  While  they  were  greeting  each  other,  the 
monomaniac  suddenly  struck  his  friend  a  violent  blow  on 
the  pit  of  the  stomach,  exclaiming  in  a  burst  of  laughter, 
that  he  had  done  it  for  him,  as  he  had  hit  the  cceliac  plexus. 
The  professor  reprimanded  him  in  strong  terms  for  this  dis- 
honorable and  cruel  act,  at  which  the  monomaniac  was 
much  surprised,  and  informed  his  preceptor  that  he  was  irre- 
sistibly led  to  commit  homicide,  and  cared  not  who  was  the 
victim  of  this  propensity.  The  professor  now  asked  him 
somewhat  tauntingly,  if  he  had  not  a  design  against  his 
life.  The  monomaniac  acknowledged  it;  but  added  that 
he  had  sufficient  control  over  himself  to  prevent  the  de- 
struction of  his  benefactor.  The  professor  took  his  arm 
and  they  proceeded  to  the  hospital,  where  the  monomaniac 
was  immediately  confined.  He  almost  instantly  became 
furiously  maniacal,  and  in  a  few  months  after  died." 

1  Medico-Chirurgical  Review,  xiii.  446. 


PARTIAL    MORAL    MANIA.  213 

<)  175.  Gall  quotes  an  account  of  Catherine  Hansterin, 
who,  in  consequence  of  being  detected  in  a  petty  theft 
which  was  reported  to  her  husband,  a  man  of  harsh  and 
austere  manners,  of  whom  she  stood  greatly  in  fear  on  ac- 
count of  his  cruel  treatment  of  her,  became  exceedingly 
melancholy  and  depressed.  After  suffering  much  and  long 
from  her  cruel  husband,  she  determined  to  leave  him,  and 
accordingly  departed,  taking  her  infant  two  and  a  half 
months  old,  and  her  little  girl  who  had  declared  she  would 
rather  die  than  be  left  behind  with  her  father.  "The 
thought  which  this  reply  brought  to  her  mind,  the  distress 
that  afflicted  her,  the  fear  of  what  would  happen  to  her 
children  in  case  of  her  death,  and  at  the  same  time,  her 
ardent  desire  to  terminate  her  own  existence  ;  —  all  these 
united,  gave  rise  to  the  barbarous  design  of  drowning  her 
two  children.  Having  arrived  at  the  bank  of  the  Danube, 
she  made  her  little  girl  kneel  down  and  pray  God  for  a 
good  death.  She  then  placed  the  infant  in  the  hands  of  her 
sister,  blessed  them  both,  and  making  the  sign  of  the  cross, 
pushed  them  into  the  river.  This  done,  she  returned  to 
the  village  and  told  what  had  passed."  '  • 

§  176.  Dr.  Otto  has  published  the  case  of  Peter  Nielsen, 
a  joiner,  aged  forty-seven  years,  who  drowned  four  of  his 
seven  children.  He  appears  to  have  experienced  some  mis- 
fortunes, but  was  not  in  positive  want  of  the  necessaries  of 
life  at  the  moment  when  he  committed  the  horrid  deed. 
Many  persons,  who  conversed  with  him  on  the  same  day 
both  before  and  after  the  transaction,  testified  that  he  was 
not  intoxicated,  nor  the  least  agitated  in  mind.  He  was,  on 
the  contrary,  placid  and  tranquil.  No  domestic  altercations, 
of  any  moment,  had  occurred,  but  he  was  disconcerted  at 
not  readily  getting  a  new  lodging  on  being  turned  out  of 


Op.  cit.  iv.  152. 


214  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

that  which  he  previously  occupied.  His  love  to  his  children 
was  testified  to  by  all.  He  confessed  that  the  idea  of  kill- 
ing his  children  came  into  his  head  on  the  morning  of  the 
day  that  he  put  the  idea  into  execution,  and  that  the  impulse 
was  quite  irresistible.  He  determined  to  drown  the  three 
younger  boys  and  spare  the  daughter  who  was  older.  But 
she  insisted  on  accompanying  her  father  and  brothers  in  the 
walk  he  proposed,  and  though  he  endeavored  to  persuade 
her  to  return,  she  would  not.  He  averred  that  his  motive 
for  destroying  the  boys  was  the  fear  of  not  being  able  to 
maintain  them  ;  whereas  he  would  have  spared  the  girl,  not 
because  he  loved  her  more,  but  because  she  was  better  able 
to  maintain  herself.  Having  arrived  at  a  turf-pit,  he  first 
embraced  his  children,  and  then  pushed  them  all  into  the 
water.  He  stood  by  unmoved  and  saw  them  struggle  and 
sink.  He  then  returned  quietly  to  the  town  and  told  what 
he  had  done.  He  was  led  back  to  the  turf-pit,  and  beheld 
the  dead  bodies  of  his  children  without  evincing  any  emotion. 
For  a  moment  he  wept,  when  he  saw  the  bodies  opened  (for 
the  purpose  'of  medico-legal  proof  of  the  kind  of  death), 
•ut  soon  regained  his  tranquillity.  He  affirmed  that  he  did 
not  destroy  his  offspring  in  order  to  procure  happiness  for 
them  in  heaven,  nor  from  any  desire  to  be  put  to  death  him- 
self, as  he  wished  to  live.1 

§  177.  The  case  of  Henriette  Cornier,  which  occurred 
in  Paris  a  few  years  since,  has,  in  consequence  of  the  im- 
posing weight  of  medical  opinions  that  were  delivered  on 
her  trial,  and  of  the  discussions  to  which  it  gave  rise  in  the 
various  shapes  of  reports,  newspaper  criticisms,  and  elabo- 
rate treatises  from  some  of  the  most  distinguished  physi- 
cians of  that  capital,  contributed,  more  than  any  other  single 
event,  to  advance  our  knowledge  of  homicidal  insanity.  A 


Edinburgh  Phrenological  Journal,  v.  87. 


PARTIAL    MORAL    MANIA.  215 

case  so  celebrated  deserves  a  particular  notice  here.  The 
facts  as  related  below  are  contained  in  the  indictment  (acte 
d?  accusation),  which  is  given  at  length  by  Georget  in  his 
account  of  the  trial.1 

§  178.  Henriette  Cornier,  a  female  servant  aged  twenty- 
seven  years,  was  of  a  mild  and  lively  disposition,  full  of 
gaiety,  and  remarkably  fond  of  children.  In  the  month  of 
June,  1825,  a  singular  change  was  observed  in  her  charac- 
ter ;  she  became  silent,  melancholy,  absorbed  in  reverie, 
and  finally  sank  into  a  kind  of  stupor.  She  was  dismissed 
from  her  place,  but  her  friends  could  obtain  from  her  no 
account  of  the  causes  of  her  mental  dejection.  In  the 
month  of  September  she  made  an  attempt  to  commit  sui- 
cide, but  was  prevented.  In  the  following  October  she  en- 
tered into  the  service  of  darne  Fournier,  but  there  she 
still  presented  the  melancholy  and  desponding  disposition. 
Dame  Fournier  observed  her  peculiar  dejection  and  endea- 
vored in  vain  to  ascertain  its  cause  ;  the  girl  would  talk 
only  of  her  misfortune  in  losing  her  parents  at  an  early 
age,  and  of  the  bad  treatment  she  received  from  her  guar- 
dian. On  the  4th  of  November,  her  conduct  not  having 
been  previously  different  from  what  it  usually  was,  she 
suddenly  conceived  and  immediately  executed  the  act  for 
which  she  was  committed. 

§  179.  About  noon  her  mistress  went  out  to  walk,  hav- 
ing told  Cornier  to  prepare  dinner  at  the  usual  hour,  and  to 
go  to  a  neighboring  shop  kept  by  dame  Belon,  to  buy  some 
cheese.  She  had  frequently  gone  to  this  shop  and  had 
always  manifested  great  fondness  for  Belon's  little  girl,  a 
beautiful  child  nineteen  months  old.  -On  this  day  she  dis- 
played her  usual  fondness  for  it,  and  persuaded  its  mother, 
who  at  first  was  rather  unwilling  to  let  her  take  it  out  to 


Discussion  medico-legale,  70. 


6  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

walk.  Cornier  then  hastened  back  to  her  mistress's  house 
with  the  child,  and  laying  it  across  her  own  bed,  severed 
its  head  from  its  body  with  a  large  kitchen  knife.  She 
subsequently  declared  that  while  executing  this  horrid  deed, 
she  felt  no  particular  emotion  —  neither  of  pleasure,  nor  of 
pain.  Shortly  after,  she  said,  the  sight  of  the  horrible 
spectacle  before  her  eyes  brought  her  to  herself,  and  she 
experienced  some  emotions  of  fear,  but  they  were  of  short 
duration.  At  the  end  of  two  hours,  during  which  time  she 
had  remained  chiefly  in  her  own  chamber,  dame  Belon 
came  and  inquired  for  her  child,  from  the  bottom  of  the 
staircase.  "Your  child  is  dead,"  said  Henriette.  The 
mother,  who  at  first  thought  she  was  only  in  jest,  soon  be- 
came alarmed,  and  pushed  forward  into  the  chamber, 
where  she  witnessed  the  bloody  sight  of  the  mutilated  frag- 
ments of  her  child.  At  that  moment,  Cornier  snatched  up 
the  head  of  the  murdered  child,  and  threw  it  into  the  street, 
from  the  open  window.  The  mother  rushed  out  of  the 
house,  struck  with  horror.  An  alarm  was  raised  ;  the 
father  of  the  child  and  the  officers  of  justice  with  a  crowd 
of  persons  entered  the  room.  Henriette  was  found  silting 
on  a  chair  near  the  body  of  the  child,  gazing  at  it,  with 
the  bloody  knife  by  her,  her  hands  and  clothes  covered 
with  blood.  She  made  no  attempt  to  escape,  nor  to  deny 
the  crime  ;  she  confessed  all  the  circumstances,  even  her 
premeditated  design,  and  the  perfidy  of  her  caresses,  which 
had  persuaded  the  unhappy  mother  to  entrust  her  with  the 
child.  It  was  found  impossible  to  excite  in  her  the  slightest 
emotion  of  remorse  or  grief;  to  all  that  was  said,  she  re- 
plied, with  indifference,  "  I  intended  1o  kill  the  child.1' 
When  closely  and  earnestly  interrogated,  as  to  her  motives 
for  committing  this  dreadful  act,  she  replied  that  she  had 
no  particular  reason  for  it ;  that  the  idea  had  taken  posses- 
sion of  her  mind,  and  that  she  was  destined  to  do  it. 
When  asked  why  she  threw  the  head  into  the  street,  she 


PARTIAL    MORAL   MANIA,  217 

answered  that  it  was  for  the  purpose  of  attracting  public 
attention,  so  that  people  might  come  up  to  her  chamber 
and  see  that  she  alone  was  guilty.  The  nature  of  her  ex- 
traordinary replies,  the  want  of  motives  for  such  an  atro- 
cious deed,  the  absence  of  every  kind  of  emotion,  and  the 
state  of  stupor  in  which  she  remained,  fixed  the  attention 
of  the  medical  men  who  were  called  in,  and  impressed  them 
with  the  belief  that  she  was  mad.  On  the  examination  be- 
fore the  magistrate,  she  confirmed  the  above  statements 
respecting  her  mental  condition,  adding,  among  other 
things,  that  she  had  been  unhappily  married  seven  years 
before  ;  that  she  attempted  to  drown  herself  "  because  she 
was  ennuied  at  changing  her  place  of  service  so  often  ;  " 
that  she  knew  her  crime  deserved  death  and  she  desired  it. 

§  180.  She  was  tried  for  the  first  time,  on  the  27th  of 
February,  1826.  She  then  appeared  to  be  in  a  state  of 
great  nervous  irritation  ;  her  limbs  trembled  ;  her  eyes  were 
fixed  ;  and  her  understanding  was  dull  and  stupid.  A  few 
days  previously,  the  court,  at  the  request  of  her  counsel, 
appointed  a  medical  commission  consisting  of  Adelon,  Es- 
quirol,  and  Leveille,  to  examine  the  accused  and  all  the 
documents  of  the  case,  and  report  on  her  "  present  moral 
state."  Accordingly  they  reported  that  they  were  unable 
to  detect  any  sign  or  proof  of  mental  derangement ;  but 
added  that  it  is  extremely  difficult  in  some  cases,  to  establish 
the  existence  of  insanity,  it  requiring  a  long  intimacy  with 
the  individual  and  numerous  opportunities  of  watching  him 
under  every  variety  of  circumstance,  none  of  which  they 
had  possessed  in  this  case.  In  fine,  they  reported  that 
though  they  could  not  adduce  any  positive  proof  of  her 
insanity,  yet  they  were  equally  unable  to  pronounce  her 
sane. 

§  181.  This  report  not  being  satisfactory,  the  trial  was 
postponed  to  another  session,  and  the  prisoner  was  sent  to 
the  Salpetriere  to  be  observed  by  the  above-named  physi- 
19 


218  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

cians.  After  recapitulating  their  observations,  which  were 
continued  three  months,  they  came  to  the  following  con- 
clusions :  "  first,  that  during  the  whole  time  Cornier  was 
under  examination,  from  the  25th  of  February  to  the  3d  of 
June,  they  had  observed  in  regard  to  her  moral  state  great 
mental  dejection,,  extreme  dullness  of  mind,  and  profound 
chagrin ;  secondly,  that  the  present  situation  of  Cornier 
sufficiently  explains  her  moral  state,  and  thus  does  not  of 
itself  indicate  mental  alienation  either  general  or  partial." 
They  also  added  that  it  was  due  to  the  cause  of  justice  and 
to  their  own  conscience,  to  declare  that  their  judgment  of 
her  actual  moral  condition  could  not  be  considered  final,  if 
it  were  proved,  as  stated  in  the  acte  (Tactusation,  that  long 
before  the  4th  of  November,  the  character  and  habits  had 
changed  ;  that  she  had  become  sad,  gloomy,  silent  and  rest- 
less ;  for  then  that  which  might  be  attributed  to  her  present 
situation,  could  be  only  the  continuation  of  a  melancholy 
state  that  had  existed  for  a  year.1 

Cornier  was  again  brought  to  trial  on  the  24th  of  June, 
and  the  jury  returned  a  verdict  of  .guilty  of  "committing 
homicide  voluntarily,  but  not  with  premeditation;"2  and 
accordingly  she  was  sentenced  to  hard  labor  for  life. 


1  Georget  justly  observes  that  the  meaning  of  the  committee 
would  have  been  better  expressed  in  the  following  language.  "  The 
present  moral  state  of  Henriette  Cornier  is  doubtful.  It  may  be 
the  result  either  of  a  painful  moral  affection,  or  of  melancholy  ; 
which  it  really  is,  the  nature  of  the  prior  circumstances  must 
decide.  If,  several  months  before  the  4th  of  November,  her  char- 
acter had  changed;  if  she  became  sad  and  gloomy  without  cause; 
if  she  had  a  motiveless  propensity  to  suicide ;  and  finally,  if  the 
homicide  she  committed  was  without  cause,  and  under  the  cir- 
cumstances related  in  the  acte  d'accusation,  it  is  certain  that  she  has 
been  and  still  is  laboring  under  a  kind  of  mental  alienation." 

*  This  verdict  is  very  properly  censured  by  Georget,  who  says, 
that  if  the  accused  was  mad  she  ought  to  have  been  acquitted  ;  and 
that  if  not  mad,  she  acted  from  premeditation,  and  should  have 
suffered  the  punishment  of  death. 


PARTIAL    MORAL    MANIA.  219 

^  182.  Sometimes,  the  individual  confesses  a  motive  for 
the  homicidal  act,  which  is  rational  and  well  founded,  but 
altogether  inadequate  to  lead  to  such  an  action  in  a  sound 
mind.  There  are  seldom  wanting  other  circumstances  in 
the  previous  conduct,  conversation,  or  bodily  health,  to 
confirm  and  establish  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  the  pres- 
ence of  insanity,  the  suspicion  of  which  is  thus  excited. 
All  doubt  of  the  correctness  of  this  conclusion  is  removed 
in  the  first  of  the  following  cases,  which  is  introduced  to 
illustrate  this  form  of  the  disorder,  by  the  pathological 
changes  discovered  after  death,  and  in  the  second  by  the 
previous  existence  of  insanity. 

§  183.  At  Rouen,  in  1820,  a  young  man,  named  Trestel, 
seventeen  or  eighteen  years  old,  whose  family  was  respect- 
able and  in  easy  circumstances,  obtained  an  almost  com- 
plete meeting  of  its  various  members  to  the  number  of 
thirteen,  and  endeavored  to  poison  them  all  by  putting 
arsenic  into  the  soup.  The  severe  vomiting  which  it  pro- 
duced, however,  was  the  means  of  saving  all  their  lives. 
It  appeared  in  evidence,  that  Trestel  was  so  imbecile  at 
fifteen  years  of  age,  that  he  was  incapable  of  executing 
the  slightest  commissions ;  that  he  had  strange  and  inco- 
herent ideas  ;  that  he  was  sad,  taciturn,  and  incapable  of 
being  instructed  ;  that  he  was  in  the  habit  of  addressing 
letters  to  an  imaginary  female  whom  he  was  in  love  with. 
On  the  trial,  as  well  as  on  the  previous  examination,  Trestel 
alleged  as  his  motive  for  committing  the  crime,  that  his 
father  had  frequently  threatened  to  send  him  to  sea.  Not- 
withstanding these  strong  indications  of  mental  deficiency 
and  alienation,  he  was  convicted  and  sentenced  to  be  exe- 
cuted ;  but  on  the  day  appointed  for  the  execution,  he 
killed  himself  by  taking  poison.  His  body  was  examined 
by  Dr.  Vingtrinier,  surgeon  of  the  prisons,  in  the  presence 
of  three  other  medical  men,  and  there  was  found  inflam- 
mation of  the  arachnoid  membrane  of  the  brain,  character- 


220  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

ized  by  thickening,  induration  and  redness,  and  by  its  almost 
entire  adhesion  to  the  pia  mater.  In  short,  not  one  of  the 
four  physicians  had  the  least  doubt  of  the  existence  of 
arachnoid  inflammation  of  very  long  standing.  However 
uncertain  other  symptoms  and  tests  of  insanity  may  be,  this 
at  least  is  sure ;  and  we  are  left  with  the  comfortable  re- 
flection, that  an  unfortunate  youth  paid  the  last  penalty  of 
the  law  for  the  consequences  of  bodily  disease.1 

§  J84.  "A  Portuguese,  by  the  name  of  Rabello,  was 
employed  by  a  mechanic  in  the  western  part  of  Litchfield 
county,  Connecticut,  to  assist  him  as  a  shoemaker.  He  had 
been  in  the  neighboring  towns,  and  his  conduct  appeared 
singular,  but  usually  inoffensive.  In  the  family  of  the  me- 
chanic he  had  appeared  pleasant,  and  grateful  for  the  kind- 
ness which  had  been  extended  to  him.  One  day  a  little  son 
of  his  new  employer  accidentally  stepped  upon  his  toes. 
The  lad  was  twelve  years  old  only.  Rabello  was  exceed- 
ingly angry  and  in  the  moment  of  his  rage  threatened  the 
boy's  life.  The  next  day  he  appeared  sullen,  refused  his 
food,  and  looked  wild  and  malicious.  The  following  morn- 
ing, he  went  to  the  barn-yard  with  the  boy,  seized  an  axe, 
and  killed  him  on  the  spot,  mangling  him  in  the  most  shock- 
ing manner.  He  went  deliberately  away  from  the  house, 
but  was  soon  overtaken  by  those  in  pursuit.  He  acknow- 
ledged that  he  killed  the  boy,  and  gave  as  a  reason  that  he 
stepped  on  his  toes.  It  was  found,  from  the  evidence  pro- 
duced at  his  trial,  that  this  was  an  offence  considered  most 
heinous  and  not  to  be  forgiven.  Many  instances  were  given 
in  which  the  same  accident  had  produced  the  same  excite- 
ment of  temper,  often  accompanied  with  threats.  One  of 
the  physicians  who  visited  him  in  jail,  stepped,  apparently 
by  accident,  upon  his  toes  while  counting  his  pulse.  The 


Georget,  Discussion  Medico -legal e  sur  la  Folie,  65,  165. 


PARTIAL    MORAL    MANIA.  221 

pulse,  he  declared,  rose  immediately  forty  strokes  in  a  min- 
ute, his  countenance  flushed  up,  and  he  appeared  instantly 
in  a  rage."1  Insanity  was  pleaded  in  defence  on  his  trial, 
and  on  this  ground  he  was  acquitted  by  the  jury.  It 
appeared  in  evidence  that  his  life  and  conduct  had  been 
marked  by  much  singularity  during  his  residence  in  this 
country  ;  and  after  the  trial  it  was  ascertained  from  the 
Portuguese  consul  at  New  York  that  he  had  been  previously 
deranged.  He  had  been  employed  as  a  clerk  in  a  mercan-' 
tile  house  at  Madeira,  to  which  place  he  had  returned  a 
"  little  deranged  "  after  having  been  to  Brazil.  From  Ma- 
deira he  went  to  Philadelphia,  where  he  got  employment  as 
a  clerk  in  the  house  of  some  merchants,  natives  of  Madeira, 
who  knew  he  had  been  a  little  deranged,  but  supposed  he 
had  recovered.  One  day  one  of  the  house  came  in  and 
asked  him  if  any  body  had  called,  when  Rabello  told  him 
he  would  break  his  head,  if  he  asked  him  any  such  questions. 
§  185.  In  the  last  phasis  of  the  murderous  propensity  that 
will  be  noticed,  though  it  is  not  properly  homicidal  mania, 
there  exists  some  hallucination,  and  the  individual  acts  from 
motives — 'absurd  and  unfounded  it  is  true  —  but  still,  mo- 
tives to  him.  In  consequence  of  the  universal  prevalence, 
in  some  shape  or  other  of  religious  fanaticism,  and  of  the 
excitement  of  the  religious  sentiments  thereby'  produced,  a 
perversion  of  these  sentiments  is  one  of  the  most,  common 
exciting  causes  of  the  murderous  propensity  in  this  class  of 
cases.  When  thus  excited  its  fury  knows  no  restraints,  and 
whole  families  are  slaughtered  in  a  single  paroxysm.  Pinel 
gives  the  case  of  a  vine-dresser,  who  thought  himself  com-- 
missioned  to  procure  the  eternal  salvation  of  his  family  by 
killing  them,  or  by  the  baptism  of  blood,  as  he  called  it ; 
and  accordingly  executed  his  commission  so  far  as  to  kill 

1  Dr.  Woodward's  Reports  and  other  documents  relating  to  the 
State  Lunatic  Hospital  at  Worcester,  Mass.  177. 
19* 


222  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

two  of  his  children,  when  he  was  arrested  and  confined. 
Fourteen  years  after,  when  he  was  thought  to  be  convales- 
cent, he  conceived  the  project  of  offering  up  an  expiatory 
sacrifice,  by  killing  all  who  might  come  within  his  reach, 
and  he  succeeded  in  wounding  the  keeper  and  cutting  the 
throats  of  two  other  lunatics  before  he  was  arrested.1 

§  186.  Sometimes  the  individual,  even  when  in  easy 
circumstances,  imagines  that  he  is  coming  to  want,  and  to 
avoid  this  calamity,  he  kills  his  family  and  generally  him- 
self. The  following  case  presents  an  illustration  of  this 
very  common  manifestation  of  mental  disorder. 

"  Captain  James  Purington,  of  Augusta,  Maine,  a  rich, 
independent  farmer,  of  steady,  domestic  habits,  dark  com- 
plexion, grave  countenance,  reserved  in  company,  never 
looking  in  the  face  of  persons  he  addressed,  obstinate  in  his 
opinions,  though  he  frequently  changed  his  religious  notions 
voluntarily,  died  a  decided  believer  in  universal  salvation, 
often  expressed  anticipation  of  the  moment  when  his  family 
would  be  happy,  and  sometimes  how  happy  he  should  be 
if  they  should  die  at  once.  He  was  very  avaricious,  and 
elated  or  depressed,  as  his  affairs  were  prosperous  or 
adverse.  In  August,  1805,  he  moved  to  a  new  farm,  which 
he  rapidly  improved.  He  seemed  happy  till  within  a  few 
weeks  of  his  death.  The  uncommon  drought  depressed 
him  greatly,  lest  his  family  should  suffer  for  want  of  bread, 
and  his  cattle  starve.  Oa  Sunday,  the  Gth  of  July,  1806, 
Mrs.  Purington  and  the  eldest  daughter  being  at  church,  the 
second  daughter  saw  her  father  writing  a  letter  which  he, 
perceiving  that  he  had  been  overlooked,  attempted  to 
hide.  She  asked  him  what  he  had  been  writing.  He  said 
"  nothing,"  and  asked  for  his  butcher-knife,  saying  he 
wanted  to  sharpen  it.  Having  made  it  very  sharp,  he 
stood  before  the  glass,  and  seemed  preparing  to  cut.  his 

i  Sur  T  Alienation  Mentale,  §  130. 


PARTIAL    MORAL    MANIA. 

throat.  His  daughter,  terrified,  cried,  'what  are  you 
doing? '  He  calmly  said,  4  nothing  ;'  and  laid  the  knife 
away.  This  was  told  to  his  wife  ;  she  searched  for  the 
letter  and  found  it.  [It  was  addressed  to  his  brother,  and 
stated  that  he  was  about  going  a  long  journey,  and  directed 
him  to  take  charge  of  his  children.]  On  the  7th  of  July, 
at  dinner-time,  he  found  his  wife  sitting  in  the  barn  weep- 
ing;  she  disclosed  the  cause;  he  said  'he  did  not  intend 
suicide,  but  he  had  a  presentiment  his  death  was  near. 
Towards  the  close  of  the  following  day,  he  ground  the  axe  ; 
when  the  family  went  to  bed,  he  was  reading  the  bible  ;  it 
was  found  open  on  the  table  at  Ezekiel,  chap.  ix.  On  the 
9th  of  July,  at  two  o'clock  in  the  morning,  his  eldest  son 
alarmed  the  neighbors;  they  found  Capt.  Purington  lying 
on  his  face,  his  two  sons  aged  five  and  eight  in  bed,  with 
their  throats  cut ;  the  razor  on  the  table  by  his  side,  the 
axe  near  ;  in  the  next  room,  Mrs.  Purington  aged  forty-four, 
in  bed,  her  head  almost  severed  from  the  body  ;  near  her, 
on  the  floor,  a.  daughter  murdered,  ten  years  old  ;  in  the 
other  room  in  bed,  a  daughter  aged  nineteen,  most  dread- 
fully butchered  ;  the  second,  aged  fifteen,  most  desperately 
wounded,  reclining  her  head  on  the  infant,  eighteen  months 
old,  whose  throat  was  cut.  The  eldest  son  was  wounded, 
when  Capt.  Purington  attacked  and  dreadfully  mangled  the 
second,  twelve  years  old,  who  attempted  to  escape  ;  Capt. 
Purington  did  not  speak  a  word."  '  2 

§  187.     The  various  forms  of  homicidal  insanity  have 

1  Parkman  :  Illustrations  of  Insanity. 

8  Perhaps  the  most  extraordinary  case  on  record  of  homicidal 
insanity  accompanied  by  hallucination,  is  one  related  by  Mr. 
Scoresby,  the  arctic  navigator,  and  copied  into  Waldie's  Circu- 
lating Library,  vol.  xii.  p.  258,  where  the  captain  of  a  British  ves- 
sel on  the  passage  from  St.  Andrews,  N.  B.  to  Ireland,  succeeded  in 
getting  his  crew  into  his  power,  and  murdering  them  all  in  detail, 
excepting  one,  who  escaped  into  the  hold  desperately  wounded. 


224  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

thus  been  illustrated,  by  selecting  a  few  cases  only,  from  a 
mass  that  would  fill  a  considerable  volume.  Now,  however, 
these  cases  may  differ  from  one  another,  whether  the  indi- 
vidual has  succumbed  to  the  propensity  to  kill,  after  a  long 
struggle  with  his  better  nature,  or  has  yielded  to  it  at  once 
and  instantaneously ;  whether  harassed  by  previous  disease 
of  body  or  despondency  of  mind,  or  apparently  in  sound 
health  and  with  a  cheerful  disposition  ;  whether  his  passions 
have  been  tamed  by  the  discipline  of  a  good  education,  or 
allowed  to  seek  their  gratification  without  restraint ;  they 
all,  except  the  last  two,  possess  one  feature  in  common, ''the 
irresistible,  motiveless  impulse  to  destroy  life.  Before  enter- 
ing upon  any  discussion  relative  to  the  nature  of  these  forms 
of  insanity,  it  may  be  well  to  consider  the  following  analysis 
of  their  most  important  features. 

§  188.  I.  In  nearly  all,  the  criminal  act  has  been  pre- 
ceded, either  by  some  well-marked  disturbance  of  the 
health,  originating  in  the  head,  digestive  system,  or  uterus, 
or  by  an  irritable,  gloomy,  dejected  or  melancholy  state,  in 
short  by  many  of  the  symptoms  of  the  incubalion  of  mania. 
The  absence  of  particulars  in  some  of  the  cases,  we  find 
recorded,  leaves  us  in  doubt  how  general'  this  change  really 
is;  but  a  careful  examination  would,  no  doubt,  often,  if  not 
always,  show  its  existence  where,  apparently  it  has  never 
taken  place. 

II.  The  impulse  to  destroy  is  po.werfully  excited  by  the 
sight  of  murderous  weapons,  by  favorable  opportunities  of 
accomplishing. the  act,  by  contradiction,  disgust,  or  some 
other  equally  trivial  and  even  imaginary  circumstance. 

III.  The  victims  of  the  homicidal  monomaniac  are  mostly, 
either  entirely  unknown  or  indifferent  to  him,  or  they  are 
among  his  most  loved  and  cherished  objects;  and  it  is  re- 
markable  how  often  they  are  children,  and  especially  his 
own  offspring. 

IV.  While  the  greater  number  deplore  the  terrible  pro- 


PARTIAL    MORAL    MANIA.  225 

pensity  by  which  they  are  controlled,  and  beg  to  be  subjected 
to  restraint,  a  few  diligently  conceal  it,  or  if  they  avow  it, 
declare  their  murderous  designs,  and  form  divers  schemes 
for  putting  them  in  execution,  testifying  no  sentiment  of 
remorse  or  grief. 

V.  The  most  of  them  having  gratified  their  propensity 
to  kill,  voluntarily  confess  the  act  and  quietly  give  them- 
selves up  to  the  proper  authorities;  a  very  few  only  —  and 
these,  to  an  intelligent  observer,  show  the  strongest  indica- 
tions of  insanity  —  fly,  and  persist  in  denying  the  act. 

VI.  While  the  criminal  act  itself  is,  in  some  instances, 
the   only   indication   of  insanity,   the   individual   appearing 
rational,  as  far  as  can  be  learned,  both  before  and  after  the 
act ;  in  others,  it  is  followed  or  preceded,  or  both,  by  strange 
behavior,  if  not  open  and  decided  insanity. 

VII.  Some  plead  insanity  in  defence  of  their  conduct,  or 
an  entire  ignorance  of  what  they  did  ;  others  deny  that  they 
labored  under  any  such  condition,  and  at  most  acknowledge 
only  a  perturbation  of  mind. 

§  189.  Apart  from  the  obvious  similarity  of  all  these 
cases  to  those  where  the  murderous  propensity  coexists  with 
hallucinations,  as  in  the  last  two,  the  circumstances  under 
which  the  homicidal  act  is  perpetrated,  furnish  strong  ground 
for  believing,  that  they  depend  on  mental  alienation  in  some 
form  or  other;  so  different  are  these  circumstances  from 
those  which  attend  the  commission  of  crime.  In  homicidal 
insanity,  murder  is  committed  without  any  motive  whatever 
strictly  deserving  the  name;  or  at  most,  with  one  totally 
inadequate  to  produce  the  act  in  a  sane  mind.  On  the 
contrary,  murder  is  never  criminally  committed  without; 
some  motive  adequate  to  the  purpose  in  the  mind  that  is/ 
actuated  by  it,  and  with  an  obvious  reference  to  the  ill-fated 
victim.  Thus,  the  motive  may  be  theft,  or  the  advance^ 
ment  of  any  personal  interest,  in  which  case  it  will  be  found 
that  the  victim  had  or  was  supposed  to  have  property,  ori 


226  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

was  an  obstacle  to  the  designs  or  expectations  of  another. 
Or  it  may  be  revenge,  and  then  the  injury  real  or  imaginary 
will  be  found  to  have  been  received  by  the  murderer  from 
the  object  of  his  wrath.  In  short,  with  the  criminal,  murder 
is  always  a  means  for  accomplishing  some  selfish  object, 
and  is  frequently  accompanied  by  some  other  crime ; 
whereas,  with  the  homicidal  monomaniac,  murder  is  the 
only  object  in  view,  and  is  never  accompanied  by  any  other 
improper  act. 

§  190.  The  homicidal  monomaniac,  after  gratifying  his 
bloody  desires",  testifies  neither  remorse,  nor  repentance, 
nor  satisfaction,-  and  if  judicially  condemned,  perhaps 
acknowledges  the  justice  of  the  sentence.  The  criminal 
either  denies  or  confesses  his  guilt ;  if  the  latter,  he  either 
humbly  sues  for  mercy,  or  glories  in  his  crimes,  and  leaves 
the  world  cursing  his  judges  and  with  his  last  breath  exclaim- 
ing against  the  injustice  of  his  fate. 

The  criminal  never  sheds  more  blood  than  is  necessary 
for  the  attainment  of  his  object;  the  homicidal  monomaniac 
often  sacrifices  all  within  his  reach  to  the  cravings  of  his 
murderous  propensity. 

The  criminal  lays  plans  for  the  execution  cf  his  designs ; 
time,  place,  and  weapons  are  all  suited  to  his  purpose  ;  and 
when  successful,  he  either  flies  from  the  scene  of  his  enorm- 
ities, or  makes  every  effort  to  avoid  discovery.  The  homi- 
cidal monomaniac,  on  the  contrary,  for  the  most  part, 
consults  none  of  the  usual  conveniences  of  crime  ;  he  falls 
upon  the  object  of  his  fury,  oftentimes  without  the  most 
proper  means  for  accomplishing  his  purpose ;  and  perhaps 
in  the  presence  of  a  multitude,  as  if  expressly  to  court  obser- 
vation ;  and  then  voluntarily  surrenders  himself  to  the  con- 
stituted authorities.  When,  as  is  sometimes  the  case,  he 
does  prepare  the  means,  and  calmly  and  deliberately 
executes  his  project,  his  subsequent  conduct  is  still  the  same 
as  in  the  former  instance. 


PARTIAL    MORAL    MANIA.  227 

The  criminal  often  has  accomplices,  and  generally  vicious 
associates  ;  the  homicidal  monomaniac  has  neither. 

The  acts  of  homicidal  insanity  are  generally,  perhaps 
always,  preceded  by  some  striking  peculiarities  in  the  con- 
duct or  character  of  the  individual,  strongly  contrasting  with 
his  natural  manifestations  ;  while  those  of  the  criminal  are  in 
correspondence  with  the  tenor  of  his  past  history  or  character. 

In  homicidal  insanity,  a  man  murders  his  wife,  children, 
or  others  to  whom  he  is  tenderly  attached';  this  the  criminal 
never  does,  unless  to  gratify  some  evil  passion,  or  gain  some 
other  selfish  end,  too  obvious  to  be  overlooked  on  the  slight- 
est investigation.  .  ^ J 

§  191.  A  stronger  contrast  than  is  presented,  in  every 
respect,  between  the  homicidal  act  of  the  real  criminal  and 
that  of  the  monomaniac,  can  hardly  be  imagined  ;  and  yet 
we  are  obliged  to  acknowledge  that  men  of  learning  and 
intelligence  have  been  often  unable  or  unwilling  to  perceive 
it,  though,  undoubtedly,  the  number  of  such  is  fast  dimin- 
ishing. Much  of  the  unwillingness  manifested  by  juries  to 
abide  by  the  result,  to  which  the  above  distinctions  would 
necessarily  lead  them,  arises  from  those  feelings  of  horror 
and  indignation  excited  by  the  perpetration  of  cold-blooded 
murders,  which  incapacitate  them  from  discriminating  with 
their  usual  acuteness  between  the  various  causes  and  mo- 
tives of  human  action.  Besides,  notwithstanding  the  great 
similarity,  for  the  most  part,  between  these  cases,  one  will 
occasionally  occur,  where,  from  defect  of  information,  no 
little  knowledge  of  insanity  and  of  human  nature  is  re- 
quired to  find  one's  way  through  the  mists'  of  doubt  and 
obscurity  in  which  it  .is  involved.  When, .therefore,  as  in 
the  case  of  jurors  generally,  the  mind  is  not  fitted  by  any 
of  this  preparation  so  necessary  to  a  successful  investiga- 
tion of  difficult  cases,  it  seizes  only  on  some  of  the  most 
obvious,  though  perhaps  least  important  points  which  they 
present,  and  of  course  the  verdict  will  often  be  deplorably 
at  variance  with  the  dictates  of  true  science. 


CHAPTER    VIII. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    MANIA. 

§  192.  MAN,  being  destined  for  the  social  condition, 
has  received  from  the  author  of  his  being,  the  faculties 
necessary  for  discovering  and  understanding  his  relations  to 
his  fellow-men,  and  possesses  the  liberty,  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent, of  regulating  his  conduct  agreeably  or  directly  opposed 
to  their  suggestions.  For  the  manner  in  which  this  power 
is  used  he  is  morally  responsible,  the  elements  of  responsi- 
bility always  being  the  original  capacity,  the  healthy  action, 
and  the  cultivation  of  the  moral  and  intellectual  faculties, — 
the  measure  of  the  former  being  in  proportion  to  the  degree 
in  which  the  latter  are  possessed.  In  legal  responsibility, 
the  last  element  above  mentioned  is  not  admitted,  and  the 
first  to  a  very  limited  extent  only,  the  second  alone  being 
absolutely  essential.  The  relation  of  original  incapacity  to 
legal  responsibility  has  already  been  discussed,  when  treat- 
ing of  MENTAL  DEFICIENCY  ;  that  of  cerebral  disease  now 
comes  up  for  consideration. 

§  193.  The  influence  of  this  condition  on  responsibility 
will  obviously  be  proportioned  to  its  severity  and  the  extent 
of  its  action  ;  and  though  we  cannot  hope  to  become  ac- 
quainted with  all  its  grades,  there  is  no  reason  why  we  may 
not  be  able  to  recognize  and  identify  some  of  the  more 
common  and  prominent.  If  men  had  agreed  to  receive 
some  particular  analysis  and  arrangement  of  the  affective 
and  intellectual  faculties,  and  to  assign  to  each  a  portion  of 


- 

LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  INTELLECTUAL  MANIA. 

the  brain  as  its  material  organ,  we  might  then,  by  studying 
the  derangements  of  each  faculty,  ascertain,  in  some  meas- 
ure, how  far  they  affect  the  actions  of  one  another.  But 
as  no  such  unanimity  exists,  we  can  only  consider,  as  we 
have  in  a  preceding  chapter,  the  observations  that  have 
been  made  on  the  derangement  of  a  few  particular  facul- 
ties, and  form  our  opinions  relative  to  their  influence,  by 
the  general  tenor  of  human  experience. 

SECTION  I. 
Legal  Consequences  of  Intellectual  Mania. 

§  194.  The  common  law  relating  to  insanity,  as  before 
intimated,  is  open  to  censure,  not  so  much  on  account  of 
the  manner  in  which  it  modifies  the  civil  and  criminal  re- 
sponsibilities of  the  lunatic,  as  of  the  looseness,  inconsis- 
tency, and  incorrectness  of  the  principles  on  which  the  fact 
of  the  existence  of  the  disease  is  judicially  established. 
The  disabilities  it  imposes  on  this  unfortunate  class  of  our 
fellow-men  are  founded  in  the  most  humane  and  enlight- 
ened views,  and  have  for  their  object  the  promotion  of  their 
highest  welfare.  To  incapacitate  a  person  from  making 
contracts,  bequeathing  property,  and  performing  other  civil 
acts,  who  has  lost  his  natural  power  of  discerning  and  judg- 
ing, who  mistakes  one  thing  for  another,  and  misapprehends 
his  relations  to  those  around  him,  is  the  greatest  mercy  he 
could  receive,  instead  of  being  an  arbitrary  restriction  of 
his  rights. 

§  195.  In  opposition  "to  that  principle  of  the  common  law, 
which  makes  the  lunatic  who  commits  a  trespass  on  the  per- 
sons or  property  of  others,  amenable  in  damages  to  be  re- 
covered by  a  civil  action,1  HofFbauer  declares,  that  if  the 

1  Weaver  v.  Ward,  Hobart's  Reports,  134.     Butterly  v.  Darling, 
Com.  Pleas,  New  York;  Nat.  Intelligencer,  March  30,  1841. 
20 


230  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

patient  is  "so  deranged  that  he  is  no  longer  master  of  his 
actions,  he  is  under  no  responsibility,  nor  obliged  to  make 
reparation  for  injuries."1  He  gives  no  reason  for  this  opin- 
ion, and  we  are  unable  to  see  how  it  can  be  even  plausibly 
supported.  To  the  maniac,  who,  when  restored  to  his 
senses,  discovers  that  during  his  derangement  he  has  com- 
mitted an  injury  to  his  neighbor's  property,  indemnity  for 
which  will  strip  him  of  his  own  possessions  and  reduce  him 
to  absolute  beggary,  his  recovery  must  seem  indeed  like 
escaping  from  one  evil  only  to  encounter  a  greater.  Such 
a  possible  consequence  of  madness,  it  is  certainly  painful 
to  think  of;  but  as  the  damage  is  produced  and  must  be 
borne  by  one  party  or  the  other,  we  cannot  hesitate  to  say 
which  it  should  be  ;  for  though  it  may  be  hard  for  a  person 
thus  to  suffer  for  actions  committed  while  utterly  uncon- 
scious of  their  nature,  it  would  manifestly  be  the  height  of 
injustice  to  make  another  suffer,  who  was  equally  innocent 
and  perhaps  equally  unconscious  of  the  act. 

§  196.  There  is  one  operation  of  the  common  law,  how- 
ever, which  is  justly  a  cause  of  complaint,  namely,  that  by 
which  lunatics,  even  when  under  guardianship,  are  subject 
to  be  imprisoned  like  others,  in  default  of  satisfying  a  civil 
execution  obtained  against  them  ;  *  because,  whether  such 
imprisonment  be  considered  as  a  penal  or  a  merely  coercive 
measure,  it  is  altogether  inapplicable  to  the  insane.  It  can- 
not coerce  one.  who  has  no  control  over  his  own  property, 
and  whose  mental  condition  is  supposed  to  be  such  that  he 
is  unable  to  see  any  relation  between  the  means  and  the 
end  ;  and  to  punish  a  person,  for  what  he  himself  had  no 
agency  whatever  in  doing,  is  a  violation  of  the  first  princi- 
ples of  justice.  To  incarcerate  some  madmen  in  a  common 


a 
207. 


Op.  cit.  §  131. 

Shelford  on  Lunacy,  407 ;  Ex  parte  Leighton,  14  Mass.  Rep. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    INTELLECTUAL    MANIA.      231 

jail  would,  in  all  probability,  aggravate  their  disorder,  and 
if  the  confinement  were  protracted  to  the  extent  which  the 
law  would  allow,  render  it  utterly  incurable. 

§  197.  The  civil  disabilities  above-mentioned  are  not  in- 
curred by  every  one  laboring  under  mental  derangement ; 
the  measure  of  insanity  necessary  to  produce  this  effect,  or 
in  legal  phrase,  the  fact  of  the  party's  being  compos  or  non 
compos  mentis,  is  a  question  to  be  submitted  to  judicial  in- 
vestigation, the  result  of  which  will  depend  on  the  views  of 
individuals  relative  to  the  effect  of  insanity  on  the  mental 
operations,  and  to  the  respect  due  to  opinions  and  decisions 
already  promulgated.  General  intellectual  mania,  as  we 
have  represented  it,  should  be  followed,  to  the  fullest  extent, 
by  the  legal  consequences  of  insanity  ;  but  partial  intel- 
lectual mania  does  not  necessarily  render  a  person  non  com- 
pos, or  so  impaired  in  mind  as  to  be  no  longer  legally  re- 
sponsible for  his  acts,  any  more  than  every  disease  of  the 
lungs  or  stomach  prevents  a  patient  from  attending  to  his 
ordinary  affairs,  and  enjoying  a  certain  measure  of  health. 
The  question  when  mania  invalidates  a  person's  civil  acts 
and  annuls  criminal  responsibility,  and  when  it  does  not 
affect  his  liability  in  these  respects,  has  occasioned  consid- 
erable discussion,  and  is  certainly  the  most  delicate  and  im- 
portant that  the  whole  range  of  this  subject  embraces.  No 
general  principles  concerning  it  are  to  be  found  in  the  com- 
mon law  except  lord  Hale's,  (<§  8)  and  cases  seem  to  have 
been  decided  with  but  little  reference  to  one  another,  ac- 
cording to  the  medical  or  legal  views  which  happened  at  the 
time  to  possess  the  minds  of  the  court  and  jury.  As  insan- 
ity has  become  better  known,  decisions  have  occasionally 
been  more  correct,  but  as  the  prevalence  of  these  improve- 
ments has  not  been  universal,  this  branch  of  jurisprudence 
has  often  retrograded,  and  thus  the  mind  of  the  inquirer  is 
confused  by  an  array  of  opinions  diametrically  opposed. 
Correct  general  principles  on  this  subject,  therefore,  are  yet 


232  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

to  be  established  ;  and  in  furtherance  of  this  object,  we  shall 
endeavor  to  lay  down  such  legal  consequences  of  partial 
intellectual  mania,  as  seem  to  be  warranted  by  correct  me- 
dical knowledge  of  madness  and  by  enlightened  principles 
of  justice. 

§  198.  We  see  some  persons  managing  their  affairs  with 
their  ordinary  shrewdness  and  discretion,  evincing  no  extra- 
ordinary exaltation  of  feeling  or  fancy,  and  on  all  but  one 
or  a  few  points,  in  the  perfect  enjoyment  of  their  reason. 
It  has  been  elsewhere  remarked,  (§  118)  that  strange  as  it 
may  appear,  it  is  no  less  true,  that  notwithstanding  the  seri- 
ous derangement  of  the  reasoning  power  which  a  person 
must  have  experienced,  who  entertains  the  strange  fancies 
that  sometimes  find  their  way  into  the  mind,  it  may  still  be 
exercised  on  all  other  subjects,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  with 
no  diminution  of  its  natural  soundness.  The  celebrated 
Pascal  believed  at  times  that  he  was  sitting  on  the  brink  of 
a  precipice  over  which  he  was  momentarily  in  danger  of 
falling,  and  a  German  professor  of  law,  mentioned  by  Hoff- 
bauer,  thought  the  freemasons  were  leagued  against  him, 
while  he  discharged  the  duties  of  his  chair  with  his  usual 
ability  ;  and  numberless  are  the  instances  of  worthy  people 
who  have  imagined  their  heads  turned  round,  or  their  limbs 
made  of  butter  or  glass,  who  nevertheless  manage  their  con- 
cerns with  their  ordinary  shrewdness.  No  one,  however, 
following  the  dictates  of  his  own  judgment,  would  seriously 
propose  to  invalidate  such  of  these  men's  acts  as  manifestly 
have  no  reference  to  the  crotchets  they  have  imbibed.  To 
deprive  them  of  the  management  of  their  affairs,  under  the 
show  of  affording  them  protection,  would  be  to  inflict  a  cer- 
tain and  a  serious  injury,  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  a 
much  smaller  one  that  might  never  occur.  The  principle 
that  we  would  inculcate  is,  that  monomania  invalidates  a 
civil  act  only  when  such  act  comes  within  the  circle  of  the 
diseased  operations  of  the  mind. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES   OF    INTELLECTUAL    MANIA.      233 

$  199.  It  is  not  to  be  understood,  however,  that  in  every 
case  of  partial  mania  we  have  only  to  ascertain  the  insane 
delusion,  and  then  decide  whether  or  not  the  act  in  question 
could  have  come  within  the  range  of  its  influence.  In  many 
instances  the  delusion  is  frequently  changing,  in  which  case, 
it  is  not  only  difficult  to  determine  how  far  it  may  have  been 
connected  with  any  particular  act,  but  the  mind,  in  respect 
to  other  operations,  has  lost  its  original  soundness,  to  such 
a  degree  that  it  cannot  be  trusted  in  the  transaction  of  im- 
portant affairs.  Still,  this  is  not  a  sufficient  reason  against 
applying  the  general  principle  where  it  can  be  done  with- 
out fear  of  mistake.  In  doubtful  instances  we  must  be 
governed  by  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  and  this  course, 
with  all  its  objections,  seems  far  more  rational  than  the 
practice  of  universal  disqualification. 

§  200.  The  validity  of  a  marriage  contracted  in  a  state 
of  partial  mania,  is  not  to  be  determined  exactly  upon  the 
above  principles.  Here  it  is  not  sufficient  to  consider  merely 
the  connexion  of  the  hallucination  with  the  idea  of  being 
married,  nor  should  we  form  any  conclusion  in  favor  of  the 
capacity  of  the  deranged  party,  from  the  propriety  with 
which  he  conducts  himself  during  the  ceremony.  The 
mere  joining  of  hands  and  uttering  the  usual  responses  are 
things  not  worth  considering ;  it  is  the  new  relations  which 
the  married  state  creates,  the  new  responsibilities  which  it 
imposes,  that  should  fix  our  attention,  as  the  only  points  in 
regard  to  which  the  question  of  capacity  can  be  properly 
agitated.  In  other  contracts,  all  the  conditions  and  circum- 
stances may  be  definite  and  brought  into  view  at  once,  and 
the  capacity  of  the  mind  to  comprehend  them  determined 
with  comparative  facility.  In  the  contract  of  marriage,  on 
the  contrary,  there  is  nothing  definite  or  certain  ;  the  obliga- 
tions which  it  imposes  do  not  admit  of  being  measured  and 
discussed  ;  they  are  of  an  abstract  kind,  and  constantly 
varying  with  every  new  scene  and  condition  of  life.  With 
20* 


234  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

these  vjews  we  are  obliged  to  dissent  from  the  principle 
laid  down  by  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  of  Massachusetts, 
in  a  case  of  libel  for  divorce  for  insanity  of  the  wife  at  the 
time  of  the  marriage,  that  "  the  fact  of  the  party's  being 
able  to  go  through  the  marriage  ceremony  with  propriety, 
was  primd  facie  evidence  of  sufficient  understanding  to 
make  the  contract."  *  If  by  making  the  contract  is  meant 
merely  the  giving  of  consent  and  the  execution  of  certain 
forms,  then  indeed  the  fact  of  the  party's  going  through  the 
ceremony  with  propriety  may  be  some  evidence  of  sufficient 
understanding  to  make  it ;  but  if  the  expression  includes  the 
slightest  idea  of  the  nature  of  the  relations  and  duties  that 
follow,  or  even  of  the  bonds  and  settlements  that  sometimes 
accompany  it,  then  the  fact  here  mentioned  is  no  evidence 
at  all  of  sufficient  capacity.  Sir  John  Nicholl,  looking  at 
the  subject  in  a  different  light,  has  very  properly  said,  that 
"  going  through  the  ceremony  was  not  sufficient  to  establish 
the  capacity  of  the  party ;  and  that  foolish,  crazy  persons 
might  be  instructed  to  go  through  the  formality  of  the  cere- 
mony, though  wholly  incapable'  of  understanding  the  mar- 
riage contract."  2  In  a  similar  case,  Lord  Stowell,  then  Sir 
William  Scott,  had  previously  observed,  on  the  fact  given 
in  evidence,  that  the  party  "  had  manifested  perfect  pro- 
priety of  behavior,"  during  the  ceremony,  "that  much  stress 
was  not  to  be  laid  on  that  circumstance ;  as  persons,  in  that 
state,  will  nevertheless  often  pursue  a  favorite  purposer 
with  the  composure  and  regularity  of  apparently  sound 
minds."3 

§  201.  Within  a  few  years,  a  class  of  cases  has  made 
its  appearance,  exceedingly  embarrassing  to  the  medical 
jurist.  The  woman,  after  preparing  for  a  union,  to  which 

1  4  Pickering's  Reports,  32. 

2  Browning  v.  Reacle,  2  Phillimore's  Eccl.  Rep.  69. 

3  Turner  v.  Meyers,  1  Hagg.  Con.  Rep.  414." 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    INTELLECTUAL    MANIA.      235 

her  head  and  heart  had  apparently  fully  consented,  and 
going  through  the  marriage  ceremony  with  the  utmost  pro- 
priety, manifesting  all  the  while  nothing  unusual  in  her 
deportment,  immediately  after  imbibes  an  insuperable  aver- 
sion towards  her  husband,  shuns  his  company,  and  perhaps 
refuses  to  live  with  him.  In  some  of  -the  cases,  other  sin- 
gularities of  conduct  soon  appear,  one  after  another,  till  at 
last  the  woman  becomes  a  subject  of  unequivocal  insanity. 
In  others,  however,  this  strong  repugnance  towards  the 
husband  continues  to  be  the  principal,  if  not  the  only  symp- 
tom, of  mental  disorder,  but  so  closely  do  they  resemble  the 
former  in  other  respects,  that  we  can  have  no  hesitation  in 
regarding  them  as  merely  varieties  of  the  same  affection. 
The  pathological  character  of  these  cases  seems  to  be  suffi- 
ciently obvious.  From  some  cause  or  other,  the  patient  has 
been  affected  with  a  cerebral  irritation  not  sufficient  to  dis- 
turb the  mental  manifestations,  and  which,  under  favorable 
circumstances  might  have  entirely  disappeared.  In  this 
condition,  marriage,  with  the  crowd  of  new  thoughts  and 
feelings  -with  which  it  is -preceded,  operates  as  a  powerfully 
exciting  cause,  and  under  its  influence  the  pathological  affec- 
tion is  completely  developed.  It  is  not  strange  certainly 
that  marriage  should  occasionally  find  a  female  brain  in 
this  morbid  condition  ;  nor  that  in  case  of  such  a  conjunc- 
tion, the  result  here  mentioned  should  follow.  The  legal 
relations  of  these  cases  are  not  so  satisfactorily  settled.  In 
some  of  them,  a  close  scrutiny  of  the  conduct  and  condition 
previous  to  marriage,  may  detect  indubitable  signs  of  insan- 
ity ;  while  in  others  no  such  signs  can  be  discovered,  though 
subsequently  the  mental  disorder  may  have  become  no  less 
obvious.  Now,  are  we  prepared  to  make  a  distinction 
between  them  ?  to  grant  divorce  in  one  class,  and  refuse 
it  in  the  other  ?  This,  no  doubt,  would  be  highly  convenient, 
but  we  are  not  sure  that  it  would  be  strictly  just.  While 
we  see  not  how  legal  relief  can  be  withheld  in  the  former 


236  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

class,  yet  in  regard  to  the  latter,  we  recoil  from  the  idea  of 
depriving  a  woman  of  her  protection  and  support,  at  the 
very  moment  when  the  severest  of  earthly  calamities  has 
overtaken  her,  merely  on  the  strength  of  what  we  may  call 
a  pathological  abstraction.  How  these  cases  have  been 
regarded  by  the  courts,  we  have  had  no  means  of  ascer- 
taining. 

§  202.  The  principles  that  should  regulate  the  legal 
relations  of  the  partially  insane  are  few  and  simple.  While 
they  should  be  left  in  possession  of  every  civil  right  that 
they  are  not  clearly  incapable  of  exercising,  they  should  be 
subjected  to  the  performance  of  no  duties  involving  the 
interests  or  comfort  of  individuals,  which  may  be  equally 
well  discharged  by  others.  In  the  former  instance  we  con- 
tinue the  enjoyment  of  a  right  that  has  never  been  abusetl ; 
in  the  latter,  we  refrain  from  imposing  duties  on  people  who 
may  not  be  qualified  to  perform  them.  We  cannot,  there- 
fore, agree  with  HofFbauer,  that  a  monomaniac  should  be 
allowed  to  manage  the  affairs  of  another,  or  be  appointed  to 
the  office  of  guardian,  however  much  we  might  be  inclined 
to  respect  the  validity  of  his  civil  acts.  In  some  instances 
it  is  impossible  to  know  or  to  conjecture,  beforehand,  how 
the  predominant  idea  in  his  mind  may  be  affected  by  his 
connexion  with  persons  and  things  that  have  hitherto  been 
foreign  to  his  thoughts ;  while  in  others,  it  is  far  within  the 
range  of  probability  that  the  consequences  will  be  ruinous  to 
himself  and  others.  Here,  for  example,  is  a  man  who  has 
long  believed  that  he  has  an  eel  in  his  stomach,  but  on  no 
other  point  has  he  manifested  the  slightest  mental  impair- 
ment. If  a  monomaniac  is  ever  a  suitable  person  to  manage 
the  affairs  of  another,  it  would  seem,  at  first  thought,  that 
this  one  certainly  is  ;  yet  nothing  would  be  more  injudicious 
than  to  entrust  him  with  any  such  duty,  for  in  all  probability, 
though  perfectly  upright  in  his  dealings,  he  would  be  irre- 
sistibly impelled  to  dissipate  the  property  of  others,  as  he 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    INTELLECTUAL    MANIA.       237 

always  has  his  own  earnings,  in  constant  journeyings  from 
one  empiric  to  another,  in  purchasing  medicines,  and  con- 
sulting physicians,  for  the  purpose  of  getting  relieved  from 
his  fancied  tormenter.  This  exclusion,  as  Chambeyron,  the 
French  translator  of  Hoffbauer,  justly  remarks,  does  the 
monomaniac  no  wrong ;  it  frees  him  from  a  great  responsi- 
bility, and  prevents  dangers,  possible  at  least,  either  to  the 
ward  or  to  him. 

§  203.  The  above  views,  though  not  yet  distinctly  re- 
ceived in  courts,  are  countenanced  by  many  distinguished 
physicians  and  jurists.  Hoffbauer  supports  them  to  the 
fullest  extent;  Esquirol  sanctions  them,  by  interposing  no 
'word  of  disapprobation ;  Georget  admits  them  in  application 
to  civil  cases ;  and  Paris  and  Fonblanque  have  explicitly  re- 
cognized their  correctness  in  the  following  passage.  "  When 
a  man  suffers  under  a  partial  derangement  of  intellect,  and 
on  one  point  only,  it  would  be  unjust  to  invalidate  acts  which 
were  totally  distinct  from,  and  uninfluenced  by  this  so  limited 
insanity  ;  but  if  the  act  done  bear  a  strict  and  evident  re- 
ference to  the  existing  mental  delusion,  we  cannot  see  why 
the  law  should  not  also  interpose  a  limited  protection,  and 
still  less  why  courts  of  equity,  which  in  their  ordinary 
jurisdiction  relieve  against  mistake,  should  deny  their  aid  in 
such  cases."  l 

§  204.  Mr.  Evans,  the  translator  of  Pothier's  Treatise 
on  Obligations,  expresses  an  opinion  on  this  subject,  no  less 
positive  and  precise.  "  I  cannot  but  think,"  he  says,  "  that 
a  mental  disorder  operating  on  partial  subjects,  should,  with 
regard  to  those  subjects,  be  attended  with,  the  same  effects 
as  a  total  deprivation  of  reason  ;  and  that  on  the  other 
hand,  such  a  partial  disorder  operating  only  upon  particular 
subjects,  should  not,  in  its  legal  effects,  have  an  influence 
more  extensive  than  the  subjects  to  which  it  applies  ;  and 

1  1  Medical  Jurisprudence,  302. 


238  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

that  every  question  should  be  reduced  to  the  point,  whether 
the  act  under  consideration  proceeded  from  a'  mind  fully 
capable,  in  respect  of  that  act,  of  exercising  free,  sound 
and  discriminating  judgment ;  but  in  case1  the  infirmity  is 
established  to  exist,  the  tendency  of  it  to  direct  or  fetter  the 
operations  of  the  mind  should  be  in  general  regarded  as 
sufficient  presumptive  evidence,  without  requiring  a  direct 
and  positive  proof  of  its  actual  operation."  l 

§  205.  It  has  been  already  remarked,  that  the  practice 
of  the  English  courts  in  regard  to  partial  insanity  has  been 
regulated  by  no  settled  principles.  Of  the  truth  of  this  re- 
mark we  have  a  striking  illustration  in  Greenwood's  case, 
which  is  so  often  cited.  Mr.  Greenwood  was  bred  to  the 
bar,  and  acted  as  chairman  at  the  quarter  sessions,  but  be- 
coming diseased,  and  receiving  in  a  fever  a  draught  from 
the  hand  of  his  brother,  the  delirium,  taking  its  ground 
then,  connected  itself  with  that  idea  ;  and  he  considered 
his  brother  as  having  given  him  a  potion,  with  a  view  to 
destroy  him.  He  recovered  in  all  other  respects,  but  that 
morbid  image  never  departed  ;  and  that  idea  appeared  con- 
nected with  the  will  by  which  he  disinherited  his  brother. 
Nevertheless,  it  was  considered  so  necessary  to  have  some 
precise  rule,  that,  though  a  verdict  had  been  obtained  in  the 
common  pleas  against  the  will,  the  judge  strongly  advised 
the  jury  to  find  the  other  way,  and  they  did  accordingly 
find  in  favor  of  the  will.  Farther  proceedings  took  place 
afterwards,  and  concluded  in  a  compromise.2  No  one 
would  be  hardy  enough  to  affirm  that  Greenwood's  mind 
was  perfectly  rational  and  sound,  and  as  his  insanity  dis- 
played itself  on  all  topics  relating  to  his  brother,  every  act 
involving  this  brother's  interests,  to  go  no  farther,  ought 


1  2  Pothier  on  Obligations,  Appendix,  24. 

8  Lord  Eldon,  in  White  v.  Wilson.  13  Vesey's  Reports,  88. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    INTELLECTUAL    MANIA.        239 

consequently   to  have    been  invalidated.     A   plainer  case 
cannot  well  be  imagined. 

§  206.  More  enlarged  and  correct  views  prevailed  in 
the  able  and  elaborate  judgment  delivered  by  Sir  John 
Nicholl,  in  the  case  of  Dew  v.  Clark,1  where  the  existence 
of  partial  mania  is  recognized,  and  the  necessity  is  strongly 
inculcated,  of  bearing  in  rnind  the  fact  of  its  partial  opera- 
tion on  the  understanding,  while  determining  its  influence 
on  the  civil  acts  of  the  individual.  The  point'at  issue  was 
the  validity  of  the  will  of  one  Scott,  (who  left  personal  pro- 
perty amounting  nearly  to  ,£40,000),  in  which  he  bequeathed 
the  complainant,  who  was  his  daughter  and  only  child,  a 
life-interest  in  a  small  portion  of  his  estate,  the  most  of 
which  was  devised  to  his  nephews.  The  object  of  inquiry 
was,  whether  the  extraordinary  conduct  and  feelings  of  the 
deceased  towards  his  daughter  had  any  real  cause,  or  was 
solely  the  offspring  of  delusion  in  a  disordered  mind  ;  and 
to  this  end  an  unparalleled  mass  of  evidence  was  offered  by 
each  party.  It  was  proved  by  the  nephews,  that  the  testator 
had  considerable  practice  as  a  surgeon  and  medical  electri- 
cian from  1785  to  1820,  and  that  at  all  times  down  to  the 
latter  period  when  he  had  a  paralytic  stroke,  he  managed 
the  whole  of  his  pecuniary  and  professional  affairs  in  a  ra- 
tional manner,  and  rationally  conducted  all  manner  of  busi- 
ness. They  admitted  that  he  was  a  man  of  an  irritable  and 
violent  temper  ;  of  great  pride  and  conceit ;  very  precise  in 
all  his  domestic  and  other  arrangements  ;  very  impatient  of 
contradiction,  and  imbued  with  high  notions  of  parental  au- 
thority. They  represented  him  to  have  entertained  rigid 
notions  of  the  total  and  absolute  depravity  of  human  nature 
and  of  the  necessity  of  sensible  conversion,  arid  contended 
that  all  the  singularities  of  his  conduct  could  be  attributed 
to  his  peculiar  disposition  and  belief,  without  resorting  to 

1  3  Addams's  Reports,  79. 


240  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

insanity  for  an  explanation.  By  the  daughter,  it  was  shown, 
by  a  body  of  evidence  that  placed  the  fact  beyond  the 
shadow  of  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  from  an  early  period  of 
her  life,  he  manifested  an  insane  aversion  towards  her.  It 
appears  that  he  was  in  the  habit  of  describing  her,  even  to 
persons  with  whom  he  was  not  intimately  acquainted,  as  sul- 
len, perverse,  obstinate,  and  given  to  lying ;  as  a  fiend,  a 
monster,  a  very  devil,  the  special  property  of  Satan  ;  and 
charging  her  with  vices,  of  which  it  was  impossible  that  a 
girl  of  her  age  could  be  guilty.  The  peculiar  and  unequaled 
depravity  of  his  child,  her  vices,  obstinacy,  .and  profligacy 
were  topics  on  which  he  was  constantly  dwelling,  and  his 
general  deportment  towards  her  not  only  negatived  all  idea 
of  natural  affection,  but  betrayed  a  most  fiend-like  temper. 
His  manner  towards  her  was  fiery  and  terrific  ;  the  instant 
she  appeared,  his  eye  flashed  with  rage  and  scorn,  and  he 
spurned  her  from  him  as  he  would  a  reptile.  He  compelled 
her  to  do  the  most  menial  offices,  such  as  sweeping  the 
rooms,  scouring  the  grates,  washing  the  linen  and  the  dishes  ; 
to  live  in  the  kitchen  and  be  sparingly  fed.  He  once  stripped 
her  naked,  when  ten  or  eleven  years  old,  tied  her  to  a  bed- 
post, and  after  flogging  her  severely  with  a  large  rod  inter- 
twisted with  brass  wire,  rubbed  her  back  with  brine.  Re- 
peatedly, and  on  the  most  trivial  occasions,  he  struck  her 
with  his  clenched  fists,  cut  her  flesh  with  a  horsewhip,  tore 
out  her  hair,  and  once  aimed  at  her  a  blow  with  some 
weapon  which  indented  a  mahogany  table,  and  which  must 
have  killed  her,  had  she  not  avoided  it.  Now  it  was  abun- 
dantly proved  that  there  existed  no  real  cause  whatever  for 
this  strange  antipathy,  but  that,  the  daughter  was  of  an 
amiable,  obliging,  and  docile  disposition  —  that  she  had 
always  shown  a  great  filial  affection  for  her  father  —  that 
she  conducted  at  home  and  abroad  with  the  utmost  propriety 
and  decorum  —  that  she  was  a  person  of  strictly  moral  and 
religious  habits,  and  was  so  considered  and  known  to  be  by 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    INTELLECTUAL    MANIA.        241 

the  friends  of  the  deceased  and  others  of  high  reputation 
and  character.  The  court,  in  making  up  its  decision,  de- 
clared that  the  question  at  issue  was,  "  not  whether  the 
deceased's  insanity  in  certain  other  particulars,  as  proved  by 
the  daughter,  should  have  the  effect  of  defeating  a  will,  gen- 
erally, of  the  deceased,  or  even  this  identical  will  —  but 
whether  his  insanity,  on  the  subject  of  his  daughter,  should 
have  the  effect  of  defeating,  not  so  much  any  will  (a  will 
generally)  of  the  deceased,  as  this  identical  will."  Accord- 
ingly, considering  it  proved  that  the  will  was  the  direct,  un- 
qualified offspring  of  that  morbid  delusion  concerning  the 
daughter,  thus  put  into  act  and  energy,  it  was  pronounced 
to  be  null  and  void  in  law.  In  this  decision  we  see  the  pre- 
valence of  those  more  correct  and  profound  views  of  insan- 
ity, which  have  resulted  from  the  inquiries  of  the  last  few 
years. 

§  207.  The  same  principle  had  been  previously  laid  down 
in  the  following  case  which  was  adjudicated  in  Kentucky, 
in  1822.  George  Moore  made  his  will  in  April,  1822,  and 
shortly  after  died.  It  was  the  validity  of  this  will  which 
was  the  point  at  issue.  About  twenty-four  years  previous 
to  his  death,  he  had  a  dangerous  fever,  during  which  he 
imbibed  a  strong  antipathy  towards  his  brothers,  imagining 
that  they  intended  to  destroy  or  injure  him,  though  they  at- 
tended him  throughout  his  illness,  and  never  furnished  the 
slightest  foundation  for  his  belief.  This  antipathy  continued 
to  the  day  of  his  death,  with  a  single  exception,  when  he 
made  a  will  in  their  favor,  but  afterwards  cancelled  it. 
When  asked  by  one  of  the  witnesses  why  he  disinherited 
his  brothers,  he  became  violently  excited,  and  declared  that 
they  had  endeavored  to  get  his  estate  before  his  death.  The 
court,  in  its  decision,  observe,  that,  "  he  cannot  be  accounted 
a  free  agent  in  making  his  will,  so  far  as  his  relatives  are 
concerned,  although  free  as  to  the  rest  of  the  world.  But 
however  free  he  may  have  been  as  to  other  objects,  the  con- 
21 


242  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 

elusion  is  irresistible,  that  this  peculiar  defect  of  intellect  did 
influence  his  acts  in  making  his  will,  and  for  this  cause  it 
ought  not  to  be  sustained.  It  is  not  only  this  groundless 
hatred  or  malice  to  his  brethren  that  ought  to  affect  his  will, 
but  also  his  fears  of  them,  which  he  expressed  during  his 
last  illness,  conceiving  that  they  were  attempting  to  get 
away  his  estate  before  his  death,  or  that  they  were  lying  in 
wait  to  shoot  him,  while  on  other  subjects  he  spoke  ration- 
ally ;  all  which  are  strong  evidences  of  a  derangement  in 
one  department  of  his  mind,  unaccountable  indeed,  but  di- 
rectly influencing  and  operating  upon  the  act  which  is  now 
claimed  as  the  final  disposition  of  the  estate."  ] 

§  203.  Esquirol  has  related  a  case  of  a  very  similar  kind, 
where  a  person  conceived  an  antipathy  against  his  brothers, 
sisters,  and  other  relatives,  who,  he  believed  were  seeking 
to  destroy  him.  Under  the  influence  of  this  delusion  he 
made  testamentary  dispositions,  and  Esquirol  being  consulted 
respecting  their  validity,  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  the  tes- 
tator was  laboring  under  insanity.2 

§  209.  On  the  other  hand  testamentary  dispositions  which 
are  founded  on  motives  that  might  be  supposed  to  govern  a 
sane  mind,  and  present,  on  their  face,  no  indications  of  in- 
sanity, ought  not  to  be  disturbed,  though  the  mind  were  con- 
fessedly laboring  under  some  degree  of  derangement.  The 
following  case  was  decided  in  strict  accordance  with  this 
principle. 

At  a  session  of  the  supreme  court  of  Massachusetts,  in 
Worcester  county,  April,  1843,  the  probate  of  a  will  was 
contested  on  the  ground  of  the  insanity  of  the  testator  who 
had  bequeathed  the  most  of  his  property  to  a  nephew,  though 
having  children  of  his  own.  It  appeared  in  evidence,  on 
the  one  hand,  that  the  testator,  when  under  the  immediate 

1  Johnson  v.  Moore's  heirs,  1  Littel's  Reports,  371. 
9  Annales  d'  Hygiene  Publique,  iii.  370. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    INTELLECTUAL    MANIA.       243 

influence  of  strong  drink,  to  which  he  was  intemperately 
addicted,  manifested  some  abberration  of  mind,  and  for  sev- 
eral years  before  his  death  had  persisted  in  the  declaration 
that  his  children  were  not  legitimate,  as  he  had  never  been 
married  to  their  mother.  On  the  other  hand,  it  appeared, 
.that  his  only  son  was  intemperate,  and  neglected  and  abused 
his  parents  ;  that  his  daughter,  her  husband  and  children 
also  neglected  him  ;  and  that  for  many  years,  there  was 
non-intercourse  among  the  various  members  of  the  family. 
The  nephew  had  always  maintained  friendly  relations  with 
the  testator  and  ministered  to  his  wants  and  infirmities. 
Although  he  had  lived  with  the  mother  of  his  children,  as 
husband  and  wife,  forty-nine  years,  yet  no  certificate  or 
record  of  the  marriage  could  be  found,  and  it  did  not  appear 
very  improbable  that  the  marriage  ceremony  had  never  been 
performed.  He  had  always  managed  his  property,  which 
was  of  considerable  amount,  prudently  and  intelligently,  and 
the  will  was  properly  drawn  and  executed,  giving  good- rea- 
sons also  for  its  bequests.  In  short,  it  was  a  rational  act, 
rationally  done,  and  was  established  by  the  verdict  of  the 
jury.1 

§  210.  In  criminal  as  well  as  civil  cases,  Jt  is  important 
to  consider  the  operation  of  the  predominant  idea,  and  its 
influence  on  the  act  in  question.  There  certainly  is  no  rea- 
son why  a  person  should  be  held  responsible  for  a  criminal 
act  that  springs  from  a  delusion  which  would  be  sufficient 
to  invalidate  any  civil  act  to  which  it  might  give  rise.  A 
monomaniac's  sense  of  the  fitness  of  things  is  not  different 
when  he  signs  a  ruinous  contract,  or  makes  a  will,  from 
what  it  is  when  he  commits  a  criminal  deed.  If  the  inabil- 
ity to  discern  the  true  relations  of  things  is  the  ground  on 

1  For  the  facta  in  this  case  I  am  indebted  to  Dr.  S.  B.  Woodward, 
Superintendent  of  the  Massachusetts  Lunatic  Hospital,  who  gave 
his  testimony  on  the  trial,  as  an  expert. 


244  B1EDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

which  the  former  are  invalidated,  it  ought  equally  to  annul 
criminal  responsibility  ;  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  the  ab- 
stract conceptions  of  the  nature  and  consequences  of  crime 
are  never  affected  in  insanity,  or  are  compatible  with  a  de- 
gree of  mental  soundness  that  would  incapacitate  a  person 
from  buying  a  house  or  selling  a  lot  of  land.  It  is  yet  a 
disputed  point,  however,  whether  partial  mania  should  have 
the  full  legal  effect  of  insanity,  in  criminal  cases.  By  Hoff- 
bauer,  Fodere  and  some  other  writers,  it  is  contended  that 
the  same  principle  which  determines  the  effect  of  mania  in 
civil,  should  also  determine  its  effect  in  criminal  cases  ;  that 
is,  that  criminal  responsibility  should  be  annulled  only  when 
the  act  comes  within  the  range  of  the  diseased  operations 
of  the  mind.  In  favor  of  this  view,  it  has  been  urged,  that 
the  connexion  of  the  morbid  delusion  with  the  criminal  act, 
is  generally  very  direct,  and  not  easily  mistaken.  A  remote 
and  circuitous  association  of  the  predominant  idea  with  the 
deed  in  question,  presents  fair  ground  for  suspicion,  because 
the  farther  the  thoughts  of  the  monomaniac  wander  from 
the  object  of  his  delusion,  the  less  are  they  affected  by  its 
influence.  If  a  man  who  imagines  his  legs  are  made  of 
glass,  should  %ee  another  approaching  him  with  a  stick  for 
the  purpose  of  breaking  them,  he  could  not  help  resisting 
even  to  bloodshed,  in  what  would  be  to  him  an  act  of  self- 
defence,  but  it  would  require  a  very  peculiar  concatenation 
of  circumstances  to  warrant  us  in  considering  a  rape  or 
theft  as  the  offspring  of  this  hallucination,  because  the  idea 
of  these  acts  would  carry  the  thoughts  far  beyond  the  reach 
of  its  influence. 

§  211.  Against  these  views  it  is  objected,  that  it  is  not 
always  easy  to  trace  the  connexion  between  the  predomi- 
nant idea  and  the  criminal  act.  The  links  that  connect  the 
thoughts  which  rise  successively,  in  the  sound  mind,  defy 
all  our  penetration,  and  the  few  laws  we  have  established 
are  totally  inapplicable  to  the  associations  of  the  insane 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    INTELLECTUAL    MANIA.      245 

mind.  No  one  will  be  bold  enough  to  affirm  that  a  certain 
idea  cannot  possibly  be  connected  with  a  certain  other  idea, 
in  a  healthy  state  of  the  mind,  least  of  all  when  it  is  dis- 
ordered by  disease  ;  so  that  the  existence  of  partial  insanity 
once  established,  it  is  for  no  human  tribunal  arbitrarily  to 
circumscribe  the  circle  of  its  diseased  operations.  We  must 
remember  also  that  sometimes  the  predominant  idea  is  fre- 
quently changing,  and  at  others,  is  obstinately  concealed  by 
the  patient,  and  not  ascertained  till  after  his  restoration  to 
health.  The  views  here  objected  to  have  found  a  strong 
opponent  in  Georget,  whose  practical  knowledge  of  the 
subject  and  acknowledged  acuteness  in  observing  the  man- 
ners of  the  insane,  entitle  his  opinions  to  great  consideration, 
if  not  to  entire  belief.  The  following  observations  of  his 
should  never  be  forgotten  in  forming  conclusions  on  this 
disputed  point.  "In  conversing,"  says  he,  "with  patients 
on  topics  foreign  to  their  morbid  delusions,  you  will  gene- 
rally find  no  difference  between  them  and  other  people. 
They  not  only  deal  in  common-place  notions,  but  are  capa- 
ble of  appreciating  new  facts  and  trains  of  reasoning.  Still 
more,  they  retain  their  sense  of  good  and  evil,  right  and 
wrong,  and  of  social  usages,  to  such  a  degree,  that  when- 
ever they  come  together  forgetting  their  moral  sufferings 
and  delusions,  they  conduct,  as  they  otherwise  would,  in-, 
quiring  with  interest  for  one  another's  health,  and  maintain- 
ing the  ordinary  observances  of  society.  They  have  special 
reasons  even  for  regarding  themselves  with  a  degree  of 
complacency ;  since,  for  the  most  part  they  believe  that  they 
are  victims  of  arbitrary  measures,  fraudulent  contrivances, 
and  projects  of  vengeance  or  cupidity,  and  thus  they  sym- 
pathize with .  one  another  in  their  common  misfortunes. 
Accordingly,  the  inmates  of  lunatic  asylums  are  rarely 
known  to  commit  those  reprehensible  acts  which  are  re- 
garded as  crimes  when  dictated  by  sound  reason,  though 
the  most  of  them  enjoy  considerable  freedom.  They  often 
21* 


246  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

talk  very  sensibly  of  their  interests,  and  some  even  manage 
their  property  perfectly  well." 

"  Those  patients  who  are  insane  on  one  point,  only  more 
or  less  limited,  may  have  experienced  some  severe  moral 
disorders  which  influence  the  conduct  and  actions  of  the 
individual,  without  materially  injuring  his  judgment.  Those 
who  conduct  themselves  so  well  in  the  asylum,  in  the  midst 
of  strangers  with  whom  they  have  no  relations,  and  against 
whom  they  have  conceived  no  prejudice  nor  cause  of  com- 
plaint, and  in  quiet  submission  to  the  rule  of  the  house,  are 
no  sooner  at  liberty,  in  the  bosom  of  their  families,  than 
their  conduct  becomes  insupportable;  they  are  irritated  by 
the  slightest  contradiction,  abusing  and  threatening  those 
who  address  to  them  the  slightest  observation,  and  working 
themselves  up  to  the  most  intolerable  excesses.  And  whether 
the  reprehensible  acts  they  then  commit  are  really  foreign 
to  the  predominant  idea  or  not,  ought  we  to  make  a  being 
responsible  for  them  whose  moral  nature  is  so  deeply 
affected?"  These  facts,  it  cannot  be  denied,  furnish 
strong  ground  for  the  remark  with  which  Georget  closes  his 
observations  on  this  point,  namely,  that  if,  in  following  the 
rule  that  partial  mania  excludes  the  idea  of  culpability,  "  the 
moralist  and  the  criminal  judge  run  the  risk  of  committing 
injustice  by  sparing  a  really  guilty  person,  certainly,  the 
opposite  course  would  lead  them  into  still  greater  errors." 

§  212.  Hoffbauer  has  not  only  limited  the  exculpatory 
effects  of  partial  mania  to  the  acts  which  clearly  come 
within  its  influence,  but  has  laid  down  the  principle  that  in 
the  criminal  jurisprudence  of  this  condition,  the  predominant 
idea  should  be  considered  as  true ;  that  is,  that  the  acts  of 
the  patient  should  be  judged  as  if  he  had  really  been  in  the 
circumstances  he  imagined  himself  to  be  when  they  were 
committed.  The  same  view  was  maintained  by  chief 

1  Discussion  medico-legale  sur  la  Folie,  10,  14* 


LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  INTELLECTUAL  MANIA.   247 

justice  Shaw,  of  Massachusetts,  in  the  recent  case  of  Rogers. 
It  is  based  on  the  common,  but  erroneous  notion,  that  in- 
sane people  always  reason  correctly  from  wrong  premises, 
and  therefore  it  is  inapplicable  to  the  numerous  instances 
where  the  premises  and  inferences  are  all  equally  wrong. 
If  a  person  imagines  he  heard  the  voice  of  God  commanding 
him  to  immolate  his  only  child  and  he  accordingly  obeys,  it 
may  be  said  indeed  that  he  is  not  responsible  for  the  bloody 
deed,  because  it  would  have  been  perfectly  proper,  had  he 
really  heard  the  command  ;  but  are  we  to  be  told,  that  if  he 
had  killed  his  neighbor  for  a  fancied  petty  injury,  he  is  not 
to  be  absolved  from  punishment,  because,  the  act  would 
have  been  highly  criminal,  even  though  he  might  have 
really  received  the  injury  ?  In  cases  like  the  latter,  the 
insanity  manifests  itself,  not  only  in  the  fancied  injury,  but 
in  the  disproportionate  punishment  which  he  inflicts  upon 
the  offender.  Nothing  in  regard  to  insanity  is  better  estab- 
lished, than  the  fact  that  when  the  mind  is  possessed  by  a 
delusion  the  conclusions  it  may  adopt  are  as  likely  to  be 
absurd  as  logical  and  wise.  The  character  of  the  conclu- 
sion, so  far  as  we  are  concerned,  is  an  accidental  feature  in 
the  case,  and  therefore  nothing  can  be  more  unphilosophical 
or  unjust,  than  to  make  it  the  criterion  of  legal  responsibility. 
Two  men  in  affluent  circumstances  imagine  that  they  are 
coming  to  want,  and  the  belief  fills  them  with  the  keenest 
distress.  To  all  appearance  they  are  both  equally  insane, 
equally  diseased  in  body,  and  equally  wretched.  The  one 
denies  himself  and  family  the  necessities  of  life,  and  they 
are  indebted  for  their  continued  existence  to  the  charities  of 
others.  The  other  slaughters  his  family  and  attempts  to 
kill  himself.  Upon  the  principle  in  question,  the  latter  is 
held  guilty  of  murder,  while  the  former  is  held  to  be  irre- 
sponsible for  his  conduct.  The  turn  which  the  delusion 
takes  decides  the  question  of  guilty  or  not  guilty.  Had- 
field's  motive  for  shooting  at  the  king  was,  that  certain 


248  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

great  ends  might  be  attained  by  his  own  execution,  which  he 
supposed  would  follow.  Lawrence,  who  attempted  to  take 
the  life  of  President  Jackson,  imagined  that  his  victim  stood 
in  the  way  of  his  obtaining  certain  imaginary  estates.  These 
men  were  tried  and  acquitted,  and  the  public  voice  has 
abundantly  confirmed  the  correctness  of  the  verdict.  Judged 
however,  by  Hoffbauer's  principle,  they  must  have  been 
deemed  fully  responsible  for  their  acts,  and  so  must  a  large 
portion  of  those  lunatics  who,  for  their  bloody  deeds,  have 
been  consigned  to  the  hospital,  instead  of  the  gallows.  The 
meaning  of  the  principle  is,  that  when  a  person  who  is  ad- 
mitted to  be  insane,  inflicts  an  injury  which,  in  the  judg- 
ment of  a  benevolent  man,  is  disproportioned  to  the  provoca- 
tion, the  surplus  injury  is  to  be  attributed  to  passion,  or  some 
bad  motive,  and  the  lunatic  must  be  punished  accordingly. 
The  unsoundness  of  such  views,  it  might  be  supposed, 
would  have  been  shown  by  the  most  superficial  knowledge 
of  insanity.  When  a  person  is  so  insane  as  to  imagine  that 
another  is  disturbing  his  peace  by  spells  and  incantations, 
is  it  strange  that  at  the  same  time,  his  notions  of  right  and 
wrong  should  be  so  confused,  that  he  thinks  himself  justified 
in  sacrificing  his  disturber  ?  It  certainly  would  be  far  more 
strange  —  although  it  is  not  denied  that  this  is  sometimes 
the  case  —  if  a  person,  after  adopting  a  gross  delusion, 
should  reason  respecting  it  with  all  the  clearness  and  saga- 
city of  a  sound  mind. 

§  213.  It  is  a  great  mistake  to  suppose,  as  "this  prin- 
ciple does,  that  the  insane  generally  act  from  well  defined, 
tangible  motives  or  reasons.  Some  unquestionably  do, 
while  it  is  just  as  certain  that  some  do  not.  It  is  often  im- 
possible for  them 'to  give  a  clear  and  consistent  reason  for 
their  conduct.  Their  discourse  on  this  point  is  vague, 
obscure  and  contradictory.  The  truth  is,  they  act  from  im- 
pulse and  sudden  suggestions,  whhout  being  very  conscious 
at  the -time  of  what  they  are  doing,  or  if  they  are,  without 


LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  INTELLECTUAL  MANIA.   249 

being  able  to  explain  their  conduct  even  to  their  own  satis- 
faction. Many  of  those  who  attempt  suicide  are  unable  to 
assign  anything  like  a  reason  for  the  act.  They  contemplate 
it  but  a  moment,  perhaps,  before  proceeding  to  carry  the 
idea  into  execution,  and  then  sincerely  rejoice  that  they 
were  prevented  from  succeeding.  Homicidal  acts  are  often 
unquestionably  committed  by  the  insane,  in  a  similar  state 
of  mind.  In  general  mania,  especially  the  early  stage,  the 
mind  is  filled  with  vague  fears,  suspicions,  jealousy  and  dis- 
trust, and  the  thoughts  are  sadly  confused.  The  patient 
believes  that  enemies  encompass  him  around,  bent  on  de- 
stroying his  reputation  or  his  life.  With  no  special  plan  in 
view,  he  arms  himself  with  swords  and  pistols,  and  acci- 
dent or  some  unaccountable  caprice  finally  determines  the 
victim.  The  poor  maniac  can  no  more  give  a  reason  for 
his  selection,  than  he  can  for  the  groundless  fears  that 
besiege  his  mind.  It  is  a  fact  that  should  be  duly  pondered 
by  those  who  would  adopt  the  principle  we  are  now  con- 
tending against,  that  very  often,  maniacs,  upon  recovery, 
have  but  a  shadowy  recollection  of  the  violence  they  may 
have  committed,  though  at  the  time,  they  may  have  dis- 
coursed about  it  with  some  degree  of  coherence  and  perti- 
nency. A  case  strongly  illustrative  of  this  fact  was  related 
by  Dr.  Woodward  at  the  trial  of  Rogers,  but  it  did  not  pre- 
vent the  court  from  concluding  that  Rogers  was  responsible 
for  all  the  injury  he  committed  over  and  above  the  amount 
of  provocation  he  thought  he  had  received. 

§  214.  Another  mistake  often  made  on  this  subject,  is 
sufficient  to  vitiate  any  conclusions  formed  under  its  influ- 
ence, relative  to  moral  responsibility.  This  mistake  is  to 
regard  the  operations  of  the  insane  mind  as  governed  by  the 
same  laws  of  association,  as  those  of  the  sane  mind.  Their 
motives  are  weighed  in  the  same  balance,  they  are  supposed 
to  be  equally  affected  by  the  same  moral  considerations, 
and  their  conclusions  are  expected  to  be  equally  logical. 


250  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

Such  views  of  the  mental  operations  in  insanity  are  not 
warranted  by  our  knowledge  of  the  disease.  Nothing  can 
be  more  unsafe  than  to  infer,  from  certain  notions  or  plans, 
an  insane  person  may  have,  the  line  of  conduct  or  specula- 
tive conclusions  he  may  adopt.  It  is  a  fact  which  every 
one,  much  conversant  with  the  insane,  must  have  recognized, 
that  their  mental  operations  are  marked  by  a  kind  of 'con- 
fusion that  finds  its  analogy  only  in  dreaming.  And  this  is 
the  case,  not  only  with  the  wild  and  raving,  but  to  a  degree 
with  those  whose  insanity  is  apparently  confined  within  a 
narrow  circle,  and  who  would  not  be  readily  recognized  to 
be  insane,  by  the  world  at  large.  In  dreaming'  and  in  in- 
sanity there  is  the  same  firm  conviction  of  the  reality  of  false 
impressions,  the  same  patches  of  coherence  and  consistency, 
the  same  embroilment  of  the  thoughts,  the  same  absurdity 
in  the  conclusions,  and  on  recovery  the  patient  often  feels 
as  if  just  awoke  from  a  dream,  wondering  how  he  could 
have  had  such  thoughts  and  done  such  acts.1  With  what 
propriety  then  can  we  deem  the  insane  responsible  for  any 
of  the  views  they  may  adopt  ? 


1  This  character  of  insanity  is  admirably  represented  by  Shaks- 
peare,  whose  delineations  of  this  disease  are  marked  by  his  usual 
fidelity  to  nature.  Lear,  on  suddenly  recovering,  knows  not,  at 
first,  where  he  is,  or  where  he  has  been ;  he  scarcely  recognizes  his 
own  friends,  and  almost  doubts  his  own  identity. 

"  Pray,  do  not  mock  me. 
I  am  a  foolish,  fond  old  man, 
Fourscore  and  upwards ;  and  to  deal  plainly, 
I  fear  I  am  not  in  my  perfect  mind. 
Methinks  I  should  know  you,  and  know  this  man ; 
Yet  I  am  doubtful ;  for  I  am  mainly  ignorant 
What  place  this  is ;  and  all  the  skill  I  have 
Remembers  not  these  garments ;  nor  I  know  not 
Where  I  did  lodge  last  night." 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF    MORAL    MANIA.  251 

SECTION  II. 
Legal  Consequences  of  Moral  Mania. 

§  215.  General  moral  mania  furnishes  good  ground  for 
invalidating  civil  acts,  for  notwithstanding  the  apparent  in- 
tegrity of  the  intellectual  powers,  it  is  probable  that  their 
operation  is  influenced  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  by  a 
derangement  of  the  moral  powers.  The  mutual  independ- 
ence of  these  two  portions  of  our  spiritual  nature  is  not 
absolute  and  unconditional,  but  is  always  liable  to  be  affected 
by  the  operation  of  the  organic  laws.  The  animal  economy 
is  a  whole  ;  no  part  of  it  can  exist  without  the  rest,  nor  be 
injured  or  abstracted  without  marring  the  energy  or  harmony 
of  the  whole  system  ;  and  though  each  part  is  so  far  inde- 
pendent of  the  others  as  to  contribute  its  distinct  share  in  the 
production  of  the  general  result,  even  sometimes  when  sur- 
rounded by  the  ravages  of  disease,  yet  the  general  law  is, 
that  disease  in  one  part  modifies  more  or  less  the  action  of 
all  the  rest,  and  especially  of  those  connected  with  it  by 
contiguity  or  by  resemblance  of  function.  Nature  has  es- 
tablished a  certain  adaptation  of  the  moral  and  intellectual 
faculties  to  one  another,  leading  to  that  harmony  of  action 
which  puts  them  in  proper  relation  to  external  things,  and 
we  can  scarcely  conceive  of  any  disturbance  of  their  equili- 
brium, that  will  not  more  or  less  impair  the  general  result. 
Amid  the"  chaos  of  the  sentiments  and  passions  produced 
by  moral  mania,  the  power  of  the  intellect  must  necessarily 
suffer,  and  instead  of  accurately  examining  and  weighing 
the  suggestions  of  the  moral  powers,  it  is  influenced  by 
motives  which  may  be  rational  enough,  but  which  would 
never  have  been  adopted  in  a  perfectly  healthy  state. 
It  is  hard  to  conceive,  indeed,  that  with  an  understanding 
technically  sound,  the  relations  of  a  person  should  be  viewed 


252  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

in  an  entirely  different  light,  the  circle  of  his  rights  and 
duties  broken  and  distorted,  and  his  conduct  turned  into  a 
course  altogether  foreign  to  that  of  his  ordinary  habits  and 
pursuits.  Notwithstanding  the  correctness  of  his  conversa- 
tion, and  his  plausible  reasons  for  his  singular  conduct,  a 
strict  scrutiny  of  his  actions,  if  not  his  words,  will  convince 
us  that  in  particular  cases,  his  notions  of  right  and  wrong 
are  obscured  and  perverted,  and  that  his  own  social  position 
is  viewed  through  a  medium  which  gives  a  false  coloring  to 
its  whole  aspect.  Now,  though  such  a  person  may  not  be 
governed  by  any  blind,  irresistible  impulse,  yet  to  judge  his 
acts  by  the  standard  of  sanity  and  attribute  to  them  the  same 
legal  consequences  as  to  those  of  sane  men,  would  be  clearly 
unjust,  because  their  real  tendency  is  not  and  cannot  be  per- 
ceived by  him.  Not  that  his  abstract  notions  of  the  nature 
of  crime  are  at  all  altered,  for  they  are  not,  but  the  real 
character  of  his  acts  being  misconceived,  he  does  not  asso- 
ciate them  with  their  ordinary  moral  relations.  No  fear  of 
punishment  restrains  him  from  criminal  acts,  for  he  is  either 
totally  unconscious  of  violating  any  penal  laws,  or  thinks  he 
is  acting  under  a  sanction  that  transcends  all  law,  and  there- 
fore, the  great  end  of  punishment,  the  prevention  of  crime, 
is  wholly  lost  in  his  case.  If  there  were  no  other  reason  for 
withholding  punishment  in  cases  of  moral  mania,  this  alone 
would  be  sufficient,  that  the  fear  of  it,  which  with  others  is 
a  powerful  preventive  of  crime,  or  at  least  is  supposed  to  be, 
in  the  most  popular  theories  of  criminal  law,  does  not  and 
cannot  exert  its  restraining  influence  on  the  mind.  No  one 
would  think  of  attributing  moral  guilt  to  Earl  Ferrers  for 
entertaining  the  insane  idea  that  his  steward  was  a  villain 
conspiring  with  the  earPs  relatives  against  his  comfort  and 
interests  (§  128)  ;  why  then  should  it  be  charged  to  him  as 
a  crime,  that,  amid  the  tumult  of  his  passions  disturbing  the 
healthy  exercise  of  his  understanding,  he  acted  on  this  belief 
and  made  himself  the  avenger  of  his  own  wrongs  ?  Each 


LEGAL    CONSEQJ/ENCES    OF    MORAL    MANIA.  253 

delusion  was  alike  the  offspring  of  the  same  derangement, 
and  it  is  unjust  and  unphilosophical  to  regard  one  with  in- 
difference as  the  hallucination  of  a  madman,  and  be  moved 
with  horror  at  the  other  and  visit  it  with  the  utmost  penalty 
of  the  law,  as  the  act  of  a  brutal  murderer. 

§  216.  Liberty  of  will  and  of  action  is  absolutely  essen- 
tial to  criminal  responsibility.  Culpability  supposes  not  only 
a  <3le~ar 'perception  of  the  consequences  of  criminal  acts,  but 
the  liberty,  unembarrassed  by  disease  of  the  active  powers 
which  nature  has  given  us,  of  pursuing  that  course  which  is 
the  result  of  the  free  choice  of  the  intellectual  faculties. 
It  is  one  of  those  wise  provisions  in  the  arrangement  of 
things,  that'  the  power  of  perceiving  the  good  and  the  evil, 
is  never  unassociated  with  that  of  obtaining  the  one  and 
avoiding  the  other.  When,  therefore,  disease  has  brought 
upon. an  individual  the  very  opposite  condition,  enlightened 
jurisprudence  will  hold  out  to  him  its  protection,  instead  of 
crushing  him  as  a  sacrifice  to  violated  justice.  That  the 
subject  of  homicidal  insanity  is  n9t  a  free  agent,  in  the  pro- 
per sense  of  the  term,  is  a  truth  that  must  not  be  obscured 
by  theoretical  notions  of  the  nature  of  insanity,  nor  by  ap- 
prehensions of  injurious  consequences  from  its  admission. 
Amid -the  rapid  and  tumultuous  succession  of  feelings  that 
rush  into  his  mind,  the  reflective  powers  are  paralyzed,  and 
his  movements  are  solely  the  result  of  a  blind,  automatic 
impulse  with  which  the  reason  has  as  little  to  do,  as  with  the 
•movements  of  a  new-born  infant.  That  the-notions  of  right 
and  wrong  continue  unimpaired  under  these  circumstances, 
proves  only  the  partial  operation  of  the  disease ;  but  in  the 
internal  struggle  that  takes  place  between  the  affective  and 
intellectual  powers,  the  former  have  the  advantage  of  being 
raised  to  their  maximum  of  energy  by  the  excitement  of 
disease,  which,  on  the  other  hand,  rather  tends  to  diminish 
'the  activity  of  the  latter.  We  have  seen  that  generally  after 
the  fatal  act  has  been  accomplished,  and  the  violence  of  the- 
•  22 


254  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

paroxysm  subsided,  the  monomaniac  has  gone  and  delivered 
himself  into  the  hands  of  justice,  as  if,  overwhelmed  with 
horror  at  the  enormity  of  his  action,  he  either  considered 
his  own  life  the  only  compensation  he  could  offer  in  return ; 
or,  it  may  be  felt,  that  the  presence  of  his  fellow  men, 
though  it  would  seal  his  own  fate,  would  be  a  welcome 
relief  from  the  crushing  agony  of  his  own  spirit.  It  is  not 
to  be  wondered  at,  however,  if  occasionally,  the  tide  of1  feel- 
ing takes  a  different  course,  and  the  murderer  is  prompted 
to  avoid  what  he  cannot  help  thinking  to  be  the  just  conse- 
quence of  his  act,  by  flying  from  the  bloody  scene,  and  even 
denying  his  agency  in  it  altogether.  Considering  the  diver- 
sity of  habits,  sentiments  and  education,  uniformity  in  an 
unessential  phenomenon  like  this  is  not  to  be  expected. 
That  flying  from  pursuit  indicates  a  consciousness  of  having 
committed  a  reprehensible  act,  and  also  a  fear  of  punish- 
ment, is  not  denied,  but  it  has  never  been  contended  that 
the  opposite  course  implies  the  absence  of  all  ideas  of  this 
kind  from  the  mind  of  the  homicidal  monomaniac.  The 
real  point  at  issue  is,  whether  the  fear  of  punishment  or 
even  the  consciousness  of  wrong  doing  destroys  the  supposi- 
tion of  insanity,  and  this  is  settled  by  the  well-known  fact 
that  the  inmates  of  lunatic  asylums,  after  having  committed 
some  reprehensible  acts,  will  often  persist  in  denying  their 
agency  in  them,  in  order  to  avoid  the  reprimand  or  punish- 
ment which  they  know  would  follow  their  conviction.  If 
insane  persons  have  any  rational  ideas  at  all,  and  it  is  not 
denied  that  they  have,  it  is  not  strange  that  they  sometimes 
are  conscious  of  the  penal  consequences  of  their  acts,  and 
use  the  intelligence  of  a  brute  in  order  to  avoid  them. 
Besides,  in  moral  insanity  the  intellectual  faculties  are  sup- 
posed not  to  be  impaired,  and  when  the  fury  of  the  paroxysm 
which  has  borne  him  on  in  spite  of  every  attempt  at  resist- 
ance has  subsided,  the  homicidal  monomaniac  returns,  in 
some  degree  at  least,  to  his  ordinary  habit  of  thinking  and 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    MORAL    MANIA.  255 

feeling.  He  regrets  the  havoc  he  has  made,  foresees  its 
disgraceful  consequences  to  himself,  shudders  at  the  sight, 
and  flies,  like  the  most  hardened  crimina1,  to  avoid  them. 

§  217.  In  medical  science,  it  is  dangerous  to  reason 
against  facts.  Now  we  have  an  immense  mass  of  cases 
related  by  men  of  unquestionable  competence  and  veracity, 
where  people  are  irresistibly  impelled  to  the  commission  of 
criminal  acts  while  fully  conscious  of  their  nature  and  con- 
sequences ;  and  the  force  of  these  facts  must  be  overcome 
by  something  more  than  angry  declamation  against  visionary 
theories  and  ill-judged  humanity.  They  are  not  fictions 
invented  by  medical  men  (as  was  rather  broadly  charged 
upon  them  in  some  of  the  late  trials  in  France,)  for  the  pur- 
pose of  puzzling  juries  and  defeating  the  ends  of  justice,  but 
plain,  unvarnished  facts  as  they  occurred  in  nature ;  arid  to 
set  them  aside  without  a  thorough  investigation,  as  unworthy 
of  influencing  our  decisions,  indicates  anything  rather  than 
that  spirit  of  sober  and  indefatigable  inquiry  which  should 
characterize  the  science  of  jurisprudence.  We  need  have 
no  fear  that  the  truth  on  this  subject  will  not  finally  prevail, 
but  the  interests  of  humanity  require  that  this  event  should 
take  place  speedily. 

§  218.  The  distinction  between  crimes  and  the  effects 
of  homicidal  monomania  is  too  well  founded  to  be  set  aside 
by  mere  declamation,  or  appeals  to  popular  prejudices,  as  it 
has  repeatedly  been  in  courts  of  justice.  On  the  trial  of 
Papavoine  for  the  murder  of  two  young  children  near  Paris, 
in  1823,  the  advocate  general,  in  reply  to  the  counsel  of 
the  prisoner  who  had  pleaded  homicidal  insanity  in  his 
defence,  declared  that  Papavoine  committed  the  crime,  in 
order  "  to  gratify  an  inveterate  hatred  against  his  fellow-men, 
transformed  at  first,  into  a  weariness  of  his  own  life,  and 
subsequently  into  an  instinct  of  ferocity  and  a  thirst  of  blood. 
Embittered  by  his  unhappy  condition,  excited  by  a  sense  of 
his  sufferings  and  misfortunes,  irritated  by  the  happiness  of 


256  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

others  which  awakened  in  him  only  ideas  of  fury,  and  drove 
him  into  seclusion  which  increased  the  perversity  of  his 
depraved  propensities,  he  arrived  at  that  pitch  of  brutal 
depravity  where  destruction  became  a  necessity,  and  the 
sight  of  blood  a  horrible  delight.  His  hateful  affections, 
after  being  long  restrained,  finally  burst  forth  and  raised  in 
his  bosom  a  necessity  of  killing,"  which,  like  a  young  tiger, 
he  sought  to  gratify."  *  That  beings  in  human  s"hape  have 
lived  who  delighted  in  the  shedding  of  blood,  and  found  a 
pastime  in  beholding  the  dying  agonies  of  their  victims,  is  a 
melancholy  fact  too  well  established  by  the  -Ne.ros  and 
Caligulas  of  history.  For  such  we  have  no  disposition  to 
urge  the  plea  of  insanity,  for  though  we  are  willing  to 
believe  them  to  have  been  unhappily  constituted,  we  have  no 
evidence  that  they  labored  under  cerebral  disease,  and  they 
certainly  exhibited  none  of  its  phenomena.  Motives,  the 
very  slightest  no  doubt,  generally  existed  for  even  their  most 
horrid  atrocities,  and  even  when  they  were  entirely  wanting, 
there  was  still  a  conformity  of  their  bloody  deeds  with  the 
whole  tenor  of  their  natural  character.  They  followed  the 
bent  of  their  dispositions  as  manifested  from  childhood, 
glorying  in  their  preeminent .  wickedness,  and  •  rendered 
familiar  by  habit  with  crime  ;  'and  though  .conscience  might 
have  slumbered,  or  opposed  but  a  feeble  resistance  to  the 
force  of  their  passions,  yet  it  was  not  perverted  by  diseased 
action  so  as  to  be  blind  to  the -existence  of -moral  distinctions. 
In  homicidal  insanity,  on  the  contrary^  everything  is  differ- 
ent. The  criminal  act  for  which  its  subject  is  called  to  an 
account,  is  the  result  of  a  stron'g  and,  perhaps,  sudden  im- 
pulse, opposed  to  his  natural  habits  and  generally  preceded 
or  followed  by  some  derangement  of  the  healthy  actions  of 
the  brain  or  other  organ.  The  advocate  general  himself 
represented  Papavoine,  "  as  having  been  noted  for  his  un- 

1  George't .  Examen  des  proces  criminelles. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    MORAL    MANIA.  257 

social  disposition,  for  avoiding  his  fellow  laborers,  for  walk- 
ing in  retired,  solitary  places,  appearing  to  be  much  absorbed 
in  the  vapors  of  a  black  melancholy."  This  is  not  a  picture 
of  those  human  fiends  to  whom  he  would  assimilate  Papa- 
voine,  but  it  is  a  faithful  one  of  a  mind  over  which  the  clouds 
of  insanity  are  beginning  to  gather.  Where  is  the  similarity 
between  this  man,  who,  with  a  character  for  probity  and  in 
a  fit  of  melancholy,  is  irresistibly  hurried  to  the  commission 
of  a  horrible  deed,  arid  those  wretches  who,  hardened  by  a 
life  of  crime,  commit  their  enormities  with  perfect  delibera- 
tion and  consciousness  of  their  nature. 

§  219.  It  has  been  also  urged  that  the  subjects  of  homi- 
cidal insanity  are,  no  less  than  criminals,  injurious  to  society, 
the  safety  of  which  implicitly  requires  their  extermination, 
upon  the  same  principle  that  we  do  not  hesitate  to  destroy 
a  dog  that  has  been  so  unfortunate  as  to  go  mad.  Sane,  or 
insane,  criminal  or  not,  such  monsters  should  be  cut  off  from 
the  face  of  the  earth,  and  it  is  a  misplaced  humanity  to  re- 
serve them  for  a  different  fate.  Such  language  might  have 
been  expected  from  people  who  are  moved  only  by  the 
feelings  that  are  immediately  raised  by  the  sight  of  appalling 
crimes,  but  it  is  an  humiliating  truth  that  the  opinions  of 
those  who  are  in  the  habit  of  discriminating  between  various 
shades  of  guilt,  and  of  canvassing  motives,  are  too  often  but 
an  echo  to  the  popular  voice.  If  the  old  custom  of  smother- 
ing under  a  feather  bed,  the  miserable  victims  of  hydropho- 
bia, be  now  considered  as  a  specimen  of  the  most  revolting 
barbarity,  we  cannot  see  why  the  punishment  of  insane 
offenders  should  be  regarded  under  a  more  favorable  aspect. 
Society  has  a  right  to  protect  itself  against  the  aggressions 
of  the  dangerously  insane,  but  unnecessary  severity  in  its 
protective  measures  often  defeats  the  very  purpose  in  view, 
and  indicates  a  want  of  humanity  and  intellectual  enlighten- 
ment. While  confinement  in  prisons  and  mad-houses  fur- 
nishes all  the  restraint  which  the  necessity  of  their  case 
22* 


258  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

requires,  it  is  idle  to  urge  the  infliction  of  death  as  the  only 
means  by  which  society  can  be  effectually  shielded  from  a 
repetition  of  their  terrible  enormities.1 

§  220.  One  of  the  principal  objects  of  punishments  should 
be  to  deter  from  the  commission  of  crime,  by  impressing  the 
mind  with  ideas  of  physical  and  moral  suffering  as  its  certain 
consequence;  and  whenever.it  is  found  to  produce  a  very 
different  effect,  it  is  the  part  of  enlightened  legislation  to 
devise  some  other  means  of  prevention.  Nothing  can  be 
more  absurd  than  to  inflict  the  very  punishment  which  the 
delusion  of  the  monomaniac  often  impels  him  to  seek,  ^— to 
put  him  to  death  who  voluntarily  surrenders  himself  and 
imploringly  beseec'hes  it  as  the  only  object  he  had  at. heart 
in  perpetrating  a  horrid  crime.  What  is  it  but  converting  a 
dreadful  punishment  into  the  dearest  boon  that  earth  can 
offer  ?  -  Jn  religious  monomania,  it  is  not  uncommon  for'the 
patient  to  believe  that  the  joys  of  heaven  are  in  store  for 
him,  and,  under  the  excitement  of  this  insane  idea,  to  murder 
a  fellow  creature,  in  order  that  he  may  the  sooner  enter  on 
their  .fruition.  To  execute  one  of  this  class,  is  to  perpetuate 
an  evil  which  needs  only  a  change  of  penal  consequences  to 
be  effectually' remedied.  A  kind  of  delusion  has  sometimes 
prevailed  in  certain  parts  of  Europe  which  persuades  its  un- 
fortunate subjects  that  eternal  happiness  can  be  gained  by 
being  executed  .for  the  murder  of  some  innocent  person. 
The  idea  is  that  suicide  being  itself  a  sin  will  not  be  followed 
by  the  happiness  they  seek,  but  that  murder,  though  a  greater 
crime,  can  be  repented  of  before  the  time  of  execution. 


1  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  when  a  person  charged  with  a 
capital  crime,  is  acquitted  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  though  ad- 
mitted to  be  the  author  of  the  crime,  it  is  rendered  obligatory  on  the 
court  in  England  by  stat.  39  and  40  Geo.  III.  c.  94,  and  by  similar 
provisions  in  most  of  the  United  States,  to  order  him  into  confine- 
ment. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    MORAL    MANIA.  259 

This  delusion  prevailed  epidemically  in'.  Denmark,  during 
the  middle  of  -the  last  century,  and  to  avoid  sending  an  un- 
prepared person  out  of  the  world,  the  victim  generally 
selected  was  a  child.  Death,  of  course,  was  no  punishment 
in  this  case,  and  at  last,  the  king  issued  an  ordinance  direct- 
ing that  the  guilty  should  be  branded  on  the  forehead  with 
a  hot  iron  and  whipped,  and  be  imprisoned  for  life,  with 
hard  labor.  Every  year,  on  the  anniversary  of  their  crime, 
they  were  to  be  whipped.1  Lord  Dover,  in  his  life  of  Frederic, 
relates  that  such  was  the  severity  of  discipline  to  which  -the 
Prussian  troops  at  Potsdam  were  subjected,  that  many  wished 
for  death  to  finish  their  intolerable,  sufferings,  and  murdered 
children,  whom  they  .had  enticed  m  within  their  power,  in 
order  to  obtain  from  justice  the  stroke  they  dared  not  inflict 
upon  themselves.2  Abolish  capital  punishment  in  such  cases, 
and  the  delusion  will  disappear  with  it;  continue  it,  and  no 
one  can  tell  when  the  latter  will  end. 

§  221.  Not  only  is  the  moral  effect  of  punishment  totally 
lost  when  inflicted  on  the  subjects  of  homicidal  insanity, 
since  it  does  not  deter  other  madmen  from  committing 
similar  acts,  but  by  a  curious  law  of  morbid  action,  every 
publicity  obtained  for  them,  by  the  trial  and  execution  of  the 
actors,  leads  to  their  repetition  to  an  almost  incredible 
extent.  At  a  sitting  of  the  Royal  Academy  of  Medicine  in 
Paris,  August  8th,  1826,  Esquirol  stated  that  since  the  trial 
of  Henriette  Cornier,  which  occurred  not  two  months  before, 
he  had  become,  acquainted  with  six  instances  of  a  parallel 
nature.  Among  these  was  a  Protestant  minister  who  be- 
came affected  with  the  desire  of  destroying  a  favorite  child. 
He  struggled  against  this  terrible  inclination  for  fifteen  days, 
but  was  at  last  driven  to  the  attempt  on  his  child's  life,  in 
which  he  fortunately  failed.  Several  other  physicians,  on 
the  same  occasion,  bore  similar  testimony  relative  to  the 

1  London  Quarterly  Review,  xii.  219.  *  i.  321. 


260  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

effect  of  that  trial,  and  the  newspapers  about  that  period 
teemed  with  cases  of  child-murder  which  had  originated  in 
the  same  way. 

§  222.  It  should  not  be  forgotten,  that  well-grounded 
suspicion  that  the  homicidal  act,  thus  punished,  was  the  re- 
sult of  physical  disease,  instead  of  moral  depravity,  is  so 
horrid  as  to  excite,  in  whatever  mind  it  arises,  feelings  of 
distrust  and  jealousy  towards  the  law  and  its  ministers, 
infinitely  more  to  be  dreaded  than  the  occasional  acquittal  of 
a  supposititious  maniac.  When,  on  the  contrary,  the  dis- 
tinction is  carefully  made  between  the  acts  of  a  sound  and 
those  of  an  unsound  mind,  and  a  decision  in  doubtful  cases 
is  dispassionately  and  deliberately  formed  upon  every  species 
of  evidence  calculated  to  throw  light  upon  it,  the  mind  is 
impressed  with  a  new  sense  of  the  wisdom  and  majesty  of 
the  laws  and  with  a  feeling  of  security  under  their  discrimi- 
nating operation.  The  numerous  trials  for  witchcraft  in  a 
former  age,  and  the  occasional  condemnation  of  a  maniac 
in  the  present,  have  done  more  to  lessen  men's  respect  for 
the  laws,  than  all  its  overruled  decisions  have  to  weaken 
their  confidence  in  its  certainty.  Insanity  is  a  disease,  be- 
fore the  prospect  of  which  the  stoutest  heart  may  quail,  but 
how  much  more  appalling  is  it  made  by  the  reflection,  that 
in  some  wild  paroxysm  it  may  be  followed  by  legal  conse- 
quences, that  will  consign  its  unhappy  subject  to  an  ignomini- 
ous death.  In  cases  of  simulated  madness,  the  purposes  of 
justice  are  more  fully  answered  by  receiving  and  examining 
all  the  evidence  and  patiently  showing  its  value  and  bear- 
ings, and  thus  laying  open  the  imposition  to  the  conviction 
of  all,  than  by  repelling  the  plea  with  idle  declamation  on 
its  injurious  tendency.  Not  only  does  the  criminal  obtain 
his  deserts,  by  such  a  course,  but  the  most  cunning  device 
of  his  ingenuity  is  seen  to  be  baffled,  and  the  plea  that  should 
ever  shield  innocence  from  destruction  is  ineffectually  urged 
to  protect  the  guilty.  Every  murmur  at  the  injustice  of  the 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    MORAL    MANIA.  261 

sentence  is  hushed,  all  scruples  are  removed  and  all  fears 
are  dissipated,  that  a  fellow-being  has  been  sacrificed,  whose 
only  crime  was  the  misfortune  of  laboring  under  disease  of 
the  brain.  Besides,  what,  if  amid  the  obscurity  in  which  a 
case  may  sometimes  be  involved,  a  guilty  person  do  es- 
cape—  though  this  event  must  be  of  very  rare  occur- 
rence,—  is  it  not  a  maxim  in  Legal  practice  that  it  is  better 
for  ten  guilty  persons  to  escape  punishment  than  for  one 
innocent  person  to  suffer?  And  though  he  escape -the  sen- 
tence of.  the  law,  yet  society  is  perfectly  secure  from  the 
effects  of  mistake,  because  the  very  plea,  by  which  he 
obtains^his  acquittal,  consigns  him  to  confinement  and  sur- 
veillance. 

§  223.  In  those  cases  where  there  are  some  but  not  per- 
fectly satisfactory  indications  of  insanity,  the  trial  or  sentence 
should  be  postponed,  in  order  that  opportunity  may  be  afford- 
ed to  those  who  are  properly  qualified,  for  observing  the 
state  of  the  prisoner's  mind.  Where  the  moral  powers  have 
become  so  deranged  as  to  lead  to  criminal  acts,  without, 
however,  any"  perceptible  impairment  of  the  intellect,  time 
only  is  necessary,  in  the  greater  proportion  of  cases,  to  furnish 
indubitable  evidence  of  mental  derangement.  And  whatever 
may  be  the  result,  the  ends  of  justice  are  not  'defeated  by 
waiting  a  few  months,  while  the  scruples  of  the  over  humane 
are.  removed,  and  the  acquiescence  of  the  ministers  of  the 
law  in  measures  calculated  to  establish  innocence  rather 
than  guilt,  gains  for  them  a  confidence  and  respect  that  the 
conviction  of  guilt  never  can.  Many  instances  might  be 
mentioned  where  the  accused,  whose  insanity  was  doubtful 
on  trial,  has,  during  the  confinement  subsequent  to  his  ac- 
quittal on  a  criminal  prosecution,  become  most  manifestly 
insane.  Hadfield,  who  was  tried  for  shooting  at  the  king, 
'and  acquitted  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  though  during  the 
trial  he  displayed  no  indications  of  disordered  mind,  spent 
the  remainder  of  his  life  in  Bedlam  hospital, .and  for  thirty 


262  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

years  showed  scarcely  any  signs  of  mental  alienation,  ex- 
cept once,  when  suddenly  and  without  any  known  cause,  he 
became  so  furious  that  they  were  obliged  to  chain  him  in 
his  cell.  This  paroxysm  lasted  but  a  short  time,  when  he 
recovered  his  ordinary  state  of  health.1 

§  224.  Another  reason  for  delay  is,  that  insanity  is  some- 
times so  completely  veiled  from  observation,  as  never  to  be 
suspected  even  by  the  most  intimate  associates  of  the  patient. 
An  instructive  case  is  related  by  Georget,  in  which  the  ex- 
istence of  insanity,  though  of  several  years  duration,  was 
not  recognized  till  after  the  death  of  the  subject.  The  cir- 
cumstances were  briefly  these.  Bertet,  a  revenue  officer, 
exercised  the  duties  of  his  office  for  three  years,  in  the 
manufactory  of  MM.  Ador  and  Bonnaire,  at  Vaugirard, 
where  he  was  only  noticed  for  his  unaccommodating  disposi- 
tion, melancholy  temperament,  and  fondness  for  seclusion. 
One  day  while  M.  Ador  was  conversing  with  some  of  the 
workmen,  he  was  requested  by  Bertet  to  affix  his  signature 
to  certain  papers.  He  proceeded  to  his  room  for  this  pur- 
pose, and  while  in  the  act  of  writing,  was  'shot  dead  by 
Bertet,  who  immediately  afterwards  blew  out  his  own  brains. 
Among  his  papers  were  found  several  addressed  to  the 
advocate  general,  bearing  the  most  singular  titles,  such  as 
my  last  reflections,  my  last  sighs,  in  which  he  declared  that 
he  had  been  poisoned  several  years  before,  and  gave  a 
minute  account  of  the  numerous  remedies  he  had  ineffectu- 
ally used,  insisting  at  the  same  time  that  his  head  was  not 
turned,  that  he  acted  deliberately,  and  giving  very  coherent 
reasons  to  prove  it.  He  announced  that  four  victims  were 
required,  namely,  the  two  heads  of  the  establishment,  a 
woman  who  was  living  in  it,  and  his  old  housekeeper,  and 
that  in  case  he  should  be  contented  with  one,  he  would 
leave  to  justice  the  charge  of  obtaining  the  others.  Some 

1  Billard,  quoted  by  Georget  in  Nouvelle  discuss,  med.  leg.  71. 


LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  MORAL  MANIA.      263 

of  these  papers  he  finishes  with  saying,  "  To  day  my  pains 
are  less  acute,  —  I  feel  better,  —  my  vengeance  is  retarded," 
or,  "  my  pains  are  renewed  —  with  them  my  thoughts  of 
vengeance."  Among  other  wild  fancies,  he  made  a  descrip- 
tion of  the  funeral  monument  to  be  raised  to  one  of  his 
victims,  which  was  to  be  a  gibbet  covered  with  figures  of 
instruments  of  punishment.  He  also  described  his  own 
funeral  procession.  He  wished  the  four  corners  of  the  pall 
to  be  carried  by  the  four  persons  above  mentioned,  in  case 
he  should  not  have  sacrificed  them  ;  that  the  advocate  gene- 
ral should  follow  the  cortege  ;  and  that  when  it  reached  the 
cemetery,  the  latter  should  prepare  a  large  ditch  in  which 
they  should  first  cast  him,  Bertet,  and  then  the  four  pall- 
bearers. In  another  paper,  he  said  he  designed  for  each  of 
his  victims  two  gilt  balls,  as  an  emblem  of  their  ambition 
and  thirst  of  gold,  and  some  pulverized  cantharides,  as  an 
image  of  the  torments  which  he  suffered.  Bertet  had  never 
shown  any  signs  of  mental  alienation  in  his  official  letters 
and  reports.  He  was  sometimes  abstracted  and  loved  to  be 
alone,  but  his  disposition,  in  this  respect,  had  been  of  long 
standing  and  seemed  to  be  owing  to  the  state  of  his  health, 
of  which  he  was  constantly  complaining,  though  judging 
from  his  exterior  he  seemed  to  be  well  enough.  He  had 
always  discharged  the  duties  of  his  office  satisfactorily,  and, 
by  his  own  solicitation,  had  just  before  obtained  a  more  pro- 
fitable place.  Had  not  Bertet  recorded  his  insane  fancies, 
but,  failing  in  his  suicidal  attempt,  had  been  brought  to  trial 
for  the  murder  of  M.  Ador,  the  plea  of  insanity  would  have 
fallen  on  the  most  incredulous  ears,  and  he  would  have  paid 
the  last  penalty  of  the  law.  In  a  state  of  confinement  and 
seclusion,  however,  nothing  but  time  would  have  been  neces- 
sary to  reveal  the  true  nature  of  his  case. 

§  225.  Homicidal  monomania  presents  us  with  one  of 
those  remarkable  phenomena,  the  existence  of  which  men 
are  slow  to  believe,  long  after  the  evidence  in  its  favor  has 


264  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

accumulated  to  such  an  extent  as  to  render  incredulity  any- 
thing but  a  virtue.  The  facts  themselves  cannot  be  denied, 
and  the  various  methods  of  explaining  them  on  the  hypo- 
thesis of  a  sound  understanding,  though  every  phase  of 
human  character  and  every  spring  of  human  action  have 
been  resorted  to  for  the  purpose,  are  little  calculated  to 
diminish  the  confidence  of  impartial  minds  in  the  correctness 
of  the  above  views.  Strongly  impressed  as  we  are 'with 
their  importance,  we  may  have  devoted  more  attention  to 
the  objections  that  have  been  urged  against-them,  than  they 
really  deserve  ;  we  shall,  therefore,  say  but  little  more  on 
this  part  of  the  subject.  Against  Georget's  proposition  re- 
lative to  the  homicide  committed-  by  Henriette  Cornier,  that 
"  an  act  so  atrocious,  so  contrary  to  human  nature,  com- 
mitted without  interest,  without  passion,  opposed  to  the  natural 
character  of  the  individual,  is  evidently  an  act  of  madness  ;"  1 
it  has  been  seriously  objected  that  though  we  may  be  unable 
to  discover  motives,  yet  this  is  not  a  positive  proof  that  there 
actually  are  no  motives.  This  objection  depends  upon  a 
question  of  fact,  and  we  shall  content  ourselves  with  putting 
it  to  every  criminal  lawyer  to  answer  for  himself,  whether  a 
criminal  act,  committed  by  a  person  whose  motives  defy  all 
penetration  or  rational  suspicion  while  his  mind  evinces  no 
signs  of  impairment,  is  not  one  of  the  most  uncommon 
occurrences  in  the  world  —  so  uncommon  perhaps,  as  to 
have  never  fallen  within  their  experience  ?  Indeed  we  are 
disposed  to  go  one  step  farther.  We  do  not  hesitate  to  say 
that  sometimes  the  character  of  the  act  itself  furnishes  suffi- 
cient evidence  of  its  having  been  prompted  by  insanity,  even 
when  the  closest  investigation  of  the  bodily  and  mental  con- 
dition of  the  parly,  fails  to  detect  other  proofs  of  its  exist- 
ence. A  man  named  Greensmith  was  tried  and  executed  in 
England  in  1837,  for  the  murder  of  his  four  children.  It 

1  Discussion  medico-legale  sur  la  Fftlie,  126. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    MORAL    MANIA.  265 

appeared  in  evidence  that  he  was  a  kind  father  and  a  sober, 
industrious  man  ;  that  he  took  affectionate  leave  of  his  child- 
ren before  he  destroyed  them,  and  again  before  he  finally 
left  them  ;  that  he  calmly  and  deliberately  strangled  them 
one  after  the  other,  and  evinced  neither  fear,  nor  repentance 
nor  mental  agitation.  The  motive  he  assigned  for  the  act 
was,  that  he  thought  it  would  be  better  for  him  and  for  his 
family  that  he  should  destroy  his  children  and  be  executed 
for  the  act,  than  let  them  go  to  the  workhouse.  Stronger 
evidence  of  insanity  than  such  conduct  furnishes,  could  not  be 
had.  The  judge  and  jury,  however,  thought  otherwise, 
although  they  had,  besides,  the  testimony  of  an  eminent 
physician  of  a  lunatic  asylum,  who  stated  his  belief,  as  the 
result  of  his  observations  of  the  accused,  that  he  was  labor- 
ing under  insane  delusion,  and  that  the  act  was  the  direct 
offspring  of  that  delusion.  Does  the  man,  who  like  Had- 
field  imagines  that  he  is  to  be  sacrificed  for  the  salvation  "of 
the  world,  and  to  that  end,  shoots  at  the  king,  or  he  who 
murders  his  neighbor  in  the  belief  that  his  victim  and  others 
are  conspiring  against  his  life,  (§  19)  evince  a  more  exten- 
sive derangement  of  the  mental  powers,  than  this  poor  crea- 
ture who  destroys  his  dear  offspring  in  the  imaginary  appre- 
hension of  coming  want  ?  It  seems  as  if  nothing  but  the 
most  slavish  and  puerile  regard  for  technicalities,  could  so 
blind  one  to  the  clearest  manifestation  of  truth,  as  to  lead 
him  to  return  an  affirmative  to  this  question. 

§  226.  By  those  who  delight  not  in  metaphysical  subtle- 
ties, a  more  summary,  if  not  more  philosophical,  explanation 
of  homicidal  monomania  has  been  furnished  in  the  idea  that 
it  is  to  be  attributed  to  an  instinct  of  ferocity  ;  to  unnatural 
depravity  of  character  ;  to  a  radical  perversity.  That  such 
qualities  do  exist  as  the  too  common  result  of  a  defective 
constitution,  or  a  vicious  education,  is  proved  by  the  testi- 
mony of  every  day's  experience,  even  if  we  had  not  the 
best  authority  for  believing  that  the  heart  may  be  "  desper- 
23 


266  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

ately  wicked."  But  even  where  they  exist  to  the  fullest  ex- 
tent, the  actions  to  which  they  prompt  have  always  some 
immediate  motive,  slight"  as  it  may  be,-  of  pleasure  sought, 
or  pain  avoided  ;  or  if  they,  can  claim  no  higher  title  than 
that  of  instinct,  it  is  one  of  no  sudden,  transitory  character, 
but  a  constant  and  consistent  portion  of  the  constitution.  It 
is  an  anomalous  instinct  that  manifests  itself  but  Once  or 
twice  in  a  person's  life  ;  and  therefore,  we  cannot,  without 
indulging  in  the  most  unwarrantable  use  of  language,  apply 
this  term  to  those  uncontrollable,  abnormal  influences  that 
lead  to  acts  of  fury  and  destruction.  What  resemblance 
can  we  detect  between  the  Domitians  and  Neros  of  history, 
and  the  Papavoines  and  Corniers,  whose  terrible  acts  have 
been  commemorated  in' the  records  of  criminal  jurispru- 
dence ?  In  the  former,  this  instinct  of  ferocity  appeared  in 
their  earliest  youth  ;  it  imparted  a  zest  to  every  amusement, 
and  excited  ingenuity  to  contrive  new  means  for  heightening 
the, agonies  of  the  wretched  victims  of  their  displeasure. 
In  the  latter,  the  character  was  mild  and  peaceable,  and  their 
days  were  spent  in  th'e  quiet  and  creditable  discharge  of  the 
duties  belonging  to  their  station,  till  a  cloud  of  melancholy 
enveloped  their  minds  and  under  its. shadow  they  perpetrated 
a  single  deed,  at  the  very  thought  of  which  they  would  have 
previously  shuddered  with  horror.  In  short,  all  our  know- 
ledge of  human  nature,  all -our  experience  of  the  past,  force 
us  to  the  conclusion,  that  "  the  presence  of  mental  aliena- 
tion should  be  admitted  in  him  who  commits  a  homicide 
without  positive  interest,  without  criminal  motives,  and  with- 
out a  reasonable  passion." 

§  2*27.  After  what  has  been  said  on  the  subject  of  homi- 
cidal monomania,  it  will  be  scarcely  necessary  to  enter  into 
particulars  relative  to  the  legal  consequences- of  the  other 
forms  of  partial  moral  mania. .  Completely  annulling,  as  we 
believe  they  do,  all  moral  responsibility  for  acts  committed 
under  their  influence,  the  law  can  rightfully  inflict  no  pun- 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    MORAL    MANIA.  267 

ishment  on  their  unfortunate  subjects,  though  it  should  adopt 
every  measure  of  precaution  that  the  interests  of  society 
require.  To  punish  the  thief  and  the  incendiary  for  acts 
which  are  -the  result  of  disease  is  not  only  unjust,  but  it 
serves  to  aggravate  their  disorder,  and  to  prepare  them, 
when  their  term  of  punishment  has  closed,  for  renewing 
their  depredations  on  society  with  increased  perseverance. 
The  proper  course  to  pursue  with  this  class  of  offenders, 
when  brought  into  courts  of  justice,  is  to  place  them  or  ob- 
tain a  guaranty  from  their  friends  that  they  shall  be  placed, 
where  judicious  medical  treatment  will  be  used  for  the  pur- 
pose of  restoring -their  moral  powers  to  a  sounder  condition, 
and  where  they  will  be  secluded  from  society  until  this  end 
shall  be  accomplished. 

§  228:  If  the  doctrines  here  laid  down  relative  to  moral 
insanity  and  its  legal  consequences  are  correct,  it  would 
seem  to  follow  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  they  should  exert 
their  legitimate  influence  on  judicial  decisions.  Nevertheless, 
it  is  contended  —  and  that  too  by  some  who  do  not  question 
the  truth  of  these  doctrines — that  they  ought  not  to  have 
this  practical  effect,  for  the  reason  that  insanity  would 
thereby  be  made  the  ground  of  defence  in  criminal  actions, 
to  a  most  pernicious  extent.  Stated  in  the  plainest  and 
strongest  terms,  the  objection  is,  that  if  these  doctrines 
should  be  recognized  in  our  courts  of  justice,  and  suffered 
to  influence  their  decisions,  almost  every  criminal  would  re- 
sort to  a  defence,  the  .tendency  of  which  is  invariably  to 
puzzle  and  distract  the  minds  of  the  jury,  and.  to  produce 
the  acquittal  of  many  a  wretch,  who  would  first  hear  the 
mention  of  his  own  derangement  from  the  lips  of  ingenious 
counsel.  Now,  even  if  we  were  disposed  to  accord  to  this 
objection  all  ^  the  foundation  that  is  claimed  for  it,  it  would 
not  seem  to  warrant  the  inference  that  is  drawn  from  it. 
Are  we  to  take  from  the  maniac  the  defence  which  the  law 
of  nature  secures  -to  him,  because  it  may  sometimes  be 


268  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

offered  by  those  who  use  it  as  a  means  of  deception  ?  Are 
the  innocent  to  be  made  to  suffer  for  the  devices  of  the 
guilty  ?  To  avoid  this  cruel  injustice,  therefore,  without  at 
the  same  time  inflicting  a  positive  evil  on  society,  we  would 
deduce  from  this  objection  an  inference  of  a  totally  different 
kind.  It  is,  to  let  the  right  of  the  accused  party  to  make 
his  defence  be  cumbered  with  no  restrictions,  expressed  or 
implied  ;  to  let  the  plea  of  insanity,  if  he  choose  to  make 
it,  be  attentively  listened  to,  the  facts  urged  in  its  support 
closely  scrutinized,  the  accused  carefully  and  dispassionately 
examined,  and  his  character  and  history  investigated.  If 
this  duty  be  performed  as  it  should  be,  and  always  may  be, 
the  case  will  seldom  happen,  when  the  truth  will  not  be 
established  to  the  satisfaction  of  every  unprejudiced  mind. 
If  the  accused  be  really  insane,  we  have  the  satisfaction  of 
reflecting,  that  an  enlightened  investigation  of  his  case  has 
saved  an  innocent  person  from  an  ignominious  fate,  while 
on  the  other  hand,  if  he  be  simulating  insanity,  every  doubt 
will  be  dissipated  as  to  the  justice  of  his  sentence,  and  the 
conviction  will  be  strengthened  in  the  popular  mind,  that  the 
law  will  prevail  over  every  false  pretence,  and  expose  the 
guilty  even  in  their  most  secret  refuge.1 


1  The  following  remark  of  chief  justice  Parker  of  N.  H.,  shows 
that  this  objection  is  not  confirmed  by  the  experience  of,  at  least, 
one  practical  lawyer,  the  value  of  whose  testimony  on  this,  or  any 
other  point,  need  not  be  indicated  by  any  comment  of  mine.  "  There 
are  undoubtedly  instances,  in  which  this  kind  of  defence  is  attempted 
from  the  mere  conviction,  that  nothing  else  can  avail — cases  in 
which  the  advocate  forgets  the  high  duty  to  which  he  is  called,  and 
excites  a  prejudice  against  the  case  of  others,  by  attempting  to  pro- 
cure the  escape  of  a  criminal  under  this  false  pretence,  but  such 
cases  are  truly  rare,  and  usually  unsuccessful."  Charge  to  the  grand 
jury  of  Merrimack  county,  N.  H.,  1838,  quoted  in  20  American  Jurist, 
457.  Dr.  Bell,  the  Superintendent  of  the  McLean  Asylum,  Massa- 
chusetts, states  "  that  for  one  real  criminal  acquitted  on  the  score 
of  insanity,  there  have  been  a  dozen  maniacs  executed  for  their 


CHAPTER  IX. 


DEMENTIA. 

§  229.  THIS  form  of  insanity  is  attended  by  a. general 
enfeeblement  of  the  moral  and  intellectual  faculties  which 
were  originally  sound  and  well-developed,  in  consequence 
of  age  or  disease,  and  is  characterized  by  forgetfulness  of 
the  past,  indifference  to  the  present  and  future,  and  a  cer- 
tain childishness  of  disposition.  The  apparent  similarity  of 
this  state  to  that  of  imbecility  or  idiocy  renders  it  necessary 
that  they  should  be  accurately  distinguished;  for  nothing  could 
be  more  improper  or  unjust,  than  to  view  them  merely  as 
different  shades  of  the  same  mental  condition.  Idiocy  and 
the  higher  degrees  of  imbecility  are  congenital  or  nearly 
so,  and  consist  in  a  destitution  of  powers  that  were  never 
possessed.  Little  or  nothing  is  remembered,  because  little 
or  nothing  has  left  any  impression  upon  the  mind,  and  no 
advance  is  made  in  knowledge,  because  the  faculties  ne- 
cessary for  obtaining  it  have  never  existed.  The  proprie- 
ties and  decencies  of  life  are  unobserved,  for.  the  simple 
reason  that  their  moral  relations  have  never  been  discerned, 
and  their  indifference  to  the  most  pressing  wants  is  to  be 
attributed  -to  the  absence  of  the  most  common  instincts  of 


criminal  acts."  Dr.  Woodward,  Superintendent  of  the  Massachu- 
setts Lunatic  Hospital,  says,  "of  all  the  cases  that  have  come  to 
my  knowledge,  and  I  have  examined  the  subject  with  interest  for 
many  years,  I  have  known  but  a  single  instance  in  which  an  indi- 
vidual arraigned  for  murder,  and  found  not  guilty  by  reason  of  in- 
sanity, has  not  afterwards  shown  unequivocal  symptoms  of  insanity 
in  the  jails  or  hospitals  where  he  has  been  confined  ;  and  I  regret 
to  say  that  quite  a  number  who  have  been  executed,  have  shown 
as  clear  evidence  of  insanity  as  any  of  these." 
23* 


270  MEDICAL'  JURISPRUDENCE     OF    INSANITY. 

our  nature.  The  idiot  is  restless,  uneasy,  and  inattentive, 
because  the  faculties  that  direct  the  attention,  and  draw 
from  its  application  valuable  results,  have  been  utterly  de- 
nied. In  idiocy  and  imbecility  the  manners  and  conversa- 
tion strongly  resemble  those  of  childhood  ;  in  dementia 
they  never  lose  the  impress  of  manhood,  however  disjointed 
and  absurd  they  may  be.  The  former  appear  at  an  early 
age  of  life  ;  the  latter  never  takes  place  till  after  the  age  of 
puberty,  except  occasionally  as  a  sequel  of  wounds  or  dis- 
eases of  the  head,  and  generally  increases  with  time,  from 
the  slightest  possible  impairment  of  mental  energy  to  the 
most  complete  fatuity.  In  dementia  the  past  is  forgotten, 
or  but  indistinctly  and  unconnectedly  brought  up  to  the 
mind  ;  the  attention  wanders  from  one  thing  to  another ; 
the  affairs  of  the  present  possess  no  interest ;  and  the  moral 
and  social  affections  are  inactive,  because  the  faculties, 
in  consequence  of  pathological  changes  in  the  brain,  have 
fallen  into  a  state  of  inertia  that  prevents  their  ordinary 
manifestations.  The  whole  condition  betrays  the  existence, 
not  of  physical  imperfection,  but  of  physical  weakness 
(many  of  the  bodily  functions  also  frequently  being  enfee- 
bled,) and  consequently  it  may  sometimes  be  cured,  or 
temporarily  relieved.  When  once  firmly  seated,  it  is  not 
incompatible  with  length  of  years  ;  and  after  death,  we 
may  find,  on  examination,  lesions  of  structure,  or  diminu- 
tions of  size,  which  are  accidental,  the  result  of  diseased 
action,  and  not  original  malconformations.  The  above 
comparison  of  mental  deficiency  with  dementia  shows,  that 
they  depend  on  two  very  different  conditions  of  the  brain, 
and  consequently  must  display  very  different  moral  and  in- 
tellectual manifestations  ;  from  which  we  are  warranted  in 
inferring  that  in  regard  to  their  medico-legal  relations,  they 
cannot  properly  be  placed  on  the  same  ground. 

§  230.     Dementia  is  distinguished  from  general  mania, 
the  only  other  affection  with  which  it  is  liable  to  be  con- 


DEMENTIA.  271 

founded,  by  characters  that  cannot  mislead  the  least  practised 
observer.  The  latter  arises  from  an  exaltation  of  vital 
power,  from  a  morbid  excess  of  activity,  by  which  the  ce- 
rebral functions  are  not  only  changed  from  their  healthy 
condition,  but  are  performed  with  unusual  force  and  rapid- 
ity. The  maniac  is  irrational  from  an  inability  to  discern 
the  ordinary  characters  and  relations  of  things,  amid  the 
mass  of  ideas  that  crowd  upon  his  mind  in  mingled  confu- 
sion ;  while  in  dementia,  the  reasoning  faculty  is  impaired 
by  a  loss  of  its  original  strength,  whereby  it  not  only 
mistakes  the  nature  of  things,  but  is  unable,  from  want  of 
power,  to  rise  to  the  contemplation  of  general  truths.  The 
reasoning  of  the  maniac  does  not  so  much  fail  in  the  force 
and  logic  of  its  arguments,  as  in  the  incorrectness  of  its 
assumptions  ;  but  in  dementia  the  attempt  to  reason  is  pre- 
vented by  the  paucity  of  ideas,  and  that  feebleness  of  the 
perceptive  powers,  in  consequence  of  which  they  do  not 
faithfully  represent  the  impressions  received  from  without. 
In  mania,  when  the  memory  fails,  it  is  because  new  ideas 
have  crowded  into  the  mind,  and  are  mingled  up  and  con- 
founded with  the  past ;  in  dementia  the  same  effect  is  pro- 
duced by  an  obliteration  of  past  impressions  as  soon  as  they 
are  made,  from  a  want  of  sufficient  power  to  retain  them. 
In  the  former,  the  mental  operations  are  characterized  by 
hurry  and  confusion  ;  in  the  latter,  by  extreme  slowness 
and  frequent  apparent  suspension  of  the  thinking  process. 
In  the  former,  the  habits  and  affections  undergo  a  great 
change,  the  conduct  becoming  strange  and  inconsistent 
from  the  beginning,  and  the  persons  and  things  that  once 
pleased  and  interested,  viewed  with  indifference  or  aversion. 
In  the  latter,  the  moral  habits  and  natural  feelings,  so  far 
as  they  are  manifested  at  all,  lose  none  of  their  ordinary 
character.  The  temper  may  be  more  irritable,  but  the 
moral  disposition  evinces  none  of  that  perversity  which 
characterizes  mania. 


272  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

§  231.  In  dementia  the  mind  is  susceptible  of  only  feeble 
and  transitory  impressions,  and  manifests  but  little  re- 
flection even  upon  these.  They  come  and  go  without 
leaving  any  trace  of  their  presence  behind  them.  The 
attention  is  incapable  of  more  than  a  momentary  effort, 
one  idea  succeeding  another  with  but  little  connexion  or 
coherence.  The  mind  has  lost  the  power  -of  comparison, 
and  abstract  ideas  are  utlerty  beyond  its  grasp.  The  mem- 
ory is  peculiarly  weak,  events  the  most  recent  and  most 
nearly  connected  with. the  individual,  being  rapidly  forgotten. 
The  language  of  the  demented  is  not  only  incoherent,  but 
they  are  much  inclined  to  repeat  insulated  words  and  phra- 
ses without  the  slightest  meaning.  "  It  seems,"  says 
Esquirol,  ".as  if  they  were  listening  to  imaginary  tales 
which  they  repeat  in  obedience  to  an  involuntary  or  auto- 
matic impulse*  excited  by  their  old  habits  or  fortuitous 
associations  with  actual  impressions."  *  Their  mind  is 
often  occupied  by  hallucinations  which  continue  a  longer 
or  shorter  time,  and  disappear  to  be  succeeded  by  others. 
The  useful  or  ornamental  arts  which  they  may  have  prac- 
tised with  skill  and  followed  with  ardor,  and  the  various 
other  employments  of  life,  seem  to  be  utterly  forgotten  as 
if  they  had  never  been  thought  of.  Their  time  is  spent 
either  in  moving  about  with  restless  activity,  or  passing 
days,  weeks  or  months,  in  the  same  spot,  in  utter  vacuity 
of  thought  or  purpose  ;  in  pouring  forth  an  incessant  flow  of 
words  at  the  top  of  their  voice,  or-  uttering  low,  muttering 
sounds,  consisting  of  scarcely  articulate  words  and  broken 
phrases  ;  in  singing,  crying  or  laughing. 

§  232.  Though  often  irascible  and  self-willed,  their  an- 
ger is  momentary,  and  thus  they  readily  yield  to  the  direc- 
tion of.  others.  The  moral  powers,  in  fact,  seem  to  be 
possessed  of  too  little  energy  to  maintain  resolution,  or 

1  Maladies  Mentales,  ii.  220. 


DEMENTIA.  273 

cherish  the  passions.  Their  feebleness  of  purpose  and 
passive  obedience  to  the  will  of  others,  strikingly  contrast 
with  the  pertinacity  and  savage  fury  often  evinced  by  the 
maniac.  With  the  remembrance  of  their  friends  and  for- 
mer employments,  there  also  disappears  all  trace  of  the 
social  and  domestic  affections.  All  interest  in  the  con- 
cerns of  others  is  lost  ;  and  family,  friends  and  relations 
are  viewed  with  the  indifference  of  perfect  strangers,  and 
nothing  is  able  to  awaken  an  emotion  of  pleasure  or  pain. 

§  233.  The  derangement  of  the  intellectual  powers  is 
sometimes  indicated  by  remarkable  changes  of  the  counte- 
nance. The  skin  is  pale,  dry  and  wrinkled  ;  the  eyes 
sunken,  dull  and  moistened  with  tears  ;  the  pupils  dilated  ; 
the  look  uncertain  and  wandering  ;  the  cheeks  hollow  and 
emaciated  ;  and  the  whole  face  destitute  of  expression,  and 
indicative  of  decay.  The  organic  functions  suffer  but  little  ; 
the  appetite  for  food  is  so  great  that  the  patient  seems  to  be 
constantly  eating,  and  the  quantity  consumed  is  enormous. 
Affections  of  the  nervous  system,  however,  particularly 
paralysis,  are  not  unfrequent  complications  of  dementia. 

§  234.  The  above  description  is  applicable  to  dementia 
only  when  fully  developed  and  before  it  has  passed  into  the 
state  of  fatuity  in  which  it  often  terminates.  This  form  of 
insanity  appears  under  two  different  degrees  of  severity, 
which  are  designated  as  acute  and  chronic.  The  former  is 
a  sequel  of  temporary  errors  of  regimen,  of  fevers,  hem- 
orrhages, metastases,  suppression  of  customary  evacuations, 
and  the  debilitating  treatment  of  mania.  It  differs  from 
the  latter  in  being  more  rapid  in  its  progress,  and  in  its 
successive  stages  not  being  so  well  distinguished  from  one 
another.  It  is  readily  cured  by  regimen,  exercise,  bathing, 
tonics,  anti-spasmodics,  or  simply  by  removing  the  exciting 
cause.  It  sometimes  terminates  in  an  explosion  of  acute 
mania,  which  then  becomes  critical. 

§  235.  Chronic  dementia  is  a  sequel  of  mania,  of  which 


274  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

it  is  the  usual  termination,  when  life  continues  long  enough, 
of  apoplexy,  epilepsy,  masturbation  and  drunkenness  ;  or 
it  may  occur  idiopathically,  and  then  it  usually  accompanies 
old  age.  This  form  of  the  disorder,  or  senile  dementia,  is 
so  often  the  subject  of  medico-legal  inquiries,  especially  in 
connexion  with  wills,  that  it  deserves  particular"  attention. 
Senile  dementia,  it  must  be  recollected,  is  something  more 
than  that  mere  loss  of  mental  power  which  results  frotti 
the  natural  decay  of  the  faculties  ;  it  is  attended  with  those 
pathological  changes  also  which  are  essential  to  the  pro- 
duction of  insanity.  The  mind  is  not  only  feeble,  but  it  is 
deranged.  Were  it  not  so,  every  old  man  would  labor 
under  a  certain  degree  of  dementia.  The  first  symptom 
which  indicates  the  approach  of  this  affection,  is  generally 
an  impairment  of  the  memory  of  recent  occurrences.  The 
events  of  early  life  have  lost  none  of  their  distinctness, 
while  recent  impressions  are  feebly  made,  and  in  a  short 
time  mostly  forgotten.  While  the  visits  of  his  friends  are 
forgotten  beyond  the  day  or  week  they  are  made,  the  pa- 
tient may  talk  of  their  former  interviews,  and  relate  the 
most  trivial  details  concerning  them.  From  this  weakness 
of  memory  seems  to  arise  oftentimes  the  first  appearance 
of  mental  alienation.  The  patient  forgetting  the  interme- 
diate ideas,  the  connexion  between  those  he  does  remember, 
and  that  order  and  filiation  of  them  necessary  to  sound 
reasoning,  are  destroyed  ;  and  hence  those  gaps  in  his  ideas, 
and  those  inconsistencies  of  conduct  which  convey  the 
impression  of  mental  derangement.  Coincident  with  the 
failure  of  the  memory,  or  very  shortly  afterwards,  there  is 
a  diminution  of  the  ordinary  ability  of  recognizing  external 
objects,  which  arises  not  so  much  from  weakness  of  the 
organs  of  sensation,  as  of  the  organs  of  perception  within. 
That  is,  the  impressions  of  sound,  light,  touch,  &c.,  are  well 
enough  received,  but  the  qualities  of  form,  size,  weight, 
color,  &c.,  are  imperfectly  discerned.  Objects  not  very 


DEMENTIA.  275 

different  are  mistaken  for  one  another,  from  an  inability  to 
perceive  at  the  first  sight  the  qualities  that  distinguish  them, 
though  the  individual.. may  recognize  his  mistake  when  it  is 
pointed  out  to  him. 

§  236.  Thus  far  there  is  nothing  that  can  properly  be  called 
mental  derangement ;  the  pathological  changes  in  the  brain 
have  only  occasioned  a  diminution  of  the  natural  power 
and  activity  of  the  mind.  The  first  symptom  indicative  of 
derangement  (and  it  is  the  next  which  is  observed)  is  a 
degree  of  incoherence  in  the  ideas,  like  that  of  dreams.  It 
may  not  appear  for  days  or  weeks  together,  or  only  on 
certain  occasions.  The  above  symptoms  increase  in  inten- 
sity more  or  less  rapidly  till  complete  dementia  is  produced, 
when  all  the  moral  and  intellectual  powers  are  involved  in 
this  state  of  decay  and  derangement.  The  memory  of 
recent  impressions  fades  away  as  fast  as  they  are  formed, 
and  the  past  is  beheld  with  considerable  indistinctness  and 
confusion,  though  events  and  acquaintances  of  early  life 
are  not  'yet  forgotten.  The  patient  is  often  at  a  loss  to 
know  where  he  is,  or  thinks  himself  at  home  when  in  another 
house,  and  wonders  why  he- is  not  engaged  in  his  usual 
occupations.  Places,  times,  and  circumstances,  are  forgot- 
ten, or  incorrectly  remembered.  His  friends  are  not  easily 
distinguished;  morning,  noon,  and- evening, -yesterday  and 
to-morrow  are  being  constanl-ly  blended  together ;  and  he 
will  get  up-in.the  night,  mistake  the.  light  of  candles  for 
that  of  day,  and  persist  in  calling  it  morning.  Objects  the 
most  dissimilar  are  mistaken  for  one  another,  and  conse- 
quently his  notions/are  often  the  most  grotesque  and  absurd. 
The  intellect  gradually  becomes  incapable  of  discerning 
the  -relations  of  cause  and  effect,  and  of  comparing  ideas 
together;  in  short  anything  like  an  effort  of  reflection  is 
beyond  its  powers.  The  person  is  unable  to  follow  the 
conversation,  unless  it  be  of  the  simplest  ideas,  and  partic- 
ularly addressed  to  him. 

.§  237.     Although  such  is  the  ordinary  course  of  senile 


276  MEDICAL     JURISPRUDENCE     OF    IN  SANITY. 

dementia,  it  sometimes  begins  with  a  general  nervous  ex- 
citement, accompanied  by  an  excitement  of  some  particular 
function  which  is  exerted  with  a  new  and  unaccustomed 
energy  that  deceives  the  old  man  and  imposes  on  his  friends. 
Thus,  some  are  irritated  by  the  slightest  circumstances,  and 
are  very  active  and  ready  to  undertake  anything.  Others 
experience  venereal  desires  that  have  been  long  since  ex- 
tinguished, exciting  them  to  conduct  directly  contrary  to 
their  ordinary  habits.  Others,  who  had  previously  been 
temperate  and  sober,  manifest  an  appetite  for  high-seasoned 
dishes  and  intoxicating  drinks.  These  symptoms  of  ex- 
citement, however,  are  soon  succeeded  by  those  of  demen- 
tia, and  the  transition  is  sometimes  quite  sudden,  especially 
when  the  patient  is  restrained  from  gratifying  his  unreason- 
able desires. 

§  238.  The  same  decay  which  the  bodily  powers  exhibit 
as  they  proceed  to  their  natural  termination  in  death,  is  al- 
ways participated  by  the  mental  •,  but  it  sometimes  happens 
that  the  latter  are  irretrievably  affected  long  before  the 
former  have  shown  any  symptoms  of  faltering  in  their 
course.  The  causes  of  this  inversion  of  the  natural  order 
of  decay,  so  far  as  they  are  external,  are  to  be  found  prob- 
ably in  the  great  irregularity  of  exercise,  both  of  kind  and 
duration,  to  which  the  brain  is  subjected  by  the  habits  and 
wants  of  a  highly  civilized  condition,  whereby  its  healthy 
elasticity  and  vigor  are  so  impaired,  that  it  needs  only  the 
first  touch  of  decay  to  lose  forever  the  nicely  adjusted  bal- 
ance of  its  -faculties.  The  transition  from  the  greatest 
menial  exertion  to  the  most  tedious  inactivity,  from  the 
various  phases  of  excitement  to  the  irksome  sameness  of 
ennui,  from  the  stimulus  afforded  by  the  performance  of  a 
thousand  duties,  and  the  glow  that  is  constantly  kindled  by 
the  hopes  of  the  future,  to  the  monotony  too  often  occasion- 
ed by  the  loss  of  business,  friends,  and  the  cares  of  long- 
accustomed  pursuits,  is  of  such  frequent  occurrence,  that 
everything  like  regular  and  proper  exercise,  which  is  as 


DEMENTIA.  *277 

indispensable  to  the  health  of  the  brain  as  it  is  to  that  of 
every  other  organ,  is  rarely  enjoyed  by  men  who  are  en- 
gaged in  the  active  business  of  life. 

§  239.  In  the  later  periods  of  life  —  and  particularly  if 
the  constitution  be  weakened  by  sickness  or  dissipation  — 
any  exertion  of  the  mind  far  beyond  its  power  to  sustain,  is 
liable  to  be  rapidly  followed  by  a  state  of  dementia.  The 
same  effect  is  produced  when  after  many  years  of  unremit- 
ting attention  to  certain  pursuits,  the  mind  is  suddenly  de- 
prived of  the  objects  on  which  it  rested,  and  thrown  upon 
itself  to  furnish  the  means  of  excitement  in  the  declining 
years  of  life,  when  novelty  presents  no  allurements,  and 
the  circle  of  earthly  prospects  is  being  constantly  nar- 
rowed. Take  an  individual  from  the  stir  and  bustle  of  a 
city  residence  ;  from  the  unceasing  strife  of  competition  in 
the  pursuit  of  wealth  or  honor  ;  throw  down  the  goal  on 
which  for  years  his  eye  has  rested,  though  ever  receding 
from  his  grasp ;  place  him  in  the  country,  at  a  distance 
from  familiar  faces  and  scenes  ;  and  unless  his  mind  be 
informed  with  various  knowledge,  or  warmed  by  an  interest 
in  the  moral  concerns  of  his  fellow-men  around  him,  it 
will  sink  into  that  state  of  inactivity  so  favorable  for  the 
operation  of  the  predisposing  causes  of  this  disease. 

§  240.  It  must  not  be  supposed  that  old  age  is  subject  to 
no  other  kind  of  insanity  than  that  of  dementia,  for  mania, 
even  of  the  severest  description,  is  not  uncommon  at 
this  period,  and  the  importance  of  distinguishing  between 
them,  in  a  legal  point  of  view,  must  be  immediately  obvi- 
ous. Not  only  may  the  mind  remain  competent  to  the  dis- 
charge of  some  of  the  civil  duties  of  life,  in  mania,  but 
there  is  always  a  prospect  of  its  restoration  to  health.  The 
characteristic  symptoms,  as  well  as  the  exciting  causes  that 
we  have  described  above,  if  carefully  observed,  will  gener- 
ally prevent  us  from  committing  the  serious  mistake  of 
confounding  them  together,  as  is  too  often  done,  with  scarcely 
a  thought  of  the  impropriety  of  the  practice. 
24 


CHAPTER  X. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    DEMENTIA' 

241.  IN  its  last  stages,  dementia  does  not  differ  of 
course,  in  respect  to  its  legal  relations,  from  general  intel- 
lectual mania.  It  is  only  while  the  mind  is  in  its  transition- 
state,  if  we  may  use  the  expression,  passing  from  its  sound 
and  natural  condition  to  the  enfeeblement  and'  total  extinc- 
tion of  its  reflective  powers  —  and  the  entire  change  may 
occupy  months  and  years  in  its  progress  — that  its  legal 
capacity  is  ever  called  in  question.  The  successive  steps 
of  this  disorder  are  so  gradual  and  oftentimes  affect  the 
powers  so  unequally,  that  it  is  not  strange  that  so  much 
diversity  of  opinion  should  arise  respecting  the  capacity  of 
the  mind  which  is  the  subject  of  it,  or  that  groundless  sus- 
picion of  improper  influence  should  be  so  frequently  excit- 
ed. It  must  be  considered  too,  as  a  circumstance  calculated 
to  favor  this  effect,  that  the  judgment  is  debarred  -from 
forming  an  unbiased  decision,  by  suggestions  of  interest 
or  jealousy  which  leads  it  to  see  lapses  of  the  mind  that 
would  otherwise  have  appeared  to  be  nothing  more  than 
that  natural  loss  of  energy,  suffered  by  the  mind  as  it 
"  draws  near  to  its  eternal  home."  Most  people  too  are  so 
little  accustomed  to  observe  and  analyze  the  mental  phe- 
nomena, and  so  little  acquainted  with  the  physiological 
laws  that  govern  their  manifestations,  that  circumstances 
are  often  adduced  as  indications  of  unequivocal  insanity, 
which  only  evince  some  normal  peculiarities  of  the  senile 


LEGAL     CONSEQUENCES     OF    DEMENTIA.  279 

understanding.  They  need  only  to  be  put  on  the  proper 
bias,  to  confound  the  natural  decay  of  the  mental  faculties 
with  that  derangement  that  depends  exclusively  on  patho- 
logical affections  ;  so  strongly  do  they  resemble  each  other 
to  the  superficial  observer.  By  how  many  would  Bichat's 
beautiful  picture  of  the  closing  scenes  of  old  age,  be -mis- 
taken to  represent  the  defaced  and  shattered  temple  that 
has  been  prostrated  by  the  touch  of  disease.  "  Seated 
near  the  fire  and  concentrated  within  himself,  a  stranger  to 
cvery'thing  without  him,  he  passes  his  days  there,  deprived 
of  desire,  of  passion,  and  sensation ;  speaking  little, 
because  he  is  determined  by  nothing  to  break  his  silence, 
yet  happy  in  feeling  that  he  still  exists,  when  almost  every 
other  sentiment  is  gone."1  Far  greater,  then,  must  be  the 
necessity  of  caution  in  distinguishing  between  such  degrees 
of  capacity  as  exist  in  the  early  and  those  of  the  later 
stages  of  dementia,  and  where  too  the  causes  of  error  are 
so  much  more  numerous.  The  deafness  that  generally 
accompanies  the  early  stages,  disables  the  individual  from 
participating  in  or  listening  to  the  conversation  of  those 
around  him,  and  thus  gives  to  his  countenance  an  expression 
of  dullness  and  stupidity  that  might  easily  mislead  one-not 
particularly  acquainted  with-  him,  while  in  fact,  he  needs 
only  to  be  properly  addressed,  to  display. a  mind  that  has 
not  yet  ceased  to  think  with  some  degree  of  accuracy  and 
vigor.  •  The  latter  fact,  however,  will  be  known  only  to  his 
intimate  friends,  while  the  former  is  conveyed  to  the  mass 
of  common  observers  who  are  always  ready  to  decide 
upon  a  person's  mental  capacity,  from  an  occasional  glimpse 
of  his  manner,  or  a  few  remarks  on  the  most  ordinary 
topics.  .  . 

§  242.     A  judge  is  seldom  required  to  decide  questions 
of.  more  delicacy  —  questions  that  demand  such  nice  and 

1  Sur  la  Vie  et  leMort,-pt.  1,  c.  x. 


280  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

cautious  balancing  of  evidence,  such  penetration  into  motives 
and  biases,  such  a  profound  knowledge  of  the  mental  man- 
ifestations as  affected  by  disease,  —  than  those  of  mental 
capacity  in  old  age,  where  the  mind  is  confessedly  laboring 
under  some  kind  or  degree  of  impairment.  The  standard 
by  which  witnesses'  opinions  are  formed  in  such  cases  is  so 
different,  and  the  pertinacity  with  which  each  one  clings  to 
his  own  conclusions,  —  in  proportion  generally  to  his  igno- 
rance of  the  subject  —  is  so  strong,  that  nothing  but  a  great 
display  of  the  above  mentioned  qualities  will  enable  the 
judge  to  perform  his  duty  with  credit  to  himself,  and  satis- 
faction to  others.  Unless  he  can  state  the  grounds  of  his 
opinions,  they  are  no  better  than  surmises,  and  he  fails  of 
accomplishing  one  of  the  most  desirable  objects  of  the  law  — 
that  of  establishing  and  confirming  the  popular  confidence 
in  its  decisions.  Difficult  as  this  duty  is,  it  will  be  very 
much  lightened  by  attending  to  some  of  those  points  which 
can  always  be  ascertained,  and  which  have  an  important 
bearing  on  the  question  at  issue. 

§  243.  Though  some  of  the  perceptive  powers  may 
preserve  their  wonted  activity  through  the  whole  of  the  dis>- 
ease;  yet  it  is  in  these  that  the  disorder  is  first  manifested, 
and  that  long  before  the  higher  powers  of  the  understanding 
have  materially  suffered.  The  memory  of  persons,  things, 
and  dates,  and  especially  of  recent  impressions,  is  exceed- 
ingly treacherous,  and  so  striking  is  this  impairment  to  those 
unaccustomed  to  look  beneath  the  surface  of  appearances, 
hat  when  they  find  they  are  not  recognized,  though  once 
well  enough  known ;  that  past  events  and  the  actors  en- 
gaged in  them,  are  either  forgotten,  or  singularly  entangled 
and  confused ;  and  that  a  certain  listlessness  and  absence  of 
mind  takes  the  place  of  former  animation  and  attentiveness  ; 
they  summarily  conclude  that  for  all  business  purposes,  the 
patient  is  utterly  incapacitated.  The  impressions  produced 
by  a  single  short  interview  have  no  chance  of  being  correct- 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    DEMENTIA.  281- 

ed  by  subsequent' opportunities,  or  by  more  philosophical 
observations,  and  the  final  opinion  is  adopted  and  authorita- 
tively propounded,  that -the  individual;  in  question  did  not 
possess  legal  capacity.  If  he  take  no  part  in  the  Conversa- 
tion, and  appear  scarcely  to  know  what-  is  passing  around 
him,  we  are  not  to  draw  unfavorable  conclusions  relative  to 
his  mental  condition,  until  we  ascertain,  if  possible,  that  there 
are  no  peculiar  reasons  why  he  should  remain  silent  and 
alone,  and  that  he  is  no  longer  capable  of  pursuing  a  "train 
of  thought  of  some  length  and  complexity.  If  he  have  for- 
gotten the  names  and  cireumstances  of  those  once  familiar, 
but  whom  he  has  not  been  in  the  habit  of  seeing  recently,  it 
does  not  follow  that  he  has  also  forgotten  those  whose  rela- 
tions to  him  have  kept  them  within  the  sphere  of  his  daily 
observation,  and  made  them  the  objects  of  his  thoughts.  An 
old  servant  or  tenant  whose  countenance  may  not  have  been 
seen  for  weeks,  or  months,  is  not  to  be  compared  in  this 
respect,  with  the  near  relative  who  is  frequently  in  his  com- 
pany, and  always  regarded  with  feejings  of  interest  and 
affection.  However  certain  it  may  be  that  he  has  lost  all 
sense  of  the  ordinary  proprieties  of  life,  it  needs"  farther 
evidence  to  prove  that  the  persons  and  interests,  which  have 
been  always  nearest  to  his  heart  and  connected  with  the 
great  purposes  of  his  life,  have  utterly  faded  from  his  mind. 
The  evidence  of  those,  therefore,  who  are  qualified  both  by 
their  habits  of  intimacy  with  the  person  whose  mental  capa- 
city is  in  question,  and  by  their  intelligence  and  education, 
to  appreciate  the  changes  his  mind  may  have  undergone,  is 
far  more  to  be  relied  on  than  that  of  people  of  a  different 
description,  who  make  up  their  opinion  hastily  from  a  few 
casual  and  perhaps  trivial  circumstances.  The  great  point 
to  be  determined  is,  not  whether  he  was  apt  to  forget  the 
names  of  people  in  whom  he  felt  no  particular  interest,  nor 
the  dates  of  events  which  concerned  him  little,  but  whether 
in  conversation 'about  his  affairs,  his  friends  and  relatives, 
24* 


282  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

he  evinced  sufficient  knowledge  of  both,  to  be  able  to  dis- 
pose of  the  former  with  a  sound  and  untrammeled  judgment. 
It  is  a  fact  that  many  of  those  old  men  who  appear  so  stupid, 
and  who  astonish  the  stranger  by  the  singularities  of  their 
conduct,  need  only  to  have  their  attention  fairly  fixed  on 
their  property,  their  business,  or  their  family,  to  understand 
them  perfectly  well,  and  to  display  their  sagacity  in  the  re- 
marks they  make.  In  the  case  of  Kindleside  v.  Harrison,1 
whicn  we  shall  briefly  notice,  in  illustration  of  these  remarks, 
the  reader  may  obtain  a  better  idea  than  can  otherwise  be 
conveyed,  of  the  kind  of  evidence  generally  produced  in 
cases  of  senile  dementia,  and  derive  instruction  and  high 
intellectual  gratification  from  the  clearness  and  ability  with 
which  it  is  sifted  and  stamped  with  its  proper  value,  in  the 
judgment  of  the  court,  Sir  John  Nicholl. 

§  244.  The  points  contested  in  this  case  were  four  codi- 
cils to  the  will  of  an  old  gentleman,  on  the  ground  that  at 
the  time  of  making  them,  he  was  incapable,  by  reason  of 
mental  decay,  of  understanding  their  nature  and  effect.  It 
was  testified  by  some  of  the  servants  of  his  brother,  who 
lived  at  a  little  distance  from  him,  and  by  those  of  the  lady 
with  whom  he,  the  deceased,  resided,  that  during  the  two 
or  three  years  within  which  the  codicils  were  made,  he  fre- 
quently did  not  know  people  with  whom  he  had  previously 
been  well  acquainted,  without  being  told  who  they  were ; 
that  he  would  go  about  the  house  and  garden  looking  around, 
and  appearing  not  to  know  what  he  was  about.  On  one 
occasion,  he  not  only  did  not  recognize  a  certain  person,  but 
could  not  be  made  to  understand  who  he  was,  and  it  was 
testified  by  a  very  different  kind  of  witness,  that  the  de- 
ceased asked  him  how  old  was  witness's  father  (though  he 
had  been  dead  sixteen  years  and  had  been  his  partner  in 
business,)  and  soon  after,  he  inquired  of  the  witness  after 

1  2  Fhillimore's  Reports,  449. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    DEMENTIA.  283 

his  health/as  if  he  were  addressing  another  person.  Several 
other  similar  lapses  of  memory  and  various  appearances  of 
childishness  in  his  conduct,  were  also  revealed  by  the  evi- 
dence, amply  sufficient,  no  doubt,  to  induce  superficial 
observers  to  believe  that  he  was  mentally  incapacitated  from 
disposing  of  property.  It  appeared,  however,  that  he  was 
in  the  habit  of  giving,  in  favor  of  his  brother's  butler,  drafts 
accurately  signed  and  filled  up ;  that  at  christmas  time,  he 
gave  the  servants  christmas  boxes  and  the  usual  amount  of 
money,  and  entered  the  sums  in  his  account  book  ;  that  he 
received  a  farmer's  bills  for  corn  and  paid  them  with  drafts 
on  his  banker  which  he  wrote  himself,  going  through  the 
whole  business  correctly,  and  that  he  docketed  the  bills  and 
receipts  on  the  back  with  the  name  of  the  person  to  whom 
paid,  and  the  amount  of  the  bill,  making  corresponding 
entries  also  in  his  private  account  book ;  that  he  signed 
twenty  drafts  at  least  one  morning  for  payment  of  his 
brother's  debts,  without  instruction  or  assistance,  subscribing 
his  own  name  as  executor  of  his  brother ;  that  he  would 
detect  errors  in  the  casting  up  of  other  people's  accounts ; 
that  he  discharged  his  physician's  bills  correctly ;  and  in 
short  that  he  managed  his  affairs,  and  that  prudently  and 
correctly,  to  the  last.  It  was  also  testified  that  it  was  his 
practice  to  read  aloud  to  the  family  the  psalms  and  lessons 
of  the  day ;  that  he  was  fond  of  a  little  fun  and  played  at 
whist  remarkably  well.  That  a  person  might  have  done  all 
this  and  yet  been  unsound  in  mind,  is  certainly  not  impos- 
sible ;  but  it  was  far  beyond  the  power  of  a  mind  so  broken 
up  by  old  age  and  the  invasion  of  disease  as  to  be  incapable 
of  altering  testamentary  dispositions  previously  made.  This 
consideration,  and  the  fact  that  the  circumstances  of  the 
case  furnished  abundant  reasons  for  the  alteration,  induced 
the  court  to  decide  in  favor  of  the  capacity  of  the  testator. 

§  215.  In  this  country  where  such   cases  are  decided  by 
juries  who  are  not  responsible  for  their  decisions,  we  some- 


284  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

times  meet  with  extraordinary  verdicts.  The  case  of  Den- 
net  and  wife  v.  Dow,  Executor,  recently  decided  in  Maine, 
after  a  protracted  litigation,  is  calculated  to  excite  serious 
reflections  in  the  minds  of  all  who  are  accustomed  to  regard 
the  testamentary  act  as  too  sacred  to  be  disturbed  by  any 
other  than  the  clearest  evidence  of  incompetency.  It  ap- 
pears that  Stephen  Neal,  who  died  in  December,  1836,  aged 
seventy-four  years,  left  a  will,  dated  29th  of  October, 
1835,  in  which  his  nephew,  John  Neal,  was  made  residuary 
legatee  to  nearly  the  whole  of  his  property.  From  the  de- 
cree of  the  probate  judge  approving  this  will,  an  appeal  was 
entered  by  the  natural,  heirs^  (the  daughter  of  the  testator 
and  her  husband)  and  tried  before  the  supreme  court  in 
November,  1838  ;  and  again,  in  consequence  of  a  successful 
application  for  a  new  trial,  in  December,  1840,  .the  verdict 
being,  in  each  trial,  against  the  will,  on  the  ground  of  in- 
sanity. Before  noticing  the  evidence  relative  to  his  mental 
condition,  it  will  be  better  to  mention  some  acts  in  which 
the  testator  was  a  party  concerned.  April  15th,  1834,  he 
was  placed  under  guardianship,  as  being  non  compos,  but 
the  application  which  was  made  by  some  prominent  mem- 
bers of  the  Society  of  Friends,  to  which  he  also  belonged, 
was  accompanied  by  a  written  request  from  him  that  the 
measure  might  be  taken,  and  no  inquiry  was  made  into  his 
mental  condition.  The  guardian  having  taken  him  home  to 
his  own  house,  and  observed  him  closely  for  several  months, 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  he  was  not  unsound,  and  on  his 
setting  forth  the  facts,  the  letters  of  guardianship  were  re- 
voked, September,  1834.  In  November,  1834,  he  conveyed 
to  the  appellants  divers  stocks  and  portions  of  real  estate, 
amounting  to  about  one  half  of  his  whole  property.  In 
December,  1834,  he  made  a  will  which  was  found  after  his 
death  uncancelled,  in  which  he  constituted  the  Society  of 
Friends  in  Portland  residuary  legatee  of  nearly  all  his  re- 
maining property.  In  July,  1835,  the  Friends,  by  their  com- 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    DEMENTIA.  285 

mittee,  applied  to  have  him  placed  under  guardianship  on 
the  ground  of  his  being  non  compos  mentis.  This  application 
having  been  dismissed  in  October,  1835,  it  was  immediately 
renewed,  and  again  dismissed  December  2d,  1835.  On 
the  29th  of  October,  1835,  he  made  the  will  in  dis- 
pute, agreeing  essentially  with  the  other  just  mentioned, 
excepting  the  clause  respecting  the  residuary  legatee,  in 
which  John  Neal  is  substituted  for  the  Society  of  Friends. 
In  February,  1836,  his  last  illness  commenced  ;  he  was 
placed  under  guardianship  upon  application  of  the  Friends, 
25th  of  April,  1836,  and  died  in  December  of  the  same 
year. 

§  246.  As  the  evidence  touching  the  mental  condition  of 
the  testator,  was  unusually  multifarious,  rambling  and  inap- 
propriate, we  must  confine  ourselves  to  those  facts  which 
have  any  real  connexion  with  this  point.1  In  favor  of  his 
mental  capacity,  it  was  testified  by  the  person  who  drew  up 
the  will,  that  he  did  it  from  a  draft  originally  in  testator's 
handwriting  ;  that  they  had  considerable  conversation  about 
the  items  ;  arid  that  he  had  no  doubt  of  his  entire  compe- 
tency. One  of  the  subscribing  witnesses,  who  was  also  a 
neighbor  and  in  the  habit  of  doing  business  with  him,  had 
no  doubt  of  his  competency.  While  under  the  first  guardi- 
anship and  during  the  year  1835,  he  made  bargains  and 
contracts  of  various  kinds,  such  as  for  sale  of  land,  for  board, 
for  rent  with  his  tenants,  for  services,  &c.,  all  of  which  ap- 


1  For  these  I  am  indebted  to  the  notes  of  the  Courts  (Mr.  Justice 
Shepley  on  the  first  trial,  and  Chief  Justice  Weston,  on  the  last,) 
which  were  politely  submitted  to  my  inspection  by  those  gentlemen. 
As  the  evidence  at  the  two  trials  was  essentially  the  same,  except 
that  some  additional  facts  came  out  at  the  last,  I  have  made  no  dis- 
tinction between  it,  only  using  those  notes  in  which  it  is  most  fully 
reported.  As  the  verdicts  were  alike,  there  seems  to  be  no  impro- 
priety in  this  course.  I  have  given  every  fact  which  had  any  bear- 
ing on  the  state  of  the  testator's  mind. 


286  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

peared  to  be  shrewd  and  well-considered.  The  woman  with 
whom  he  boarded  a  few  weeks,  immediately  after  the  first 
guardianship  was  discharged,  testified  that  he  used  to  pur- 
chase for  the  table,  he  keeping  an  account  and  she  also  ; 
and  that  when  they  settled,  she  found  him  exact  to  a  cent, 
and  very  close.  The  accounts  with  his  tenants  were  en- 
tered in  a  little  memorandum-book,  addition  and  subtraction 
made,  credits  given,  &c.  After  making  a  contract  for  board 
in  November,  1834,  by  which  he  was  to  provide  the  fuel, 
he  struck  out  the  word  firewood,  and  inserted  "  coal,  to 
be  delivered  at  the  wharf,"  in  order  to  save  the  charge  of 
truckage.  In  July,  1835,  when  land  speculations  were  rife, 
he  refused  an  offer  of  two  thousand  six  hundred  dollars  and 
half  profits  for  a  lot  of  land,  preferring  two  thousand  eight 
hundred  dollars,  part  in  cash  and  the  balance  secured  by 
mortgage.  It  appears  too,  that  the  purchaser,  having  soon 
after  sold  the  land  for  five  thousand  dollars,  induced  the 
testator  to  change  the  papers,  and  receive  from  the  last  pur- 
chaser notes  amounting  to  three  thousand  five  hundred  dol- 
lars, secured  by  a  mortgage  on  the  land.  He  showed  un- 
common watchfulness  about  security,  insisting  upon  the  pur- 
chaser's wife  signing  a  relinquish ment  of  dower  in  the  mort- 
gage, until  satisfied  by  legal  inquiry  that  it  was  not  necessary. 
He  insisted  too  upon  having  the  deed  carried  down  at  night 
and  recorded,  lest  'possibly  an  attachment  might  be  slipped 
in,  as  he  had  known  such  a  case.'  On  being  assured  of  the 
purchaser's  solvency,  he  gave  up  the  point,  and  waited  until 
the  next  morning.  Hiring  a  man  to  dig  his  potatoes  by 
the  bushel  in  October,  1834,  and  finding  that  he  made  more 
than  day's  wages,  he  insisted  on  changing  the  bargain  and 
paying  him  by  the  day.  Another  witness  who  had  known 
him  for  fifty  years,  met  him  one  day  while  under  the.  first 
guardianship,  and  the  testator  began  to  converse  about  the 
value  of  stocks  and  the  comparative  value  of  bank  and  in- 
surance stocks,  observing  that  he  owned  both,  and  thought 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF    DEMENTIA.  287 

the  former  safer,  though  the  latter  might  be  more  profitable. 
Neither  then  nor  afterwards,  for  he  was  in  the  habit  of 
meeting  testator  frequently  at  his  son's  house,  did  he  observe 
anything  in  him  to  lead  him  to  suspect  that  the  testator  was 
unsound  or  incompetent.  One  of  his  nieces  often  saw  him 
during  the  summers  of  1833,  '34,  and  '35.  At  one  time 
he  fenced  their  land-lots  which  were  contiguous;  bought 
boards,  used  her  old  posts  to  save  expense,  and  kept  the 
accounts.  He  also  bought  trees,  gave  her  some,  and  directed 
her  how  to  plant  them.  An  architect  conversed  with  him 
several  times  about  some  houses  he  was  building  for  his 
nephew  in  1835,  and  showed  him  plans  with  which  he  was 
pleased,  though  he  criticised  them,  and  suggested  some  sen- 
sible alterations  in  the  manner  of  laying  the  stone.  In  the 
autumn  of  1834,  he  bargained  with  a  witness  for  some  stones 
to  be -used  in  making  a  cellar  drain;  and  conversed  very 
sensibly  on  the  different  kinds  and  qualities  of  stone  and  the 
manner  of  spliting  them.  About  this  time  he  conversed 
with  considerable  acuteness  respecting  a  young  child's 
memory.  The  child  knew  its  aunt,  he  said,  not  because  he 
remembered  her  countenance,  but  because  she  resembled 
his  mother ;  and  when  it  was  objected  that  the  resemblance 
was  not  very  strong,  he  replied  that  the  child  might  perceive 
it  though  an  adult  might  not,  and  that  probably  the  resem- 
blance was'  in  the  sound  of  their  voices,  rather  than  their 
features.  This  child  died  in  September,  1835,  and  for  some 
time  afterwards,  he  frequently  spoke  of  it,  and  with  feelings 
of  affection.  It  appears  that  until  his  last  sickness  he  always 
immediately  recognized  his  friends  and  acquaintances,  and 
manifested  an  interest  in  their  welfare. 

§  247.  To  show  that  the  will  was  a  rational  act,  as  well 
as  rationally  done,  a  memorandum  book  was'produced,  con- 
taining,. in  the  handwriting  of  the  first  guardian,  a  schedule 
of  the  property  he  had  conveyed  to  his  children,  and  be- 
neath it,  in  his  own  hand  and  subscribed  with  his  name,  he 


288  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

expressed  the  design  not  to  give  them  anything  more,  say- 
ing,  "  he  had  amply  provided  them  with  the  means  of  a 
comfortable  subsistence,  provided  that  they  exercise  proper 
industry  and  economy  ;  and  without  these  all  my  property 
could  not  suffice  them,  which  therefore,  I  have  thought 
proper  to  dispose  of  in  another  manner."  He  expressed  the 
same  views  in  conversation  with  different  witnesses.  It 
also  appeared  that  he  was  not  on  good  terms  with  his  child- 
ren, from  whom  he  had  received,  or  at  least  thought  he  had 
received  much  unkind  treatment.  As  reasons  for  altering 
his  testamentary  dispositions,  we  have  the  two  attempts  of 
the  Friends  to  place  him  under  guardianship,  which,  of 
course,  were  as  little  calculated  to  secure  his  regard  for 
them,  as  the  treatment  of  his  children  was  to  increase  his 
affection  for  them.  It  also  appeared  in  evidence  that  the 
society  had  "  dealt  with  his  wife,"  and  turned  her  out  of 
meeting,  on  the  representations  of  his  own  daughter. 

§  248.  On  the  other  hand,  in  proof  of  his  incompetency, 
it  was  testified  by  one  of  the  subscribing  witnesses,  that  he 
41  did  not  think  him  of  sound  mind,"  though  he  could  give 
no  other  reason  for  his  opinion  than  "  the  appearance  of  the 
man."  He  could  state  no  facts  nor  conversation  evincing 
unsoundness  of  mind,  though  before  and  after  the  execution 
of  the  will,  the  testator  was  in  the  habit  of  buying  groceries 
at  his  shop.  He^  also  admitted  that  the  testator  "  always  ap- 
peared to  know  what  he  was  about."  The  remaining  sub- 
scribing witness  "  did  not  consider  him  so  sound  as  it  was 
desirable  he  should  be  in  such  an  important  transaction," 
though  he  admitted  that  "  he  was  pretty  close  in  making  a 
bargain,  and  was  a  saving,  prudent  man  in  his  calculations." 
He  told  stories  and  conversed  correctly  on  old  affairs,  but  on 
recent  transactions,  was  not  so  connected.  This  witness 
also  mentioned  some  other  facts  indicative,  in  his  opinion,  of 
mental  unsoundness,  which  will  be  presently  noticed.  In 
July,  1835,  he  offered  to  the  city  treasurer,  in  payment  of 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    DEMENTIA.  289 

his  taxes,  a  scrap  of  paper,  apparently  a  bill  of  purchases, 
and  insisted  that  it  was  as  good  as  money  and  would  be 
taken  at  the  bank.  But  it  appeared  that  he  had  received  a 
check  upon  a  bank,  but  his  sight  being  poor  and  his  specta- 
cles missing,  he  had  mistaken  for  it  something  of  no  im- 
portance. One  evening  he  entered  a  house  next  his  own 
and  sat  down,  but  he  discovered  the  mistake  himself  the 
moment  he  heard  a  -strange  voice.  Once  when  the  meeting 
for  worship  was  over,  and  the  business  meeting  had  begun, 
he  asked  in -a  loud  whisper,  an  old  friend  of  his  who  dealt 
in  wool,  what  he  gave  for  wool  then.  On  being  answered 
that  he  should  wait  till  after  meeting  before  talking  on  such 
subjects,  he  nodded  assent  and  was  silent.  Several  .times 
he  went  out  of  his  house  without  his  hat,  and  in  one  or  two 
instances,  he  inquired  the  way  to  a  house  or  street  with 
which  he  had  been  previously  well  acquainted,  and  then 
started  off  in  an  opposite  direction.  Some  of  the  entries  in 
the  memorandum  book  were  repeated,  but  they  were  all 
correct  to  a  cent.  Once,  in  1833,  after  paying  the  balance 
of  an  account,  .he  entirely  forgot  it  in  fifteen  or  twenty 
minutes,  and  when  reminded  of  it,  said,  I  am  forgetful ;  and 
in  1835, 'he  would  ask  the  same  question  several  times  in 
succession,  without  being  aware  that  it  had  been  asked  and 
answered.  Once  he  undertook  to  write  a  deed  (a  business 
he  was  accustomed  to), .boggled  ove'r,  and  finally  gave  it  up. 
Then  he  took  another  blank,  got  confused,  and  the.  witness 
had  to  write  it  himself.  In  1834,  when  the -witness  carried 
to  him  money  to  pay  a  note,  he  had  forgotten  the  note 
entirely,  was  unable  to.  find  it,  and  requested  the  witness  to 
write  a  receipt  for  him  to  sign.  The.  money  he  undertook 
to  count,  but  merely  tumbled  it  over,  and  laid  it  down,  when 
the  witness  counted  it  over  to  him,  bill  by  bill.  On  pur- 
chasing-things at  the  shops,,  he  would  take  his  change  with- 
out counting  it.  It  was  testified  that  when  at  table  he 
required  his  food  to  be  cut  up  for  him ;  thai  he  would  at- 
25 


290  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

tempt  to  spread  cheese  on  his  bread,  mistaking  it  for  butter ; 
would  pour  his  tea  into  a  cup-plate,  instead  of  a  saucer ; 
and  put  his  sugar  into  the  plate.  A  stray  cow  coming  into 
the  yard,  he  said  it  was  one  he  had  lately  bought.  Asked 
a  witness  if  his  mother's  shed  was  much  injured  in  the 
storm,  alluding  to  his  aunt's  shed,  which  had  been  blown 
down.  He  spoke  of  having  some  chairs  and  tables  in  a 
town  at  some  distance,  and  wanted  the  witness  to  ask  the 
stage-driver  to  bring  them  down,  as  he  might,  a  part  at  a 
time.  One  witness  testified  that  in  the  autumn  of  1835, 
after  the  execution  of  the  will,  he  rode  out  with  him  at  a 
little  distance  from  town;  that  he  seemed  lost  —  did  not 
know  where  he  was,  even  when  he  got  to  his  son's  tanyard  ; 
that  he  would  rave  about  his  children  and  their  ill-treatment 
of  him,  and  then  go  to  see  them  and  be  cheerful  with  them, 
make  no  complaints,  and  come  away  happy.  He  admitted, 
however,  that  they  drove  around  by  an  unusual  road,  and 
that  on  returning,  while  yet  at  a  little  distance  from  town, 
testator  asked  where  they  were,  when  he  replied,  pointing 
over  the  bridge  to  Dennet's  tanyard,  "Do'nt  thee  know 
that  place  ?  That  is  Oliver's  tanyard."  He  spoke  of  cer- 
tain property  as  his,  after  he  had  sold  it.  A  female  witness, 
who  lived  in  the  same  house  with  him  in  the  autumn  of 
1835,  said  that  he  could  not  dress  himself  unassisted ;  that 
she  had  seen  him  try  to  put  on  his  wife's  stays ;  that  he 
used  to  bring  bits  of  paper  and  ask  her  to  sew  them  together, 
calling  it  dividing  his  property ;  that  he  talked  of  being 
buried  at  the  head  of  his  bed  ;  that  he  called  patching  win- 
dows, tailoring;  and  that  he  made  up  a  fire  on  the  floor  and 
filled  the  room  with  smoke.  It  appeared,  however,  that 
being  large,  clumsy,  and  wearing  a  loose  wrapper,  he  was 
sometimes  embarrassed  in  putting  on  his  pantaloons ;  that 
his  wife's  stays  were  in  fact  a  flannel  waist  much  resembling 
the  flannel  waistcoat  he  always  wore  ;  that  the  bits  of  paper 
he  had  sewed  together  were,  on  one  occasion  at  least, 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    DEMENTIA.  291 

vouchers  of  his  guardian's  accounts,  which  he  had  stitched 
through  and  through,  in  order  to  preserve  them ;  that  he 
had  strips  of  paper  sewed  together  and  used  for  a  measure  ; 
that  the  hearth  was  very  large,  and  one  leg  of  one  andiron 
stood  off  the  hearth  on  the  floor.  There  was  evidence  of  a 
want  of  cleanliness,  and  neglect  of  the  decencies  of  life, 
indicative  of  mental  unsoundness.  He  was  seen  in  the 
street  with  the  flap  of  his  pantaloons  wholly  or  partly  down, 
and  he  sometimes  disregarded  the  calls  of  nature,  or  attend- 
ed to  them  in  improper  places.  It  was  testified,  however, 
in  explanation  of  these  facts,  that  his  hands  being  swollen 
and  clumsy,  and  the  button  holes  of  his  pantaloons  much 
worn,  he  had  some  difficulty  in  buttoning  and  in  keeping 
them  buttoned;  that  the  uncleanliness  was  not  habitual,  but 
limited  to  occasions  when  he  was  suffering  from  diarrhoea, 
and  that  other  instances  of  impropriety,  which  had  been 
alleged,  occurred  during  his  last  illness,  when  his  mental 
unsoundness  was  admitted  by  the  other  party.  It  also  ap- 
peared that  he  was  somewhat  intemperate  in  the  use  of 
spirituous  liquors. 

§  249.  No  one,  at  all  acquainted  with  the  habits  of  old 
age  and  with  the  effect  of  senile  dementia  on  the  mind,  can 
entertain  a  doubt  of  the  testator's  competency  to  make  his 
will.  True,  he  was  more  forgetful  of  the  present  than  of 
the  past ;  he  frequently  forgot  what  he  had  just  before  said 
or  done ;  and  he  sometimes  disregarded  the  common  ob- 
servances of  life.  All  this,  however,  may  be  said  of  multi- 
tudes of  old  men  whose  competency  for  any  business  is 
never  questioned  by  those  who  know  them  best.  However 
weak  may  have  been  the  mind  of  this  old  man,  he  still  was 
acquainted  with  the  value  of  property,  especially  of  his  own  ; 
he  recognized  his  relatives  and  friends,  was  always  aware 
of  the  exact  nature  of  their  relations  towards  him,  and  of 
their  respective  claims  on  his  bounty  ;  he  still  was  capable 
of  feeling  the  sting  of  filial  ingratitude,  and  of  beingf  actu- 


292  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

ated  by-  motives  of  ordinary  prudence  and  discretion.  If 
his  mind  were  not  sufficiently  vigorous  to  engage  in  contracts 
and  speculations  of  large  magnitude,  it  was  none  the  less 
able  to  bequeath  his  property,  the  kind  and  amount  of  which 
he  perfectly  understood,  to  relatives  and  friends  whom  he 
still  recognized  and  loved.  The  will  was  a  rational  act, 
rationally  done,  and  there  was  not  a  tittle  of  evidence  to 
show  that  the  testator  was  under  improper  influences. 

$  250.  The  court,  at  each  trial,  refrained  from  any 
comments  on  the  evidence  relating  to  the  testator's,  mental 
condition,  and  the  jury  were  left  to  their  own  unenlightened 
'and  unassisted  deliberations.  There  were  peculiar  reasons, 
perhaps,  for  taking  this  course,  in  the  present  case,  but  we 
'may  be  allowed  to  question  its  propriety  as  a  general  rule 
of  practice.  In  cases  like  these,  which  are  characterized 
by  the  abundance  and  discrepancy  of  the  evidence,  it  needs 
a  cool,  tenacious,  and  intelligent  mind  to  recapitulate 
this  evidence ;  to  sift'1,  to  analyze,  weigh,  and  finally 
stamp  it  with  its  proper  value.  The  jury,  it  is  true,  are 
sole  judges  of  the  facts,  and  if  the  question  here  were, 
whether  certain  facts  offered  in  evidence  were  true  or  false, 
not  a  remark  might  be  required  of  the  court.  But  since 
they  .have  to  do  with  a  'very  different  question,  that  is, 
whether  these  facts  warrant  certain  inferences  relative  to 
mental  capacity,  they  are  unable  to  answer  it  correctly,  we 
apprehend,  without  the  light  that  is  derived  from  superior 
penetration  and  attainments.  The  knowledge  necessary 
for  this  purpose  is  of  a  technical  kind,  which  a  jury  cannot 
be  expected  to  possess,  and  the  very  abundance  of  the  ev- 
idence is  calculated  to  fill  their  minds  with  uncertainty  and 
confusion.  If  they  can  hear  the  opinions  of  experts- — of 
persons  who  have  given  especial  attention  to  this  branch  of 
knowledge  —  respecting  the  precise  value  of  all  these 
facts  considered  in  relation  to  the  point  they  are  designed 
to  establish,  then  indeed  they  would  be  in  a  condition  to 


LEGAJ,    CONSEQUENCES     OF    DEMENTIA.  293 

form  conclusions  of  their  own.  But  since  this  is  not 
always  practicable,1  .are  they  to  be  left  to  float  about  on  a 
sea  of  conjecture,  without  star  or  compass  to  guide  their 
course?  Must  a  jury,  not  one  of  whom,  perhaps,  ever 
observed  a  case  of  insanity,  or  even  studied  the.  operations  of 
the  sane  mind,  take  upon  themselves  to  say  that  certain  facts 
do;  or  do  not  prove  the  presence  of  testamentary  capacity  ;  in 
other  words,  to  decide  upon  professional  questions  of  acknowl- 
edged difficulty  ? "  The  really  intelligent  and  conscientious 
juror,  distracted  by  an  appalling  mass  of  evidence,  much 
"of  which  .is  irrelevant  and  contradictory,  which  he  may  try 
in  vain  to  unravel  and  arrange,  and  puzzled  by  questions  he 
never  'considered  before,  will  and  ought  to  look  to  the  court 
for  assistance. 

§  251.  The  principle  laid  down  by  the  court,  at  the 
first  trial,  that  a  disposing  mind  means  "so  much  mind  and 
memory  as  would  enable  him  to  transact  common  business 
with  that  intelligence  which  belongs  to  -the  weakest  class  of 
sound  minds,"  may  be  'theoretically  correct,  but  it  seems 
to  be  of  too  abstract  a  nature  to  be  practicably  applied  by 
jurors.  To  compare  one  mind  with  another  of  different 
calibre,  is*  a  task  for  which  they  a"re  altogether  unfitted  by 
their  previous  tastes,  habits  and  studies.  Justice  merely 


i  Nothing  can  more  strongly  illustrate  the  necessity  of  some 
such  measure  as  we  have  suggested,  (§31)  than  a  fact  that  occur- 
red in  this  case.  The  appellees  were  desirous  that  the  evidence 
relating  to  the  testator's  mental  condition,  should  be  heard  by  some 
one  particularly  acquainted  with  the  subject  of  insanity,  who  might 
testify,  on  the  strength  of  such  knowledge,  whether  the  evidence 
showed  him  to  have  been  incapable  of  making  a  valid  will.  The 
attendance  of  such  a  wjtness  could  not  be  obtained,  for  one  of  the 
gentlemen  applied  to  —  and  they  were  the  nearest  —  resided  at  a 
distance  of  120,  and  another  of  250  miles.  Had  it  been  otherwise, 
we  might  not  have  seen  the  most  sacred  of  legal  acts  annulled  on 
the  most  trivial  grounds. 
25* 


294  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

requires  that  the  strength  of  the  mind  should  be  equal  to 
the  purpose  to  which  it  is  applied.  If  this  simple  principle 
be  distinctly  presented  to  the  minds  of  the  jury,  there  are 
few  so  dull  as  to  be  unable  to  give  it  a  practical  application. 
It  is  not  only  reasonable,  but  it  has  the  merit  of  having 
been  repeatedly  recognized  in  courts  of  law,  until  it  has 
now  obtained  all  the  force  of  established  authority.  "  He 
may  not  have  sufficient  strength  of  memory  and  vigor  of 
intellect,  to  make  and  to  digest  all  the  parts  of  a  contract, 
and  yet  be  competent  to  direct  the  distribution  of  his  prop- 
erty by  will."  !  "  A  man  may  be  capable  of  making  a 
will,  and  yet  incapable  of  making  a  contract,  or  to  manage 
his  estate."  2 


1  Stevens  and  wife  v.  Vancleve,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  R.  262. 

*  Harrison  v.  Rowan,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  R.  580.  Nowhere  has  the 
subject  of  testamentary  capacity  been  treated  with  so  much  good 
sense  and  regard  to  scientific  truth,  as  in  the  charges  of  the  court 
from  which  the  above  quotations  are  made.  With  the  progress  of 
sound  views  on  this  subject,  the  correctness  of  the  principles  there 
laid  down  will  only  be  the  more  firmly  established. 


CHAPTER   XL 


FEBRILE    DELIRIUM. 

§  252.  CEREBRAL  affection,  of  some  kind  or  other,  we 
have  considered  as  essential  to  the  existence  of  insanity  —  as 
constituting  in  fact  the  whole  disease  ;  but  there  is  another 
form  of  mental  derangement  of  very  common  occurrence, 
in  which  the  cerebral  affection  is  only  an  accidental  symp- 
tom of  severe  disease  in  the  brain  or  some  other  organ. 
The  functions  of  the  brain  are  disturbed  in  each,  but  they 
differ  so  widely  in  their  causes,  progress,  and  termination, 
that  the  propriety  of  distinguishing  them  from  each  other 
for  medico-legal,  as  well  as  therapeutical  purposes,  is  uni- 
versally recognized.  Few  diseases  terminate  in  death  with- 
out presenting  at  some  period  or  other  of  their  progress,  but 
more  particularly  towards  their  close,  more  or  less  disturb- 
anceof  the  mental  faculties  ;  organic  diseases  of  the  brain, 
especially  acute  inflammation  of  its  membranes  and  its 
periphery,  are  generally  accompanied  with  delirium ;  and 
it  is  sometimes  a  symptom  of  acute  disease  in  other  organs, 
in  consequence  of  the  cerebral  irritation  which  they  sympa- 
thetically produce.  It  is  seldom  entirely  absent  in  fevers  of 
any  severity,  and  is  readily  determined  by  inflammations 
of  the  mucous  and  serous  membranes,  particularly  of  the 
alimentary  canal.  In  inflammation  of  the  lungs,  liver, 
spleen,  and  kidneys,  it  appears  only  towards  the  last  period 
of  the  disease  when  it  is  approaching  a  fatal  termination. 
Surgical  operations,  too,  that  prove  fatal,  are  ordinarily 


296  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

attended  at  last  with  delirium.  In  chronic  diseases,  such  as 
cancer,  dropsy,  consumption,  the  mind  is  seldom  impaired, 
except  that  occasional Jy,  during  the  final  struggle,  it  wanders 
over  the  mingled  and  broken  images  of  the  past.  Delirium 
is  also  produced  by  intoxicating  agents,  when  it  simulates 
mania  more  perfectly  than  when  it  arises  from  other  causes  ; 
but  this  form  of  the  affection  will  be  discussed  in  a  different 
.place. 

§  253.  Delirium  sometimes  occurs  suddenly,  but  gene- 
rally comes  on  gradually,  and  is  preceded  by  premonitory 
symptoms,  such  as  pain  or  throbbing  in  the  head,  heat  of 
the  scalp,  and  flushing  of  the  cheeks.  Its  first  appearance 
is  manifested  by  a  propensity  of  the  patient  to  talk  during 
sleep,  and  a  mome'ntary  forgetful  ness  of  hjs  situation  and  'of 
things  about  him,  on  waking  from  it.  After  being  fully 
aroused,  however,  and  his  senses  collected,  the  mind  is 
comparatively  clear  and  tranquil,  till  the  next  slumber, 
when  the  same  scene  is  repeated.  Gradually,  the  mental 
disorder  becomes  more  intense,  arid  the  intervals  between 
its  returns  of  shorter  duration,  until  they  are  scarcely,  or 
not  at  all  perceptible.  The  patient  lies  on  his  back,  his 
eyes,  if  open,  .presenting  a  dull  and  listless  look,  and  is  .. 
almost  constantly  talking  to  himself  in  a-  low,  muttering 
tone.  Regardless  of  persons  or  things  around  him,  and 
scarcely  capable  of  recognizing  them  when  aroused. by  his 
attendants,  his  mind  retires  within  itself  to  dwell  upon  the 
scenes  and  events  of  the  past,  which  glide  before  it  in  wild 
and  disorderly  array  ^  while  the  tongue  feebly  records  the 
varying  impressions,  in  the  form  of  disjointed,  incoherent 
discourse,  or  of  senseless  rhapsody.  In  the  delirium  which 
occurs  towards  the  end  of  chronic  diseases,  the  discourse  is 
often  more  coherent  and  continuous,  though  the  mind  is  no 
less  absorbed  in  its  own  reveries.  As  the  disorder  advances, 
the  voice  becomes  more  indistinct,  the  fingers  are  constantly 
picking  at  the  bed-clothes,  the  evacuations  are  passed  insen- 


FEBRILE    DELIRIUM.  297 

sibly,  and  the  patient  is  incapable  of  being  aroused  to  any 
farther  effort  of  attention.  In  some  cases,  delirium  is  at- 
tended with  a  greater  -degree  of  nervous  and  vascular 
excitement  which  more  or  less  modifies  the- above-mentioned 
symptoms.  The  eyes  are  open,  dry,  and  bloodshot,  intently 
gazing  into' vacancy,  as  if  fixed  on  some  object  which  is 
really  present  to  the  mind  of  the  patient ;  the  skin  is  hotter 
and  drier;  and  he  is  more  restless  and  intractable.  He 
talks  more  loudly,  occasionally  breaking  out.  into  cries 
and  vociferations,  and  tosses  about  in  bed,  frequently  en- 
deavoring to  get  up,  though  without  any  particular  object 
in  view. 

§  254.  While  delirium  thus  shuts  out  all  ideas  and 
images  connected  with  the  present,  it  sometimes  revives  the 
impressions  of  the  past,  which  had  seemed  long  before  to 
have  been  consigned  to  utter  oblivion,  in  a  manner  unknown 
in  a  stale  of  healtit.  A  case  once  occurred  in  St.  Thomas's 
hospital,  of  a  pftient  who,  when  he  began  to  rally,  after  a 
considerable  injury  of  the  head,  spoke  a  language  that 
nobody  could  understand,  but  which  was,  at  last,  ascertained 
to  be  Welsh.  It  appeared  that  he  was  a  Welshman,  and 
had  been  from  his  native  country  about  thirty  years,  during 
which  period,  he  had  entirely  forgotten  his  native  tongue, 
and  acquired  the  English  language.  But  when  he  recov- 
ered from  the  accident,  he  had  forgotten  .the  language  he 
had  been  so  long  and  recently  in  the  habit  of  speaking,  and 
acquired  that  which  he  had  originally  learned  and  lost.1 
Dr.  Rush  mentions,  among  many  other  similar  instances, 
that  the  old  Swedes  pf  Philadelphia,  when  on  their  death- 
beds, would  always  pray  in  their  native  tongue,  though  they 
had  not  spoken  it  for  fifty  or  sixty  years,  and  had  probably 
forgotten  it  before  they  were  sick.8 

1  Tupper's  Inquiry  into  Gall's  System,  35. 
*  On  Diseases  of  the  Mind,  282. 


298  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

§  255.  When  delirium,  or  more  properly  speaking,  the 
disease  on  which  it  depends,  proves  fatal,  it  usually  passes 
into  coma.  Occasionally,  however,  it  disappears,  some 
days  or  hours  before  death,  and  leaves  the  mind  in  posses- 
sion of  its  natural  soundness.  Though  enfeebled  by  dis- 
ease, and  therefore  incapable  of  much  exertion  of  his 
faculties,  the  patient  is  rational  and  intelligent,  recognizes 
perfectly  well  his  relations  to  others,  and  on  familiar  sub- 
jects, can  arrange  his  ideas  without  dictation  or  guidance. 

§  256.  So  closely  does  delirium  resemble  mania  to  the 
casual  observer,  and  so  important  is  it  that  they  should  be 
distinguished  from  each  other,  that  it  may  be  well  to  indicate 
some  of  the  most  common  and  prominent  features  of  each. 
In  mania,  the  patient  recognizes  persons  and  things,  and  is 
perfectly  conscious  of  and  remembers  what  is  passing  around 
him.  In  delirium,  he  can  seldom  distinguish  one  person  or 
thing  from  another,  and,  as  if  fully  occupied  with  the  images 
that  crowd  upon  his  memory,  gives  no  attention  to  those 
that  are  presented  from  without.  In  delirium,  there  is  an 
entire  abolition  of  the  reasoning  power;  there  is  no  attempt 
at  reasoning  at  all ;  the  ideas  are  all  and  equally  insane  ;  no 
single  train  of  thought  escapes  the  morbid  influence,  nor 
does  a  single  operation  of  the  mind  reveal  a  glimpse  of  its 
natural  vigor  and  acuteness.  In  mania,  however  false  and 
absurd  the  ideas  may  be,  we  are  never  at  a  loss  to  discover 
patches  of  coherence,  and  some  semblance  of  logical  se- 
quence in  the  discourse.  The  patient  still  reasons,  though 
he  reasons  incorrectly.  In  mania,  the  muscular  power  is 
not  perceptibly  diminished,  and  the  individual  moves  about 
with  his  ordinary  ability.  Delirium  is  invariably  attended 
with  great  muscular  debility ;  the  patient  is  confined  to  his 
bed,  and  is  capable  of  only  a  momentary  effort  of  exertion. 
In  mania,  sensation  is  not  necessarily  impaired,  and  in  most 
instances,  the  maniac  sees,  hears,  and  feels  with  all  his 
natural  acuteness.  In  delirium,  sensation  is  greatly  im- 


FEBRILE    DELIRIUM.  299 

paired,  and  this  avenue  to  the  understanding  seems  to  be 
entirely  closed.  In  mania,  many  of  the  bodily  functions 
are  undisturbed,  and  the  appearance  of  the  patient  might 
not,  at  first  sight,  convey  the  impression  of  disease.  In 
delirium,  every  function  suffers,  and  the  whole  aspect  of  the 
patient  is  indicative  of  disease.  Mania  exists  alone  and 
independent  of  any  other  disorder,  while  delirium  is  only  an 
unessential  symptom  of  some  other  disease.  Being  a  symp- 
tom only,  the  latter  maintains  certain  relations  with  the 
disease  on  which  it  depends ;  it  is  relieved  when  that  is 
relieved,  and  is  aggravated  when  that  increases  in  severity. 
Mania,  though  it  undoubtedly  tends  to  shorten  life,  is  not 
immediately  dangerous,  whereas  the  disease  on  which  deli- 
rium depends,  speedily  terminates  in  death,  or  restoration  to 
health.  Mania  seldom  occurs  till  after  the  age  of  puberty ; 
delirium  attacks  all  periods  alike,  from  early  childhood  to 
extreme  old  age.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that 
the  above  distinctive  features  are  not  always  present.  A 
form  of  mania  is  occasionally  seen,  in  which  the  mental 
aberrations  and  some  of  the  physical  symptoms  are  remark- 
ably like  those  of  delirium. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES     OF    DELIRIUM. 

§  257.  TESTAMENTARY  dispositions  made  during  the 
intervals  of  febrile  delirium,  are  often  contested  on  the 
ground  of  incapacity,  especially  where  there  is  any  sus- 
picion, real  or  pretended,  of  improper  influence  on  the 
testator's  mind.  These  cases  are  sometimes  very  embar- 
rassing, and  it  is  impossible  to  come  to  a  conclusion  upon 
the  direct  evidence  respecting  the  state  of  mind  ;  nothing 
more  can  be  attained  than  an  approximation  to  correctness, 
by  a  careful  investigation  of  the  attending  circumstances. 
When  the  delirium  accompanies  only  the  daily  exacer- 
bations of  the  fever,  and  disappears  with  them,  there  can 
be  no  doubt  of  the  mind's  being  in  a  suitable  condition, 
during  the  intervals,  for  devising  property,  but  not  for  trans- 
acting other  business  of  importance.  The  existence  of 
delirium  at  any  period  of  a  disease  will  be  sufficient  to 
throw  suspicion  on  any  contracts  entered  into  during  such 
disease  ;  and  unless  it  .can  be  shewn  that  the  delirium  was 
but  an  occasional  symptom  and  of  short  duration  when  it 
occurred,  and  that  the  mind  of  the  patient  at  other  times 
was  perfectly  calm  and  rational,  .their  validity  is  liable  to 
be  destroyed.  When  these  two.  conditions  are  reversed, 
that  of  delirium  .being  the  habitual,  and  the  lucid  intervals 
the  occasional  state,  the  mind  may  have  -sufficient  capacity 
to  make  a  will ;  but  certainly,  no  other  civil  act  which  it 
might  perform  ought  to  be  held  valid,  for  the  same  reason 
that  the  acts  of  imbeciles  a're  avoided.  Georget,  however, 
does  not  hesitate  to  express  his  belief,  that  under  these  cir- 


LEGAL     CONSEQUENCES     OF     DELIRIUM.  301 

cumstances,  the  reason  is  not  so  restored  that  the  patient 
can  be  declared  capable  even  of  making  a  will,  and  we 
readily  admit  that  it  is  often  questionable  whether  the  mind 
is  sufficiently  steady  and  collected  to  comprehend  the  rela- 
tions of  property,  or  appreciate  the  claims  of  kindred  and 
friends.  A  case  related  by  Dr.  Woodward,  the  superintend- 
ent of  the  Massachusetts  Lunatic  Asylum,  while  giving  his 
evidence  in  court  on  one  occasion,  strongly  confirms  the 
correctness  of  Georget's  views.  A  legal  gentleman,  in  the 
course  of  an  acute  pneumonic  affection,  began  to  have 
slight  delirium  on  waking  in  the  morning,  but  it  was  ob- 
served at  no  other  time.  About  this  time  he  remarked  to 
his  physicians  that  if  they  considered  him  in  danger,  he 
wished  to  know  it,  as  he  was  desirous  of  altering  his  will, 
which  he  had  previously  made.  Though  not  considering 
him  to  be  in  much  danger,  they  approved  of  the  plan,  and 
the  alteration  was  made.  A  few  months  after  his  recovery, 
he  accidentally  met  with  the  will  among  his  papers,  but  had 
no  recollection  of  having  made  it,  and  was  /nuch  surprised 
and  dissatisfied  with  its  dispositions,  for  they  did  great  injus- 
tice to  two  of  his  sons.  Still  we  would  not  make  the  disquali- 
fication universal,  for  cases  not  unfrequently  happen  in 
which,  after  days  of  constant  delirium,  reason  for  a  while 
resumes  her  dominion  and  the  patient  converses  with  his 
accustomed  fluency  and  wisdom,  describing  his  feelings, 
giving  directions  to  his  family,  and  alluding  to  the  past  with 
a  clearness  and  accuracy  that  leave  no  doubt  on  the  minds 
of  those  around  him,  of  his  perfect  sanity.  A  safer  prac- 
tice probably  would  be,  to  be  governed  in  our  decision  of 
this  point  by  the  circumstances  that  attend  the  making  of 
the  will,  the  previous  intentions  of  the  testator,  and  the 
nature  of  his  disease.1 

1  It  must  be  recollected  that  the   question  is,  not  whether    the 
mind   possesses  its  ordinary  soundness  and  vigor,  for  we  know  it  is 
26 


302  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY1. 

§  258.  The  law  requires  that  in  this  affection,  as  in 
mania,  the  occurrence  of  lucid  intervals  should  be  proved 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  but  as  delirium  is  merely  an  ad- 
ventitious symptom,  and  not,  like  mania,  the  habitual  state 
of  the  patient,  it  will  be  satisfied  with  much  less  proof  in 
the  former  than  in  the  latter  affection.  Sir  John  Nicholl 
has  very  justly  observed,  that  "  in  cases  of  permanent, 
proper  insanity,  the  proof  of  a  lucid  interval  is  a  matter  of 
extreme  difficulty,  and  for  this  among  other  reasons,  namely ; 
that  the  patient  so  affected  is  not  unfrequently  rational  to 
all  outward  appearance,  without  any  real  abatement  of  his 
malady  :  so  that  in  truth  and  substance,  he  is  just  as  insane 
in  his  apparently  rational,  as  he  is  in  his  visible  raving  fits. 
But  the  apparently  rational  intervals  of  persons,  merely  de- 
lirious, for  the  most  part,  are  really  such.  Delirium  is  a 
fluctuating  state  of  mind,  created  by  temporary  excitement ; 
in  the  absence  of  which,  to  be  ascertained  by  the  appear- 
ance of  the  patient,  the  patient  is,  most  commonly,  really 
sane.  Hence,  as  also  indeed,  from  their  greater  presumed 
frequency  in  most  instances  in  cases  of  delirium,  the  prob- 
abilities, a  priori,  in  favor  of  a  lucid  interval,  are  infinitely 
stronger  in  a  case  of  delirium,  than  in  one  of  permanent 
proper  insanity  ;  and  the  difficulty  of  proving  a  lucid  inter- 
val is  less,  in  the  same  exact  proportion,  in  the  former,  than 
it  is  in  the  latter  case,  and  has  always  been  so  held  by  this 
court." 1 

§  259.     In  the  case  from  which  the  above  passage  is 

always  enfeebled,  but  whether  it  retains  what  may  be  called  a  tes- 
jtamentary  capacity.     See  ante  §  §  89,  243. 

1  Judgment  in  Brogden  v.  Brown,  2  Addams's  Rep  441.  If  the 
reader  is  desirous  of  extending  his  knowledge  of  this  subject,  he 
will  be  well  rewarded  for  a  careful  perusal  of  this  and  the  following 
cases,  in  which  the  luminous  expositions  of  Sir  John  Nicholl  cannot 
fail  to  please  and /convince  :  Evans  v.  Knight,  1  Addams,  229; 
Lemann  v.  Bonsall,  ibid.  383. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES     OF     DELIRIUM.  303 

taken,  the  testatrix,  a  widow  lady,  died  of  some  acute  dis- 
ease after  an  illness  of  about  ten  days,  during  the  two  or 
three  last  of  which  she  was  more  or  less  delirious.  Her 
will  was  made  on  the  evening  of  the  day  preceding  her 
death,  and  its  validity  was  opposed  on  the  ground,  that  she 
did  not  possess  a  testamentary  capacity  at  the  time  of  its 
execution.  The  evidence  of  the  two  consulting  physicians 
who  visited  her  about  four  o'clock,  which  was  but  a  few 
hours  prior  to  the  execution  of  the  will,  was  decidedly  un- 
favorable to  her  testamentary  capacity.  One  considered  it 
"doubtful  whether  she  was  capable  of  making  a  will,  or 
not ;  his  opinion  rather  was,  that  she  was  not."  He  saw 
her  once  or  twice  afterwards,  when  she  was  "  quite  deli- 
rious and  clearly  incapable."  The  other  physicians  who 
saw  her  at  four  o'clock,  conceived  her  "  quite  incapable  of 
any  complicated  act ;  undoubtedly  of  anything  that  re- 
quired fixed  attention,  or  any  exercise  of  mental  faculty." 
The  attending  physician,  however,  attributed  the  delirium 
to  the  paroxysms  of  severe  pain  suffered  by  the  deceased, 
it  being  scarcely  perceptible  when  these  were  absent,  and 
believed  that  in  the  intervals  she  had  perfect  capacity.  It 
appeared  too  that  the  will,  which  had  been  prepared  from 
instructions  just  before  received  from  her,  was  read  over  to 
the  deceased,  placed  before  her  while  she  was  sitting  up  in 
•  bed,  and  subscribed  by  her  in  the  usual  form  with  a  dash 
below.  The  validity  of  the  will  was  established. 

§  260.  In  another  case,  the  testator  who  died  on  Fri- 
day, the  24th  of  April,  of  an  attack  of  pneumonia,  during 
the  latter  stages  of  which  he  had  considerable  delirium, 
made  his  testamentary  dispositions  on  the  21st.  One  of 
the  physicians  deposed  that  when  he  saw  the  deceased  on 
the  21st,  "  he  was  not  in  a  state  of  "sound  mind,  memory 
and  understanding,  or  capable  of  doing  any  act  requiring 
the  exercise  of  thought,  judgment  and  reflection."  An- 
other, who  saw  him  for  the  first  and  only  time  on  the  23d, 


304  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

thought  it  was  extremely  "  improbable  that  the  deceased 
should  have  been  free  from  wandering  and  mental  affection, 
on  a  day  so  shortly  before  he  saw  him,  as  the  21st."  It 
appeared,  on  the  other  hand,  that  he  gave  instructions  for  a 
will  without  any  suggestions  whatever  from  the  solicitor  who 
reduced  them  to  writing,  and  that  after  they  were  read  to 
him,  he  approved  and  subscribed  them.  It  was  also  depos- 
ed by  other  witnesses,  that  when  the  solicitor  came  and 
while  giving  him  instructions,  he  appeared  rational  and 
conducted  with  propriety.  The  court  pronounced  in  favor 
of  the  deceased's  testamentary  capacity.1 

§  261.  In  cases  where  the  validity  of  testamentary  dis- 
positions is  impugned  on  the  ground  of  mental  incapacity 
produced  by  delirium,  or  indeed  by  any  other  disorder,  it  is 
the  practice  of  the  English  Ecclesiastical  courts,  not  to 
confine  their  attention  exclusively  to  the  evidence  directly 
relating  to  the  mental  condition  of  the  testator,  but  to  con- 
sider all  the  circumstances  connected  with  the  testamentary 
act ;  for  the  object  is  not  so  much  to  settle  the  question  of 
soundness  and  unsoundness  in  general,  as  it  is  in  reference 
to  that  particular  act.  The  principle  is  —  and  it  is  one  that 
is  well-grounded  in  the  common  experience  of  men  —  that 
a  person  may  be  capable  of  testamentary  acts,  while  tech- 
nically and  really  unsound,  and  incapable  of  doing  other 
acts  requiring  much  reflection  and  deliberation.  This  prin- 
ciple is  particularly  applicable  in  cases  of  delirium  where 
the  transitions  from  a  state  of  senseless  raving  to  that  in 
which  the  mind  is  calm,  perfectly  rational,  and  conscious  of 
its  condition,  are  very  rapid,  and  where  in  the  lucid  inter- 
val, the  mind,  though  weak,  is  clear  and  unclouded  by  any 
of  those  peculiar  views  or  notions  which  often  characterize 
the  lucid  intervals  in  mania,  Accordingly,  the  testament- 
ary capacity  is  to  be  determined,  in  a  great  measure,  by 

1  Evans  v.  Knight  and  Moore,  1  Addams,  229. 


LEGAL     COH  SEQUENCES     OF    DELJR1UM.  305 

the  nature  of  the  act  itself.  If  it  be  agreeable  to  instruc- 
tions or  declarations  previously  expressed,  when  unques- 
tionably sound  in  mind  ;  if  it  be  consonant  to  the  general 
tenor  of  his  affections  ;  if  it  be  consistent  and  coherent,  one 
part  with  another ;  and  if  it  have  been  obtained  by  the  ex- 
ercise of  no  improper  influence;  it  will  be  established,  even 
though  the  medical  evidence  may  throw  strong  doubts  on 
the  capacity  of  the  testator.  On  the  contrary,  when  these 
conditions  are  absent,  or  are  replaced  by  others  of  an  oppo- 
site description,  it  will  as  generally  be  annulled,  however 
plain  and  positive  may  be  the  evidence  in  favor  of  his 
capacity.1 

§  262.  In  some  affections  of  the  head,  and  they  may 
be  primary,  or  sympathetic,  the  patient  lies  in  a  comatose 
state  from  which  he  may  be  aroused,  when  he  will  recog- 
nize persons  and  answer  questions  correctly  respecting  his 
feelings,  but  drop  asleep  again  as  soon  as  they  cease  to  ex- 
cite him.  That  the  mind  is  much  embarrassed  certainly 
cannot  be  doubted,  and  it  is  well  known  that  when  the 
patient  recovers,  he  has,  ordinarily,  very  little  idea  of  what 
passed  at  those  times ;  indeed,  he  is  generally  unconscious 
of  everything  he  either  said  or  did.  It  would  be  a  bold 
assertion  to  say  that  the  mind,  under  these  circumstances, 
is  legally  capable  of  making  testamentary  dispositions,  and 
they  ought,  therefore,  to  receive  no  favor  from  courts.  In 
cases  of  injury  to  the  head,  it  is  not  uncommon  for  the 
patient  (after  rallying  from  its  immediate  effects)  to  answer 
questions  rationally,  to  appear  collected  and  intelligent,  in 


1  In  illustration  of  these  remarks  the  reader  is  referred  to  Cook 
v.  Goude  and  Bennet,  1  Haggard,  577  ;  King  and  Thwaits  v.  Far- 
ley, ibid.  502  ;  Waters  v.  Hewlett,  3  Haggard,  790  ;  Bird  v.  Bird,  2 
Haggard,  142  ;  Martin  v.  Wotton,  1  Lee's  Eccl.  Rep.  130 ;  Bittle- 
ston  by  her  guardian  v.  Clark,  2  Lee,  229;  Marsh  v.  Tyrrel,  2 
Haggard's  Eccl.  Rep.  84  ;  Hoby  v.  Hoby  1  Haggard,  146. 


306  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

short  to  have  fully  recovered  his  senses,  though  he  may  sub- 
sequently declare  that  he  is  utterly  unconscious  of  what 
were  his  acts,  thoughts  or  feelings  at  that  time.  Few,  even 
among  medical  men,  who  observe  a  person  under  such  cir- 
cumstances, would  have  any  hesitation  in  expressing  their 
belief  in  his  testamentary  capacity,  though  the  event  would 
show  that  they  had  labored  under  a  serious  error. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

DURATION    AND    CURABILITY    OF    MADNESS. 

§  263.  WITH  the  exception  of  that  kind  of  dementia  that 
occurs  at  a  period  more  or  less  remote  from  birth,  mania  is 
the  only  form  of  insanity  that  admits  of  a  cure  ;  and  though 
its  duration  is  various,  the  probability  of  this  event  is  almost 
entirely  destroyed  within  a  comparatively  short  space  of 
time.  This  is  abundantly  evident  from  the  statistics  of 
madness  that  have  been  published  from  time  to  time  by  the 
heads  of  various  lunatic  establishments.  Esquirol  con- 
cludes, on  data  furnished  by  the  returns  of  the  principal 
French  and  English  hospitals,  that  the  absolute  number  of 
recoveries  from  madness  is  about  one  in  three ;  and  also 
that  the  number  of  recoveries  varies  in  different  establish- 
ments, from  one  in  four,  to  one  in  two  or  two  and  a  half  of 
the  whole  number  of  persons  affected.  Prichard  regards 
this  computation  of  recoveries  as  much  below  what  really 
takes  place  under  favorable  circumstances,  and  the  reports 
of  American  hospitals  confirm  the. correctness  of  his  opinion. 
Such,  however,  is  the  imperfection  of  statistics  on  this  sub- 
ject, that  we  can  speak  with  but  little  confidence  respecting 
the  proportion  of  recoveries.  We  only  know  that  in  cases 
subjected  to  judicious  treatment  soon  after  the  attack,  re- 
covery takes  place  in  the  proportion  of  six  or  eight  to  ten  ; 
while  in  those  which  have  continued  a  couple  of  years,  there 
is  little  prospect  of  recovery.  Pinel,  in  a  memoir  presented 
to  the  Institute  in  1800,  was  led  to  conclude  from  a  selection 


308  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

of  cases  expressly  chosen  for  this  purpose,  that  a  greater 
number  of  recoveries  takes  place  in  the  first  month  than  in 
any  succeeding  one,  and  that  the  mean  time  of  the  duration 
of  the  disease  when  cured  is  between  five  and  six  months. 
Esquirol,  however,  gives  a  table  of  recoveries  at  the  Salpe- 
triere  during  ten  years,  which  shows  a  little  longer  term  to 
insanity.  Out  of  two  thousand  and  five  patients,  twelve 
hundred  and  twenty-three  were  cured,  viz.,  six  hundred 
and  four  during  the  first  year;  four  hundred  and  ninety- 
seven  in  the  second  ;  eighty-six  in  the  third  ;  and  forty-one 
in  the  seven  succeeding  years;  from  which  it  appears  that 
eleven  twelfths  of  the  number  of  cures  is  obtained  within 
the  first  two  years ;  that  the  mean  duration  of  cases  cured 
is  a  little  short  of  one  year;  and  that  after  the  third  year, 
the  probability  of  a  cure  is  scarcely  more  than  one  in 
thirty.  M.  Desportes  states,  from  observations  made  at  the 
Bicetre  and  Salpetriere,  that  of  the  whole  number  of  re- 
coveries in  1822,  1823,  and  1824,  seven  hundred  and  forty- 
six  took  place  in  the  first  year,  and  one  hundred  and  eighteen 
only  from  the  second  to  the  seventh  year.1 

§  264.  Recovery  from  insanity  generally  takes  place 
gradually,  though  occasionally  the  disease  may  suddenly 
disappear  on  the  occurrence  of  certain  moral  or  physical 
impressions.  Pinel  relates  the  case  of  a  literary  gentleman, 
who,  in  a  paroxysm  of  suicidal  mania  resolved  to  go  and 
jump  into  the  river.  On  arriving  at  the  bridge,  he  was  at- 
tacked by  robbers,  against  whom  he  defended  himself  vig- 
orously, beat  them  off,  forgot  the  purpose  of  his  excursion, 
and  returned  home  cured.  Dr.  Rush  relates  that  one  of 
his  patients,  for  whom  he  had  recommended  gentle  exer- 
cise on  horseback,  was  suddenly  cured  in  consequence  of 
the  fright  experienced  from  her  horse  running  away  in  one 


Esquirol,  Des  mal.  ment.  i.  94. 


DURATION     AND    CURABILITY     OF     MADNESS.  309 

of  her  excursions.  He  was  stopped  by  a  gate,  and  when 
her  attendants  came  up  they  found  her  entirely  restored  to 
reason.  Several  other  cases  of  recovery  are  related,  pro- 
duced by  a  similar  cause.  Esquirol  speaks  of  having  cured 
a  girl  at  once  by  the  terror  she  experienced  at  the  sight  of 
the  actual  cautery  which  he  was  about  to  apply.  He  also 
mentions  the  case  of  a  girl  who  after  being  insane  ten 
years,  suddenly  ran  to  her  mother's  bed,  exclaiming,  as 
she  embraced  her,  "  mother,  mother,  I  am  well."  She  had 
become  insane  in  consequence  of  a  suppression  of  the 
menses,  which  at  last  made  their  appearance  on  the  evening 
preceding  her  cure.  Prichard  states  that  several  instances 
of  sudden  cure  from  the  same  cause  have  occurred  in  some 
of  the  English  hospitals.  Insanity  has  been  sometimes 
cured  by  an  attack  of  fever.  A  number  of  maniacs  were 
once  cured,  in  the  Pennsylvania  hospital,  by  a  malignant 
fever  which  appeared  in  that  establishment.  Direct  appeals 
to  the  reasoning  power  have  sometimes  been  followed  by 
immediate  recovery.  Pinel  relates  the  case  of  a  watch- 
maker who  became  deranged,  and  believed  that  he  had 
been  guillotined,  and  that,  in  consequence  of  the  mixing  of 
the  heads  of  other  victims,  his  own  had  been  replaced  by 
another.  When  the  miracle  of  St  Denis  was  mentioned, 
who  carried  his  head  under  his  arm  and  kissed  it  as  he 
went,  he  contended  for  the  possibility  of  the  fact,  by  ap- 
pealing to  his  own  case,  when  one  of  his  companions  burst 
into  a  loud  laugh,  saying,  "  What  a  fool  you  are  ;  how 
could  St.  Denis  kiss  his  own  head  ?  was  it  with  his  heel  ?" 
The  absurdity  of  the  idea  struck  his  mind  and  he  never 
after  spoke  of  the  misplacement.  Dr.  Cox  speaks  of  a  pa- 
tient who  believed  that  he  was  the  Holy  Ghost.  Another 
asked  him  l<  Are  there  two  Holy  Ghosts?  how  can  you  be 
the  Holy  Ghost  and  I  be  so  too  ?"  He  appeared  surprised, 
and  after  pausing  awhile  said,  "  But  are  you  the  Holy 
Ghost?"  and  when  the  other  replied  "  Did  you  not  know 


310  MEDICAL     JURISPRUDENCE     OF     INSANITY. 

that  I  was  r"  he  answered,  "  I  did  not  know  it  before ;  then 
I  cannot  be  the  Holy  Ghost."  l  It  is  probable  that  in  nearly 
if  not  quite  all  these  cases  of  sudden  recovery,  by  means 
of  mental  impressions,  the  disease  was  declining,  and  that 
its  termination  was  hastened  only  by  these  impressions. 

<§  265.  Partial  intellectual  mania  is  said  to  be  cured 
with  much  more  difficulty  than  general  mania,  and  the  latter 
is  more  easily  cured  when  the  sequel  of  some  violent  cause, 
than  when  it  has  come  on  gradually  from  some  steadily 
continued  influence.  Among  the  circumstances  favorable 
to  recovery  may  be  mentioned  a  constitution  not  greatly 
debilitated  by  excesses  of  any  kind,  good  moral  and  intel- 
lectual education,  the  absence  of  hereditary  predisposition, 
and  an  early  medical  treatment. 

266.  The  above  facts  and  considerations  will  furnish 
the  data,  on  which  the  physician  is  to  form  an  opinion  rel- 
ative to  the  duration  and  curability  of  any  given  case  of 
insanity.  While  in  very  many  cases  incurability  is  certain, 
and  there  can  be  no  hesitation  in  certifying  the  same,  there  are 
none  in  regard  to  which  we  can  predict  a  certain  recovery. 
The  utmost  we  can  say  in  the  most  favorable  cases  is,  that 
the  patient  will  probably  recover,  and  the  physician  cannot 
be  too  cautious  how  he  commits  his  own  reputation  and  the 
interests  and  happiness  of  others  by  the  expression  of  hasty 
and  positive  opinions.'2  Idiocy,  imbecility,  and  senile  de- 
mentia admit  neither  of  cure  nor  amelioration,  and  when 
mania  is  of  more  than  two  years  standing,  and  especially  if 


1  Spurzheim  on  Insanity,  294. 

2  If  proof  be  required  of  the  propriety  of  this  warning,  the  reader 
will  find  a   memorable   one,  in   Wraxall's  (Posthumous   Memoirs) 
lively  description  of  the  contradictory  statements  and  dogmatic  as- 
sertions into  which  the  medical  attendants  of  George  III.   were 
betrayed  by  party  zeal,  and  which   resulted  in  the  confusion  and 
disgrace  of  some  respectable  physicians. 


DURATION    AND    CURABILITY    OF    MADNESS.  311 

other  circumstances  are  not  favorable,  it  may  be  safely 
said  there  is  but  little  hope  of  cure,  but  never  that  the  case 
is  beyond  all  hope.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  persons 
after  years  of  insanity,  have  sometimes  recovered  their 
reason  shortly  before  death. 

§  267.  An  important  feature  of  insanity  in  a  medico- 
legal  point  of  view,  is  its  tendency  to  relapse  during  con- 
valescence, and  to  recurrence  after  being  perfectly  cured. 
The  general  rule  is,  that  a  brain  which  has  once  been  the 
seat  of  the  maniacal  action  is  far  more  liable  to  its  recur- 
rence, than  one  which  has  not.  Many  recover  the  full 
strength  and  activity  of  their  mental  faculties,  but  the  ma- 
jority, Prichard  thinks,  are  curable  only  to  a  certain  extent. 
"They  remain,"  says  Esquirol,  "  in  such  a  state  of  suscep- 
tibility that  the  slightest  causes  give  rise  to  relapses,  and 
they  only  preserve  their  sanity  by  continuing  to  live  in  a 
house  where  no  mental  agitation  or  inquietude,  no  unfor- 
tunate contingency  is  likely  to  fall  to  their  lot,  and  throw 
them  back  to  their  former  state.  There  are  other  individuals 
whose  faculties  have  sustained  such  a  shock,  that  they  are 
never  capable  of  returning  to  the  sphere  which  they  had 
held  in  society.  They  are  perfectly  rational,  but  have  not 
sufficient  mental  capacity  to  become  again  military  officers, 
to  conduct  commercial  affairs,  or  to  fulfil  the  duties  belong- 
ing to  their  appointments."  ]  The  proportion  of  cases  in 
which  insanity  is  recurrent,  is  estimated  by  writers  at  from 
one  tenth  to  one  sixth  ;  Esquirol  estimates  it  at  one  twentieth. 
In  those  cases  where  the  mind  on  recovery  regains  its  usual 
capability,  this  disposition  to  recurrence  is  by  no  means  so 
strong,  as  when  it  is  left  in  a  weak  and  irritable  state,  and 
it  diminishes  with  the  length  of  the  interval  after  the  re- 
covery. This  feature  of  insanity  should  ever  be  borne  in 
mind  by  the  physician,  when  required  to  give  his  opinion  on 

1  Des  maladies  mentales,  i.  96. 


312  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

the  propriety  of  removing  the  interdiction  of  an  insane 
patient,  who  is  apparently  restored  to  health.  He  should 
seriously  consider  the  risk  that  he  runs,  by  entering  again 
on  the  busy  scenes  of  life  and  enduring  the  anxiety  and  ex- 
citement attendant  on  the  management  of  his  affairs,  of 
renewing  that  cerebral  irritation  which  the  quiet  and  repose 
of  seclusion  have  temporarily  subdued.  In  criminal  cases 
also,  it  should  lead  to  a  thorough  and  candid  investigation 
of  the  plea  of  insanity  urged  in  defence  of  those  who  have 
previously  suffered  from  it,  and  it  should  be  satisfactorily 
settled  whether  or  not  the  circumstances  attending  the  crimi- 
nal act  were  likely  to  reproduce  that  pathological  condition 
on  which  insanity  depends.  If  it  should  prove  that  they 
were  of  that  nature,  and  that  the  individual  had  but  recently 
recovered  from  an  attack  of  insanity,  then  it  would  indicate 
a  confidence  that  springs  from  some  other  source  than  a 
just  appreciation  of  the  phenomenon  of  insanity  under  con- 
sideration, to  presume,  nevertheless,  the  continuance  of 
mental  soundness  and  consequently  of  moral  responsibility. 
§  268.  It  has  been  already  remarked  that  in  most  in- 
stances, recovery  takes  place  gradually  and  is  completed 
only  after  a  period,  more  or  less  long,  of  convalescence. 
Nothing,  therefore,  can  be  more  chimerical  than  the  idea  of 
fixing  on  any  precise  moment  when  all  disease  has  departed 
and  perfect  health  is  established ;  and  yet  this  is  what  we 
are  called  upon  to  do  when  required  to  determine,  as  we 
sometimes  are  in  criminal  cases,  at  what  time  the  accused 
began  to  be  responsible.  To  contend  that  a  convalescent 
maniac  may  be  irresponsible  one  day  and  responsible  the 
next,  would  be  no  less  absurd  than  to  say  to  one  recovering 
from  inflammation  of  the  lungs,  that,  as  he  valued  his  life, 
he  must  not  leave  his  room  to-day,  though  to-morrow  he 
might  safely  expose  himself  to  the  severest  inclemency  of 
the  weather;  and  to  believe  that  the  former  is  perfectly 
sound,  because  laboring  under  no  hallucination  and  attacked 


DURATION   AND   CURABILITY    OF   MADNESS.  313 

by  no  fits  of  fury,  would  be  as  erroneous,  as  to  consider  the 
respiratory  functions  of  the  latter  sound  and  vigorous,  be- 
cause we  hear  no  cough  and  see  no  difficulty  of  breathing. 
The  time  that  has  elapsed  since  the  unequivocal  insanity  of 
the  accused,  is  therefore  an  important  element  in  the  deter- 
mination of  his  mental  soundness.  Just  as  exposure  to  bad 
weather,  a  week  after  an  attack  of  inflammation  of  lungs  had 
begun  to  subside,  would  be  more  likely  to  reproduce  the 
disease,  than  it  would  a  month  afterwards ;  so  the  longer  the 
time  since  an  attack  of  insanity  has  been  apparently  cured, 
the  less  likely  is  the  cerebral  irritation  to  be  renewed  by 
sudden  provocations  or  other  causes  that  tend  to  produce  it. 
Ample  time  must  be  allowed  to  cover  the  period  of  conva- 
lescence, and  if  it  be  difficult  to  fix  upon  the  exact  duration 
of  this  state,  so  much  greater  the  necessity  of  caution  in 
determining  the  responsibility  of  the  accused.  Here  it  is 
often  a  merit  to  doubt,  and  justice  requires  that  the  accused 
should  have  the  benefit  of  our  doubts. 


27 


CHAPTER  XiV. 


LUCID     INTERVALS. 

§  269.  IT  is  well  known  that  many  diseases  —  espe- 
cially of  the  class  called  nervous  —  observe  a  law  of  pe- 
riodicity which  is  not  uncommon  in  the  actions  of  the  an- 
imal economy.  One  effect  of  this  curious  law  consists  in 
an  intermission  of  the  outward  manifestations  of  the  disease, 
so  complete  as  to  bear  the  appearance  .of  a  perfect  cure, 
and  this,  in  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge,  is  all  that 
we  can,  with  certainty,  say  of  it.  As  to  the  change  that 
takes  place  in  the  organic  condition  of  the  part  affected, 
during  the  intermission,  we  can  at  best  hazard  nothing  more 
than  a  rude  conjecture.  We  have  no  warrant  for  believing 
that  the  pathological  affection  itself  entirely  disappears  with 
the  symptoms  that  arise  from  it,  and  perhaps  never  shall 
have,  until  we  are  able  to  explain  why,  after  such  disap- 
pearance, the  tendency  of  the  disease  to  return  at  certain 
intervals  should  still  remain  ;  or  in  other  words,  wherein  the 
final,  perfect  cure  differs  from  the  temporary  intermission. 
But  in  view  of  the  established  fact  that  organic  disease  of- 
ten exists  without  producing  its  ordinary  symptoms,  or  re- 
vealing itself  by  any  appreciable  signs,  it  seems  the  more 
probable  supposition,  that  the  pathological  condition  of  the 
affected  organs  does  not  disappear  entirely  during  the  inter- 
mission, but  continues  with  perhaps  a  modified  intensity. 

§  270.  The  slightest  examination  will  convince  us,  that 
in  the  most  complete  intermission  of  any  disease,  that 


LUCID     INTERVALS.  315 

affects  the  whole  system  to  some  extent,  the  patient  is  far 
from  enjoying  sound  health,  or  free  from  every  indication 
of  morbid  action.  A  greater  contrast  in  the  matter  of 
health  can  scarcely  be  presented  in  the  same  individual, 
than  that  between  the  paroxysm  and  the  intermission  of  a 
quotidian  fever ;  yet  none  will  say,  after  the  former  has 
passed  off  and  the  patient  is  no  longer  shaking  with  cold  nor 
parched  with,  heat,  but  is  able  to  arise  and  give  some  atten- 
tion to  his  duties,  that  he  is  entirely  well.  Better,  no  doubt, 
he  is  ;  but  his  mind  is  weak,  his  stomach  declines  ils  once 
favorite  food,  a  little  exertion  overcomes  him,  a  certain 
malaise  not  easily  described  pervades  his  whole  system,  and 
which,  though  not  excessively  painful,  is  something  very 
different  from  the  buoyant  sensation  of  health.  We  are 
therefore  bound  to  believe,  that  the  disease  still  exists,  though 
its  external  aspect  has  changed.  And  here  it  may  be  as 
well  to  remark,  that  we  must  not  be  led  by  an  abuse  of  lan- 
guage, to  attribute  iJiat  to  the  disease  —  to  the  pathological 
condition  —  which  belongs  only  to  one  of  its  symptoms. 
When  the  epileptic,  a  few  days  after  one  of  his  frightful 
convulsions,  appears  to  have  regained  his  customary  health, 
no  intelligent  physician  imagines  that  the  proximate  cause 
of  this  disturbance  has  vanished  with  the  fit,  leaving  the 
organ  it  affected  as  sound  as  ever.  The  fit  itself,  which  is  a 
mere  symptom,  is  indeed  of  periodical  occurrence,  but  the 
pathological  condition  on  which  it  depends  continues,  slowly 
and  surely  though  imperceptibly,  to  undermine  the  powers 
of  the  constitution.  The  general  expression  of  all  our 
knowledge  on  the  subject  of  the  intermission  of  diseases  is, 
then,  that  certain  pathological  conditions  give  rise,  among 
other  phenomena,  to  some  that  disappear  for  a  time  only  to 
recur  after  an  interval  of  more  or  less  duration. 

§  271.  That  insanity,  or  rather  mania,  is  one  of  the 
diseases  that  are  subject  to  this  law  of  periodicity,  in  some 
respects,  is  universally  admitted  ;  but  to  what  extent  th<?  law 


316  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

operates,  is  a  point  on  which  there  is  much  diversity  of 
opinion.  There  are  few  cases  in  which  we  may  not  observe 
various  periods  in  their  course,  when  the  severity  of  the 
symptoms  is  greatly  alleviated  ;  when  calmness  takes  the 
place  of  fury,  and  a  quiet  and  sober  demeanor  succeeds 
to  noisy  and  restless  agitation  ;  when  reason,  driven  from 
her  throne,  seems  to  be  retracing  her  steps  and  struggling 
for  her  lost  dominion.  In  all  this,  however,  there  is  no- 
thing different  from  what  occurs  in  many,  if  not  the  greater 
proportion  of  chronic  diseases.  In  mania,  but  in  no  other 
form  of  insanity,  this  abatement  of  the  severity  of  the 
symptoms,  may  amount  to  a  complete  intermission,  when 
the  patient  is  conscious  of  his  true  condition,  converses  ra- 
tionally, and  admits  his  having  been  insane.  But  that  the 
intermissions  of  mania  are  ever  so  complete,  that  the  mind 
is  restored  to  its  original  integrity,  would  seem  scarcely 
probable,  from  the  fact,  that  the  very  seat  of  the  pathologi- 
cal changes  is  the  material  organ  on  which  the  manifesta- 
tions of  the  mental  phenomena  depend.  For  if  the  mind 
be  rendered  as  sound  as  before  the  attack,  it  necessarily 
follows  that  the  brain  is  equally  restored,  since  in  point  of 
health  they  stand  to  each  other  in  the  relation  of  cause  and 
effect.  But  as  there  is  no  proof  that  such  is  the  case,  and 
as  the  supposition  is  not  supported  by  what  we  do  know  of 
pathological  actions,  we  have  no  right,  at  present,  to  con- 
clude that  the  physical  condition  on  which  mania  depends 
is  entirely  removed  during  the  intermission.  We  are  thus 
led  to  scrutinize  a  little  more  closely  these  periodical  resto- 
rations of  the  insane  mind,  or  lucid  intervals  as  they  are 
called,  in  order  to  ascertain  if  possible,  what  is  the  actual 
state  of  the  mind  at  these  times.  But  before  doing  this,  it 
will  be  proper  to  show  what  is  understood  in  law  by  lucid 
intervals,  as  explained  by  eminent  legal  authorities. 

§  272.     D'Aguesseau,  in  his  pleading  in  the  case  of  the 
Abbe   d'Orleans,  says,  "  It  must  not  be  a  superficial  tran- 


LUCID     INTERVALS.  S17 

quillity,  a  shadow  of  repose,  but  on  the  contrary  a  profound 
tranquillity,  a  real  repose  ;  it  must  be,  not  a  mere  ray  of 
reason,  which  only  makes  its  absence  more  apparent  when 
it  is  gone  —  not  a  flash  of  lightning,  which  pierces  through 
the  darkness  only  to  render  it  more  gloomy  and  dismal  — 
not  a  glimmering,  which  joins  the  night  to  the  day  ;  but  a 
perfect  light,  a  lively  and  continued  lustre,  a  full  and  entire 
day  interposed  between  the  two  separate  nights,  of  the  fury 
which  precedes  and  follows  it  ;  and,  to  use  another  image, 
it  is  not  a  deceitful  and  faithless  stillness  which  follows  or 
forebodes  a  storm,  but  a  sure  and  steadfast  tranquillity  for  a 
time,  a  real  calm,  a  perfect  serenity  ;  in  fine,  without  look- 
ing for  so  many  metaphors  to  represent  our  idea,  it  must 
be  not  a  mere  diminution,  a  remission  of  the  complaint,  but 
a  kind  of  temporary  cure,  an  intermission  so  clearly  marked, 
as  in  every  respect  to  resemble  the  restoration  of  health."  l 

§  273.  Many  years  after,  Lord  Thurlow,  in  the  court  of 
chancery,  thus  stated  his  views  of  the  condition  of  mind 
necessary  to  constitute  a  lucid  interval.  "  By  a  perfect  in- 
terval, I  do  not  mean  a  cooler  moment,  an  abatement  of 
pain  or  violence,  or  of  a  higher  state  of  torture  —  a  mind 
relieved  from  excessive  pressure  ;  but  an  interval  in  which 
the  mind,  having  thrown  off  the  disease,  had  recovered  its 
general  habit."  2 

§  274.  Here  then  is  the  lucid  interval  as  clearly  and  mi- 
nutely described,  as  a  profusion  of  words  and  metaphors 
could  do  it,  and  as  such  it  was  believed  by  these  authorities, 
no  doubt,  to  have  a  real  existence.  In  the  early  periods  of 
the  English  law,  the  doctrine  of  lucid  intervals  was  univer- 
sally admitted,  and  they  seem  to  have  been  considered  not 
a  rare,  but  a  very  common  phenomenon  of  mental  derange- 
ment. Indeed,  judging  from  the  frequent  mention  made  of 


1  Pothier  on  Obligations,  by  Evans,  Appendix,  579. 

2  Attorney  General  v.  Parnther,  3  Brown's  Ch.  Cases,  234. 

27* 


318  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

them  in  all  discussions  on  the  subject,  and  from  the  fact  that 
idiocy  and  lunacy  —  which  latter  was  considered,  as  its 
name  would  lead  us  to  suspect,  to  be  of  an  intermittent  na- 
tur — constituted,  for  a  long  time,  the  only  division  of 
mental  diseases,  it  will  not  perhaps-  be  too  strong  an  expres- 
sion to  say,  that  they  were  viewed  as  an  essential  feature  of 
mania.  This,  however,  was  in  the  infancy  of  medical 
science,  before  the  phenomena  of  mania  —  which,  until  re- 
cently, has  always  been  less  understood  than  other  diseases 
—  were  thoroughly  and  accurately  observed,  and  the  men 
whose  ideas  we  have  just  quoted  had  no  practical  acquaint- 
ance with  the  disorder  whose  phases  they  so  vividly  de- 
scribed. Before  adopting  their  views,  then,  it  will  be  pro- 
per to  inquire  how  far  they  are  supported  by  the  investiga- 
tions of  modern  medical  science. 

§  275.  While  the  doctrine  of  lucid  intervals,  as  ex- 
plained by  the  language  above  quoted,  is  upheld  by  scarcely 
a  single  eminent  name  in  the  medical  profession,  we  find 
that  their  existence  is  either  denied  altogether,  or  they  are 
regarded  as  being  only  a  remission,  instead  of  an  intermis- 
sion of  the  disease  ;  an  abatement  of  the  severity  of  the 
symptoms,  not  a  temporary  cure.  Mr.  Haslam,  who  is  no 
mean  authority  on  any  question  connected  with  insanity, 
emphatically  declares,  that,  "  as  a  constant  observer  of  this 
disease  for  more  than  twenty-five  years,  I  cannot  affirm 
that  the  lunatics,  with  whom  I  have  had  daily  intercourse, 
have  manifested  alternations  of  insanity  and  reason.  They 
may  at.  intervals  become  more  tranquil,  and  less  disposed  to 
obtrude  their  distempered  fancies  into  notice.  For  a  time 
their  minds  may  be  less  active,  and  the  succession  of  their 
thoughts  consequently  more  deliberate  ;  they  may  endeavor 
to  effect  some  desirable  purpose,  and  artfully  conceal  their 
real  opinions,  but  they  have  not  abandoned,  nor  renounced 
their  distempered  notions.  It  is  as  unnecessary  to  repeat 
that  a  few  coherent  sentences  do  not  constitute  the  sanity  of 


LUCID    INTERVALS.  319 

the  intellect ;  as  that  the  sounding  of  one  or  two  notes  of  a 
keyed  instrument  could  ascertain  it  to  be  in  tune.*1 

§  276.  Strong  as  this  testimony  is,  and  true,  no  doubt, 
as  the  result  of  an  individual's  experience,  it  cannot  be 
denied  that  others,  whose  opportunities  have  not  been  less 
than  Mr.  Haslam's,  have  distinctly  recognized  the  existence 
of  intervals,  when  the  patient  not  only  becomes  more  trail- 
quil  and  reserved,  but  is  conscious  of  having  been  mad,  and 
perceives  Vi;  folly  of  the  delusions  that  have  engrossed  his 
thoughts  But  so  far  are  they  from  attributing  to  the  'mind, 
during  their  occurrence,  that  degree  of  soundness  which  is 
contended  for  in  the  passages  above  quoted,  that  they  have 
taken  great  care  to  inculcate  o.  very  different  doctrine. 
"  The  mania,  says  Fodere,  "  \vliicli  is  accompanied  by  fury, 
is  very  often  periodical ;  thnt  is,  as  if  granting  an  occasional 
truce  to  the  ;  itient,  it  appears  only  at  certain  epochs,  be- 
tween which  he  enjoys  all  his  reason,  and  seems  to  conduct 
and  judge  in  all  respects  like  other  men,  if  we  except  in 
regard  to  certain  ideas,  the  thought  of  which  may  at  any 
time  occasion  a  fresh  paroxysm."  ! 

§  277.  Georget,  while  he  speaks  of  lucid  intervals  "  as 
returns  to  reason,"  is  careful  to  add,  that,  "  in  this  state, 
patients  frequently  experience  some  degree  of  malaise,  of 
some  disturbance  of  their  ideas,  and  weakness  of  mind, 
which  prevents  them  from  fixing  their  attention,  for  any 
length  of  time,  on  a  particular  subject ;  from  engaging  in 
reading,  writing,  or  attending  to  their  affairs."  3 

§  278.  "  There  are  few  cases  of  mania  or  melancholy," 
says  Dr.  Reid,  "  where  the  light  of  reason  does  not  now  and 
then  shine  out  between  the  clouds.  In  fevers  of  the  mind, 
as  well  as  those  of  the  body,  there  occur  frequent  intermis- 


1   Medical  Jurisprudence,  as  it  relates  to  Insanity,  224. 
a  De  Medecine  Legale,  i.  205,  §   140. 
3  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  46. 


320  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

sions.  But  the  mere  interruption  of  a  disorder  is  not  to  be 
mistaken*for  its  cure,  or  its  ultimate  conclusion.  Little 
stress  ought  to  be  laid  upon  those  occasional  and  uncertain 
disentanglements  of  intellect,  in  which  the  patient  is  for  a 
time  only  extricated  from  the  labyrinth  of  his  morbid  hallu- 
cinations. Madmen  may  show,  at  starts,  more  sense  than 
ordinary  men."  l 

<§  279.  Dr.  Combe,  in  one  of  the  most  philosophical 
treatises  on  Insanity,  which  the  present  century  has  pro- 
duced, expresses  similar  views  in  the  most  explicit  and 
forcible  language.  "  But  however  calm  and  rational  the 
patient  may  appear  to  be,  during  the  lucid  intervals,  as  they 
are  called,  and  while  enjoying  the  quietude  of  domestic 
society,  or  the  limited  range  of  a  well  regulated  asylum,  it 
must  never  be  supposed,  that  he  is  in  as  perfect  possession 
of  his  senses,  as  if  he  had  never  been  ill.  In  ordinary  cir- 
cumstances and  under  ordinary  excitement,  his  perceptions 
may  be  accurate,  and  his  judgment  perfectly  sound ;  but  a 
degree  of  irritability  of  brain  remains  behind,  which  renders 
him  unable  to  withstand  any  unusual  emotion,  any  sudden 
provocation,  or  any  unexpected  and  pressing  emergency. 
Were  not  this  the  case,  it  is  manifest  that  he  would  not  be 
more  liable  to  a  fresh  paroxysm,  than  if  he  had  never  been 
attacked.  And  the  opposite  is  notoriously  the  fact;  for 
relapses  are  always  to  be  dreaded,  not  only  after  a  lucid 
interval,  but  even  after  perfect  recovery.  And  it  is  but  just 
as  well  as  proper  to  keep  this  in  mind,  as  it  has  too  often 
happened,  that  the  lunatic  has  been  visited  with  the  heaviest 
responsibility,  for  acts  committed  during  such  an  interval, 
which,  previous  to  the  first  attack  of  the  disease,  he  would 
have  shrunk  from  with  horror."  a 


1  Essays  on  Hypochondriacal  and  other  Nervous  Affections  :  21st 
Essay. 
*  Observations  on  Mental  Derangement,  241. 


LUCID    INTERVALS.  321 

§  280.  With  the  views  of  these  distinguished  observers 
before  us,  what  are  we  to  think  of  the  doctrine,  that  in  the 
lucid  intervals  the  mind  is  restored  to  its  natural  strength 
and  soundness ;  that  it  is  capable  of  as  great  intellectual 
exertions,  and  of  holding  as  tight  a  rein  over  the  passions ; 
that  it  is  as  able  to  resist  foreign  influence  and  to  act  on  its 
own  determinations,  with  its  ordinary  prudence  and  forecast ; 
that  "  having  thrown  off  the  disease,  it  has  recovered  its  gene- 
ral habit,"  or  that  it  has  undergone  a  "  temporary  cure  ?  " 
Sounder  pathology  was  never  written,  than  is  contained  in 
the  extract  from  Dr.  Combe,  and  no  physician,  who  has  been 
much  conversant  with  the  insane,  will  be  disposed  to  ques- 
tion its  correctness.  Fodere  goes  a  step  farther  and  hazards 
a  theory  which  is  plausible  at  least,  to  explain  the  pathologi- 
cal causes  that  produce  this  alternation  of  paroxysms  and 
lucid  intervals.  The  former  state,  he  considers,  is  attended 
by  an  excessive  plethora  of  the  blood-vessels  of  the  brain, 
and  the  latter  by  a  relaxed,  atonic  condition  of  these  vessels, 
which  is  an  effect  of  their  previous  forcible  distentiori.  In 
this  condition  they  are  liable  to  be  suddenly  engorged  by 
exciting  causes,  such  as  intemperance  in  eating  or  drinking, 
anger,  violent  exercise,  insolation,  &c. ;  or  in  consequence 
of  a  certain  predisposition  of  constitution.1  Indeed,  it  is 
well  known,  that  the  return  of  the  paroxysms  is  often  re- 
tarded by  regulated  diet,  bleeding,  quiet,  seclusion,  kind 
treatment,  and  the  absence  of  the  above  named  stimuli.  It 
is  thus  shown,  conclusively,  that  in  every  lucid  interval, 
there  remains  some  unsoundness  of  the  material  organ  of 
the  mind,  which  may  be  designated  generally  as  a  morbid 
irritability,  which,  on  the  application  of  the  slightest  exciting 
cause,  may  produce  an  outbreak  of  mania  in  all  its  original 
severity. 

§  281.     The  principle  of  law,  which  holds  the  civil  re- 

1  De  Medecine  L6gale,  i.  208,  §  140 


322  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

sponsibilities  of  the  insane  to  be  unimpaired  during  the  lucid 
interval,  we  are  willing  to  admit,  is  generally  correct.  It 
should  be  the  duty  of  courts,  however,  to  view  their  acts 
done  at  such  times  with  the  most  watchful  jealousy,  because 
their  minds,  though  left  free  from  all  delusion,  are  never- 
theless weak  and  irritable,  and  they  may  be  easily  induced 
by  the  arts  of  unprincipled  men,  to  enter  into  transactions, 
the  folly  of  which  would  have  been  obvious  enough  to  them 
before  they  began  to  be  insane.  Although  inclined  to  be- 
lieve that  the  restoration  of  the  mind  during  the  lucid  interval 
is  far  from  being  so  perfect,  as  it  is  represented  by  the  legal 
authorities  above  quoted,  yet  we  do  not  hesitate  to  say,  that  the 
proof  of  its  occurrence  should  be  as  strong  as  they  require  it. 
D'Aguesseau,  in  continuation  of  the  remarks  above  quoted, 
declares,  that,  "  as  it  is  impossible  to  judge  in  a  moment  of 
the  quality  of  an  interval,  it  is  requisite  that  there  should  be 
a  sufficient  length  of  time  for  giving  a  perfect  assurance  of 
the  temporary  reestablishment  of  reason,  which  it  is  not 
possible  to  define  in  general,  and  which  depends  upon  the 
different  kinds  of  fury,  but  it  is  certain  there  must  be  a 
time  and  a  considerable  time."  Lord  Thurlow  also,  on  the 
same  occasion,  which  elicited  his  views  of  the  nature  of  the 
lucid  interval,  says,  that  "  the  evidence  in  support  of  the 
allegation  of  a  lucid  interval,  after  derangement  at  any 
period  has  been  established,  should  be  as  strong  and  demon- 
strative of  such  fact,  as  where  the  object  of  the  proof  is  to 
establish  derangement.1  The  evidence  in  such  a  case,  ap- 


1  It  appears  from  a  note  in  1  Beck's  Med.  Juris.  556,  that  Lord 
Eldon  dissented  from  this  proposition,  and  thus  stated  his  objec- 
tions to  it  to  Lord  Thurlow  himself.  "I  have  seen  you  exercising 
the  duties  of  lord  chancellor  with  ample  sufficiency  of  mind  and 
understanding,  and  with  the  greatest  ability.  Now  if  Providence 
should  afflict  you  with  a  fever,  which  should  have  the  effect  of 
taking  away  that  sanity  of  mind  for  a  considerable  time,  (for  it  does 
nut  signify  whether  it  is  the  disease  insanity,  or  a  fever  that  makes 


LUCID    INTERVALS.  323 

plying  to  stated  intervals,  ought  to  go  to  the  state  and  habit 
of  the  person,  arid  not  to  the  accidental  interview  of  an  indi- 
vidual, or  to  the  degree  of  self-possession  in  any  particular 
act."  It  may  be  well  to  inquire  how  far  these  views  are 
sustained  by  subsequent  decisions. 

§  282.  In  law  and  equity  courts  there  seems  to  have 
been  little  disposition,  in  civil  cases,  to  question  their  cor- 
rectness.1 In  the  ecclesiastical  courts,  however,  there  has 
occurred  some  discrepancy  of  opinion,  both  as  to  the  exact 


you  insane),  would  any  one  say,  that  it  required  such  very  strong 
evidence  to  show  that  your  mind  was  restored  to  the  power  of  per- 
forming such  an  act  as  making  a  will  —  an  apt,  to  the  performance 
of  which  a  person  of  ordinary  intelligence  is  competent  ?  "  We 
are  not  informed  how  this  objection  struck  Lord  Thurlow,  but  we 
trust  that  no  reader  of  the  present  work  will  be  at  a  loss  to  per- 
ceive its  weakness  for  a  moment.  It  does  signify  everything, 
whether  it  is  the  disease  insanity  or  a  fever  that  makes  one  insane, 
for  the  delirium  of  fever  is  but  a  casual  sympton  of  that  disease, 
and,  together  with  the  pathological  condition  that  gave  rise  to  it, 
is  presumed  to  disappear  with  the  main  disorder  on  which  it  de- 
pends This  is  the  ordinary  course  of  nature.  On  the  contrary, 
mental  alienation  is  the  essential,  the  pathognomic,  and  oftentimes, 
the  only  clearly  discernible  symptom  of  mania,  and  its  disappear- 
ance furnishes  the  only  intimation  perhaps  that  we  have,  of  the 
cure  of  this  disease.  Thus,  our  means  of  deciding  this  point  being 
so  small,  we  are  necessarily  led  to  require  stronger  evidence  of 
their  certainty,  than  of  the  restoration  of  the  mind  in  fever,  because 
the  latter  is  confirmed  by  a  multitude  of  symptoms.  Recovery  from 
an  attack  of  fever  is  a  phenomenon  that  any  one  can  see,  but  not 
such  is  recovery  from  an  attack  of  mania  ;  because,  though  the 
insane  delusions  or  conduct  by  which  it  was  manifested  may  disap- 
pear, it  remains  to  be  determined  in  every  case,  whether  they  are 
not  purposely  concealed  from  observation,  or  proper  opportunity 
has  been  offered  to  the  patient  to  bring  them  forward.  Just  as  the 
existence  of  mania  requires  stronger  proof  than  that  of  the  delirium 
of  fever,  so  does  recovery  from  the  former  require  stronger  proof 
than  recovery  from  the  latter. 

1  See  Hall  v.  Warren,  9  Vesey  ;  exparte  Holyland,  11  Vesey. 


324  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

nature  of  the  lucid  interval,  and  the  kind  of  proof  required 
to  establish  its  existence.  In  a  commendable  respect  for  the 
sacred  character  of  testamentary  acts,  they  have  assumed 
considerable  latitude,  and,  no  doubt,  very  properly,  in  their 
construction  of  lucid  intervals  ;  but  occasionally  they  have 
gone  farther  than  even  the  truths  of  pathology  will  warrant. 
§  283.  In  Cartwright  v.  Cartwright,1  the  deceased,  a  sin- 
gle woman,  made  her  will  on  the  14th  of  August,  1775, 
which  will  was  contested  on  the  ground  of  the  insanity  of 
the  testator.  "  It  was  proved  in  general,"  says  the  court, 
"  that  her  habit  and  condition  of  body,  and  her  manner,  for 
several  months  before  the  date  of  the  will,  was  that  of  a 
person  afflicted  with  many  of  the  worst  symptoms  of  that 
dreadful  disease,  and  continued  so  certainly  after  making 
the  will."  It  appears  from  the  evidence,  that  for  some  time 
previous  to  the  date  of  the  will,  she  was  very  importunate 
for  the  use  of  pen,  ink,  and  paper,  which  however  were 
withheld  from  her  by  the  direction  of  her  physician,  Dr. 
Battie,  who  was  eminent  for  his  knowledge  and  treatment 
of  mental  disorders.  Her  importunity  continuing,  he  at 
length  consented,  in  order  to  quiet  and  pacify  her,  that  she 
might  have  them,  observing  that  it  did  not  signify  what  she 
might  write,  as  she  was  not  fit  to  make  a  proper  use  of  pen, 
ink,  and  paper.  These  being  carried  to  her,  her  hands 
which  had  been  constantly  tied  were  loosed,  and  she  sat 
down  to  a  bureau  to  write.  Her  attendants,  who  were 
watching  her  outside  the  door,  saw  her  write  on  several 
pieces  of  paper  in  succession,  which  she  tore  up  and  threw 
into  the  grate,  walking  up  and  down  the  room  in  a  wild  and 
ferocious  manner,  and  muttering  to  herself.  After  one  or 
two  hours  spent  in  this  manner,  she  finally  succeeded  in 
writing  a  will  that  suited  her,  though  it  occupied  but  a  few 


1  Phillimore's  Reports,  90. 


LUCID     INTERVALS.  325 

lines.  Such  are  the  facts  that  have  any  bearing  on  the 
point  at  issue.  It  was  decided  by  the  court,  Sir  William 
Wynne,  that  she  had  a  lucid  interval,  while  making  the  will, 
the  validity  of  which  was  consequently  established.  The 
grounds  of  this  decision  were,  that  the  will  made  a  natural 
and  consistent  distribution  of  her  property,  and,  in  short, 
that  it  was  "  a  rational  act  rationally  done  ;"  hence  it  was  to 
be  inferred,  that  her  mind  was  visited  by  a  lucid  interval,  at 
the  .moment  of  making  it.  For,  says  the  court,  "  I  think 
the  strongest  and  best  proof,  that  can  arise  as  to  a  lucid  in- 
terval, is  that  which  arises  from  the  act  itself ;  that  I  look 
upon  as  the  thing  to  be  first  examined,  and  if  it  can  be 
proved  and  established,  that  it  is  a  rational  act  rationally 
done,  the  whole  case  is  proved."  It  seems  to  have  occurred 
to  the  court,  that  some  catenation  must  be  made  out  between 
such  an  act  and  a  lucid  interval  ;  and  it  being  in  evidence, 
that,  at  limes,  she  would  converse  rationally,  we  have  the 
following  deductions  therefrom.  "  If  she  could  converse  ra- 
tionally, that  is  a  lucid  interval ;  and  that  she  did  so  and 
had  lucid  intervals,  I  think  is  completely  established."  The 
fact  is,  that  the  court,  throughout  its  whole  judgment,  con- 
founded testamentary  capacity  with  a  lucid  interval,  with- 
out once  seeming  to  be  aware  that  though  the  will  might  be 
a  rational  act,  and  therefore  perhaps  valid,  it  by  no  means 
followed,  that  a  lucid  interval  had  taken  place.  What  it 
considered  as  such  here  scarcely  amounted  to  the  kind  of 
remission  described  by  Mr.  Haslam  (§  275,)  for  not  a  single 
fact  appears  in  the  evidence,  from  which  we  can  infer  any 
alteration  w.hatever  in  the  stale  of  her  disease.  True,  the 
court  thought,  that  her  reason  had  returned,  because,  though 
released  from,  the  confinement  of  a  straight-waistcoat,  and 
trusted  with  a  candle,  she  did  .no  mischief  and  did  not  abuse 
her  liberty  ;  but  such  things  would  have  little  weight  with 
medical  men,  especially  at  the  present  day.  Nothing 
indeed  can  be  more  chimerical,  because  so  utterly  contra- 
28 


326  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

dieted  by  all  that  we  know  of  insanity,  than  this  idea  of  a 
lucid  interval  of  a  few  minutes  duration  suddenly  interposed 
amid  years  of  mania,  and  as  suddenly  disappearing.1  The 
point  particularly  insisted  upon  by  the  judge  is,  that  she 
would  sometimes  converse  rationally,  as  indeed  most  insane 
people  do.  "  If,"  he  says,  "  she  had  particular  subjects  or 
topics  in  her  mind,  and  at  such  times  would  converse  ra- 
tionally upon  them,  and  when  those  topics  were  out  of  her 
mind  would  fly  into  outrages  of  frenzy  and  extravagance, 
does  that  all  show  that  at  the  former  time  she  was  deprived 
of  rational  capacity  ?"  He  does  not  seem  to  be  aware, 
that  madmen  are  every  day  doing  rational  acts,  and  that 
it  would  not  be  surprising  if  wills  should  sometimes  be 
found  among  the  number.2 

§  284.  We  have  no  fault  to  find  with  the  principle  of  law, 
which  makes  these  wills  valid,  but  we  would  have  the  ground 
on  which  such  validity  is  established,  distinctly  understood 
to  be  the  character  of  the  act,  not  the  condition  of  the  tes- 
tator's mind  ;  and  if,  in  the  above  case,  the  court  had  been 
contented  with  proving  the  will  to  be  a  rational  act  and 
thence  inferring  testamentary  capacity,  there  would  have 
been  nothing  to  complain  of.  It  is  important  that  on  sub- 
jects like  medical  jurisprudence,  language  should  be  used 
with  strict  adherence  to  its  original  and  proper  signification  ; 
and  therefore  when  a  lucid  interval  is  defined  by  competent 


1  Its  consequences  seem  to  render  it  as  pernicious  as  it  is  absurd. 
In  the  trial  of  Hadfield  for  shooting  at  the  king,  Lord  Kenyon,  after 
admitting  that  he  was  insane  both  before  and  after  the  act,  and  that  it 
was  improbable  he  had  recovered  his  senses  in  the  interim,  declared, 
that  "  were  they  to  run  into  nicety,  proof  might  be  demanded  of  his 
insanity,  at  the  precise  moment  when  the  act  was  committed  !"  as 
if  such  proof  were  not  utterly  beyond  the  reach  of  human  means. 

2  It  will  be  observed  that  the  views  of  the  court  in  this  case,  are 
fully  in  accordance  with  the  law  as  laid  down  by  Swinburne. 
See  §  12. 


LUCID    INTERVALS.  327 

authority  to  be  a  "  temporary  cure  "  of  the  disease,  a  re- 
covery of  the  mind's  general  habit,  the  occurrence  of  which 
must  be  proved  by  the  "  state  and  habit,"  of  the  person, 
observed  during  a  sufficient  length  of  time,  we  have  to  com- 
plain, that  the  term  is  applied  by  others  to  a  mere  remission 
in  the  violence  of  the  symptoms,  which  lasts  but  a  few 
minutes  and  is  proved  by  a  single  coherent  act. 

§  285.  The  construction  here  put  upon  the  lucid  interval, 
not  only  conflicts  with  the  opinions  of  the  eminent  authori- 
ties we  have  quoted,  but  has  not  been  countenanced  by  sub- 
sequent decisions  even  in  the  ecclesiastical  courts.  In  a 
recent  case,  where  the  testamentary  acts  of  an  insane  per- 
son were  propounded  by  the  executors,  who  endeavored  to 
prove  the  occurrence  of  a  lucid  interval  at  the  time  of  their 
execution,  the  court,  Sir  John  Nicholl,  decided  that  the  proof 
was  not  sufficient,  though  it  was  unquestionably  stronger  than 
in  the  case  of  Cartwright  v.  Cartwright.  The  surgeon  of 
the  testator  who  saw  him  once  within  the  period  —  a  little 
more  than  ten  months  —  that  included  the  two  wills  in  ques- 
tion, and  commenced  a  frequent  attendance  on  him  between 
two  and  three  months  afterwards,  deposed,  that  on  none  of 
these  occasions  did  he  exhibit  any  symptoms  of  insanity,  but 
"  conducted  himself,  and  talked  and  discoursed  in  a  rational 
manner,  and  was  in  the  full  possession  of  his  mental  facul- 
ties." The  solicitor  who  took  the  instructions  for  the  last 
will,  considered  him  of  sound  mind,  and  deposed  that  neither 
of  the  witnesses  treated  him  as  a  person  of  deranged  intellect 
or  of  unsound  mind.  In  the  testamentary  dispositions  them- 
selves, there  was  nothing  to  negative  the  idea  of  the  most 
perfect  soundness  of  mind.  In  view  of  the  fact,  however, 
that  the  testator  was  so  deranged  that  he  was  attended  by  a 
keeper  from  a  lunatic  asylum,  till  within  a  few  months  of 
the  date  of  the  first  will,  and  frequently  manifested  absurd 
delusions  during  the  period  including  both  wills,  the  above 
proof  was  not  considered  as  sufficient  for  the  purpose,  rea- 


328 


MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 


soning  upon  the  general  principles  of  insanity.  "  It  is  clear," 
said  the  court,  "  that  persons  essentially  insane  may  be  calm, 
may  do  acts,  hold  conversations,  and  even  pass  in  general 
society  as  perfectly  sane.  It  often  requires  close  examina- 
tion by  persons  skilled  in  the  disorder,  to  discover  and  ascer- 
tain whether  or  not  the  mental  derangement  is  removed,  and 
the  mind  again  become  perfectly  sound.  When  there  is 
calmness,  when  there  is  rationality  on  ordinary  subjects, 
those  who  see  the  party  usually  conclude  that  his  recovery 

is  perfect Where  there  is  not  actual  recovery, 

and  a  return  to  the  management  of  himself  and  his  concerns 
by  th  unfortunate  individual,  the  proof  of  a  lucid  interval 
is  extremely  difficult."  J  Whatever  confidence  the  civil  law 
may  repose  in  the  evidence  furnished  by  the  character  of 
the  testamentary  act  touching  the  mental  condition  of  the 
testator,  it  is  distinctly  enough  inculcated  in  the  above  quo- 
tations, that  such  evidence  is  not  necessarily  to  prevail  over 
that  which  is  drawn  from  his  daily  walk  and  conversation. 
When,  however,  sanity  is  confessedly  doubtful  merely,  then 
"  the  agent  is  to  be  inferred  rational,  from  the  character 
broadly  taken  of  his  act."  2 

§  286.  It  has  been  admitted,  that,  with  certain  reserva- 
tions, the  civil  responsibilities  of  the  insane  are  unimpaired 
during  the  lucid  interval,  because  the  mind  is  sufficiently 
restored  to  enable  the  individual  to  act  with  tolerable  discre- 
tion in  his  civil  relations.  In  respect  to  crime,  however,  the 
matter  is  altogether  different,  for  reasons  that  will  not  be 
without  their  force,  we  trust,  to  those  who  have  attentively 
considered  the  preceding  remarks.  .  These  reasons  are,  that 

1  Groom  and  Thomas  v.  Thomas  and  Thomas,   2  Hagg.  Eccl. 
Rep.  433  :  In  White  v.  Driver,  1  Phillimore,  84,  however,  a  lucid 
interval  was  held   to  be  established,  on  much  less  proof  than  was 
offered   in  the  above  case',  tiiougli  far  more  certainly  than  was  ad- 
mitted in  Cartwright'ix  Caj-twright. 

2  Scruby  and  Finch,  v.  Fordtiam,  1  Addams,  Ecc.  R.  74. 


LUCID    INTERVALS.  329 

the  crimes  which  are  alleged  to  have  been  committed  in  a 
lucid  interval,  are  generally  the  result  of  the  momentary 
excitement  produced  by  sudden  provocations  ;  that  these 
provocations  put  an  end  to  the  temporary  cure,  by  immedi- 
ately reproducing  that  pathological  condition  of  the  brain 
called  irritation,  arid  that  this  irritation  is  the  essential  cause 
of  mental  derangement  which  absolves  from  all  the  legal 
consequences  of  crime.  The  conclusion  is,  therefore,  that 
we  ought  never  perhaps  to  convict  for  a  crime  committed 
during  the  lucid  interval,  because  there  is  every  probability, 
that  the  individual  was  under  the  influence  of  that  cerebral 
irritation  which  makes  a  man  insane.  The  difference 
between  a  person  in  the  lucid  interval  and  one  who  has 
never  been  insane,  on  which  we  particularly  insist,  is,  that, 
while  in  the  latter,  provocations  stimulate  the  passions  to  the 
highest  degree  of  which  they  are  capable  in  a  state  of  health, 
though  still  more  or  less  under  his  control,  they  produce  in 
the  former  a  pathological  change  which  deprives  him  of 
everything  like  moral  liberty.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to 
do  more  than  barely  state  these  views,  since  their  correct- 
ness seems  to  have  been  universally  recognized  in  practice, 
not  a  single  case  having  occurred,  so  far  as  can  be  ascer- 
tained, where  a  person  has  been  convicted  of  crime  com- 
mitted during  a  lucid  interval.  Burdened  as  the  criminal 
law  is  with  false  principles  on  the  subject  of  insanity,  the 
time  has  gone  by  when  juries  will  return  a  verdict  of  guilty 
against  one  who  is  admitted  to  have  been  insane,  within  a 
short  period  of  time  before  the  criminal  act  with  which  he 
is  charged.1 


1  We  have  been  so  long  accustomed  to  the  severity  that  charac- 
terizes the  spirit  of  the  English  criminal  law,  that  we  look  with  no 
little  jealousy  on  any  attempt  to  circumscribe  the  range  of  its  oper- 
ation. In  Germany,  however,  where  no  such  influence  is  felt,  more 
humane  and  scientific  views  on  the  subject  of  responsibility  during 
28* 


330  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

§  287.  We  should  be  careful  not  to  confound  the  period 
intervening  between  the  perfect  cure  of  one  attack  of  insanity 
and  the  occurrence  of  another  attack,  with  a  lucid  interval. 
The  renewal  of  the  disease  does  not  prove  that  it  never  has 
been  cured,  for  in"  this  respect,  insanity  follows  the  same 
pathological  laws,  as  gout,  rheumatism,  colic,  or  any  other 
disease.  True,  persons  who  have  experienced  repeated 
attacks  of  insanity,  generally  labor  under  a  certain  irritabil- 
ity of  the  nervous  system,  which  should  lead  us  to  be 
cautious  in  forming  opinions  relative  to  their  moral  liberty 
under  particular  circumstances.  Whether  the  absence  of 
the  disease  arise  from  a  lucid  interval,  or  a  complete  cure, 
the  occurrence  of  certain  exciting  causes  equally  exposes 
the  patient  to  a  renewed  attack  of  the  disease  in  all  its 
original  severity.  Whenever,  therefore,  the  criminal  acts 
of  one  subject  to  repeated  attacks  of  insanity,  are  called  in 
question,  and  it  appears,  that  the.  accused  was  under  the 
influence  of  violent,  or  harassing  moral  emotions,  such  as 
anger,  grief,  or  sense  of  responsibility ;  or  of  certain  phy- 
siological conditions,  such  as  menstruation,  lactation,  or  the 
repulsion  of  other  diseases ;  or  exposed  to  the  noxious  in- 
fluence of  certain  physical  agents,  such  as  insolation,  depri- 
vation of  sleep,  or  blows  on  the  head,  we  are  justified  in 
considering  him  as  not  having  been  morally  free  at  the  time 


the  lucid  interval  have  found  distinguished  supporters.  "  The  state 
of  the  mind  during  the  lucid  interval  is  such,"  says  Dr.  Friedreich, 
"  that  a  circumstance  which  would  have  passed  unnoticed  at  any 
other  time,  here  excites  the  individual  to  violent,  illegal  acts.'1 
"  Who  can  positively  decide  whether  the  criminal  act  really  happened 
during  a  lucid  interval,  or  was  the  result  of  a  paroxysm  prema- 
turely provoked  by  some  internal  or  external  cause  of  excitement, 
(for  during  the  lucid  interval,  the  susceptibility  to  excitement  is 
greatly  increased)  and  which  paroxysm  might  not  have  occurred 
at  all  without  such  provocation."  Ueber  Zurechnung  im  lucido  in- 
tervallo,  Neues  Archiv  des  Criminalrechts,  xiv.  268. 


LUCID    INTERVALS.  331 

when  the  act  was  committed.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  there 
appear  to  have  been  no  causes  of  this  kind  in  operation,  and 
the  usual  signs  of  insanity  were  not  present,  and  especially 
if  the  act  obvipusly  serves  some  interest  of  the  accused,  we 
can  hardly  avoid  the  conclusion,  that  he  is  responsible  for 
his  criminal  acts. 


CHAPTER  XV. 


SIMULATED    INSANITY. 

§  288.  THE  supposed  insurmountable  difficulty  of  dis- 
tinguishing between  feigned  and  real  insanity  has  conduced, 
probably  more  than  all  other  causes  together,  to  bind  the 
legal  profession  to  the  most  rigid  construction  and  applica- 
tion of  the  common  law  relative  to  this  disease,  and  is  always 
put  forward  in  objection  to  the  more  humane  doctrines  that 
have  been  inculcated  in  the  present  work.  That  such  diffi- 
culty has  been  experienced,  and  given  rise  to  much  per- 
plexity and  mistake,  cannot  be  denied ;  but  it  is  to  be 
considered,  whether  it  has  not  arisen,  less  from  the  obscu- 
rity of  the  subject,  than  from  the  imperfect  means  that  have 
been  generally  applied  to  its  elucidation.  The  opinions  of 
physicians,  which  are  ordinarily  taken  in  doubtful  cases, 
have  been  received  with  a  deference,  that  was  warranted 
more  by  general  professional  reputation,  than  by  superior 
knowledge  of  this  particular  disease.  The  treatment  of 
insanity  is  now  so  much  confined  to  the  heads  of  extensive 
establishments  in  which  its  subjects  are  congregated,  that 
opportunities  for  studying  it  are  comparatively  limited  in  or- 
dinary practice,  so  that  a  physician  may  be  justly  celebrated 
in  the  knowledge  and  treatment  of  other  diseases,  and  at 
the  same  time  be  poorly  qualified  to  decide  upon  questions 
relative  to  insanity,  especially  in  which  every  effort  is  made 
to  perplex  and  mystify  his  mind.  This  truth  cannot  be  dis- 


SIMULATED    INSANITY.  333 

guised,  and  though  physicians  are  frequently  unwilling  to 
believe  it,  and  are  disposed  to  act  on  the  popular  notion  that 
all  medical  subjects  are  equally  familiar  to  them,  this  is  no 
reason  why  courts  and  juries  should  ever  forget  it.  Nothing, 
indeed,  requires  a  severer  exercise  of  a  physician's  know- 
ledge and  tact,  than  a  case  of  simulated  insanity,  but  the 
same  might  be  said  with  quite  as  much  truth,  of  other  dis- 
eases that  men  have  been  led  to  feign,  tut  which,  never- 
theless, are  every  day  investigated  and  understood. 

§  289.  The  workings  of  an  insane  mind  —  such  as 
attract  the  popular  notice  —  are  apparently  so  confused  and 
discordant,  so  wild  and  unnatural,  as  to  have  given  rise  to 
the  notion  as  prevalent  as  it  is  unfounded,  that  insanity  may 
be  easily  imitated.  The  method  that  is  in  madness,  the 
constant  and  consistent  reference  to  the  predominant  idea, 
which  the  practised  observer  detects  amid  the  greatest  irre- 
gularity of  conduct  and  language,  is  one  of  those  essential 
features  in  certain  forms  of  the  disease,  which  is  generally 
overlooked,  or  at  least  very  unsuccessfully  imitated.  Those 
who  have  been  longest  acquainted  with  the  manners  of  the 
insane,  and  whose  practical  acquaintance  with  the  disease 
furnishes  the  most  satisfactory  guaranty  of  the  correctness 
of  their  opinions,  assure  us  that  insanity  is  not  easily  feigned, 
and  consequently  that  no  attempt  at  imposition  can  long 
escape  the  efforts  of  one  properly  qualified  to  expose  it. 
Georget  does  not  believe,  "  that  a  person  who  has  not  made 
the  insane  a  subject  of  study,  can  simulate  madness  so  as  to 
deceive  a  physician  well  acquainted  with  the  disease."  *  Mr. 
Haslam  declares,  that,  "  to  sustain  the  character  of  a  parox- 
ysm of  active  insanity,  would  require  a  continuity  of  exertion 
beyond  the  power  of  a  sane  person."  2  Dr.  Conolly  affirms, 
"  that  he  can  hardly  imagine  a  case  which  would  be  proof 

1  Des  Maladies  Mcntales,  60. 

8  Medical  Jurisprudence  as  it  relates  to  Insanity,  322. 


334  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

against  an  efficient  system  of  observation." ]  Another 
writer,  while  admitting  that  attempts  to  deceive  are  some- 
times successful,  on  account  of  the  imperfect  knowledge  of 
the  operations  of  the  mind  in  health  and  disease  possessed 
by  medical  men  in  general,  observes,  however,  that  when 
we  consider  the  "  very  peculiar  complex  phenomena  which 
characterize  true  madness,  and  reflect  on  the  general  igno- 
rance of  those  who  attempt  to  imitate  them,  we  have  no 
right  to  expect  such  a  finished  picture  as  could  impose  on 
persons  well  acquainted  with  the  real  disease."  2  With  such 
authority  before  us,  to  urge  as  an  objection  against  the  free 
admission  of  insanity  in  excuse  for  crime,  the  extreme  diffi- 
culty of  detecting  attempts  to  feign  it,  can  no  longer  be  any- 
thing more  than  the  plea  of  ignorance  or  indolence.  The 
only  effect  such  difficulty  should  have  on  the  minds  of  those 
who  are  to  form  their  opinions  by  the  evidence  they  hear, 
should  be  to  impress  them  with  a  stronger  sense  of  the 
necessity  of  an  intimate,  practical  acquaintance  with  insanity 
on  the  part  of  the  medical  witness,  and  convince  them  that 
without  this  qualification,  the  testimony  of  the  physician  is 
but  little  better  than  that  of  any  one  else.  We  shall  now 
notice  those  features  of  insanity  the  knowledge  of  which, 
either  from  their  riot  being  generally  obvious,  or  not  easily 
simulated,  will  enable  us  to  distinguish  the  reality  from  the 
imitation;  and  as  general  mania  is  oftener  chosen  than  any 
other  form  of  mental  derangement,  for  the  purpose  of  decep- 
tion, we  shall  begin  with  that. 

§  290.  The  grand  fault  committed  by  impostors  is,  -that 
in  their  anxiety  to  produce  an  imitation  that  shall  deceive, 
they  overdo  the  character  they  assume,  and  present  nothing 
but  a  clumsy  caricature.  The  representations  of  mania 

1  Inquiry  concerning  the  indications  of  Insanity,  467. 

2  Cyclopaedia  of  Practical  Medicine :  Article,  Feigned  Diseases, 
146. 


SIMULATED     INSANITY.  335 

put  forth  in  the  works  of  novelists  and  poets,  with  a  few 
such  admirable  exceptions  as  the  Lear  and  Hamlet  of 
Shakspeare,  are,  of  all  their  attempts  to  copy  nature,  the 
least  like  their  model.  If  then  men  of^ducation,  who  may 
have  had  some  opportunities  for  observing  the  disease,  have 
after  all  so  imperfect  a  picture  of  its  phenomena  in  their 
mind,  what  success  could  be  expected  from  the  attempts 
of  persons  who,  for  the  most  part,  assume  their  task  upon 
the  spur  of  the  occasion  with  little  preparation,  and  who 
have  derived  all  their  ideas  of  madness  from  a  casual  visit 
to  an  insane  hospital,  or  from  observing  the  mano3uvres  of 
some  roving  maniac  ?  With  such,  insanity  is  but  another 
name  for  wilclness,  fury,  and  unlimited  irregularity,  and 
consequently,  under  the  thin  disguise  they  assume,  there 
can  readily  be  detected  a  constant  effort  to  impress  on  the 
beholder  the  conviction  they  are  anxious  to  produce  by  the 
mere  force  of  noise  and  disorder.  The  really  mad,  except 
in  the  acute  stage  of  the  disease,  are,  generally  speaking, 
not  readily  recognized  as  such  by  a  stranger,  and  they  re- 
tain so  much  of  the  rational  as  to  require  an  effort  to  detect 
the  impairment  of  their  faculties.  In  feigned  cases,  all  this 
is  very  different ;  the  person  is  determined  that  his  derange- 
ment shall  not  be  overlooked  for  want  of  numerous  and  ob- 
vious manifestations  of  his  existence.  Under  this  impres- 
sion, the  impostor  is  constantly  guilty  of  some  word  or  act 
grossly  inconsistent  with  real  insanity,  and  affording  an  easy 
clew  to  the  truth  of  the  case. 

§  291.  Generally  speaking,  after  the  acute  stage  has 
passed  off,  a  maniac  has  no  difficulty  in  remembering  his 
friends  and  acquaintances,  the  places  he  has  been  accustom- 
ed to  frequent,  names,  dates,  and  events,  and  the  occurren- 
ces of  his  life.  The  ordinary  relations  of  things  are,  with 
some  exceptions,  as  easily  and  clearly  perceived  as  ever, 
and  his  discrimination  of  character  seems  to  be  marked  by 
his  usual  shrewdness.  His  replies  to  questions,  though  they 


336  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

may  sometimes  indicate  delusion  or  extravagant  notions, 
generally  have  some  relation  to  the  subject,  and  show  that 
it  has  occupied  his  attention.  Now,  a  person  simulating 
mania  will  frequently  deny  all  knowledge  of  men  or  things, 
with  whom  he'  has  always  been  familiar,  especially  when- 
ever he  imagines  that  such  ignorance,  if  believed,  may  be 
considered  as  a  proof  of  his  innocence.  The  very  names, 
dates  and  transactions,  with  which  he  has  been  most  lately 
and  intimately  conversant,  he  will,  for  the  same  reason,  re- 
fuse to  remember,  while  the  real  madman  will,  seldom,  if 
ever,  forget  them,  in  whatever  shapes  they  may  appear  to 
his  mind,  or  with  whatever  delusions  they  may  be  connect- 
ed. His  distorted  perceptions  may  transform  his  humble 
dwelling  into  a  princely  castle,  and  the  people  about  him 
into  generals  and  courtiers  ready  to  execute  his  slightest 
orders,  but  he  will  never  deny  thar  he  has  an  abode,  nor 
forget  the  existence  or  names  of  those  whose  station  and 
duties  he  has  so  entirely  mistaken.  Grant  his  premises, 
and  oftentimes  nothing  can  be  urged  against  the  conclusions 
of  the  madman's  reasoning  ;  but  in  simulated  madness,  the 
common  error  is  to  imagine  that  nothing  must  be  remem- 
bered correctly,  and  that  the  more  inconsistent  and  absurd 
the  discourse,  the  better  is  the  attempt  at  deception  sustained. 
In  simulated  madness  there  is  also  a  certain  hesitation  and 
appearance  of  premeditation  in  the  succession  of  ideas, 
however  incoherent,  very  different  from  the  abruptness  and 
rapidity,  with  which  in  real  madness,  the  train  of  thought  is 
changed.  This,  of  itself,  is  sufficient,  in  the  majority  of 
cases,  to  reveal  the  deception  to  the  practised  observer  of 
insanity.  In  simulated  mania,  the  impostor,  when  requested 
to  repeat  his  disordered  ideas,  will  generally  do  it  correctly, 
as  if  anxious  that  none  of  his  ravings  should,  escape  atten- 
tion, or  be  forgotten  ;  while  the  genuine  patient  will  be  apt 
to  wander  from  the  track,  or  introduce  ideas  that  had  not 
presented  themselves  before.  The  following  case,  which 


S'MULATED     INSANITY,  337 

we  find  in  one  of  Georgel's  works,  will  furnish  an  appro- 
priate illustration  of  the  foregoing  remarks,  and  give  an  in- 
sight into  the  devices  of  imposture,  to  be  obtained  only  from 
examples. 

§  292,  u  Jean-Pierre,  aged  forty-three  years,  formerly 
a  notary,  was  brought  before  the  court  of  assizes  of  Paris, 
on  the  21st  February,  1824,  accused  of  crimes  and  mis- 
conduct, in  which  cunning  and  bad  faith  had  been  prom- 
inently conspicuous.  He  had  already  been  condemned  for 
forgery;  and  was  now  accused  of  forgery,  swindling,  and 
incendiarism.  When  examined  after  his  arrest,  he  an- 
swered vyith  precision  every  question  that  was  put  to.  him. 
But  about  a  month  after,  he  would  no  longer  explain  him- 
self, talked  incoherently,  and  finally  gave  way  to  acts  of 
fury,  breaking  and  destroying  everything  that  came  in  his 
way,  and  throwing  the  furniture  out  of  the  window.  At 
the  suggestion  of  the  medical  men  who  were  called  to  ex- 
amine him,  Jean-Pierre  was  sent  to  the  Bicetre,  to  be  more 
closely  observed.  There  he  became  acquainted  with  an- 
other pretended  lunatic,  accused  also  of  forgery  and  swin- 
dling,-and  retained  in  that  house  for  the  same  purpose  — 
that  of  being  observed  by  the  physicians.  One  night  a  vi- 
olent fire  broke  out  at  the  Bicetre,' in  three  different  places 
at  once,  in  one  of  the  buildings  occupied  by  the  insane, 
which  circumstance  -led  to  the  suspicion  that  the  fire  was 
the  effect  of  malice  The  next  day  it  was  discovered  that 
the  two  supposed  madmen  had  disappeared.  Jean  Pierre 
hid  himself  in  Paris  in  a  house  where  his  wife  was  employed 
and  where  he  was  again  arrested.  Immediately  on  his 
escape  from  the  Bicetre,  he  wrote  a  very  sensible  letter  to 
one  of  his  friends;  but  scarcely  had  he.  been  taken  when 
he  again  assumed  the  character  of' a  madman.  From  the 
indictment,  it  appears  that  the  person  who  ran  away  at  the 
same  time  with  Jean-Pierre,  confessed  that  they  had  formed 
the  plan  of  escaping  in  company,  and  that  they  had  pro- 
29 


338  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

fited  by  the  occurrence  of  the  fire  to  put  it  into  execution. 
He  also  said  that  Jean-Pierre  had  made  him  swear  to  reveal 
nothing ;  and  he  seems  to  have  told  as  a  secret  to  one  of 
the  officers  of  La  Force,  that  the  fire  was  the  work  of  Jean- 
Pierre. 

"  All  the  witnesses,  who  had  had  any  transactions  with, 
or  known  anything  of  the  accused  before  his  arrest,  deposed 
that  he  always  seemed  to  them  rational  enough,  and  even 
very  intelligent  in  business.  One  of  the  prisoners  in  La 
Force,  who  occasionally  met  and  talked  with  Jean-Pierre, 
declared  that  his  conversation  was  often  very  incoherent, 
and  that  in  some  of  the  phases  of  the  moon,  his  mind  was 
much  excited.  But  these  observations  were  made  after  the 
arrest  of  the  accused.  It  was  his  conduct  at  the  trial,  how- 
ever, which,  more  than  anything  else,  proved  that  the  mad- 
ness of  Jean-Pierre  was  only  assumed  ;  for  there  is  per- 
haps not  one  of  his  answers  that  would  have  been  given  by 
a  madman.  The  following  are  a  few  of  them. 

"  Q.  How  old  are  you  ?  —  A.  Twenty-six  years,  [he  was 
forty-three.] 

"  Q.  Have  you  ever  had  any  business  with  Messrs.  Pel- 
lene  and  Desgranges  [two  of  his  dupes]  ?  —  A.  I  don't 
know  them. 

"  Q.  Do  you  acknowledge  the  pretended  notarial  deed 
which  you  gave  this  witness  ?  —  A.  1  do  not  understand 
this. 

"  Q.  You  have  acknowledged  this  deed  before  the  com- 
missary of  police  ?  —  A .  It  is  possible. 

"  Q.  Why,  the  day  of  your  arrest,  did  you  tear  up  the 
bill  for  three  thousand  eight  hundred  francs  ?  — A.  I  don't 
recollect. 

"  Q.  You  stated  in  your  previous  examinations,  that  it 
was  because  the  bill  had  been  paid.  —  A.  It  is  possible. 

"  To  many  other  of  his  own  depositions  the  accused 
answered,  in  like  manner,  that  he  did  not  recollect  anything 
about  them. 


SIMULATED   INSANITY. 

*'  Q.  Do  you  know  this  witness  [the  portress  of  the  house 
he  lived  in]  ?  —  A.  I  don't  know  that  woman. 

"  Q.  Can  you  point  out  any  person  who  was  confined  in 
La  Force  with  you,  and  who  can  give  any  account  of  your 
then  state  of  mind  ?  —  A.  I  don't  understand  this. 

"  Q.  You  made  your  escape  from  the  Bicetre  ?  —  A.  Was 
you  there  ? 

"  Q.  At  what  hour  did  you  escape  ?  —  A.  At  one  o'clock 
—  three  o'clock. 

"  Q.  What  road  did  you  take  ?  —  A.  That  of  Meaux  en 
Brie.  [He  took  that  of  Normandy.] 

"  Q.  Can  you  tell  us  who  set  the  Bicetre  on  fire  ?  —  A.  I 
do  not  know  what  you  mean. 

"  Q.  You  wrote  a  letter  to  Captain  Froyoff  the  day  after 
your  escape  from  the  Bicetre? — A.  I  did  not  write  that 
letter.  [It  was  his  own  handwriting.] 

"  When  charged  with  setting  fire  to  the  Bicetre,  Jean- 
Pierre  uttered  the  most  horrid  imprecations,  and  inces- 
santly interrupted  his  counsel  and  the  advocate-general  in 
their  pleadings,  with  contradictions,  ridiculous  remarks,  and 
curses.''  * 

§  293.  In  commenting  on  this  case,  Georget  observes, 
that  "  among  those  madmen  who  have  not  entirely  lost  their 
senses  —  and  Jean-Pierre  is  not  one  of  this  kind  —  probably 
not  one  will  be  found  who  would  mistake  the  persons  with 
whom  he  has  been  connected,  who  would  not  understand 
what  a  notarial  act  is,  who  would  have  forgotten  his  actions, 
who  would  not  know  what  was  meant  when  a  memorable 
event  was  recalled  to  him,  and  who  would  make  such  sin- 
gular answers  as  those  we  have  quoted.  The  latter  appear 
as  so  many  contradictions  to  those  who  are  accustomed  to 
observe  the  insane.  When  people  have  completely  lost 
their  reason,  they  either  do  not  reply  to  questions  at  all,  or 

1  Archives  general  de  Med.  viii.  1S2. 


340  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

branch  off  to  subjects  that  have  no  relation  to  the  ques- 
tions addressed  to  them.  I  have  seen  patients  whose  under- 
standing was  reduced  to  a  few  isolated  sensations,  and  who 
recognized  their  parents  and  friends,  and  called  them  by 
name.  Some,  it  is  true,  can  recognize  nobody,  but  they 
certainly  would  not  have  returned  all  the  answers  above- 
mentioned,  and  their  mental  disorder  would  have  been 
otherwise  characterized."  ' 

§  294.  The  change  that  takes  place  in  the  moral  charac- 
ter of  the  insane,  in  their  affections  and  desires,  furnishes 
an  excellent  test  of  the  genuinenesss  of  any  particular  case, 
inasmuch  as  this  fact  hardly  enters  into  the  popular  notions 
of  this  disease.  Perhaps  no  character  of  mania,  general 
or  partial,  is.  more  common  than  that  inversion  of  feeling, 
which  is  manifested  in  reference  to  every  person  or  thing, 
that  comes  within  the  circle  of  the  domestic  and  friendly 
relations.  The  feelings  of  the  parent,  child,  and  spouse, 
seem  to  be  completely  eradicated,  whrle  family  loses  its 
ties,  home  its  endearments, -and  friends  their  kind  and  sooth- 
ing influence.  Suspicion  takes  the  place  of  confiding  trust ; 
jealousy,  of  love  ;  and  fierce  and  hostile  demeanor,  of  grace 
and  suavity  of  manner.  As  the  severity  of  the  disease 
abates,  the  current  of  the  affections  begins  to  resume  its 
ordinary  'direction,  and  no  indication  of  improvement  is 
more  to  be  relied  on,  than  manifestations  of  regard  for  those 
to  whom  they  are  bound  by  ties  of  intimacy- or  relationship. 
The  impostor  is  seldom  aware  of  these  facts,  and  generally 
evinces  no  settled  diminution  of  his  attachment  to  his  family 
or  friends.  He  does  not  scruple  to  show  his  ordinary  fond- 
ness for  his  children  or  parents,  or  if  he  happen  to  be 
aware  of  the  trait  of  insanity  here  described,  and  has  sup- 
pressed all  such  displays,  the  first  menace  of  injury  to  these 
objects  of  his  regard,  is  sufficient  to  tear  away  his  disguise, 

1  Des'Maladies  Mentales,  61. 


SIMULATED    INSANITY.  341 

and  disclose  the  rational  and  affectionate  man.  In  the  con- 
spiracies and  hostile  plans  that  constantly  perplex  the  mad- 
man's brain,  his  intimate  friends  bear  the  most  prominent 
part,  while  the  impostor  always  pitches  upon  those  as  the 
disturbers  of  his  peace,  with  whom  he  has  had  some  pre- 
vious disagreement,  or  at  least,  no  particular  intimacy. 

§  295.  In  real,  general  mania  there  is  usually  more  or 
less  insensibility  to  the  ordinary  proprieties  and  decencies  of 
life,  insomuch  that  sometimes  those  who  were  formerly  noted 
for  the  purity  of  their  manners,  freely  indulge  in  obscene  lan- 
guage and  filthy  practices.  Indeed,  it  seldom  happens  that 
in  general  mania  the  patient  preserves  the  natural  propriety 
of  his  conversation  and  manners,  and  this  departure  from  the 
ordinary  character  will  go  far  to  distinguish  the  real  from 
the  simulated  disease. 

§  296.  If,  as  we  have  endeavored  to  prove  elsewhere, 
mania  arises  from  cerebral  disorder,  we  might  reasonably 
expect  to  find  it  giving  rise  to  physical  disturbances  of  more 
or  less  moment,  and  accordingly,  in  most  cases,  it  actually 
is  manifested  by  various  pathological  symptoms  which  no 
device  of  imposture  can  ever  imitate.  To  say  nothing  of 
the  wildness  of  the  eye,  and  a  certain  strangeness  of  ex- 
pression, as  easily  recognized  when  once  impressed  on  the 
mind,  as  it  is  difficult  to  describe,  there  is  some  degree  of 
febrile  action  which  it  requires  no  very  labored  examination 
to  discover.  The  pulse  will  generally  be  found  more  frequent 
than  in  health,  and  when  this  increased  frequency  is  observed 
in  doubtful  cases,  it  will  furnish  a  strong  collateral  proof  of  the 
genuineness  of  the  mental  disorder.  In  the  case  of  a  crimi- 
nal condemned  to  be  executed  who  was  suspected  of  feign- 
ing madness,  the  opinion  of  the  late  Dr.  Rush  was  requested, 
and  when  that  critical  observer  of  disease  found  the  pulse 
twenty  beats  more  frequent  than  in  the  natural  state,  he 
decided,  chiefly  on  the  strength  of  this  fact,  that  the  prisoner 
29* 


342  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

was  really  mad,1  and  such  he  finally  proved  to  be  beyond  a 
doubt.  Of  course,  it  is  not  to  be  understood  that  whenever 
the  pulse  remains  at  the  natural  standard,  the  plea  of  mad- 
ness is  fictitious,  nor  vice  versa  ;  it  is  mentioned  merely  as 
a  valuable  means  in  connexion  with  others,  of  arriving  at 
correct  conclusions  in  doubtful  cases. 

§.  297.  Sleeplessness,  which  is  so  common  in  mania,  is 
another  of  those  'symptoms,  the  presence  of.  which  would 
furnish  conclusive  proof  of  real  insanity,  and  though  its 
absence  would  hardly  warrant  the  contrary  conclusion,  it 
would  certainly  .produce  strong  suspicions,  and  thus  give 
additional  weight  to  less  prominent  symptoms.  In  real 
mania,  the  patient  will  be  days  and  even  weeks  without 
sleep,  while  the  simulator,  if  aware  of  this  feature  of  the 
disease,  will  be  observed,  when  faithfully  watched,  not  to 
protract  his  sleeplessness  to  anything  like  the  period  which 
it  commonly,  remains  in  the  real  disease.  In  fact,  in  spite 
of  all  his  efforts,  sound  sleep  will  invariably  overtake  him 
before  .the  second  or  third  day.  Impostors"  almost  always 
attempt  to  imitate  the  nocturnal  restlessness  and  disorder  of 
maniacs,  but  the  imitation  is  as  different  from  the  reality,  as 
the  occasional  disturbance  by  sound  slumbers  .can  make 
it,  —  a  difference  which  it  would  require  but  little  watching 
to  establish. 

§  298.  Perhaps  there  is  n'othing  which  of  itself  furnishes 
a  better  test  in  doubtful  cases,  than  the  manner  of  their 
invasion.  Well-marked,  real  mania  seldom  occurs  suddenly, 
but  is  preceded,  as  has  been  elsewhere  noticed,  by  a  course 
of  preliminary  symptoms  which  occupy  a  period  of  more  or 
less  duration,  and  which,  though  they  do  not  always  suggest 
to  the  beholder  the  suspicion  of  derangement,  will,  when 
the  disease  has  become  indubitably  established,  be  recollect- 
ed as  having  appeared  strange  and  unaccountable.  In 

1  Introductory  Lectures,  369. 


SIMULATED    INSANITY.  343 

simulated  insanity,  on  the  contrary,  the  invasion  is  as  sudden 
as  is  most  frequently  the  occasion  that  leads  to  it.  The 
simulator  being  unaware  of  the  progressive  nature  of  the 
invasion,  suddenly,  in  the  midst  of  health,  startles  his  at- 
tendants by  an  outbreak  of  the  most  extravagantly  wild  and 
furious  conduct,  while  the  minutest  inquiries  wijl  fail  to 
establish  the  previous  existence  of  any  precursory  symptoms. 
No  instance  of  strange,  or  eccentric  conduct  or  language, 
not  the  slightest  departure  from  the  individual's  natural 
'thoughts  and  affections,  or  manner  of  manifesting  them,  nor 
any  indication  of  Bodily  derangement,  will  have  been  ob- 
served by  those  who  were  about  his  person.  When,  there- 
fore, the  disease  has  come  on  in  this  manner,  it  may  be 
safely  concluded,  if  there  be  any  other  the  least  ground  of 
suspicion,  that  the  case  is  one  of  simulation. 
.  §  299.  When  other  tests  fail,  the  habits  and  constitutional 
peculiarities  of  the  individual  may  sometimes  furnish  us  with 
valuable  information.  If,  for  instance,  the  person  have  in- 
dulged in  intemperate  drinking,  the  occurrence  of  mental 
derangement  would  be  no  unnatural  sequel  to  the  sudden 
abstinence  from  intoxicating  drinks  to  which  prisoners  are 
generally  subjected.  If  insanity  have  been  a  dise'ase  of  his 
family,  more  especially  if  it  have  been  manifested  in  former 
periods  of  his  life,  when  there  existed  no  motive  for  decep- 
tion, there  must  be  additional  evidence  strong  enough  to 
counterbalance  the  presumption  drawn  from  this  fact,  to 
induce  the  belief  that  the  case  is  one  of  simulation.  When 
too  the  person  is  well  known  to  possess  an- irritable,  nervous 
temperament,  inordinately  excited  •  by  moral  or  physical 
causes,  this  fact  will  very  justly  raise  a  bias  in  his  favor,  and 
lead  us  to  require  so  much  additional  weight  in  the  proofs  of 
deception,  and  its  force  will  be  strengthened  by  the  con- 
sideration, that  the  circumstances  in  which  he  has  been 
recently  placed,  are  of  the  very  kind  most  calculated  to  pro- 
duce the  effect  to  which  he  is  thus  predisposed. 


344  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

§  300.  In  real  mania  there  is  always  an  extreme  irri- 
tability of  temper  which  makes  the  person  impatient  of  the 
least  contradiction,  and  is  constantly  breaking  out  into 
furious  gusts  of  passion,  as  sudden  as  the  apparent  causes 
are  inadequate  to  account  for  them.  This  feature  of  mania 
is  not  easily  imitated,  and  nothing  less  than  long  personal 
observation  of  the  insane,  joined  with  no  inconsiderable 
powers  of  mimicry,  would  enable  the  simulator  to  arrive  at 
even  an  approximation  to  the  reality.  .When,  therefore,  the 
pretended  madman  maintains  his  temper  under  various  little 
annoyances  and  contradictions,  or  only  displays  a  clumsily- 
enacted  passion,  it  may  be  pretty  safely  concluded  that  he  is 
feigning  the  disease. 

§  301.  Generally,  persons  feigning  mania  lack  the  bold, 
unflinching  look  of  real  maniacs;  they  never  look  the  physi- 
cian steadily  in  the  face,  nor  allow  him  to  fix  their  eye,  and 
on  being  accused,  their  change  of  countenance  plainly  be- 
trays that  they  are  conscious  of  the  nature  of  the  charge. 
Dr.  Hennen  speaks  of  an  instance,  where  a  person  feigning 
madness  confessed  that  he  could  not  support  the  inquiring 
glance  of  the  physician  who  examined  him.1 

§  302.  It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  in  real  madness,  the 
system  becomes  singularly  insensible  to  the  power  of  cer- 
tain medicines  —  particularly  emetics,  drastic  purgatives, 
and  opium.  A  dose  of  the  last  article,  which  would  not 
procure  a  moment's  sleep  to  a  real  maniac,  would  com- 
pletely overpower  the  simulator,  and  in  doubtful  cases  the 
result  of  this  experiment  should  be  entitled  to  considerable 
weight.  The  same  may  also  be  said  of  experiments  on  the 
effect  of  other  narcotics. 

§  303.  Partial  insanity,  in  consequence  of  the  superior 
difficulty  of  the  attempt,  is  much  less  frequently  simulated, 


Principles  of  Military  Surgery,  364. 


SIMULATED     INSANITY.  345 

and  with  a  much  smaller  degree  of  success,  than  the  gen- 
eral form  of  the  disease.  Those  who  undertake  it  "  are 
deficient,"  says  Haslam,  "  in  the  presiding  principle,  the 
ruling  delusion,  the  unfounded  aversions,  and  causeless  at- 
tachments which  characterize  insanity  —  they  are  unable 
to  mimic  the  solemn  dignity  of  characteristic  madness^  nor 
recur  to  those  associations  which  mark  this  disorder  ;  and 
they  will  want  the  peculiarity  of  look  which  so  strongly  im- 
presses an  experienced  observer."  l  The  mental  and  phys- 
ical peculiarities  of  partial  mania  are  of  a  kind  that  do  not 
•obtrude  themselves  on  the  observation,  and  instead  of  loudly 
proclaiming  th'e  presence  of  a  crazed  condition  and  soli- 
citing the  attention  of  the  beholder,  some  investigation  is 
required  before  they  are  discovered.  All  this  is  contrary  to 
the  purposes  of  the  simulator,  which  require  that  an  imme- 
diate and  powerful  impression  should  be  made  on  those  in 
whose  charge  he  is  placed.  If  however,  in  consequence  of 
ignorance  or  presumption-,  these  difficulties  are  unknown  or 
under-estimated,  and  the  task  of  simulating  partial  madness 
is  assumed,  we  have  only  to  bear  in  mind  the  characteristic 
features  of  the  affection,  to  detect  the  counterfeit  almost  at 
a  glance.  In  real  monomania  the  patient  seldom  troubles 
himself  to  make  the -subject  of  his  delusion  square  with 
other  notions  with  which  it  has  more  or  less  relation,  and 
the  spectator  wonders  that  he  can  possibly  help  observing 
the  inconsistency  of  his  ideas,  and  that  when  pointed  out 
to  him,  he  should  seem  to  be  indifferent  to  or  unaware  of 
this  fact.  In  the  simulator,  on  the  contrary,  the  experien- 
ced physician  will  detect  an  unceasing  endeavor  to  soften 
down  the  palpable  absurdity  of  his  delusions,  or  reconcile 
them  with  correct  and  rational  notions.  This  too  obvious 
anxiety  Lo  produce  an  impression,  strongly  contrasts  with 


Medical  Jurisprudence  as  it  relates  to  Insanity,  323. 


346  MEDICAL     JURISPRUDENCE     OF     INSANITY. 

the  reserve  and  indifference  of  the  real  disorder,  and  will, 
of  itself,  furnish  almost  conclusive  proof  of  simulation.  In 
partial  mania,  the  subject  of  the  delusion,  though  it  may 
frequently  change,  completely  occupies  the  mind  for  a 
longer  or  shorter  period,  and  the  patient's  discourse,  when 
he  wanders,  wilt  always  have  some  relation  to  it.  When 
this  form  of  the  disease  is  simulated,  the  hallucinations  are 
not  only  frequently  changing,  but  when  questioned  concern- 
ing them,  the  person  is  more  likely  than  not  to  shape  his 
answer  without  any  reference  to  the  subject,  and  embrace 
the  opportunity  to  introduce  a  new  insane  idea.  Nothing 
irritates  a  monomaniac  more  than  to  be  called  insane.  He 
stoutly  repels  the  idea,  and  maintains  the  reality  and  cor- 
rectness of  his  delusions.  The  simulator,  on  the  contrary, 
will  be  but  little  inclined  to  discourage  a  belief  which  it  is 
his  great  object  to  produce.  "  A  real  monomaniac,"  says 
Marc,  "  is  strongly  prejudiced  in  favor  of  his  opinions,  the 
slightest  contradiction  excites  his  temper,  while  the  simula- 
tor readily  overlooks  this  essential  point  in  his  part,  if  the 
contradiction  be  skilfully  managed.  The  taciturnity  pecu- 
liar to  the  real  subject  of  monomania,  frequently  leaves 
simulators  at  fault,  since  the  complaints  of  the  latter,  when 
sure  of  being  seen  or  heard,  and  their  repugnance  at  dwel- 
ling in  solitude  are  not  met  with,  or  at  least,  not  in  the  same 
degree,  in  the  others."  In  addition  to  these  characteristics 
of  this  form  of  mental  derangement  it  may  be  remarked 
that  many  of  the  peculiarities  diagnostic  of  general  mania, 
are  no  less  so  of  partial  mania,  such  as  sleeplessness,  insen- 
sibility to  opium,  and  irritability  of  temper.  According  to 
Marc,  monomania  that  is  not  characterized  by  sad,  or  at 
least  serious  ideas,  has  seldom,  if  ever,  led  to  criminal  acts. 
§  304.  Idiocy  and  imbecility  are  sometimes  simulated, 
and  the  imitation  would  be  very  likely  to  deceive  those  not 

1  Diet.  Med.  Sci.  Article,  Alienes. 


SIMULATED     INSANITY.  347 

practically  acquainted  with  these  mental  affections  ;  but  the 
history  of  the  individual  and  his  physical  constitution  fur- 
nish such  conclusive  proof  of  the  imposture,  that  the  attempt 
is  less  successful  than  when  the  other  forms  of  insanity  are 
selected  for  simulation.  In  genuine  cases,  if  the  affection 
be  congenital,  the  history  of  the  patient  or  form  of  the  head 
will  establish  this  fact.  If  it  have  occurred  at  an  after 
period  of  life,  the  circumstances  that  have  occasioned  it 
may  be  learned  from  the  acquaintances  of  the  patient.  If 
the  form  of  the  head  present  nothing  unnatural,  it  is  to  be 
supposed  that  the  mental  deficiency,  if  there  be  any  in 
reality,  is  of  the  acquired  kind,  so  that  if  the  person  pre- 
tends to  have  been  from  birth  in  his  present  condition,  this 
of  itself  would  be  sufficient  proof  of  imposition.  If,  how- 
ever, he  is  capable  of  referring  his  mental  deficiency  to  the 
influence  of  any  particular  adventitious  causes,  the  prac- 
titioner can  determine  for  himself,  in  a  certain  measure, 
how  far  these  alleged  causes  could  have  contributed  to  pro- 
duce the  condition  in  question.  If  they  appear  to  be  plainly 
and  palpably  inadequate,  he  has  a  right  to  conclude  that  the 
person  is  acting  the  part  of  an  impostor.  It  sometimes 
happens  that  the  simulator  has  had  frequent  opportunities 
of  observing  the  manners  of  an  idiot  or  imbecile,  and  pos- 
sessing some  powers  of  mimicry,  is  able  to  give  a  pretty 
faithful  copy  of  the  example  he  has  studied.  But  there  is 
a  stupid,  vacant  cast  of  countenance  in  these  affections, 
which  it  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible  to  imitate  well  enough 
to  deceive  one  much  conversant  with  this  class  of  beings. 
Full  as  difficult  is  it  to  imitate  the  unfixed,  uncertain,  ex- 
pressionless look,  and  the  frequently  and  abruptly  fluctuat- 
ing train  of  their  ideas.  Zacchias  offers  as  a  test  of  idiocy, 
the  pusillanimous  and  submissive  character  of  its  subjects. 
but  it  is  now  well  known  that  most  idiots  are  liable,  on  pro- 
vocation, to  gusts  of  furious,  brutal  passion,  as  transient  as 
they  are  sudden.  Imbecility  presents  such  a  diversity  of 


348  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

mental  deficiency  both  in  kind  and  degree,  that  the  simu- 
lation of  it  will  baffle  the  scrutiny  of  the  observer,  who  is 
not  prepared  for  his  task  by  a  considerable  acquaintance 
with  the  phenomena  of  the  imbecile  mind.  In  the  first  de- 
gree of  real  imbecility  there  is  a  singular  mixture  of  stupid- 
ity and  shrewdness,  in  the  fraudulent  imitation  of  which, 
the  vigilant  observer  may  discover  proofs  of  simulation. 
He  will  find  that  on  points  directly  involving  the  interest  of 
the  simulator,  the  latter  will  display  the  full  endowment  of 
the  shrewdness  compatible  with  this  condition,  while  he 
reserves  his  stupidity  for  occasions  where  his  own  interests 
are  not  particularly  concerned.  In  replying  to  the  ques- 
tions put  to  him,  he  will  be  careful,  amid  all  his  display  of 
imbecility,  to  say  nothing  likely  to  favor  a  belief  of  his 
guilt  in  the  matter  which  has  led  him  to  assume  the  part  of 
an  impostor.  'What  he  says  is  intended  to  leave  an  impres- 
sion favorable  to  his  innocence,  and  this  effect  he  will  eri-' 
deavor  to  produce  as  far  as  he  dares.  When,  therefore, 
the  person  replies  to  inquiries  in  such  a  manner  as  to  crimi- 
nate himself,  it  may  be  pretty  safely  concluded  that  the 
imbecility  is  genuine  ;  and  though  the  converse  of  this  rule 
may  not  be  equally  true,  yet  if  the  whole  tenor  of  his  re- 
plies has  an  exculpatory  turn,  strong  ground  of  suspicion 
at  least  is  afforded,  that  all  is  not  right.  Imbecility  in  the 
first  degree  will  seldom  be  counterfeited  however,  from  the 
simple  fact,  that  the  real  affection  seldom  annuls  the  crimi- 
nal responsibilities  of  those  who  are  acknowledged  to  be  its  . 
subjects. 

§  305.  Senile  dementia  may  be  simulated  by  a^ed  per- 
sons, but  it  is  so  imperfectly  known  as  a  distinct  form  of 
insanity,  that  its  peculiar  features  would  probably  be  min- 
gled with  those  of  general  and  partial  mania,  and  thus  lead 
to  an  easy  detection.  If  the  physician  .will  steadily  bear  in. 
mind  that  senile  dementia  is  essentially  characterized  by 
deficiency  of  mental  excitement,  he  will  not  be  long  in  ar- 


SIMULATED    INSANITY. 

riving  at  the  truth  in  douhtful  cases,  for  the  simulator  will 
inevitably  indulge  in  hallucinations,  and  perform  physical 
movements  indicative  of  excessive  mental  excitement.  The 
principal  points  that  distinguish  this  affection  from  mania 
may  be  briefly  recapitulated.  In  senile  dementia,  the  de- 
lusions are  based  on  some  previous  event  of  life,  and  though 
irrational,  are  not  always  absurd.  The  memory  decays, 
first,  relative  to  recent  events,  and  finally,  to  everything  it 
had  previously  stored  up.  The  senses  lose  their  acuteness  ; 
the  power  of  recognizing  persons,  places  and  things,  fails  at 
last,  and  has  gone  forever  ;  and  one  looks  in  vain  for  the 
least  exertion  of  thought.  The  whole  conduct  and  language 
are  indicative  of  complete  childishness  ;  and  in  this  second 
childhood,  the  necessity  of  vigilance  to  prevent  the  miser- 
able patient  from  injuring  himself  or  others,  is  no  less  im- 
perative than  in  the  first.  In  mania  the  delusions  are  gen- 
erally absurd  as  well  as  irrational ;  the  memory  manifests  no 
decay,  except  perhaps  on  subjects  that  relate  to  the  pre- 
dominant idea  ;  the  strength  and  accuracy  of  the  senses  are 
unimpaired  ;  persons  and  things  are  as  readily  recognized 
as  ever ;  and  occasionally  the  mind  flashes  forth  with  more 
than  its  usual  power  and  vividness.  At  times  the  char- 
acter assumes  its  natural  manliness  and  dignity,  and  the 
individual  conducts  with  a  propriety  and  discretion  scarcely 
to  be  distinguished  from  those  of  perfect  soundness  of  mind. 
Bearing  in  mind  these  characteristic  differences  which  are 
so  little  known  to  any  but  medical  men,  we  cannot  be  easily 
deceived  by  the  best-managed  attempt  at  simulating  senile 
dementia. 

§  306.  It  has  been  already  stated,  (§  235,)  that  the  other 
forms  of  dementia  are  usually  the  sequel  of  mania,  or  other 
disorders  of  the  nervous  system.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind, 
that  the  previous  disorder  is  sometimes  so  mild,  so  obscure, 
and  so  short  in  its  duration,  as  to  be  entirely  overlooked. 
When  this  is  the  case,  the  dementia  that  supervenes  is 
30 


350  MEDICAL     JURISPRUDENCE     OF    INSANITY. 

viewed  with  suspicion,  and,  unless  sufficient  time  is  allowed 
for  its  development,  it  may  frequently  be  mistaken  for  the 
effect  of  simulation.  The  following  case  looks  like  one  of 
this  kind,  though  nothing  but  farther  observation  and  per- 
haps more  information  respecting  his  previous  history,  could 
place  its  true  nature  beyond  the  reach  of  doubt.  "  I  was, 
a  few  years  ago,  requested  to  see  a  man  confined  in  gaol 
for  the  crime  of  cutting  off*  his  wife's  head.  This  man  had 
made  no  attempt  to  deny  the  deed,  or  to  escape  the  con- 
sequences. For  some  time  after  he  was  taken  to  prison,  his 
conduct  was  quiet,  and  on  common  subjects  he  would  talk 
in  a  common  way  with  his  "fellow-prisoners.  When  he  was 
asked  about  the  murder,  and  reminded  that  he  would  cer- 
tainly be  hanged  for  it,  he  always  said  he  did  not  know  that 
he  had  done  any  harm.  After  being  confined  five  or  six 
weeks,  he  occasionally  showed  a  disposition  to.be  violent; 
and,  on  one  occasion,  put'a  handkerchief  round  his  neck 
as  if  he  intended  to  hang  himself.  Subsequently,  he  be- 
came taciturn,  and  his  demeanor  changed  to  that  of  an 
imbecile  person,  which  it  was  at  the  time  of  my  seeing  him. 
He  wore  a  woollen  cap,  which  he  had  taken  from  one  of  the 
other  prisoners,  and  carried  a  piece  of  wood  about  with 
him,  which  he  represented,  by  signs,  to  be  his  sword  ;  for 
he  would  not  speak,  nor  answer  any  questions  ;  only  break- 
ing silence  now  and  then  by  repeating  the  word  '  cabbage,' 
without  any  kind  of  meaning.  He  had  buttons  and  other 
common  trinkets  tied  round  his  wrist  ;  and  he  had  made  a 
great  many  attempts  to  walk  out  of  the  hospital  of  the 
prison,  in  which  he  was  lodged.  When  a  watch  or  any 
shining  substance  was  shown  to  him,  he  would  assume  an 
•idiotic  smile  and  begin  to  dance."  * 

§  307.     The  narrator  of  this  case  suspected  that  the  man 
"  was  playing  a  part,"  though  he  admits  that  "  the  nature 

1  Conolly,  Indications  of  Insanity,  455. 


SIMULATED     INSANITY.  351. 

of  his  crime,  and  his  conduct  after  committing  it,  went  far 
to  support  the  idea  of  his  insanity,  and  that  his  insanity 
might  have  been  coming  on  some  time  before  the  murder." - 
He  remarks,  as  one  ground  of  his  suspicions,  that  "  the 
mixed  character  of  his  mental  disorder,  and  the  rapid  su- 
pervention of  idiocy  [dementia]  on  a  quiet  form  of  insanity, 
in  a  man  of  thirty-five,  seemed  to  be  unusual  circumstan- 
ces." Such  circumstances  are  certainly  not  very  common, 
but  nevertheless,  they  have  been  observed.  Esquirol  re- 
cognizes a  form  of  dementia  which  is  complicated  more  or 
less  with  monomania,  and  distinctly  alternating  with  it.  He 
remarks  of  a  patient  whose  case  he  relates,  that  "  though 
apparently  insensible  to  whatever  was  passing  around  him, 
he  still  was  not  entirely  deprived  of  intelligence;  and  he 
had  great  strength  of  will."  '  The. case  of  Pechot,  adjudi- 
cated in  France  within  three  or  four  years,  was  a  striking 
instance  of  the  rapid  supervention  of  dementia,  on  a  quiet 
form  of  insanity,  though  the  patient  was  older,  it  is  true, 
than  Dr.  Conolly's.  Between  the  time  of  the  commission 
of  the  murder  in  April,  for  which  he  was  indicted,  and  that 
of  his  trial  in  the  following  November,  he  was  frequently 
observed  and  examined  by  a  medical  commission  appointed 
for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  the  exact  condition  of  his 
mind.  •»  During  the  early  part  of  this  period,  he  merely  ap- 
peared to  be  deeply  dejected,  and  the  commission  reported 
that  it  was  impossible  for  them  to  say  that  his  understanding 
was  nowise  impaired.  At  the  time  of  the  trial,  however, 
dementia  was  plainly  visible,  and  then  one  of  the  -commis- 
sion stated,  that  during  the  first  examination,  Pechot  was 
undoubtedly  in  a  state  of  profound  melancholy,  of  which 
the  present  dementia  was  the  natural  sequel.  It  also  ap- 
peared from  the  evidence,  that  for  some  time  previous  to 


1  Des  Maladies  men.  ii.  228. 


352  MEDICAL     JURISPRUDENCE     OF    INSANITY, 

the  murder,  his  mind  was  considerably  disordered.1  The 
other  circumstances  which  raised  the  suspicion  of  simula- 
tion in  the  above  case,  were,  that  though  he  would  not 
answer  questions,  he  heard  and  understood  them,  —  that 
"  although  he  never  looked  directly  at  any  one,  he  was,  in 
reality,  very  watchful  of  their  movements,  even  when  dis- 
tant from  him," — and  that  "  he  always  made  a  sudden  run 
toward  the  door  when  any  body  opened  it  to  go  out."  In 
regard  to  the  last  circumstance,  I  can  only  say,  that  it  is 
often  seen  in  every  form  of  insanity  ;  and  as  it. regards  the 
others,  it  may  be  sufficient  to  observe,  that  the  committee, 
in  speaking  of  Pechot's  condition  a  few  days  after  the 
murder,  stated,  that  he  was  very  reluctant  to  answer  ques- 
tions, and  that  "  his  eye  was  constantly  on  the  watch,  the 
slightest  noise,  the  least  gesture  instantly  attracting  his 
attention." 

§  308.  Homicidal  insanity,  when  the  fact  of  its  exist- 
ence shall  be  generally  recognized,  will,  undoubtedly,  be 
often  falsely  pleaded  in  excuse  for  crime,  and  the  task  im- 
posed on  the  physician  in  such  cases,  will  be  sometimes  a 
difficult  and  a  delicate  one.  The  characteristic  and  dis- 
tinctive features  of  this  affection  have  been  elsewhere  stated 
(§  188,)  and  it  is  to  a  knowledge  of  them  we  are  to  look 
for  the  means  of  detecting  its  counterfeits  ;  and  though  our 
investigation  may  occasionally  result  only  in  doubt  and  un- 
certainty, yet,  generally  speaking,  when  rightly  conducted, 
it  will  lead  us  to  the  truth. 

§  309.  Insanity,  characterized  by  hysteric  symptoms, 
was  simulated  not  long  since  in  the  McLean  Asylum,  Mas- 
sachusetts, and,  considering  the  youth  of  the  subject,  the 
apparent  want  of  motive,  and  the  severity  of  the  symptoms, 
it  was  somewhat  curious.  The  lad,  thirteen  years  old,  had 


i  Annales  D'Hygiene  Publique,  No.  35.     The  article  is  condensed 
in  22  American  Jurist,  27. 


SIMULATED    INSANITY.  353 

fallen  on  his  head  about  two  years  and  a  half  previous  to 
admission,  and  ever  since  that  period,  had  exhibited •  some 
anomalous  symptoms  of -disease,  which  had  been  referred 
by  his  physicians  to  derangement  of  the  digestive  organs. 
For  the  few  last  months  the  symptoms  were  more  severe 
and  decided.  He  refused  food  for  long  periods,  had  spasms, 
laid  with  his  eyes  fixed  and  legs  drawn  up,  would  hold  his 
breath  and  strike.  On  admission  to  the  asylum,  he  pre- 
sented the  appearance  of  a  sickly,  emaciated  boy  under 
puberty,  unable  to  stand,  exhausted  by  suffering,  breathing 
quick  and  passing  his  evacuations  in  bed.  Every  few 
minutes  he  had  a  frightful  spasm,  commencing  with  a  con- 
vulsive shaking  of  the  head,  pawing  of  the  hands,  and 
turned-up  eyes.  Soon  his  hands  would  vibrate  against  his 
sides  and  chest;  his  countenance  would  be  dreadfully  dis- 
torted, and  then  would  commence  a  horrid  scream  that 
might  be  heard  over  the  whole  premises.  In  this  condition, 
with  occasional  remissions,  and  the  addition  at  one  time, 
of  diarrhoea,  he  remained  for  about  a  month,  when  the  im- 
posture which  had  been  suspected,  was  detected.  Being 
watched  through  a  hole  in  a  blanket  hung  before  his  win- 
dow, he  was  observed  to  jump  up  and  stride  about  his  room 
as  actively  as  anybody,  but  at  the  slightest  noise,  resuming 
his  old  position,  screaming  and  groaning.  Dr.  Bell,  finally  . 
burst  in  upon  him  before  he  could  regain  his  bed,  chided 
him  for  his  deceit,  and  bade  him  walk  into  the  hall.  "  The 
spell  is  broken,"  says  the  record,  "  the  feeble  knees  are 
made  strong,  the  convulsed  and  distorted  visage  is  calm  and 
smooth,  and  the  young  deceiver,  goes  forth  erect,  clothed 
and  in  his  right  mind." 

§  310.  Besides  a  knowledge  of  the  symptoms  of  insan- 
ity, which  will  enable  the  physician  to  detect  its  simulation, 
his  own  ingenuity  may  often  contrive  some  plan  for  outwit- 
ting the  pretender,  and  entrapping  him  in  his  own  toils.  To 
perform  the  part  of  an  insane  person,  carrying  through  its 
30* 


354  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

numerous  and  complicated  phases,  requires  an  endowment 
of  the  imitative  powers,  seldom  bestowed  on  any,  least  of  all, 
on  those  who  would  have  occasion  to  use  it  for  such  pur- 
poses, so  that  the  measure  of  ingenuity  by  which  it  is  main- 
tained, is  scarcely  ever  a  match  for  the  devices  which  a 
shrewd  and  vigilant  physician  has  always  at  hand.  In  the 
case  of  a  girl  feigning  mania,  Fodere  informed  the  keeper, 
in  her  presence,  that  if  she  were  not  better  the  next  day, 
he  should  apply  a  hot  iron  between  her  shoulders.  This 
immediately  produced  a  decided  amendment.  There  is 
related  the  case  of  a  sailor,  whose  simulated  madness  was 
manifested  by  a  vehement  desire  to  throw  himself  over- 
board, which,  after  being  prevented  for  some  time,  he  was 
at  last  permitted  to  do;  immediately  on  reaching  the  water, 
however,  he  swam  vigorously  and  called  loudly  for  a  boat.1 
A  device  frequently  resorted  to,  is  to  mention  in  the  hear- 
ing of  the  person  some  symptom  of  madness  which  is  easily 
imitated,  as  not  being  present ;  at  a  subsequent  examina- 
tion, if  the  disease  is  feigned,  this  symptom  will  certainly 
be  observed,  whether  it  is  or  is  not  a  symptom  of  madness. 
In  some  cases,  it  would  be  perfectly  proper  to  adopt  the 
suggestion  of  Marc,  to  intoxicate  him  slightly,  when,  if  he 
be  playing  a  part,  he  will  be  likely  to  forget  it,  and  appear 
in  his  real  colors.  In  the  English  naval  and  military  ser- 
vice, where  the  medical  officer  is  often  called  on  to  deal 
with  feigned  insanity,  punishment  is  much  resorted  to,  on 
the  principle  that  if  the  affection  be  counterfeited,  it  will  be 
more  efficacious  than  anything  else  in  restoring  the  impostor 
to  his  right  mind  ;  and  if  real,  it  will  do  good  by  acting  as 
a  powerful  derivative.  If  the  latter  part  of  the  alternative 
were  true,  nothing  certainly  could  be  more  proper  than 
sound  flagellation  ;  but  if  anything,  more  surely  than  an- 
other, will  push  a  case  of  mental  derangement  beyond  the 

1  Cyclop.  Pract.  Mod.  Article,  Feigned  Diseases. 


SIMULATED    INSANITY.  355 

reach  of  curative  means,  it  is  corporal  punishment.  The 
misery  thus  produced  is  poorly  compensated  by  the  de- 
tection of  a  few  cases  of  imposture.  In  the  following  case, 
however,  where  something  like  this  kind  of  treatment  was 
used,  it  would  undoubtedly  have  been  very  proper  had  the 
disorder  actually  existed  ;  and  as  it  may  serve  as  a  guide 
to  the  practitioner  in  similar  instances,  a  brief  notice  of  it 
may  not  be  out  of  place  in  this  connection. 

§  311.  Jean  Gerard,  a  bold  villain,  murdered  a  woman 
at  Lyons  in  1829.  Immediately  after  being  arrested,  he 
ceased  to  speak  altogether,  and  appeared  to  be  in  a  state  of 
fatuity.  He  laid  nearly  motionless  in  his  bed,  and  when 
food  was  brought,  his  attendants  raised  him  up,  and  it  was 
given  to  him  in  that  position.  His  hearing  also  seemed  to 
be  affected.  The  physicians  who  were  directed  to  examine 
him,  concluded  that  if  this  were  actually  what  it  appeared 
to  be,  a  paralysis  of  the  nerves  of  the  tongue  and  ear,  the 
actual  cautery  applied  to  the  soles  of  the  feet,  would  be  a 
proper  remedy.  It  being  used,  however,  for  several  days, 
without  any  success,  it  was  agreed  to  apply  it  to  the  neck. 
For  two  days  no  effect  was  produced,  but  on  the  third, 
while  preparations  were  making  for  its  application,  Gerard 
evinced  some  signs  of  repugnance  to  it,  and  after  some 
urging,  he  spoke,  declaring  his  innocence  of  the  crime  of 
which  he  was  charged.  His  simulation  was  thus  ex- 
posed.1 

§  312.  When  required  to  examine  and  report  upon  cases 
of  suspected  simulation,  the  medical  man  cannot  be  too  cau- 
tious in  arriving  at  his  final  decision.  The  judgment  is  not 
to  be  determined  by  any  single  symptom,  however  striking, 
but  every  pathological  indication,  every  possible  motive  to 
action,  in  short,  the  whole  moral,  intellectual  and  physical 
history  of  the  individual  should  be  faithfully  studied,  before 

1  Arjnales  D'Hygicne  Publique,  ii.  392. 


356  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

we  venture  to  make  up  our  final  opinion.  Especially 
should  we  try  to  ascertain  from  the  acquaintances  of  the 
individual,  whether  he  has  evinced  mimic  powers  to  any 
extent,  and  has  ever  had  an  opportunity  to  observe  the 
manners  and  discourse  of  the  insane.  The  mimic  power 
necessary  to  produce  a  clever  imitation  of  insanity  of  any 
kind,  can  hardly  be  supposed  to  have  laid  all  his  life  un- 
exercised  and  unknown,  and  still  less  could  it  be  supposed 
that  this  power  might  be  so  great  as  to  render  any  personal 
observation  of  the  disease  unnecessary.  Ample  time  for 
the  investigation  should  be  demanded,  and  unless  it  be 
granted,  the  physician  would  be  justified  in  declining  alto- 
gether the  duty  assigned  him.  Opportunities  must  be  pro- 
vided of  observing  the  simulator,  when,  thinking  himself 
not  watched,  he  throws  off  the  guise  he  has  assumed  (which 
he  will  do  at  such  times),  and  returns  to  his  own  proper 
character.  The  physician  should  never  forget,  however, 
the  extreme  perseverance  and  vigilance  with  which  these 
people  manage  their  impositions,  and  not  be  too  easily 
induced  to  regard  them  favorably  in  consequence  of  the  re- 
sults which  such  opportunities  may  sometimes  furnish.  For 
they  will  often  suppose  they  are  watched  at  times  when 
they  have  no  means  of  knowing  whether  they  are  so  or  not. 
Fodere  speaks  of  a  girl,  undoubtedly  a  simulator,  who  com- 
mitted every  kind  of  indecency  in  her  cell  ;  and  another 
case  is  related  of  some  French  prisoners  of  war,  who  car- 
ried "  their  simulation  to  so  exquisite  a  height,  as  to  eat  their 
own  excrement,  even  when  shut  up  in  their  cells,  suspecting 
that  they  might  be  overlooked."  '  In  suspected  cases,  there- 
fore, the  persons  should  be  strictly,  and  as  far  as  possible, 
secretly  watched,  in  order  that  in  their  moments  of  forgel- 
fulness  or  sense  of  security,  they  may  be  seen  laying  aside 
their  false  colors,  and  suddenly  assuming  their  natural 

1  Cyclop.  Pract.  Med.  Article,  Feigned  Diseases. 


SIMULATED    INSANITY.  357 

manners.  That  this  will  happen  sooner  or  later  in  every 
case,  there  cannot  be  a  doubt,  for  the  mind  will  instinctively 
seek  relief  from  the  painful  exertion  and  sense  of  restraint, 
rendered  necessary  by  an  elaborate  attempt  at  deception, 
by  throwing  off  the  disguise  that  has  been  adopted,  and 
again  returning  to  its  natural  condition.  Again  we  caution 
the  practitioner  not  to  be  in  haste  to  form  his  opinion,  but 
to  wait  long  and  patiently,  for  opportunities  that  may  shed 
new  light  on  the  difficulties  before  him. 

§  313.  The  importance  of  the  last  suggestion  is  strongly 
exemplified  in  the  following  case,  related  by  Professor  Mon- 
teggia,  and  translated  from  the  Italian  by  Marc.  We  have 
taken  the  liberty  to  abridge  somewhat  the  original  narra- 
^tive.  In  1792,  a  criminal  who  was  confined  in  the  prison 
of  St.  Ange,  in  the  province  of  Lodi,  became  insane  soon 
after  hearing  that  he  had  been  betrayed  by  his  accomplices. 
The  physicians  of  the  place  who  were  required  to  examine 
him,  came  to  the  conclusion  that  he  was  feigning  madness, 
though  they  did  not  express  strong  confidence  in  their 
opinion.  From  their  report,  his  disorder  seems  to  have 
been  of  rather  a  quiet  form.  To  any  question  whatever,  he 
merely  uttered  the  words,  look,  priest,  crown,  crucifx. 
Sometimes  he  seemed,  by  the  motions  of  his  mouth  and 
tongue,  desirous  of  replying  to  questions,  but  finally  repeat- 
ed, with  a  smile,  the  usual  words.  Their  reasons  for  con- 
sidering him  to  be  feigning,  were,  that  the  disease  appeared 
suddenly,  without  any  premonition,  and  was  accompanied 
by  irregular  symptoms,  sometimes  appearing  to  be  a  melan- 
choly, attended  by  wandering,  sometimes  a  cheerful  mania, 
and  sometimes  a  complete  dementia.  It  appears  that  he 
was  noisy  at  night  and  quiet  by  day  ;  that  he  scattered  his 
food  about ;  that  he  never  sighed  ;  and  that  he  never  fixed 
his  eye  on  any  particular  object.  The  physicians,  in  speak- 
ing to  one  another  in  his  hearing,  of  these  four  circum- 
stances, observed,  for  the  purpose  of  entrapping  him,  that 


358  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

if  just  the  contrary  had  happened,  they  must  necessarily 
have  concluded  that  he  was  insane.  It  was  soon  after*  ob- 
served that  he  was  quiet  at  night,  no  longer  scattered  his 
food,  and  did  sigh.  He  seemed  reluctant  to  have  his  pulse 
felt,  for  whenever  this  was  done,  he  would  keep  his  arm 
and  fingers  constantly  in  motion,  though  before  perfectly  at 
rest.  The  physicians  also  said  in  his  presence,  that  his  dis- 
order would  certainly  be  improved  by  a  blister  to  the-  neck. 
At  this  time  he  was  mute,  but  shortly  after  the'  application, 
he  began  to  repeat  the  old  words,  book,  crown,  &c. 

In  July,  1793,  he  was  ordered  by  the  court  to  be  trans- 
ferred to  the  prison  at  Milan,  and  Prof.  M.  was  requested  to 
examine  him  and  ascertain  his  m-ental  condition.  At  this 
time  he  appeared  to  be  in  a  demented,  imbecile  state,  and 
there  was  a  kind  of  oddity  and  apparent  affectation  in  his 
manners,  which  at  first  strongly  favored  the  suspicion  of 
simulation.  Though  attentive  to  what  was  passing  around 
him,  he  see.med  to.  shrink  from  observation,  and  averted  his 
eye  the  moment  it  met  that  of  another.  When  called,  he 
certainly  heard  the  -voice,  and  would  start  to  go  in  the 
direction  of  the  sound,  but  instead  of  advancing  directly,  he 
would  wander  about  the  room.  He  never  spoke  ;  the  only 
sound  he  uttered  was  a  kind  of  whistle,  like  that  made  by 
the  wind  blowing  through  a  keyhole.  He  was  singularly 
fond  of  bright  and  beautiful  objects,  viewing  and  touching 
them  with  an  air  of  great  interest.  He  collected  various 
trifles,  of  which  he  was  quite  fond.  He  never  was  com- 
pletely quiet,  but  was  constantly  in  motion,  or  making  some 
gesture.  He  was  never  observed  to  sleep ;  while  in  bed 
he  was  continually  moving  his  legs,  or  some  other  part  of 
his  body,  or  playing  with  a  rag  which  he  would  put  upon 
his  eyes  or  mouth,  or  twine  around  his  fingers.  He  loved 
to  put  it  over  the  eyes  or  mouth  of  others,  and  then  retiring 
a  few  steps,  would  look  at  them  with  a  smiling  air,  and 
utter  a  sound  expressive  of  gratification.  He  would  fre- 


SIMULATED    INSANITY.  359 

quently  caress  those  about  him,  and  pinch  their  cheeks  in  a 
friendly  manner.  He  could  neither  dress  nor  undress  him- 
self alone  ;  being  used  to  eat  out  of  crockery  plates,  he 
would  refuse  food  brought  to  him  in  any  other  kind  of 
ware.  He  would  sometimes  hide  his  bread  in  his  bed, 
and  think  no  more  of  it.  He  never  seemed  to  desire,  nor 
to  seek  for  food,  though  he  ate  with  avidity  when  he  was 
hungry.  Sometimes,  instead  of  eating  his  soup  out  of  the 
plate,  he  would  turn  it  out  on  the  floor,  and  then  take  it 
up  with  a, spoon.  He  was  much  annoyed  if  made  to  remain 
long  in  any  one  place.  When  they  brought  towards  him  a 
mirror,  he  would  spit  at  it,  refuse  to  look  at  it,  and  be 
made  quite  angry  if  they  persisted  in  putting  it  under  his 
eyes.  When  teased  in  this  manner,  he  exerted  extraordi- 
nary strength.  When  pinched,  he  appeared  not  to  feel  it, 
and  he  was  seen  to  take  up  live  coals  in  his  hands,  without 
showing  any  sign  of  pain.  When  his  attention  was  directed 
to  figures  on  the  wall,  made  by  candlelight,  he  would  run 
as  if  to  catch  them  in  his  hands,  and  express  his  disappoint- 
ment by  beating  his  head  with  his  fist.  He  Would  never 
drink  wine,  but  the  moment  he  lasted  it,  he  would  spit  it 
out  with  a  strong  expression  of  displeasure. 

Though  inclined  to  believe,  from  the  examination  so  far, 
that  the  disorder  was  real  and  not  feigned,  yet  considering 
the  suspicions  of  the  physicians  of  St.  Ange,  some  decisive 
test  seemed  to  be  required  that  would  unmask  the  simula- 
tion, if  it  existed,  beyond  all  doubt.  Wine  being  out  of  the 
question,  six  grains  of  opium  was  given  him  in  his  soup, 
but  it  produced  no  effect  whatever.  A  few  days  afterwards 
he  again  took  six  grains  of  opium,  in  the  morning,  and  this 
producing  no  effect  at  the  end  of  six  hours,  six  more  grains, 
from  a  different  parcel,  was  given  him.  In  the  evening 
he  appeared  as  usual.  A  cracker  was  fired  near  him  while 
his  eye  was  turned  in  another  direction,  to  see  if  the  unex- 
pected explosion  would  surprise  him  at  all ;  but  it  did  not, 


360  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

nor  did  another  that  was  exploded  under  his  shirt.  He 
passed  the  night  as  usual,  without  sleep.  No  change  was 
observed  in  him  the  next  morning,  but  in  the  evening,  he 
appeared  a  little  uneasy  and  looked  towards  the  windows, 
as  if  frightened.  He  went  to  bed,  and  about  one  o'clock 
in  the  morning,  he  raised  himself  up,  heaved  some  deep 
sighs,  and  at  last  cried  out,  "  My  God,  I  am  dying."  The 
physician  who  was  immediately  summoned,  found  him 
quiet  and  talking  rationally,  without  any  sign  of  madness. 
He  said,  upon  inquiry,  that  he  had  no  idea  of  what  had 
taken  place  ;  he  believed,  or  seemed  to  believe,  that  he 
was  still  in  the  prison  of  St.  Ange ;  and  demanded  a  con- 
fessor and  an  officer  of  justice,  that  he  might  be  judicially 
interrogated.  He  added,  that  there  had  seemed  to  be  per- 
sons at  the  windows,  who  told  him  that  they  had  given  him 
poisoned  soup  in  order  to  kill  him.  He  complained  of  nau- 
sea, though  his  pulse  was  natural,  and  his  countenance 
calm  and  unaltered.  The  next  day  he  ate  well,  and  con- 
tinued to  conduct  well  and  appear  perfectly  rational  as  long 
as  he  remained  in  the  prison,  after  which  he  was  lost  sight 
of.  The  narrator  of  the  case  concludes  that  the  criminal 
was  really  insane,  and  that  he  was  suddenly  cured  by  the 
opium  ;  because  if  he  had  been  feigning,  and  were  finally 
induced  to  throw  off  the  mask  from  the  fear  of  actually  dy- 
ing from  the  effects  of  opium,  it  is  not  very  clear  why  the 
first  dose  had  no  effect. 

§  314.  Marc,  in  commenting  on  the  above  case,  ob- 
serves, "  that  the  reasons  which  induced  the  physicians  of 
St.  Ange  to  suspect  simulation,  may  be  easily  disposed  of. 
Their  opinion  is  founded,  first,  on  the  irregularity  of  the/ 
signs  of  madness  ;  but  this  fact  appears  to  me  by  no  means 
to  have  been  established.  I  see  in  this  patient,  so  far  as  the 
imperfect  description  enables  me  to  judge,  a  maniac  labor- 
ing under  a  cheerful  form  of  mania,  characterized  by  rest- 
lessness and  nocturnal  noise,  followed  by  a  remission  with 


SIMULATED    INSANITY.  361 

depression  and  true  dementia.  Such  a  complication,  how- 
ever, is  frequently  observed  in  maniacs.  The  circumstance 
of  the  patient's  being  noisy  at  night,  and  quiet  by  day,  is 
rather  in  favor  of  the  reality  of  the  derangement,  than 
otherwise.  Is  it  probable,  indeed,  that  a  simulator  would 
choose  the  time  when  the  imperious  want  of  sleep  is 
most  strongly  felt,  to  feign  an  attack  of  rnania  which  he 
could  just  as  well  feign  during  the  day,  and  sleep,  at  least, 
a  portion  of  the  night?  Besides,  those  who  lived  with  the 
prisoner,  and  even  the  keepers  of  the  prison  of  Milan,  de- 
clared that  he  had  never  been  seen  to  sleep,  and  during  the 
day,  was  so  restless  as  to  be  constantly  changing  his  posi- 
tion. It  seems  to  me  impossible  for  a  simulator  to  persist 
in  this  manner,  and  therefore,  I  believe  that  such  a  com- 
plete and  long-continued  absence  of  sleep  is  alone  sufficient 
to  prove  the  reality  of  the  mental  perturbation."  The  sud- 
den invasion  of  the  insanity,  he  does  not  regard  as  a  proof 
of  simulation,  because  this  fact,  though  rare,  is  not  without 
examples.  The  oddities  of  demeanor  also,  are  characteris- 
tic of  dementia,  and  could  not  be  counterfeited  for  any 
length  of  time.  But  the  effect  of  opium  was  enough  to  de- 
stroy any  remaining  suspicion  of  simulation.  If  he  had 
been  simulating,  there  does  not  appear  to  have  been  a  suffi- 
cient reason  for  ceasing  when  he  did.  The  return  of  rea- 
son was  preceded  by  a  hallucination  of  the  sense  of  hearing, 
but  it  is  not  probable,  says  Marc,  that  an  Italian  bandit 
could  have  been  so  thoroughly  acquainted  with  mental  dis- 
ease, as  to  have  thought  of  using  such  a  stratagem. 


31 


CHAPTER  XVI. 


CONCEALED     INSANITY. 

§  315.  IT  sometimes  happens,  that  when  maniacs  have 
learned  what  notions  of  theirs  are  accounted  insane  by  oth- 
ers, and  have  understanding  enough  left  to  appreciate  the 
legal  consequences  of  their  mental  condition,  they  endeavor 
to  conceal  it,  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  those  consequen- 
ces. If  the  address  and  ingenuity  which  they  then  man- 
ifest have  occasionally  succeeded  in  baffling  the  scrutiny  of 
the  most  practised  experts,  it  is  not  strange  that  common 
observers  should  have  been  frequently  deceived,  and  that 
some  of  the  medical  profession  even,  with  a  knowledge  of 
this  fact  before  their  eyes,  should  have  been  outwitted  by 
their  manoeuvres.  When  it  is  considered  that  the  insanity 
of  many  consists'  in  a  few  insane  notions,  which  do  not  to 
appearance  affect  their  general  conduct  and  conversation, 
the  difficulty  of  concealing  it,  by  professing  to  have  renoun- 
ced their  belief  in  these  notions,  is  perhaps  not  greater  than 
that  which  attends  the  accomplishment  of  most  of  their 
designs.  Their.task  too  is  materially  lessened,  it  is  to  be 
recollected,  by  the  prevalent  error,  that  madness  is. insep- 
arable from  boisterous  behavior  and  complete  disorder  of 
the  ideas.  At  the.  commencement  of  the  French  Revolu- 
tion, when  the  mob  broke  into  the  lunatic  hospitals,  for  the 
purpose  of  liberating  those  among  their  inmates  whom  they 
supposed  to  be  unjustly  confined,  one  man  recounted  his 
wrongs  so  clearly  and  connectedly,  that  he  was  deemed. at 


.CONCEALED    INSANITY.  363 

once  to  be  a  victim  of  oppression,  and  ordered  to  be  releas- 
ed. The  use  he  made  of  his  liberty  soon  convinced  these 
enlightened  champions  of  their  race,  that  those  who  put 
him  in  confinement,  had,  what  they  themselves  had  not, 
some  reason  for  their  measures.1  Lord  Eldon  once  rela- 
ted that  after  repeated  conferences  and  much  conversation 
with  a  lunatic,  he  was  persuaded  of  the  soundness  of  his 
understanding,  and  prevailed  on  Lord  Thurlow  to  supersede 
the  commission.  The  lunatic,  calling  immediately  after- 
wards on  his  counsel  to  thank  him  for  his  exertions,  convin- 
ced him  in  five  minutes,  that  the  worst  thing  he  could  have 
done  for  his  client,  was  to  get  rid  of  the  commission.2  In 
another  place  (§  21,)  will  be  found  a  case  which  well  illus- 
trates the  adroitness  and  perseverance,  with  which  maniacs 
will  sometimes  conceal  their  mental  derangement. 

§  316.     In  England  and  in  this  country,  the  choice  of 
the  means  for  proving  the  existence  of  insanity  when  con- 

p.fialerl,    is    left    to    individual    aagnoity.      This,  no   doubt,    is 

sufficient,  where  great  practical  acquaintance  with  insanity 
readily  suggests  the  course  best  adapted  to  each  particular 
case,  but  the  great  majority  of  medical  men  will  feel  the 
need  of  some  system  or  order  of  proceeding,  that  will  sim- 
plify their  inquiries  and  render  them  more  efficient.  The 
French  arrange  their  means  into  three  general  divisions  or 
classes,  which  are  made  use  of,  each  in  succession,  when 
the  preceding  class  has  failed  of  its  object.  They  are  called 
the  interrogatory,  the  continued  observation,  and  the  inquest, 
and  as  no  better  arrangement  has  ever  been  offered,  it  may 
be  well  to  describe  it ;  and  it  may  be  added  in  passing,  that 
it  would  materially  conduce  to  our  success  in  inquiries  of 
this  kind,  if  they  were  always  pursued  in  the  course  here 
indicated. 

1  Pinel,  Sur  Alienation  mentale,  1-59. 

2  Exparte  Holyland,  11  Vesey's  Reports,  11. 


364  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

§  317.  Interrogatory.  —  The  interrogatory  embraces 
only  those  means  of  information,  which  are  applicable  in  a 
personal  interview  with  the  patient.  After  learning  gener- 
ally his  moral  and  intellectual  character,  his  education  and 
habits  of  living,  the  duration  and  nature  of  his  mental  delu- 
sion (if  it  can  be  ascertained  from  his  acquaintances),  arid 
the  state  of  his  relations  to  others,  and  after  observing  the 
expression  of  his  countenance,  his  demeanor  and  general 
appearance,  we  may  proceed  to  a  direct  examination  of  his 
case.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  necessary  to  lull  his  suspicions 
and  remove  his  distrust,  as  far  as  possible,  by  a  free  and 
courteous  deportment,  and  an  air  of  kindness  and  unaffected 
interest  in  his  welfare.  He  should  then  be  engaged  in  con- 
versation, which  should  lead  him  by  easy  and  imperceptible 
transitions  to  the  particular  subject  on  which  it  is  alleged,  his 
mind  is  deranged  ;  and  the  manner  in  which  he  treats  it 
should  be  carefully  observed,  for  if  he  be  really  insane  on 
that  point,  he  will  probably  avow  it ;  while  if  he  is  not  so, 
he  will  take  the  opportunity  to  declare  his  disbelief  in  the 
notions  imputed  to  him,  and  bring  forward  various  consider- 
ations to  support  the  truth  of  his  assertions.  He  should  be 
led  to  speak  of  his  relatives  and  friends,  especially  if  they 
have  taken  any  part  in  provoking  his  interdiction,  or  other- 
wise interfered  in  his  affairs,  and  here  he  will  need  all  his 
self-control  to  restrain  himself  from  the  angry  and  revenge- 
ful feelings  which  he  entertains  towards  them.  When  con- 
fined in  hospitals  or  other  lunatic  establishments,  we  should 
not  fail  to  ask  how  they  like  their  situation,  and  what  they 
think  of  their  companions  ;  for  Georget  observes,  that  many, 
even  of  those  the  least  deranged,  are  such  poor  observ- 
ers, or  have  so  little  penetration,  that  they  are  ignorant 
of  the  nature  of  their  abode,  and  the  character  of  those 
around  them.  When  the  mental  disorder  is  that  of  imbecil- 
ity or  dementia,  we  must  not  confine  our  questions  to  the 
simple  topics  of  their  present  condition  or  feelings,  for  they 


CONCEALED   INSANITY.  365 

may  be  able  to  answer  them  clearly  and  rationally,  though 
subjects  requiring  a  little  more  reflection  or  exertion  of  mem- 
ory, may  be  far  beyond  their  comprehension.  It  riot  unfre- 
quently  happens  that  the  mental  deficiency  affects  the  fac- 
ulties of  the  mind  unequally,  degrading  some  to  the  scale  of 
idiocy,  and  leaving  others  in  a  state  of  tolerable -strength  and 
development.  When,  therefore,  the  capacity  of  the  mind 
is  in  question,  whether  for  interdiction  or  any  other  purpose, 
we  must  not  fail  to  test  the  soundness  of  all  the  faculties,  by 
inquiries  relative  to  the  objects  with  which  they  are  respect- 
ively concerned,  since,  if  satisfied  with  a  partial  examina- 
tion, we  may  grossly  deceive  ourselves  and  injure  the  inter- 
ests of  others.  .True,  this  requires  a  knowledge  of  the 
mental  constitution  not  possessed  by  every  one  charged  with 
this  kind  of  investigation  ;  but  the  deficiency,  common  as  it 
is,  proves  nothing  against  the  importance  of  this  knowledge. 
§  318.  The  importance  of  the  above  suggestions  is 

strikingly  shown   by  the  case  of  a  young   man,  B , 

noticed  by  Dr.  Abercrombie,1  and  Dr.  Combe,2  which  occa- 
sioned much  trouble  and  litigation  to  the  parties  concerned. 
This  person  was  educated  for  the  church,  and  had  made 
such  proficiency  in  the  study  of  Latin  and  Greek,  that,  for 
several  years,  he  acted  as  a  tutor  in  these  languages.  He 
also  displayed  great  keenness  and  adroitness  in  driving  a 
bargain.  When,  however,  his  mind  was  directed  to  those 
studies  and  topics  which  require  the  exercise  of  the  higher 
powers  of  the  intellect,  he  was  found  so  deficient  that  he 
utterly  failed  in  his  second  examination  before  the  presby- 
tery, in  which  his  -reasoning  powers  were  tasked,  though 
the  first,  which  was  in  the  languages,  he  passed  successfully 
and  creditably.  It  was  found,  too,  that  he  was  incapable  of 
comprehending  the  relations  of  business,  or  even  performing 

1  On  the  Intellectual  Powers. 

2  On  Mental  Derangement,  244. 

31* 


366  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE     OF    INSANITY. 

the  ordinary  duties  of  life.  Accordingly,  it  appeared  in  the 
course  of  the  law-proceedings,  that  those  witnesses  who  knew 
him  only  as  a  linguist  or  a  purchaser,  did  not  hesitate  to 
pronounce  him  a  capable,  clever  man;  while  those  who  had 
business  transactions  with  him  that  called  his  reflective 
powers  into  action,  had  no  doubt  whatever  of  his  imbecility. 

§  319.  The  interrogatory  is  sometimes  sufficient  of 
itself,  to  establish  the  existence  of  madness;  but  it  often 
fails  of  accomplishing  its  purpose,  and  we  are  obliged  to 
resort  to  other  means.  General  moral  mania  will  inevitably 
elude  its  scrutiny,  this  kind  of  derangement  being  exclu- 
sively manifested  in  the  conduct,  for  the  folly  and  extrava- 
gance of  which  clear  and  plausible  reasons  are  always  at 
hand.  No  definite  conclusion  in  favor  of  the  mental  sound- 
ness of  the  individual  in  question,  can  be  drawn  from  the 
result  of  the  interrogatory,  unless  confirmed  by  those  of 
the  subsequent  measures.  The  correctness  of  this  rule  was 
strongly  contended  for,  even  in  the  time  of  D'Aguesseau, 
who  declares  that  however  wise  and  rational  under  the  in- 
terrogatory, yet  if  the  fact  of  insanity  is  proved  by  a  mul- 
titude of  particular  acts  and  the  general  tenor  of  conduct, 
interdiction  must  be  pronounced.1 

§  320.  Continued  observation. — A  systematic  course 
of  observations  continued  for  some  time,  may  establish  the 
fact  of  insanity  in  doubtful  cases,  after  several  personal  in- 
terviews have  completely  failed.  Opportunities,  therefore, 
should  be  demanded  for  visiting  the  patient  freely  and  fre- 
quently ;  for  watching  him  at  times  when  he  supposes  him- 
self unobserved  ;  and  for  exercising  a  general  surveillance 
over  his  conduct  and  conversation.  Those  about  him  should 
be  enjoined  to  watch  his  movements,  and  he  should  often, 
but  cautiously,  be  led  to  speak  of  the  motives  of  those  who 
are  anxious  to  prove  his  insanity.  It  often  happens  too,  that 

1  (Euvres  Completes,  iii.  592. 


CONCEALED     INSANITY. 

those  who  are  most  successful  in  concealing  every  indica- 
tion of  disordered  mind,  in  their  conversation,  will  betray 
themselves  the  moment  they  commit  their  thoughts  to  paper. 
They  should  be  induced,  therefore,  to  write  letters  to  their 
friends  describing  their  present  situation,  and  to  prepare 
statements  of  their  wrongs  and  grievances,  and  thus  we  may 
be  readily  furnished  with  instances  of  incoherence  and  folly, 
which  the  patient  had  self-command  enough  to  withhold, 
when  put  on  his  guard  by  questions  which  he  knows  well 
enough  are  designed  to  entrap  him.  "  The  rapid  transitions 
and  odd  unions  of  discordant  subjects,  the  relations  of  things 
which  have  not  happened,  and  could  not  have  happened,  are 
in  many  cases  very  remarkable  ;  and  a  forgetfulness  of 
common  modes  of  spelling,  or  of  the  arrangement  of  the  let- 
ters of  words  well  known,  will  be  evinced  by  maniacs  who 
have  been  well  educated,  and  who  would  commit  no  such 
mistakes  but  for  their  malady."  ! 

§  321.  Inquest.  —  When  the  above  means  fail,  our  inqui- 
ries must  take  a  wider  range  and  be  directed  to  the  previous 
history  of  the  patient,  as  made  known  to  us  by  the  testimony 
of  friends  and  relatives,  and  those  who  have  been  connected 
with  him  in  business,  or  had  any  other  good  opportunity  of 
becoming  acquainted  with  his  mental  condition.  "  The  In- 
quest" says  Georget,  "  consists  in  collecting  information 
respecting  the  patient's  condition  before  and  after  the  pre- 
sumed disease,  and  the  causes  suspected  to  have  impaired 
his  mind.  For  this  purpose,  we  consult  his  writings,  arid 
recur  to  the  testimony  of  those  who  have  been  about  him 
and  conversed  with  him  ;  who  have  been  able  to  observe 
him  closely  and  to  witness  his  insane  actions  and  irrational 
discourse.  We  should  be  particularly  careful,  however,  to 
require  of  witnesses,  facts  rather  than  opinions.*  We  should 

1  Conolly  :  Inquiry  concerning  the  Indications  of  Insanity,  469. 

2  See  Hathorn  v.  King,  S  Mass.  Reports,  371. 


368  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

ascertain  if  madness  be  a  disease  of  the  family.;  if  he  have 
already  evinced  a  degree  of  singularity  in  his  moral  and 
intellectual  character,  or  exaltation  of  any  kind  ;  if  he  have 
been  exposed  to  the  influence  of  powerful  causes,  such  as 
chagrins,  severe  and  repeated  crosses,  reverses  of  fortune, 
&c.  ;  if,  without  any  real  motive,  he  has  manifested  any 
change  of  his  habits,  tastes,  or  affections .;  in  short,  we  should 
inquire  into  all  those  circumstances  which  so -frequently  pre- 
cede the  development  of  the  disease."  '  We  are  to  look 
into  his  business  transactions,  his.  management  of  family 
affairs,  his  conduct  in  the  domestic  and  social  relations,  and 
the  part  he  has  taken  in  public  scenes  and  dutie.s.  His  let- 
ters and  written  communications  should  be  closely  scrutin- 
ized, especially  those  that  have. any  reference  to  the  state  of 
his  health,  or  to  the  legal  measures  that  have  Jbeen  taken 
against  him,  for  here  we  may  meet  -with  incoherent  and 
foolish  ideas,  that  we  have  found  nowhere  else.  In  short, 
no  source  of  information  likely  to  enlighten  us  on  the  sub- 
ject of  the  patient's  mental  condition,  should  be  suffered  to 
go  unexplored.  If  the  means  thus  indicated  are  faithfully 
used  —  if  the  whole  life  of  the  individual  have  passed  in 
review  before  us,  and.  after  all,  we  are  unable  to  prove  the 
patient's  insanity  beyond  a  doubt,  we  are  bound  to  .conclude 
that  his  mind  is  sound,  or  at  least,  that  he  is  not  a  proper 
subject  for  legal  interference.  This  conclusion  will  be  no 
less  proper,  even  though  we  still  entertain  some  doubt  of  his 
mental  soundness,  for  if  he  have  sufficient  self-control  and 
penetration  to  enable  him  to  conceal  his  mental  impairments 
and  conduct  himself  rationally,  but  little -harm  will  probably 
arise  from  leaving  him  at  present  to  his  own  discretion. 

1  Des  Maladies  mentaks,  57. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 


EPILEPSY    AND    ITS    LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES. 

§  322.  EPILEPSY  is  a  nervous  disease  characterized  by 
paroxysms  of  insensibility,  unconsciousness,  and  convul- 
sions. These  vary  in  severity,  from  that  of  a  simple  ver- 
tigo, continuing  for  a  few  seconds  and  scarcely  discernible 
by  others,  to  that  of  a  most  distressful  convulsive  fit  endur- 
ing from  five  to  fifteen  minutes.  They  may  recur  twice  or 
thrice  a  day  for  several  days  together,  or  once  a  week, 
month,  or  year.  They  sometimes  occur  without  warning, 
but  as  often  perhaps  they  are  preceded  by  symptoms  indi- 
cative of  disturbance  of  the  nervous  functions  ;  such  as, 
giddiness,  pain  of  the  head,  drowsiness,  frightful  dreams, 
hallucinations  of  sight  or  of  hearing,  vigilance,  irritability  of 
temper.  So  distressing  is  the  condition  of  many  epileptics, 
says  Esquirol,  previous  to  the  paroxysm,  that  they  endeavor 
to  hasten  its  access,  and  for  this  purpose  resort  to  spirituous 
drinks.  The  cessation  of  the  paroxysm  is  followed  by  som- 
nolence, pain  in  the  head,  and  a  sense  of  weakness.  The 
recurrence  of  the  fits  is  determined  by  whatever  disturbs  the 
general  health,  more  especially  by  derangements  of  those 
organs  in  which  the  series  of  morbid  phenomena  takes  its 
origin.  Anger,  fright,  or  any  strong  moral  emotion  is  very 
liable  to  produce  a  paroxysm.  A  soldier,  in  mounting  a 
breach,  was  frightened  into  a  fit  of  epilepsy  by  the  bursting 
of  a  bumb-shell  near  him.  He  was  soon  cured,  but  at  sight 


370  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

of  the  place,  twenty  years  afterwards,  he  was  thrown  into 
a  fit.1 

§  323.  Epilepsy  seldom  continues  for  any  length  of  time 
without  destroying  the  natural  soundness  of  the  mind,  ren- 
dering the  patient  listless  and  forgetful,  indisposed  and  un- 
able to  think  for  himself,  yielding  without  any  will  of  his 
own  to  every  outward  influence,  and  finally  sinking  into 
hopeless  fatuity,  or  becoming  incurably  maniacal.  Esquirol 
states  that  of  three  hundred  and  thirty-nine  epileptics  in  the 
Salpetrieret  twelve  were  monomaniacs ;  sixty-four  were 
maniacal,  of  whom  thirty-four  were  furious  ;  one  hundred 
and  forty-five  were  imbecile  or  demented,  of  whom  one 
hundred  and  twenty-nine  were  so  only  immediately  after 
the  fit ;  eight  were  idiots ;  fifty  were  habitually  rational,  but 
with  loss  of  memory,  exaltation  of  the  ideas,  sometimes  a 
temporary  delirium  and  a  tendency  to  dementia  ;  sixty  had 
no  derangement  of  intellect,  but  were  very  irritable,  irasci- 
ble, obstinate,  capricious  and  eccentric.8 

§  324.-  From  this  statement  it  appears,  that  of  the  one  hun- 
dred and  forty-five  imbecile  or  demented  epileptics,  all  but 
sixteen  were  so  only  immediately  after  the  fit,  and  that  this 
was  also  the  case  with  three  of  the  thirty-four  who  were 
furious.  This  is' a  fact  of  no  little  importance  in  a  medico- 
legal  point  of  view,  and  should  never  be  lost  sight  of  in  ju- 
dicial investigations. of  the  mental  condition  of  epileptics. 
The  maniacal  fury  of  .these  patients  'is  of  the  wildest  and 
blindest  kind,  which  nothing  can  tame,  the  individual  acting 
automatically  as  it  we're,  and  in  a  state  of  unconsciousness. 
It  may  continue  for  minutes,  hoars,  or  days.  The  dementia, 
which  is  the  form  of  mental  derangement  to  which  epileptics 
are  most  liable  after  the'  fit,  is  characterized  by  intellectual 
stupor,  and  moral  depression,  in  which,  however,  they  have 


Esquirol,  Des  Maladies  merit;  i.  297.  2  Ibid.,  i.  284. 


EPILEPSY   AND    ITS    LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES.  371 

sufficient  energy,  under  some  circumstances,  to  commit  acts 
of  violence,  of  which  they  retain  only  an  imperfect  recol- 
lection when  they  recover.  Another  direct,  though  tempo- 
rary effect  of  the  epileptic  fit,  is  to  leave  the  mind  in  a  mor- 
bidly irritable  condition,  in  which  the  slightest  provocation 
will  derange  it  entirely.  •  Sometimes  this  irritability  is  ac- 
companied by  a  sense  of  anxiety,  distrust,  jealousy,  and 
unfounded  fear,  and  sometimes  by  great  activity  of  the 
lower  propensities. 

'§  325.  To  determine  exactly  the  mental  condition  of 
an  epileptic  at  the  moment  of  his  committing  a  criminal  act, 
is  often  a  difficult  task.  It  may  have  taken  place  in  the  ab- 
sence of  any  observer,  in  a  fit  of  fury  that  rapidly  passed 
away,  and  which,  perhaps,  may  not  have  followed  any  pre- 
vious paroxysm  ;  or  the  accused,  though  subject  to  the  dis- 
ease, may  not  ha.ve  recently  suffered  an  attack,  and  may 
have  appeared  perfectly  rational  to  those  around  him.  The 
suspicion  that  the  accused  was  deprived  of  his  moral  liberty 
when  committing  the  criminal  act,  would  be  strengthened,  if 
the  paroxysms  had  been  recently  frequent  and  severe  ;  if 
one  had  shortly  preceded  or  succeeded  the  act ;  if  he  had 
been  habitually  subject  to  mental  irritability,  or  other  symp- 
toms of  nervous  disorder ;  and  by  those  circumstances 
generally  which  would  lead  to  the  same  conclusion,  were 
the  supposed  disease  a  form  of  moral  mania,  instead  of  ep- 
ilepsy. (§  188.)  Cases  of  this  kind  should  be  closely  scruti- 
nized, and  where  the  accused  has  been  undeniably  subject 
to  epilepsy,  he  should  have  the  benefit  of  every  reasonable 
doubt  that  may  arise  respecting  his  sanity.  Less  than  this 
common  humanity  could  not  ask  ;  more  even  has  sometimes 
been  granted  under  the  operation  of  milder  codes  than  the 
English  common  law. 

§  326.  In  the  following  case,  the  criminal  act  was  the 
result  of  that  morbid  irritability  which  sometimes  succeeds 
the  paroxysms.  Joachim  Hoewe,  twenty-nine  years  old, 


372  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE     OF     INSANITY. 

had  been  an  epileptic  since  his  sixth  year.  Since  the  age 
of  puberty,  the  disease  had  become  aggravated,  and  latterly 
had  attacked  him  once  in  three  weeks.  He  was  long  in 
recovering  from  the  effects  of  the  fits,  being  troubled  with 
pain  in  the  head  and  vertigo,  and  manifesting  strong  aver- 
sion to  food,  though  never  furious  or  insane.  In  July  1826, 
after  an  hour's  walk,  he  experienced  a  fit,  and  in  the  course 
of  the  three  next  days,  he  had  several,  appearing  all  the 
while  to  be  quite  unconscious,  and  refusing  nourishment. 
On  the  third  day  he  arose  from  his  bed,  and  went  down  into 
the  yard,  where  he  met  with  a  son  of  his  brother  ten  years 
old,  and  a  daughter  of  a  relative  to  whom  he  was  attached, 
eleven  years  old.  The  boy  asked  him  if  he  did  not  wish 
to  eat.  The  patient  made  no  reply,  but  struck  at  him,  when 
the  children  ran  off.  He  followed  them,  overtook  the  girl, 
knocked  her  down,  and  catching  up  a  hatchet  from  the 
ground,  fractured  her  skull  in  several  places,  when  the 
neighbors  rushed  in,  and,  after  considerable  resistance,  over- 
powered him.  He  now  remained  quiet,  till  they  proceeded 
to  carry  him  to  the  magistrate,  when  he  broke  out  into  vi- 
olent expressions  of  hatred  against  his  fellow-townsmen.  In 
prison  he  laid  two  days  in  a  state  of  unconsciousness,  took 
no  nourishment,  and  had  a  fit.  On  the  third  day  his  reason 
returned  ;  he  expressed  some  interest  in  his  friends,  com- 
plained bitterly  of  his  sufferings,  but  had  no  recollection  of 
what  had  occurred.  The  question  having  been  put  to  the 
medical  expert,  (by  whom  the  case  was  reported)  whether 
the  accused  was  in  a  responsible  condition  of  mind  when  he 
committed  the  murder,  it  was  answered  in  the  negative,  for 
the  following  reasons.  Unlike  real  criminals,  he  had  no 
definite  purpose  in  view,  arid  did  not  fly,  after  having  com. 
mitted  the  act.  The  mental  condition  of  epileptics  just  be- 
fore and  after  the  fit,  is  usually  very  peculiar,  and  for  many 
years,  medical  jurists  have  not  been  in  the  habit  of  consid- 
ering an  epileptic  as  deserving  of  punishment  for  any  offence 


EPILEPSY     AND     ITS     LEGAL     CONSEQUENCES.  373 

he  might  commit  within  three  days  before  or  after  a  fit. 
Among  the  exciting  causes  of  his  fits  at  the  time  in  question, 
and  of  the  criminal  act,  the  reporter  mentioned  the  exercise 
and  heat  of  the  weather  to  which  the  accused  had  been  ex. 
posed,  and  the  inquiry  of  the  child  whether  he  would  eat, 
which,  on  account  of  his  morbid  aversion  to  food,  excited 
him,  in  his  unconscious  and  irritable  condition,  to  expend  his 
fury  on  the  nearest  object.  Two  months  after,  he  died  in  a 
fit.1 

§  327.  Epilepsy  is  often  accompanied  by  imbecility,  con- 
genital, or  acquired,  and  by  disordered  appetites  aud  pro- 
pensities. Although  its  immediate  effect  on  the  mind,  in 
these  cases,  may  not  be  so  definite  and  prominent  as  in 
others,  yet  it  is  no  less  effectual  in  weakening  and  per- 
verting its  faculties.  The  medical  jurist  should  pre- 
serve himself  from  the  common  error  of  viewing  these 
bad  propensities  as  indicative  of  a  depraved  and  sin-loving 
character,  instead  of  being  the  result  of  abnormal  condition 
of  the  nervous  system.  The  following  case,  from  an  old 
writer,  will  illustrate  this  form  of  the  disorder.  C.  F.  Oppel, 
sixteen  years  old,  twice  set  fire  to  the  royal  stable  in  Saxony, 
once  in  April,  and  again  in  May,  1725.  The  fire  was  dis- 
covered before  much  damage  was  done,  and  the  second 
time,  he  extinguished  it  himself.  It  appeared  in  evidence 
that  he  had  always  manifested  a  good  and  peaceable  dispo- 
sition ;  that  from  childhood,  he  had  always  been  troubled, 
especially  in  the  summer  time,  with  bleeding  from  the  nose  ; 
that  when  ten  years  old,  he  had  an  attack  of  scarlet  fever  ; 
and  that  about  a  year  before  the  incendiary  attempts,  he 
began  to  suffer  from  epilepsy,  the  paroxysms  of  which  were 
light  at  first,  but  gradually  increased  in  severity.  Four 
weeks  before  the  fire  he  had  a  fit,  and  two  days  after  he  had 
another,  and  they  continued  for  some  time  to  be  very  fire- 

1  Jahn  in  Henke's  Zeitschrift.  1827,  iv.  282. 
32 


374  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

quent  and  severe.  The  reasons  which  he  himself  gave  for 
the  act,  were,  that  when  he  had  been  drinking,  he  felt 
strongly  impelled  to  commit  incendiary  acts,  and  that  on 
this  occasion,  he  also  hoped  to  save  something  from  the  fire, 
with  which  he  might  buy  drink,  instead  of  being  obliged  to 
ask  his  mother  for  money.  It  appeared  that  his  father  was 
an  epileptic  and  addicted  to  drinking.  The  physician  who 
was  directed  to  inquire  whether  the  accused  was  in  perfect 
possession  of  his  reason  when  he  committed  the  offence, 
reported  that  he  was  not,  and  had  been  of  unsound  rnind 
from  childhood.  The  reasons  offered  in  support  of  his 
opinion,  though  remarkably  correct  for  the  time,  will  not  all 
bear  a  critical  examination  now,  and  therefore  it  will  not  be 
worth  our  while  to  state  them  at  length.  The  fact  that  he 
might  have  inherited  a  depraved  constitution  which  was  still 
more  weakened  by  the  accession  of  a  severe  nervous  disease, 
is  sufficient  to  warrant  the  suspicion  that  his  mind  may  have 
been  a  prey  to  morbid  impulses  which,  when  under  the  in- 
fluence of  drink,  he  would  find  it  difficult  to  resist.  The 
fact  that,  shortly  before  and  after  the  offence,  he  had  suffered 
from  epilepsy,  furnishes  a  presumption,  that,  however  ra- 
tional he  may  have  appeared,  his  mind  was  far  from  being 
in  a  sound  and  healthy  condition.  True,  he  alleged  as  his 
motive,  the  gratification  of  an  appetite,  but  it  does  not  ap- 
pear that  the  appetite  existed  till  after  the  invasion  of  the 
epilepsy.1 

1  Troppaneger,  decis.  med.  forens.  1735,  quoted  in  Henke's  Ab- 
handlung,  iv.  25,  2te  Aufl. 


CHAPTER    XVIII. 


SUICIDE. 

§  328.  AT  the  present  day,  the  subject  of  suicide  is 
deprived  of  much  of  the  medico-legal  importance  which  it 
once  possessed.  Still,  however,  as  questions  occasionally 
come  up  in  which  dispositions  of  property  are  made  to  de- 
pend on  the  judicial  views  that  are  formed  respecting  its 
relations  to  mental  derangement,  it  is  highly  proper  that 
mistakes  should  not  be  committed  from  a  want  of  correct 
notions  of  its  nature.  With  all  the  light  on  the  subject 
which  the  researches  of  modern  inquirers  have  elicited, 
many  probably  are  yet  unable  to  answer  understandingly 
the  question  so  often  started,  whether  suicide  is  always  or 
ever  the  result  of  insanity.  It  may  be  proper,  therefore,  to 
lay  before  the  reader  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge  on 
this  subject,  in  order  that  he  may  have  the  materials  for 
forming  correct  and  well-grounded  opinions  respecting  it. 

§  329.  To  the  healthy  and  well-balanced  mind,  suicide 
appears  so  strange  and  unaccountable  a  phenomenon,  that 
many  distinguished  writers  have  inconsiderately  regarded  it 
as,  in  all  cases,  the  effect  of  mental  derangement ;  while,  by 
many  others,  it  has,  with  still  less  reason,  been  viewed  as 
always  the  act  of  a  sound,  rational  mind.  Neither  of  these 
views  can  be  supported  by  an  impartial  consideration  of  all 
the  facts,  and  the  truth  probably  lies  between  the  two  ex- 
tremes. Suicides  may  be  divided  into  two  classes,  founded 
upon  the  different  causes  or  circumstances  by  which  they 


376  MEDICAL     JURISPRUDENCE     OF     INSANITY. 

are  actuated.  The  first  includes  those  who  have  deliberately 
committed  the  act  from  the  force  of  moral  motives  alone  ; 
the  second,  those  who  have  been  affected  with  some  patho- 
logical condition  of  the  brain,  excited  or  not  by  moral  mo- 
tives. 

'J  330.  If  it  be  considered,  that  life  is  not  the  only  nor 
perhaps  the  best  gift  we  have  received  from  the  author  of 
our  being,  it  ought  not  to  appear  strange  that  men  should 
sometimes  be  willing  to  relinquish  it  for  the  sake  of  securing 
a  good,  or  avoiding  an  evil.  We  know  well  enough  that 
life  is  not  so  dear  that  it  will  not  be  readily  sacrificed,  when 
all  that  makes  it  worth  retaining  is  taken  away.  The  in- 
trepid Roman  chose  rather  to  fall  on  his  own  sword,  than 
survive  the  liberties  of  his  country  or  live  an  ignominious 
life  ;  and  reverses  of  fortune,  which  hurl  men  from  the  pin- 
nacles of  wealth  or  power,  or  the  certain  prospect  of  infamy 
and  the  world's  scorn,  are  no  very  inadequate  motives  for 
terminating  one's  existence.  In  these  cases,  the  person,  no 
doubt,  may  act  from  error  of  judgment,  and  thus  be  guilty 
of  foolish  and  stupid  conduct,  but  we  have  no  right  to  con- 
found such  error  with  unsoundness  of  mind.  Inasmuch  as 
the  prospect  before  him  may  be  such  that  it  will  appear  to 
his  mind  more  painful  to  live  than  to  die,  it  is  not  to  be 
wondered  at,  if,  for  want  of  courage  to  bear  up  against  the 
ills  that  threaten  to  overwhelm  him,  and  battle  it  to  the  last, 
he  should  prefer  the  latter;  for,  after  all,  the  choice  might 
indicate  less  folly  than  that  which  often  characterizes  the 
conduct  of  men.  True,  the  motive  may  seem  sometimes 
totally  inadequate  to  lead  to  such  a  determination,  when  in 
reality  it  may  be  the  only  and  sufficient  motive  ;  and  this, 
probably,  must  always  continue  to  be  one  of  the  mysterious 
facts  in  our  constitution,  that  the  termination  of  our  exist- 
ence, from  which  we  instinctively  shrink  with  feelings  of 
horror,  should  so  often  be  voluntarily  hastened  from  the 
most  trivial  and  insignificant  motives.  No  doubt  the  mental 


SUICIDE.  377 

disturbance  is  always  great,  but  the  same  may  be  affirmed 
of  all  cases  where  crime  is  committed  under  the  excitement 
of  strong  passions,  and  therefore  is  in  itself  no  proof  of  in* 
sanity.     It  cannot  be  denied,  however,  that  the  cases  are 
comparatively   few  in  regard  to  which  it  would  be  safe  to 
affirm,  that  the  excitement  of  the  organic  action  of  the  brain 
and  nervous  system,  which  accompanies  this  perturbation  of 
mind,  had  not  transcended  the  limits  of  health  and  passed 
into  real  pathological  irritation.     Among  these  few  we  can 
have  no  hesitation  in  placing  the  case  of  the  pair  of  youths, 
noticed  by  Mrs.  Trollope,  who,  after  dining  sumptuously  at 
a  fashionable  restaurant  at  the  expense  of  their  entertainer, 
went  to  their  lodgings,  and  suffocated  themselves  together  in 
the  same  bed ;'  or  that  of  suicidal  clubs,   the  members  of 
which  bind  themselves  to  die  by  their  own   hands  within  an 
appointed  time.     Men,  who,  with  cultivated   intellects  and 
refined  passions,  entertain  only  the  meanest  conceptions  of 
the  great  moral  purposes  of  life,  are  ready  to  terminate 
their  existence  the  moment  it  ceases  to  impart  its  usual  zest 
to  sensual  gratification.     Here,  self-destruction  is  obviously 
not  the  effect  of  physical  disease,   but  of  moral  depravity. 
But  how  are  we  to  account  for  those   instances  of  juvenile  . 
suicide  so  often  recorded,  where  the  dreadful  propensity  is 
excited  by  the  most  trivial  causes  ?     Burrows  speaks  of  a 
girl,  but  little  over  ten  years  of  age,  who,  on  being  reproved 
for  some  trifling  indiscretion,  cried  and  sobbed  bitterly,  went 
up  stairs  and  hung  herself  in  a  pair  of  cotton  braces  ;  and 
of  another,  eleven  years  old,  who  drowned  herself  for  fear 
of  simple  correction.2     A  French  journal  has  lately  reported 
the  case  of  a  boy  twelve  years  old,  who  hung  himself  by 
fastening  his  handkerchief  to  a  nail  in  the  wall,  and  passing 
a  loop  of  it  around  his  neck,  for  no  other  reason,  than  be- 

1  Paris  and  the  Parisians. 

*  Commentaries  on  Insanity,  440. 
32* 


378  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY, 

cause  he  had  been  shut  up  in  his  room  and  allowed  only  dry 
bread,  as  a  punishment  for  breaking  his  father's  watch.  The 
same  journal  gives  another  case  of  suicide,  committed  by  a 
boy  eleven  years  old,  for  being  reproved  by  his  father  ;  and 
several  more  of  a  similar  description  are  also  recorded.1  In 
these  cases,  the  moral  causes  seem  altogether  inadequate  to 
excite  the  suicidal  propensity,  without  first  producing  some 
serious  physical  disturbance,  for  here  are  none  of  those 
motives  for  self-destruction  which  have  just  been  mentioned 
as  influencing  the  adult  mind. 

§  331.  That  suicide  is  often  committed  under  the  im- 
pulse of  mental  derangement,  even  when  mental  derange- 
ment would  not  otherwise  have  been  suspected,  is  a  doc- 
trine that  was  long  since  taught  by  some  medical  writers, 
and  has  been  confirmed  beyond  the  shadow  of  a  doubt,  by 
the  researches  of  recent  inquirers.  The  propensity  to  sui- 
cide, connected  with  an  obviously  melancholy  disposition,  is 
now  universally  recognized  as  a  form  of  monomania,  for  its 
symptoms  are  plainly  indicative  of  cerebral  derangement. 
These  patients  labor  under  a  constant  melancholy,  con- 
juring up  the  darkest  propecls,  and  presaging  nothing  but 
evil  fortune.  They  have  been  guilty  of  some  sin,  real  or 
imaginary,  which  they  believe  to  be  of  the  most  heinous 
nature,  and  thenceforth  there  is  no  more  happiness  nor 
comfort  in  the  world  for  them.  They  imagine  their  friends 
are  constantly  watching  their  movements  and  engaged  in 
machinations  against  them,  or  silently  neglecting  and  de- 
spising them  ;  at  one  time,  morose  and  taciturn  ;  at  an- 
other, uttering  the  most  bitter  complaints,  weeping  and 
traversing  the  room,  as  if  in  extreme  mental  anguish.  If 
their  thoughts  take  a  religious  turn,  they  imagine  they  have 
committed  the  unpardonable  sin,  that  their  prayers  are  re- 
jected, that  the  Saviour  turns  away  his  face  from  their 

1  Medico-Chirurgical  Review,  N.  S.  xxvii.  21. 


SUICIDE.  379 

sight,  and  that  the  miseries  of  the  damned  are  to  be  their 
everlasting  portion.  This  unquiet  and  melancholy  mood 
will  occasionally  give  way  to  short  periods  of  comparative 
cheerfulness,  when  the  clouds  seem  to  be  breaking  away, 
and  the  individual  approximating  to  his  natural  character. 
Their  nervous  system  is  weak  and  irritable,  the  circulation 
is  quickened,  the  digestion  more  or  less  impaired,  the  secre- 
tions, especially  the  biliary,  more  or  less  deficient,  or  vitia- 
ted, and  the  mind  is  incapable  of  continued  exertion.  After 
this  state  has  continued  for  some  time,  the  mental  derange- 
ment becomes  more  prominent,  and  the  wretched  victim 
begins  to  see  visions  and  hear  strange  voices,  and  believes 
that  he  has  communications  from  superior  beings.  All  this 
time  the  idea  of  self-destruction  is  frequently  if  not  con- 
stantly before  the  mind,  and  unless  the  patient  be  narrowly 
watched,  he  will  finally  succeed,  after  various  attempts,  in 
accomplishing  his  purpose. 

§  332.  The  suicidal  propensity  here  described  is  univer- 
sally attributed  to  pathological  causes;  but  there  is,  besides, 
a  large  class  of  cases,  in  which  no  insanity  of  mind  or  body 
has  been  observed  or  suspected,  though  we  have  good  rea- 
son to  believe  its  existence.  That  one  may  be  so  harassed 
with  the  ills  of  life,  as  to  deern  it  best  to  rid  himself  at 
once  of  both,  is  not  perhaps  very  strange  ;  but  when  a  per- 
son, apparently  in  good  health,  and  surrounded  with  every- 
thing that  can  make  life  dear  to  him,  deliberately  destroys 
himself  without  any  visible  cause,  no  balancing  of  motives, 
or  scrutiny  of  private  circumstances,  can  satisfactorily  ex- 
plain it,  and  we  are  obliged  to  consider  it  as  a  form  of  par- 
tial moral  mania.  Within  a  few  years  past,  the  attention 
of  the  medical  profession  has  been  directed  to  this  subject, 
and  their  researches  have  abundantly  established  the  fact, 
that  the  efficient  cause  is  some  pathological  change,  or  phy- 
sical peculiarity,  not  in  every  case  easily  defined  or  under- 
stood, but  none  the  less  certain  on  that  account. 


380  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

§  333.  Sometimes  this  monomania  is  attended  appa- 
rently by  no  physical  or  moral  disorder,  the  individual  be- 
ing driven  by  mere  impulse  to  self-destruction,  without 
being  able  to  assign  any  reason  therefor,  real  or  imaginary. 
He  feels  that  he  is  urged  on  by  an  impulse  he  can  neither 
account  for  nor  resist,  deplores  his  sad  condition,  and  be- 
seeches his  friends  to  protect  him  from  himself.  In  an- 
other class  of  cases,  some  powerful  physical  or  moral  im- 
pression only  is  needed,  to  call  the  suicidal  propensity  into 
fatal  activity.  The  wonderful  effect  of  menial  influences 
on  diseases  of  the  bodily  organs,  is  so  common  a  fact,  that 
we  have  no  rational  ground  for  disbelieving  a  similar  kind 
of  agency  in  the  production  of  this  phenomenon.  The  dis- 
tinguished accoucheur,  who  attended  the  princess  Charlotte 
in  her  fatal  confinement,  observed  a  pair  of  pistols  in  the 
room  to  which  he  had  retired  for  repose,  —  the  sight  of 
which  was  sufficient,  to  a  mind  harassed  by  long  and  anx- 
ious attendance,  and  overwhelmed,  as  it  were,  by  the  re- 
sponsibilities of  his  situation,  to  provoke  a  desire  —  which 
he  may  never  have  felt  before  —  to  die  by  his  own  hands. 
The  case  of  Sir  Samuel  Romilly,  who  committed  suicide 
immediately  after  sustaining  a  severe  domestic  bereave- 
ment, strongly  shows  how  far  the  propensity  to  commit  this 
act  is  beyond  the  control  of  moral  principle  or  Christian 
virtue,  even  when,  as  it  was  with  him,  previously  contem- 
plated and  conditionally  determined  upon. 

§  334.  It  is  a  remarkable  fact,  that  in  many  cases  of 
attempted  suicide,  the  individual,  after  recovery,  has  no  re- 
collection, or  at  most,  but  a  faint  and  shadowy  one,  of  the 
fact  itself,  and  believes  it  upon  the  testimony  of  others. 
And  yet  he  may  have  evinced  considerable  forethought  and 
ingenuity  in  preparing  the  means,  and  when  detected  in 
the  attempt,  have  conversed  about  it  calmly  and  perti- 
nently. It  seems  to  be  analogous  to  that  loss  of  recollec- 
tion in  regard  to  homicide,  or  other  violent  acts  commit- 


SUICIDE.  381 

ted  in  acute  mania,  often  evinced  by  patients  after  re- 
covery. The  fact  strongly  shows  us  what  deep  and  serious 
disorder  may  pervade  the  mind,  while  outwardly  all  is 
calm  and  regular. 

§  335.  Among  the  features  which  ally  the  propensity  to 
suicide  with  ordinary  mania,  is  that  of  its  hereditary  dispo- 
sition. Dr.  Gall  knew  several  families  in  which  the  suicidal 
propensity  prevailed  through  several  generations.  Among 
the  cases  he  mentions,  is  the  following  very  remarkable 
one.  "  The  Sieur  Ganthier,  the  owner  of  various  houses 
built  without  the  barriers  of  Paris,  to  be  used  as  entrepots 
of  goods,  left  seven  children  and  a  fortune  of  about  two 
millions  of  francs,  to  be  divided  among  them.  All  re- 
mained at  Paris  or  in  the  neighborhood,  and  preserved  their 
patrimony ;  some  even  increased  it  by  commercial  specu- 
lations. None  of  them  met  with  any  real  misfortunes,  but 
all  enjoyed  good  health,  a  competency,  and  general  esteem. 
All,  however,  were  possessed  with  a  rage  for  suicide,  and 
all  seven  succumbed  to  it  within  the  space  of  thirty  or 
forty  years.  Some  hanged,  some  drowned  themselves,  and 
others  blew  out  their  brains.  One  of  the  first  two  had 
invited  sixteen  persons  to  dine  with  him  one  Sunday.  The 
company  collected,  the  dinner  was  served,  and  the  guests 
were  at  the  table.  The  master  of  the  house  was  called, 
but  did  not  answer,  —  he  was  found  hanging  in  the  garret. 
Scarcely  an  hour  before,  he  was  quietly  giving  orders  to 
the  servants,  and  chatting  with  his  friends.  The  last,  the 
owner  of  a  house  in  the  rue  de  Richelieu,  having  raised  his 
house  two  stories,  became  frightened  at  the  expense,  imag- 
ined himself  ruined,  and  was  anxious  to  kill  himself. 
Thrice  they  prevented  him,  but  soon  after  he  was  found 
dead,  shot  hy  a  pistol.  The  estate,  after  all  the  debts  were 
paid,  amounted  to  three  hundred  thousand  francs,  and  he 
might  have  been  forty-five  years  old  at  the  time  of  his 

J  on  t}|. 


382  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

"  In  the  family  of  M.  N:  *  *  *,  the  great-grandfather,  the 
grandfather,  and  the  father  committed  suicide."  l 

§  336.  Falret,  whose  researches  have  thrown  much  light 
on  this  affection,  believes  that  it  is  more  disposed  to  he  here- 
ditary than  any  other  kind  of  insanity.  He  saw  a  mother 
and  her  daughter  attacked  with  suicidal  melancholy,  and 
the  grandmother  of  the  latter  was  at  Charenton  for  the  same 
cause.  An  individual,  he  says,  committed  suicide  in  Paris ; 
his  brother  who  came  to  attend  the  funeral,  cried  out  on 
seeing  the  body  —  What  fatality !  My  father  and  uncle  both 
destroyed  themselves ;  my  brother  has  imitated  their  exam- 
ple ;  and  twenty  times  during  my  journey  hither,  I  thought 
of  throwing  myself  into  the  Seine."  2 

§  337.  Gall  also  relates  the  case  of  a  dyer  of  a  very 
taciturn  humor,  who  had  five  sons  and  a  daughter.  The 
eldest  son,  after  being  settled  in  a  prosperous  business,  with 
a  family  around  him,  succeeded,  after  many  attempts,  in 
killing  himself  by  jumping  from  the  third  story  of  his  house. 
The  second  son,  who  was  rather  taciturn,  had  some  domestic 
troubles,  lost  part  of  his  fortune  at  play,  and  strangled  him- 
self at  the  age  of  thirty-five.  The  third  threw  himself  from 
the  window  into  his  garden,  but  did  not  hurt  himself;  he 
pretended  he  was  trying  to  fly.  The  fourth  tried  one  day 
to  fire  a  pistol  down  his  throat,  but  was  prevented.  The 
fifth  was  of  a  bilious,  melancholy  temperament,  quiet,  and 
devoted  to  business  ;  he  and  his  sister  show  no  signs  of  being 
affected  with  their  brother's  malady.  One  of  their  cousins 
committed  suicide.3 

§  338.  Like  other  kinds  of  mental  derangement,  the 
suicidal  propensity  undergoes  occasional  exacerbations,  from 
the  influence  of  the  seasons,  periodical  congestions,  &c. 
The  patient,  perhaps,  may  have  thrown  off  some  of  the 

1  Sur  les  fonctions,  iv.  345.         *  Sur  la  Hypochondria  et  Suicide, 
3  Op.  cit.  sup.  iv.  350. 


SUICIDE.  383 

gloom  which  overshadowed  his  mind,  resumed  a  portion  of 
his  ordinary  cheerfulness  and  interest  in  his  affairs,  courted 
the  company  of  his  friends,  and  thus  excited  strong  expecta- 
tions of  a  perfect  cure,  when  suddenly  his  malady  breaks 
out  afresh ;  the  sentiments  are  again  perverted,  the  judgment 
disturbed,  his  breast  torn  with  anguish  and  despair,  and  the 
utmost  watchfulness  necessary  to  prevent  him  from  accom- 
plishing his  fatal  designs. 

§  339.  Another  trait  which  the  suicidal  propensity  pos- 
sesses in  common  with  some  nervous  diseases,  though  not 
insanity,  is  its  disposition  to  prevail  epidemically,  as  it  were, 
in  consequence  of  that  law  of  our  constitution,  not  well  un- 
derstood, called  sympathy.  It  is  a  matter  of  common  obser- 
vation, that  the  occurrence  of  one  case  of  suicide  is  followed, 
oftener  than  not,  by  one  or  more  in  the  same  community. 
In  a  sitting  of  the  Academy  of  Medicine  at  Paris  a  few  years 
since,  it  was  mentioned  by  M.  Costel  that  a  soldier  at  the 
Hotel  des  Invalids  having  hanged  himself  on  a  post,  his 
example  was  followed  in  a  short  time,  by  twelve  other  in- 
valids, and  that  by  removing  this  fatal  post,  the  suicidal 
epidemic  was  arrested.  It  is  related  that  thirteen  hundred 
people  destroyed  themselves  in  Versailles  in  1793 ;  and  that 
in  one  year,  1506,  sixty  perished  by  their  own  hands  in 
Rouen.1 

§  340.  The  analogies,  thus  presented  between  the  suici- 
dal propensity  and  insanity  or  other  nervous  diseases  in  its 
symptoms,  are  also  strengthened  by  the  pathological  changes 
observed  after  death.  In  the  larger  proportion  of  instances 
where  examination  is  made,  the  brain  or  abdominal  viscera 
are  found  to  have  suffered  organic  lesions,  more  or  less  ex- 
tensive, which,  when  confined  to  the  latter,  have  effected 
the  mind  by  sympathetic  irritation.  Even  in  those  cases 
where  the  fatal  act  was  preceded  by  no  indications  of  dis- 

1  Burrows's  Commentaries  on  Insanity,  438. 


384  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY". 

ease,  or  other  symptoms  that  excited  suspicions  that  the 
individual  was  tired  of  life,  dissection  has  often  revealed  the 
most  serious  disease,  which  must  have  existed  for  some  time 
previous  to  death.  True,  the  most  careful  dissection  will 
sometimes  fail  of  revealing  the  slightest  deviation  from  the 
healthy  structure,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  the  support  of 
the  above  views  of  the  nature  of  this  affection,  that  it  always 
should.  For  here,  as  in  mania,  sometimes  the  pathological 
change  may  not  have  gone  beyond  its  primary  stage,  that 
of  simple  irritation,  which  is  not  appreciable  to  the  senses, 
but  the  existence  of  which  we  are  bound  to  believe  on  the 
strength  of  the  symptoms. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 


LEGAL     CONSEQUENCES    OF     SUICIDE. 

$  341.  BY  the  common  law  of  England,  a  felo  de  se 
forfeited  all  chattels,  real  or  personal,  which  he  had  in  his 
own  right,  and  various  other  property,  and  his  will  became 
void  as  to  personal  property.1  Such  severity  has  been  gen- 
erally avoided  by  the  almost  universal  practice  of  coroners' 
juries  returning  an  inquest  of  insanity.  At  present,  the  fact 
of  suicide  has  no  other  importance,  than  what  it  derives 
from  its  connexion  with  the  mental  derangement,  which  may 
be  supposed  to  have  given  rise  to  it.  Courts  would  very 
justly  refuse  to  consider  it  as  sufficient  proof  of  insanity,  in 
the  absence  of  other  proofs,  because  it  might  have  been  the 
act  of  a  rational  mind,  and  because  too  if  it  really  had 
sprung  from  insanity,  the  delusion  might  have  been  so  cir- 
cumscribed, as  not  to  have  perverted  the  judgment  in  re- 
gard to  testamentary  dispositions  and  other  civil  acts.  The 
principle  adopted  in  the  ecclesiastical  courts  is,  that  in  cases 
of  doubtful  sanity — among  which  those  of  suicide  must 
always  be  ranged — the  validity  of  the  individual's  testa- 
ment must  be  determined  solely  by  the  character  of  that 
instrument  itself.  Here  is  an  inherent  difficulty  that  courts 
will  never  be  very  anxious  to  encounter,  and  that  is,  to  de- 
termine the  exact  connexion  of  suicide  with  insanity  —  sup- 
posing the  latter  to  be  admitted  — in  point  of  time.  When 


1  Blackstone's  Commentaries,  iv.  190. 
33 


386  MEDICAL     JURISPRUDENCE     OF    INSANITY. 

this  act-is  the  only  proof  we  have  of  mental  derangement, 
we-  are  left  without  the  means  of  ascertaining  when  this 
condition  began  to  exist  or  to  disappear,  and  consequently 
nothing  can  be  more  difficult  than  to  decide  within  what 
time,  either  before  or  after  the  suicidal  attempt,  the  individ- 
ual can  be  pronounced  insane.  It  not  uncommonly  happens 
that  a  person  kills  himself,  or  makes  the  attempt,  shortly 
after  making  his  will,  when  the  question  requires  a  judicial 
decision,  whether  or  not  the  insanity  which  led  to  the  fatal 
act,  existed  at  the  time  of  making  the  will.  The  practice 
has  usually  been,  if  there  were  no  other  evidence  of  un- 
sound mind,  either  in  his  conduct  or  conversation,  or  in 
the  testamentary  dispositions  themselves,  not  to  impeach 
the  testator's  sanity.  In  a  certain  case  it  was  held  by 
Sir  John  Nicholl,  that  where  there  was  no  evidence  of 
insanity  at  the  time  of  giving  instructions  for  a  will,  the 
commission  of  suicide  three  days  afterwards,  did  not  invali- 
date the  will,  by  raising  an  inference  of  previous  derange- 
ment.1 Chief  Justice  Parker,  of  Massachusetts,  also,  held 
that  suicide,  committed  fifteen  days  after  the  date  of  the 
person's  will,  was  not  sufficient,  in  the  absence  of  other 
evidence,  to  prove  him  insane  and  thus  invalidate  the  will, 
on  account  of  the  difficulty  we  have  just  mentioned.2  .  . 
§  342.  Even  where  the  suicidal  act  is  unquestionably 
the  effect  of  insanity,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  a 
will  prepared  within  a  short  time  of  it,  is  invalid  ;  for  it 
may  be  that  the  insanity  was  of  a  Hmited  kind  not  involving 
ideas  of  property  or  relations.  A  gentleman  made  his  will 

1  Burrows  v.  Burrows,  1  Haggard's  Eccl.  Reports,  109. 

2  His  language  was,  that,  "even  if  the  act  itself  [suicide],  should 
be  considered  as  proof  demonstrative  that  the  reasoning   faculty 
was  disturbed  at  the  time  of  its  commission,  the  difficulty  of  ascer- 
taining with  precision  the  very  inception  of  derangement,  weakens 
its  force  in  relation  to  any  antecedent  act."     Brooks  anrl  others  v. 
Barret  and  others,  7  Pickering's  Reports,  94. 


LEGAL     CONSEQUENCES     OF     SUICIDE.  387 

a  few  hours  after  an  unsuccessful  attempt  on  his  life,  and 
entrusted  It  to  the^  charge  of  a  person  with  the  injunction 
that  he  should  produce  it  after  his  death.  After  some  months' 
treatment  he  got  better,  and  promised  never/again  to  attempt 
to  shorten  his  life.  For  three  years  he  kept  his  promise, 
and  showed  no  signs  of  mental  derangement,  but  it  does 
not  appear  of  what  disease  he  died.1  The  dispositions  of 
the -will  were  reasonable,  but  since  it  was  undoubtedly  made 
during  the  insanity  of  the  testator,  it  could  not  be  deemed 
valid  on  the  principles  of  the  common  law.  When  we  con- 
sider, however,  that  it  was  a  rational  act, 'and  that  the  testa- 
tor suffered  it  to  remain  unaltered  during  the  three  years 
that  he  was  free  from  disease,  we  are  bound  to  believe  that 
it  expressed  his  true,  deliberate  intentions  ;  and  being  such, 
we  ought  to  be  cautious  how  we  adopt  a  principle  that  would 
have  defeated  them. 

§  343.  Generally,  then,  if  the  unreasonableness  of  the 
will  itself  raises  a  suspicion  of  the  testator's  sanity,  the  act  of 
suicide  within  a  -short  time  will  always  be  strongly  con- 
firmatory of  it,  and,  in  connexion  with  attending  circumstan- 
ces, may,  in  some  instances,  turn  suspicion  into  conviction. 
There,  will  be  little  danger  of  going  wrong  in  any  cases  of 
this  kind,  if  we  are  willing  to  be  governed  in  our  decisions 
by  the  principles  of  equity  and  common  sense,  rather  than 
by  technical  distinctions  and  antiquated  maxims.  If  the 
will  be  a  rational  act  rationally  done,  a  suicidal  act  or 
attempt  ought  not  to  invalidate  it,  because  the  presumption 
is,  either,  that  the  will  was  made  .before  the  mind  became 
impaired,  or  that  the  derangement  was  of  a  kind  that  did 
not  prevent  the  judgment  from  using  its  ordinary  discretion 
in  the  final  disposition  of  property.  If,  on  the  contrary,  it 
be  an  unreasonable  act,  and'  especially  if  it  be  contrary  to 
the  previously  expressed  intentions  of  the  testator,  then  the 

1  Georget,  Des  Maladies  mentales,  114. 


388  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

act  of  suicide  will  be  in  itself  strong  proof,  that  the   mind 
was  impaired  at  the  time  of  making  the  will. 

§  344.  It  sometimes  happens  that  two  persons  desirous 
of  dying,  agree  to  kill  each  other,  while  the  plan  succeeds 
but  in  part,  and  one  survives.  In  this  case  how  is  the  sur- 
vivor to  be  treated  ?  I  do  not  know  that  any  trial  for  this 
offence  has  ever  taken  place  in  this  country  or  England,  but 
in  all  probability  it  would  be  viewed  by  the  light  of  the  com- 
mon law  as  nothing  short  of  manslaughter.  In  the  milder 
spirit  of  German  jurisprudence,  Professor  Mittermaier  thinks 
that  the  survivor  would  not  be  a  fit  object  of  punishment, 
but  whether  because  he  considers  his  responsibility  as  an- 
nulled, or  that  the  act  is  not  criminal,  he  does  not  state.1 
However,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  an  agreement  to  commit 
mutual  homicide,  ought  to  be  regarded  as  but  questionable 
evidence  of  insanity,  and  therefore  should  receive  no  favor 
on  that  ground  alone. 


1  De  principio  imputations  alienationum  mentis  in  jure  criminali 
recte  constituencies     Heidi.  1838. 


CHAPTER   XX. 


SOMNAMBULISM. 

§  345.  WHETHER  this  condition  is  really  anything  more 
than  a  cooperation  of  the' voluntary  muscles  with  the  thoughts 
which  occupy  the  mind  during  sleep,  is  a  point  very  far 
from  being  settled  among  physiologists.  While  to  some, 
the  exercise  of  the  natural  faculties-  alone  seems  to  be  suffi- 
cient to  explain  its  phenomena,  others  have  deemed  it 
necessary  to  suppose,  that  some  new  and  extraordinary 
powers  of  sensation  are  concerned  in  its  production,  though 
unable  to  convey  a  very  clear  idea  of  their  nature  or  mode 
of  operation.  Without  discussing  this  question  here,  our 
purpose  will  be  answered,  by  inquiring  how  far  the  natural 
faculties  are  exercised  during  its  continuance,  and  thus  as- 
certaining, as  well  as  may  be,  in  what  respect  it  differs  from 
the  sleeping  and  the  waking  states. 

§  346.  Not  only  is  the  power  of  locomotion  enjoyed,  as 
the  etymology  of  the  term  signifies,  but  the  voluntary  mus- 
cles are  capable  of  executing  motions  of  the  most  delicate 
kind.  Thus  the  somnambulist  will  walk  securely  on  the 
edge  of  a  precipice,  saddle  his  horse  and  ride  off  at  a  gallop, 
walk  on  stilts  over  a  swollen  torrent,  practise  airs  on  a 
musical  instrument;  in  short,  he  may  read,  write,  run,  leap, 
climb,  and  swim,  as  Well  as,  and  sometimes  even  better, 
than  when  fully  awake. 

§  347.  The  extent,  to  which  vision  is  exercised,  differs 
33* 


390  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

in  different  cases.  In  one  class  of  cases,  it  is  very  certain 
that  the  somnambulist  does  not  use  his  eyes  in  the  various 
operations  which  he  performs.  Negretti,  an  Italian  servant, 
whose  celebrated  history  is  related  by  two  different  physi- 
cians, would  rise  in  his  sleep,  go  into  the  dining-room,  spread 
a  table  for  dinner,  and  place  himself  behind  a  chair  with  a 
plate  in  his  hand,  as  if  waiting  on  his  master.  When  in  a 
place  with  which  he  was  not  perfectly  acquainted,  he  was 
embarrassed  in  his  proceedings,  and  felt  about  him  with  his 
hands;  and  sometimes  he  struck  himself  against  the  wall 
and  was  severely  injured.  He  sometimes  carried  about 
with  him  a  candle  as  if  to  give  him  light,  but  when  it  was 
taken  away  and  a  bottle  put  in  its  place,  he  failed  to  per- 
ceive the  difference.1  Galen  says  of  himself,  that  he  once 
walked  about  a  whole  night  in  his  sleep,  till  awakened  by 
stumbling  against  a  stone  which  laid  in  his  way.  Here,  it 
appears  that  the  long-continued  habit  of  performing  certain 
operations  enabled  the  individual,  with  the  aid  of  feeling 
alone,  to  repeat  them  in  his  sleep. 

§  348.  At  other  times,  objects  are  clearly  discerned,  but 
the  imagination  transforms  them  into  those  with  which  the 
mind  happens,  at  the  moment,  to  be  engaged.  Thus,  a 
somnambulist  described  by  Hoffman,  who  dreamed  he  was 
about  going  on  a  journey,  strided  across  the  sill  of  an  open 
window,  kicking  with  his  heels,  and  exerting  his  voice,  as 
if  he  supposed  himself  riding  on  his  horse. 

§  349.  In  other  instances  again,  things  are  done,  in 
which  vision,  or  an  analogous  power,  is  unquestionably  ex- 
ercised. Castelli,  whose  case,  which  is  one  of  the  most 
remarkable,  is  related  by  Francesco  Soave,2  was,  one  night, 
found  translating  Italian  into  French,  and  observed  to  look 
for  the  words  in  a  dictionary.  His  light  having  gone  out, 

1  Muratori :  della  forza  della  Fantazia  Umana. 
*  Riflessioni  sopra  il  Somnambolismo. 


SOMNAMBULISM. 

he  found  himself  in  the  dark,  groped  about  for  a  candle, 
and  went  into  the  kitchen  to  light  it.  He  would  also  get 
up,  and  go  into  his  master's  shop,  and  weigh  out  medicines 
for  supposed  customers.  When  some  one  had  altered  the 
marks  which  he  had  placed  in  a  book  he  was  reading,  he 
noticed  the  change  and  was  puzzled,  saying,  "Bel  piacere 
di  sempre  togliermi  i  segni."  Another  somnambulist,  a 
priest  whose  case  was  published  in  the  French  Encyclopedic, 
would  arise  from  his  bed  and  compose  sermons,  reading 
over  each  page  when  finished,  and  erasing  and  correcting 
with  the  utmost  accuracy.  On  one  occasion,  after  writing 
'*  ce  divine  enfant,"  he  erased  the  word  "  divine,"  and  wrote 
"  adorable "  over  it.  Perceiving  that  ce  could  not  stand 
before  the  last  word,  he  altered  it  to  cet,  by  inserting  after 
it  a  t.  He  would  also  write  music  with  the  greatest  ac- 
curacy. 

§  350.  In  another  class  of  cases,  there  seems  to  be  no 
reasonable  ground  for  doubting,  that  the  power  of  vision  is 
manifested  to  an  almost  incredible  extent.  Jane  Rider, 
whose  curious  history  was  published  a  few  years  since,  was 
able,  in  a  dark  room,  to  make  out  the  date  of  coins,  the 
figures  of  which  were  nearly  obliterated,  and  to  read  the 
motto  of  a  seal  which  others  had  been  unable  to  decipher 
by  the  light  of  a  lamp.  With  her  eyes  covered  by  several 
folds  of  handkerchief,  she  could  still  read  and  write  as  if 
nothing  intervened,  and  play  at  backgammon  understand- 
ing^. 

§  351.  It  appears  that  the  eyes  of  somnambulists  are 
sometimes  closed  while  walking  about,  and  perhaps  always 
so  when  they  first  get  up,  though  by  one  writer  they  are 
described  as  being  sometimes  half  open.  In  some  of  the 
cases  which  have  been  alluded  to,  the  eyes  were  observed 
to  be  open  and  staring. 

§  352.  The  senses  of  hearing  and  of  taste  present  as 
many  different  modifications  as  that  of  sight.  The  sound 


392  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

of  persons'  voices  talking  loud  in  his  presence  may  be  trn- 
perceived  by  the  somnambulist,  and  that  of- a  trumpet  no 
better  heard,  unless  put  close  to  his  ears ;  in  other  cases-, 
•very  faint  sounds  may  be  heard  at  considerable  distances. 
Negretti  did  not  distinguish  between  strongly  seasoned  cab- 
bage, and  some  salad  he  had  prepared.  He  drank  water 
instead  of  wine  which  he  had  asked  for,  and  snuffed  ground 
coffee  instead  of  snuff.  By  other  somnambulists,  however, 
such  deceptions  have  been  instantly  detected.  Generally, 
somnambulists  take  but  little  notice  of  what  is  passing 
around  them,  unless  it  is  naturally  connected 'with  the  sub- 
ject of  their  thoughts,  or  specially  obtruded  on  their  atten- 
tion ;  and  then  the  perceptions  will  be  associated  more  or 
less  coherently  with  their  thoughts.  Jane  Rider  would  take 
part  in  the  conversation,  and  never  mistake  the  nature  of 
outward  objects ;  while  others  have  been  no  less  accurate 
and  acute  in  some  of  their  remarks,  though  unconscious  of 
the  presence  of  other  persons.  These  facts  show  a  strong 
analogy  between  somnambulism  and  dreaming.  It  is  w.ell 
known  that  a  person,  who  will  hear  and  reply  to  questions 
addressed  to  him  relative  to  the  subject  he  is  dreaming 
about,  may  not  notice  nor  be  aware  of  loud  sounds  made 
near  him.  The  difference  in  the  sensorial  powers  of  differ- 
ent somnambulists,  probably  indicates  merely  a  difference 
in  the  degree  to  which  this  peculiar  condition  is  carried. 
Where  it  is  but  little  removed  from  that  of  ordinary  dream- 
ing, the  sense  of  feeling  alone,  in  a  limited  measure,  is  added 
to  the  locomotive  power;  when  still  farther  removed,  the 
senses  of  sight  and  hearing  come  into  play,  though  but  par- 
tially exercised  ;  and  when  displayed  to  its  utmost  extent, 
they  enjoy  a  range  and  nicety  of  perception,  not  witnessed 
in  the  ordinary  state,  and  hardly  explicable  in  the  present 
state  of  our  knowledge. 

<§>  353.     There  is  another  form  of  this  affection,  called 
ec&td&is  or  cataleptic  somnambulism,  from  its  being  con- 


SOMNAMBULISM.  393 

joined  with  a  kind  of  catalepsy,  in  which  the  walking  and 
other  active  employments  are  replaced  by  what  appears  to 
be  a  deep  quiet  sleep,  while  the  patient  converses  with 
fluency  and  spirit,  and  exercises  the  mental  faculties  with 
activity  and  acuteness.  Both  in  this  and  the  former  kind, 
the  person  generally  loses  all  recollection  of  whatever  trans- 
pires during  the  paroxysms,  though  it  may  be  revived  in  a 
subsequent  paroxysm.  In  some  cases  that  have  been  re- 
lated, the  memory  during  the  paroxysms  embraced  only  the 
thoughts  and  occurrences  of  those  periods;  those  of  the 
lucid  intervals  being  as  entirely  forgotten,  as  those  of  the 
paroxysms  were,  after  they  had  subsided. 

§  354.  It  now  scarcely  admits  of  a  doubt,  that  somnam- 
bulism results  from  some  morbid  condition  in  the  system, 
involving,  primarily  or  secondarily,  the  cerebral  organism. 
We  see  that  its  lighter  forms  are  but  a  slight  modification  of 
dreaming,  which  is  universally  admitted  to  be  very  much 
influenced  by  the  state  of  the  corporeal  functions,  and  which, 
in  certain  disorders,  is  produced  in  a  very  troublesome 
degree.  The  analogy  of  ecstasis  to  hysteria  and  epilepsy 
with  which  it  is  often  conjoined,  is  too  strong  to  escape  the 
most  cursory  observation,  not  merely  in  its  phenomena,  but 
in  its  curability  by  the  use  of  remedial  means.  Indeed, 
these  affections  are  known  to  pass  into  each  other  by  fre- 
quent and  rapid  transitions,  and  to  possess  a  strong  common 
relation  to  insanity.  The  attacks  of  cataleptic  somnambu- 
lism are  invariably  preceded  by  derangements  of  the  general 
health,  —  in  females,  of  the  uterine  functions  especially, 
and  their  recurrence  is  prevented  by  the  methods  of  treat- 
ment, which  are  found  most  successful  in  those  affections 
with  which  it  is  pathologically  related.  The  more  active 
forms  of  sleep-walking,  seldom,  if  ever,  exist,  except  in  con- 
nexion with  those  habits  or  conditions,  that  deteriorate  the 
general  health.  Intemperate  drinking  is  said  to  be  among 
the  causes  that  produce  it ;  and  an  observer  of  Negretti's 


MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

case  attributed  the  disorder  to  his  immoderate  fondness  of 
wine.  A  plethoric  condition  of  the  vessels  of  the  head  is 
also  a  strong  predisposing  cause  of  it ;  and  in  proof  of  this, 
Muratori  relates  that  he  was  assured  by  a  physician, -that 
nothing  but  having  his  hair  cut  off  once  in  a  couple  of 
months,  saved  him  from  being  a  somnambulist.  Its  heredi- 
tary character,  Which,  like  the  same  trait  in  insanity,  we 
may  fairly  Conclude  depends  on  morbid  conditions,  also 
indicates  its  physical  origin ;  and  the  same  inference  may 
be  drawn  from  the  influence  of  age  and  sex  in  its  produc- 
tion.. The  cataleptic -form  of  the  disorder  appears  chiefly 
in  females  before  the  last  critical  period;  while  the  other 
is  as  much  confined  to  males,  in  whom  it  mostly  appears  in 
childhood  and  the  early  periods  of  manhood, — -seldom  in 
old  age. 

§  355.  In  the.  somnambulist,  either  the  perceptive  or- 
gans are  inordinately  excited,  and  thus  he  is  led  to  mistake 
inward  for  outward  sensations  ;  or  the  perceptions,  if  correct, 
are  misapprehended  by  some  obliquity  of  the  reflective 
powers  ;  in  some  instances  probably,  both  these  events  take 
place.  He  talks,  moves,  and  acts,  unconscious  of  his  real 
condition,  and  of  nearly  all  his  external  relations.  The 
ideal  images  that  are  brought  before  the  mind  are  mingled 
and  confounded  with  the  real  objects,  of  sense,,  and  the  con- 
duct is  regulated  accordingly.  Psychologically  considered, 
then,  somnambulism  appears  to  be  not  very  remote  from 
mania,  the  difference  consisting  in  some  circumstances  con- 
nected with  the  causes  that  give  rise  to  the  derangement  of 
the  faculties.  In  the  latter,  the  pathological  affection  of  the 
brain  is -continuous  ;  in  the  former,  it  appears  only  during 
sleep,  by  which  its  effects  are  greatly  modified.  When  the 
maniac  finds  himself  restored  to  health,  he  looks  on  the 
period  of  his-  derangement  as  on  a  dream  crowded  with  gro- 
tesque images,  heterogeneous  associations,  and  ever-changing 
scenes.  So  the  somnambulist,  on  awaking,  is  conscious  only 


SOMNAMBULISM.  395 

of  having  been  in  a  dream,  the  events  of  which  have  left  a 
more  or  less  vivid  impression  on  his  memory. 

§  356.  In  somnambulism,  as  well  as  in  mania,  intellect- 
ual powers  are  sometimes  evinced,  that  are  altogether  un- 
known in  the  waking  state.  Jane  Rider  would  sing  cor- 
rectly, though  she  had  never  learned  to  sing,  nor  been 
known  to  sing  when  awake,  and  would  play  at  backgammon 
with  considerable  skill,  though  she  had  never  learned- the 
game  in  the  waking  state.  She  also  exhibited  a  power  of 
imitating  the  manners  and  language  of  people,  while  she 
had  never  evinced  the  slightest  trace  of  this  power  when 
awake. 

<§  357.  Like  the  maniac,  too,  the  sleep-walker's  senti- 
ments and  propensities  are  often  included  in  the  same  circle 
of  morbid  action,  in  which  the  operations  of  the  under- 
standing are  involved.  The  case  of  a  Carthusian  monk  is 
related,  who,  while  awake,  was  remarkable  for  his  sim- 
plicity, candor,  and  probity  ;  but  unfortunately,  almost  every 
night,  walked  in  his  sleep,  and  like  the  fabled  Penelope, 
undid  all  the  good  actions  for  which  he  was  celebrated  by 
day.  On  such  occasions,  he  was  a  thief,  a  robber,  and  a 
.plunderer  of  the  dead.  A  case  of  a  pious  clergyman  is 
somewhere  described,  who  in  his  fits  of  somnambulism 
would  steal  and  secrete  whatever  he  could  lay  his  hands 
upon,  and  on  one  occasion,  he  even  plundered  his  own 
church.  In  a  case  of  somnambulism  which  occurred  a  few 
years  since  in  Maine,  there  was  a  strong  disposition  to  com- 
mit suicide.  The  paroxysms  appeared  every -night,  and 
watchers  were  required,  as  if  the  somnambulist  had  been 
laboring  under  an  acute  disease.  He  always  attempted  to 
escape  from  his  keepers,  and  having  succeeded  one  night, 
an  outcry  was  heard  from  a  neighboring  pasture,  and  he 
was  found  suspended  by  a  rope  from  the  limb  of  a  high 
tree.  Fortunately,  he  had  attached  the  rope  to  his  feet 
instead  of  his  neck,  and  consequently  was  but  Jittle  injured. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES     OF    SOMNAMBULISM. 

§  358.  SOMNAMBULISM  may  sometimes  incapacitate  a 
person  from  the  proper  performance  of  the  duties  and  en- 
gagements df  his  situation,  and  then  unquestionably  it  may 
impair  the  validity  of  contracts  and  other  civil  acts  to  which 
he  is  a  party.  By  rendering  him  troublesome,  mischievous, 
and  even  dangerous,  it  furnishes  good  ground  for  annulling 
contracts  of  service,  whether  it  existed  previously  and  was 
concealed,  or  had  made  its  appearance  at  a  later  date. 
Whether  it  should  be  considered  a  sufficient  defence  of 
breach  of  promise  of  marriage,  or  a  valid  reason  for  divorce 
when  concealed  from  one  of  the  parties  previous  to  the 
marriage,  are  questions  which  do  not  properly  admit  of  a 
general  answer.  Since  its  evils  may  be  in  some,  of  the 
lightest,  in  others,  of  the  most  serious  description,  each  par- 
ticular case  ought,  in  justice,  to  be  decided  solely  on  its  own 
merits,  reference  being  had  to  the  amount  of  injury  as 
compared  with  the  magnitude  of  the  obligation  sought  to  be 
avoided.  If  studiously  concealed  or  denied,  when  its 
avowal  would  have  undoubtedly  prevented  the  other  party 
from  entering  into  a  contract,  the  latter  ought  to  be  enabled 
to  set  aside  his  own  obligations  on  the  ground  of  fraud. 

§  359.  As  the  somnambulist  does  not  enjoy  the  free  and 
rational  exercise  of  his  understanding,  and  is  more  or  less 
unconscious  of  his  outward  relations,  none  of  his  acts  dur- 
ing the  paroxysms,  can  rightfully  be  imputed  to  him  as 


LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  SOMNAMBULISM.      397 

crimes.  Hoffbauer  places  him  on  the  same  footing  with 
one  who  labors  under  hallucinations,  except  that  the  former 
is  not  fully  excused,  if,  knowing  his  infirmity,  he  has  not 
taken  every  possible  means  to  prevent  injurious  consequen- 
ces to  others.  Both  law  and  equity  too  would  undoubtedly 
hold  him  liable,  as  they  would  the  maniac,  for  injury  com- 
mitted to  the  property  of  others,  though  as  to  what  extent 
this  power  would  be  exercised,  we  have  no  means  of  form- 
ing an  opinion.  Hoffbauer  suggests  as  a  reason  for  not  re- 
garding the  criminal  actions  of  the  somnambulist  with  too 
much  indulgence,  that  they  have  probably  originated,  if  not 
in  premeditation,  at  least  in  the  deep  and  deliberate  attention 
which  the  mind  has  given  to  the  subject  when  awake.  This 
is,  no  doubt,  the  case  in  many  instances,  and  if  men  were 
to  be  punished  for  their  meditations,  the  suggestion  would 
be  not  without  its  weight ;  but  as  such  is  not  the  law,  it  is 
not  very  obvious  how  this  fact  can  affect  the  legal  conse- 
quences of  somnambulism.  Fodere  too,  comes  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  acts  of  a  somnambulist,  instead  of  resulting 
from  mental  delusion,  are  more  independent  than  any  others, 
because  they  are  the  free  and  unconstrained  expression  of 
his  waking  thoughts  and  designs,  and  therefore  that  they  are 
not  altogether  excusable.  He  seems  to  have  forgotten  that 
by  no  human  law  are  men  responsible  for  their  secret 
thoughts,  but  only  for  their  words  and  acts.  To  these  only 
does  it  look,  and  if  they  are  found  to  have  proceeded  from 
a  mind  not  in  the  full  possession  of  its  powers,  they  must  be 
excused  without  the  slightest  reference  to  the  former.  And 
as  it  cannot  be  denied  that  they  are  sometimes  excited  by 
unfounded  delusions  that  have  no  affinity  with  the  natural 
character  and  purposes  of  the  individual,  every  sentiment  of 
justice  cries  out  against  ever  regarding  them  in  a  criminal 
light.  Georget  quotes  from  an  anonymous  work  a  curious 
instance  of  somnambulism  in  a  monk,  which  was  related  to 
the  author  by  the  prior  of  the  convent,  who  witnessed  it  him- 
34 


398  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

self.  Late  one  evening,  this  somnambulist  entered  the  room 
of  the  prior,  his  eyes  open  but  fixed,  his  features  contracted 
into  a  frown,  and  with  a  knife  in  his  hand.  He  walked 
straight  up  to  the  bed,  as  if  to  ascertain  if  the  prior  were 
there,  and  then  gave  three  stabs  which  penetrated  the  bed- 
clothes and  a  mat  which  served  the  purpose  of  a  mattress. 
He  then  returned,  his  features  relaxed,  and  an  air  of  satis- 
faction on  his  countenance.  The  next  day,  the  prior  asked 
him  what  he  had  dreamed  about  the  preceding  night.  The 
monk  confessed  that  having  dreamed  that  his  mother  had 
been  murdered  by  the  prior,  and  that  her  spirit  had  appeared 
to  him  and  cried  for  vengeance,  he  was  transported  with 
fury  at  the  sight,  and  ran  directly  to  stab  her  assassin. 
Shortly  after,  he  awoke,  covered  with  perspiration,  and  re- 
joiced to  find  that  it  was  only  a  dream.1  A  similar  case  is 
also  related  of  two  individuals  who,  finding  themselves  out 
over  night  in  a  place  infested  with  robbers,  one  engaged  to 
watch  while  the  other  slept,  but  the  former,  falling  asleep 
and  dreaming  of  being  pursued,  shot  his  friend  through 
the  heart. 


1  Des  Maladies  mentales,  127. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 


SIMULATED    SOMNAMBULISM. 

§  360.  THIS  disorder  may  be  simulated,  first,  by  those 
who  have,  at  other  times,  really  experienced  its  attacks  ; 
secondly,  by  those  who  have  not  at  any  time.  The  motive 
may  be,  either  to  do  something  which  the  individual  would 
not  otherwise  dare  to  attempt,  or  to  avoid  the  punishment  of 
an  action  which  is  alleged  to  have  been  committed  in  one 
of  its  paroxysms.  The  difference,  however,  in  the  difficulty 
of  proof,  is  not  so  great,  as  at  first  sight  might  be  appre- 
hended ;  for,  since  the  mind  is  generally  unconscious  of 
what  passes  during  the  paroxysm,  the  somnambulist  pos- 
sesses but  little  advantage  over  others,  from  his  experience, 
in  feigning  this  affection.  He  will  be  no  less  at  fault  in 
respect  to  those  little  traits  which  mark  the  difference 
between  the  real  and  feigned  attacks,  as  well  as  the  more 
important  phenomena.  When,  however,  it  is  admitted  that 
the  person  has  been  subject  to  its  attacks,  this  fact  certainly 
furnishes  a  presumption  of  its  reality  in  doubtful  cases, 
which  diminishes  the  strength  of  the  evidence  which  the 
alleged  case  requires. 

§  361.  When  the  feigned  paroxysm  is  witnessed  by  others 
who  are  capable  of  describing  minutely  what  they  saw,  a 
comparison  of  his  conversation  and  acts  with  those  observed 
in  real  paroxysms,  may  furnish  us  with  a  clew  to  the  true 
nature  of  the  act  imputed  to  him  ;  for  it  is  scarcely  possible 


400  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

that,  if  feigning,  he  will  not  be  caught  tripping  in  some  of 
his  manoeuvres.  A  curious  case  is  quoted  by  Hoffbauer 
from  an  old  writer,  where  nothing  was  wanting  but  a  toler- 
able knowledge  of  the  state  of  the  mental  faculties  in  som- 
nambulism, to  expose  the  deception.  An  old  ropemaker 
frequently  fell  into  a  profound  sleep  in  the  midst  of  his  oc- 
cupation, whether  sitting  or  standing,  or  walking  in  the 
street,  when  he  would  begin  to  repeat,  by  means  of  words 
and  gestures,  everything  he  had  been  doing  during  the  day, 
from  his  prayer  in  the  morning  till  the  very  moment  of  his 
falling  asleep.  If  taken  while  walking  abroad,  he  would 
pursue  his  course  just  as  if  he  had  been  awake,  avoiding 
persons  and  things  which  might  harm  him.  The  story  was 
related  as  one  of  genuine  somnambulism,  though  there  were 
two  circumstances  in  it  sufficient  to  have  exposed  the  de- 
ception. In  the  first  place,  to  repeat  the  transactions  of  the 
day  in  this  manner,  is  contrary  to  what  we  know  of  som- 
nambulists who  do  only  what  they  have  premeditated,  or 
what  has  strongly  engaged  their  attention.  Secondly,  this 
man  acted  a  double  and  consequently  a  deceptive  part.  He 
first  repeated  what  he  had  done  during  the  day,  and  then 
went  on  with  what  he  was  in  the  act  of  doing  when  the  par- 
oxysm took  him.  The  ruse  was  finally  discovered.  The 
man  professed  himself  cured,  as  soon  as  a  physician  charged 
with  examining  his  case  proposed  to  bandage  his  eyes,  to 
see  if  he  would  then  be  able  to  perform  those  actions  which 
had  excited  so  much  surprise.  No  doubt  can  remain  of  the 
genuineness  of  the  attack,  if  the  person  perform  feats 
which  he  would  not,  dare  to  do  when  awake,  unless  —  which 
would  hardly  be  possible  —  he  has  systematically  concealed 
his  skill  and  abilities  ;  the  converse  of  the  proposition,  how- 
ever, cannot  be  equally  true.  It  will  also  be  a  strong  con- 
firmation of  the  evidence  in  favor  of  its'  reality,  if  the 
physical  symptoms,  we  have  mentioned  as  sometimes  at- 
tending the  somnambulic  disposition  are  shown  to  have 


SIMULATED    SOMNAMBULISM.  401 

been  present.  But  it  generally  happens  that  the  somnam- 
bulist walks  unwitnessed,  and  must  rest  the  proof  of  his 
mental  condition  on  his  own  testimony  and  the  circumstances 
of  the  case.  The  full  burden  of  proof  manifestly  devolves 
on  him,  and  if  he  fail  of  establishing  it  satisfactorily,  he 
must  suffer  the  consequence.  There  can  be  no  other  rule  ; 
for  once  acquit  a  criminal  on  the  score  of  somnambulism 
which  is  imperfectly  or  at  best  but  plausibly  proved,  and  it 
will  soon  become  a  favorite  excuse  for  crime,  whenever  the 
offender  possesses  the.  requisite  address  for  maintaining  the 
deception.  Among  the  proofs,  however,  necessary  to  es- 
tablish this  defence,  a  prominent  place  should  be  claimed 
for  those  drawn  from  the  nature  of  the  criminal  act  itself. 
If  this  be  manifestly  contrary  to  the  known  character  and 
disposition  of  the  accused,  and  especially  if  it  can  be  shown 
that  he  could  have  entertained  no  motive  for  injuring  the 
other  party,  but  little  else  beyond  a  straight  story  and  an  air 
of  sincerity  ought  to  be  required  to  establish  the  truth  of  his 
own  assertions. 


34* 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 


EFFECT    OF     INSANITY    ON     EVIDENCE. 

§  362.  THE  insane  are  disqualified  by  law  l  from  ap- 
pearing as  witnesses  in  courts  of  justice,  their  incompetence 
being  inferred  from  their  mental  unsoundness.  The  fact 
of  incompetence  to  testify,  however,  is  not  necessarily  con- 
nected with  that  of  insanity,  and  it  would  be  far  more  cor- 
rect to  consider  the  former  an  independent  fact  to  be  estab- 
lished by  a  distinct  order  of  proofs.  The  truth  is,  an  analo- 
gy, in  a  medico-legal  sense,  has  been  too  hastily  assumed, 
between  the  act  of  testifying,  and  that  of  performing  busi- 
ness-contracts, or  other  civil  acts,  and  in  consequence,  it 
has  shared  with  them  in  the  same  sentence  of  disqualifica- 
tion, without  an  attempt  to  ascertain  the  kind  and  degree  of 
intellectual  power  which  they  respectively  require.  The 
practice  of  including  them  in  the  same  category,  is  cer- 
tainly not  favored  by  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge  of 
insanity,  nor  does  it  approve  itself  to  the  common  sense  of 
mankind.  To  see  what  foundation  in  nature  this  rule  of 
law  really  has,  we  shall  proceed  to  inquire  how  far  the 
competency  of  a  witness  is  actually  impaired  by  the  dif- 
ferent forms  of  insanity. 

§  363.  According  to  Hoffbauer,  before  a  witness  can 
be  deemed  competent,  it  is  necessary  that  his  senses  should 


i  Thomas's   Coke's  Littleton,  489  ;  Livingston  v.  Keirsted,   10 
Johnson's  Reports,  362. 


EFFECT     OF     INSANITY     ON    EVIDENCE.  403 

be  sufficiently  sound  to  take  cognizance  of  the  facts  to  which 
he  testifies  ;  that  their  impressions  should  have  been  really 
what  he  believes  they  were  ;  that  his  testimony  should  coin- 
cide with  his  belief;  and  lastly,  that  he  should  be  able  to 
convey  to  others  his  own  ideas,  without  fear  of  being  misin- 
terpreted. These  conditions,  it  may  be  added,  constitute 
the  capacity  of  a  witness,  and  wherever  they  are  present, 
his  evidence  should  be  received  without  agitating  the  ques- 
tion of  his  mental  unsoundness,  which  is  not  absolutely 
incompatible  with  their  existence.1 

§  364.  The  higher  degrees  of  imbecility  must  of  course 
disqualify  a  witness,  but  its  less  aggravated  forms  may  not, 
under  all  circumstances,  have  this  effect.  His  senses  may 
be  acute  enough  to  see  and  to  hear  what  he  deposes  to  ;  no 
illusions  may  obtrude  and  mingle  with  their  impressions  ; 
and  his  memory  may  be  retentive  enough,  provided  too  long 
a  space  of  time  do  not  intervene  between  the  occurrence  of 
the  facts  and  his  deposition  concerning  them,  to  bear  them 
in  mind  till  revealed  by  judicial  investigation.  The  facts  to 
which  he  testifies  must  be  of  the  simplest  kind,  requiring 
the  smallest  perceptive  effort  to  seize  and  appreciate,  and 
so  intelligible  to  the  meanest  understanding,  that  the  me- 
mory can  easily  retain  them.  If  the  details  are  too  numer- 
ous and  complicated,  and  especially  if  they  include  words 
or  actions  not  familiar  with  or  analogous  to  his  own  ordi- 
nary experience,  or  if  they  happened  at  too  remote  a  pe- 
riod, they  become  confused  and  entangled  in  his  mind,  and 
many  of  them  fade  from  it  altogether,  while  some  impor- 


1  The  third  condition,  above-mentioned,  may  not  at  first  sight  ap- 
pear to  be  connected  with  capacity  ;  but  if  the  reader  will  refer  to 
the  observations  (§  139)  on  a  class  of  people,  who,  in  consequence 
of  some  natural  defect,  or  organic  disease,  are  incapable  of  telling 
the  truth,  even  when  most  conducive  to  their  own  interests,  he  will 
be  convinced  of  the  propriety  of  placing  it  in  this  connection. 


404  MEDICAL     JURISPRUDENCE     OF     INSANITY. 

tant  members  of  the  series  may  not  have  been  attended  to 
at  all.  Hence  the  evidence  of  imbeciles  may  present  many 
a  contradiction  and  hiatus,  of  which  they  may  be  perfectly 
unconscious  themselves,  and  which  it  would  be  wrong  to 
attribute  to  intentional  omissions,  or  a  wish  to  deceive.  If 
we  bear  in  mind  too,  that  these  persons  are  easily  embar- 
rassed, it  might  naturally  be  expected  that  the  presence  of 
spectators,  the  perplexing  questions  of  counsel,  and  the  for- 
malities of  a  trial,  would  so  disorder  their  ideas,  as  to  make 
their  testimony  appear,  to  those  unacquainted  with  their 
mental  deficiency,  like  the  most  impudent  trifling,  or  down- 
right mendacity.  The  more,  however,  the  witness  is  per- 
mitted to  tell  his  story  in  his  own  way,  and  finds  encour- 
agement in  the  looks  of  those  around  him,  the  less  of  this 
will  be  observed.  The  class  described  in  §  47,  are  compe- 
tent to  testify  in  matters  of  a  more  complicated  kind,  re- 
quiring a  larger  grasp  of  the  reflective  faculties  to  embrace, 
and  more  tenacity  of  memory  to  retain  them,  but,  like  the 
others,  they  are  very  liable  to  be  disconcerted  by  the  ques- 
tions of  strangers,  and,  in  consequence,  betrayed  into  numer- 
ous contradictions  of  their  own  testimony.  Since  then  the 
competency  of  these  imbeciles  is  well  established,  nothing 
can  be  clearer  than  the  propriety  of  admitting  their  evi- 
dence, and  leaving  it  for  the  jury  to  decide  upon  its  credi- 
bility. 

§  365.  In  partial  intellectual  mania  the  capacity  of  testi- 
fying under  certain  circumstances  and  with  certain  reserva- 
tions, is  still  preserved,  though  considerable  knowledge  of 
the  case  and  extreme  caution  are  requisite  to  measure  the 
witness's  credibility.  In  regard  to  the  greater  proportion  of 
cases,  the  only  doubt  is  respecting  the  second  and  third 
conditions  of  capacity  (§  363),  no  question  being  raised  as 
to  the  presence  of  the  others ;  that  is,  whether  the  witness 
has  really  seen,  heard,  &c.,  what  he  believes  he  saw  and 
heard,  and  whether  his  testimony  coincides  with  his  belief. 


EFFECT    OF    INSANITY    ON    EVIDENCE.  405 

That  he  may  offer  in  evidence  the  offspring  of  a  disordered 
imagination,  sincerely  believing  it  to  have  come  under  the 
cognizance  of  his  own  senses,  is  undoubtedly  true  ;  but  no 
less  so,  however,  that  he  may  testify  only  to  what  has  come 
under  his  own  observation.  Which  of  these  events  does 
actually  take  place,  is  a  question  to  be  settled  by  reference 
to  the  nature  of  the  evidence  and  the  character  of  the  wit- 
ness's insanity.  When  the  matter  on  which  he  testifies,  is 
remote  from  the  insane  delusion  which  he  entertains  and 
cannot  very  obviously  come  within  the  circle  of  its  influ- 
ence, it  would  be  wrong  to  reject  his  testimony  on  the  score 
of  incompetency.  When  we  see  these  monomaniacs  ra- 
tional on  every  topic  but  that  which  constitutes  their  derange- 
ment, shrewd  and  methodical  in  the  transaction  of  business, 
quick  to  perceive  and  able  to  profit  by  whatever  appears 
conducive  to  their  interests,  trusted  and  respected  by  their 
neighbors,  it  seems  more  difficult  to  disprove  than  to  prove 
their  competency.  The  power  of  remembering  and  telling 
correctly  what  they  have  seen  or  heard,  requires  no  more 
strength  or  soundness  of  mind,  than  numberless  other  duties 
that  nobody  doubts  their  ability  to  perform.  Even  on  topics 
connected  with  their  insane  belief,  their  capacity  is  not 
necessarily  destroyed,  and  in  doubtful  cases  it  would  seem 
better  to  receive  their  evidence,  and  leave  it  for  the  court  or 
counsel  to  disprove  its  credibility.  At  the  very  least,  the 
burden  of  proof  should  lie  on  the  party  that  allege  the  in- 
competence. Even  while  the  predominant  idea  is  highly 
false  and  absurd,  they  may,  and  very  often  do  reason  upon 
it  with  force  and  correctness,  their  deductions  being  sound 
and  their  reflections  appropriate.  Indeed,  this  mixture  of 
the  rational  and  the  irrational,  this  inability  to  discern  the 
relations  of  congruity  between  the  true  and  the  false,  con- 
stitutes one  of  the  most  characteristic  features  of  madness. 
Hence,  it  would  not  be  unnatural  for  them  to  see  things  in 
some  way  connected  with  the  delusion,  in  most  of  their  re- 


406  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

lations,  in  their  true  light,  and  of  this  fact  we  should  certainly 
avail  ourselves  in  deciding  on  the  admission  of  their  evi- 
dence. The  man  who  believes  that  he  is  charged  by 
government  with  the  regulation  of  the  weather,  may,  not- 
withstanding, observe  meteorological  changes,  and  testify 
accurately  concerning  the  state  of  the  weather  at  a  par- 
ticular time,  perhaps  no  one  more  so ;  and  he  who  believes 
that  he  has  made  an  immense  fortune  by  a  commercial 
speculation,  may  talk  sensibly  on  mercantile  interests,  and 
be  perfect  master  of  the  price-current,  and  thus  be  com- 
petent to  testify  on  any  matter  connected  with  the  same,  that 
has  come  under  his  observation.  The  credibility  of  such 
witnesses,  however,  depends  very  much  on  the  importance 
of  the  subject  on  which  they  testify,  and  on  the  relations  of 
their  evidence  to  that  of  other  witnesses.  When  they  cor- 
roborate the  statements  of  other  witnesses,  they  may  justly 
challenge  our  belief,  while  we  should  very  properly  hesitate 
to  decide  upon  any  great  interests  of  person  or  property, 
solely  upon  the  ground  of  their  testimony. 

§  366.  The  reported  cases,  where  the  competence  of 
witnesses  is  destroyed  by  reason  of  insanity,  are  too  few  to 
render  it  very  apparent  how  far  the  following  represents  the 
ordinary  practice  of  American  courts.  It  strikingly  illus- 
trates the  effect  of  a  rigid  adherence  to  the  common-law 
maxirn,  that  the  insane  are  incapable  of  testifying,  and, 
therefore,  may  be  properly  introduced  in  this  place.  In 
May,  1833,  Jacob  Schwartz  was  tried,  at  a  term  of  the 
supreme  court  for  the  county  of  Lincoln,  in  Maine,  on  an 
indictment  for  assaulting,  with  intent  to  kill,  Jonathan  Jones. 
Jones  himself  was  the  principal  witness,  and  he  stated  that 
he  went  into  Schwartz's  house,  for  the  purpose  of  conversing 
on  religious  subjects  with  his  wife,  who  was  also  Jones's 
sister;  that  Schwartz,  who  had  often  forbidden  him  to  do 
so,  followed  him  into  the  house,  drove  him  out,  seized  his 
gun,  and  threatened  to  shoot  him ;  that  he  then  ran  several 


EFFECT    OF    INSANITY    ON    EVIDENCE.  407 

rods,  occasionally  looking  back  at  Schwartz,  who  stood  in 
his  door-way  presenting  his  gun,  as  if  in  the  act  of  firing; 
that  Schwartz  finally  fired  and  hit  him,  several  shot  lodging 
in  his  hat  and  coat,  and  a  few  penetrating  into  the  skin  of 
his  back,  from  which  they  were  taken  out  by  some  persons 
in  a  house  to  which  he  immediately  ran.     The  transaction 
was  witnessed  by  no  one,  besides  Jones.    By  other  witnesses 
it  was  testified,  that  Jones  ran  into  the   house  where  they 
were,  exclaiming  that  Schwartz  had  shot  him,  and  that  they 
assisted  in  taking  the  shot  out  of  the  skin.     Thus  far  his 
testimony  was  rational  and  consistent,  and  his  manner  calm 
and  composed.     On  being  cross-examined  by  the  defend- 
ant's counsel  who   had  some  knowledge   of  his  case,  he 
testified,  that  he  used  to  work  on  a  piece  of  land  which  he 
owned,  but  that  feeling  himself  called  to  exhort  sinners  to 
repentance,  he  went  about,  in  imitation  of  Christ  and  the 
apostles,  preaching  the  gospel  and  exhorting  sinners  to  for- 
sake their  evil  ways.     He  declared  himself  to  be  an  apostle, 
and  inspired  by  the  Holy  Ghost ;  also,  that  he  was  one  of 
the  saints  who  are  to  judge  the  world,  and  that  he  should 
bear  a  part  in  the  judgment  of  the  great  day.     On  this  sub- 
ject he  dilated   largely  and  incoherently,  his  countenance 
being  animated,  and  his  language  and  manner  ardent  and 
impassioned.     Other  witnesses  having  testified,  that  in  his 
domiciliary  visits,  he  had  sometimes  represented  himself  to 
be  the  Lord   Jesus  Christ,  he  was  examined  on  this  point. 
Here  he  was  not  very  explicit,  and  did  not  seem  disposed  to 
make  a  full  disclosure,  as,  he  said,  he  could  not  perceive  its 
connection  with  the  question  at  issue.     He  did  not  expressly 
deny,  however,  that  he  so  considered  himself,  but  seemed 
disposed  to  leave  it  to  be  inferred  from  particular  things  in 
which  he  resembled  Jesus  Christ,  as  in  his  poverty,  in  his 
going  about  to  do  good,  and  in  the  persecution  he  suffered. 
The  jury,  not  thinking  it  safe  to  convict  the  defendant  on 
Jones's  testimony,  acquitted  him,  and  the  court  signified  its 
approval  of  the  verdict. 


408  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

§  367.  If  the  testimony  of  Jones  had  stood  alone,  un- 
supported by  confirmatory  circumstances,  no  fault  could 
be  reasonably  found  with  this  verdict.  It  would  have  been 
sufficient  for  the  jury,  to  know  that  he  was  laboring  under 
extensive  hallucinations,  with  which  the  alleged  criminal 
act  was  not  very  remotely  connected  in  his  mind,  to  be 
justified  in  shrinking  from  the  responsibility  of  depriving 
another,  on  his  testimony,  of  his  good  name,  and  subjecting 
him  to  legal  punishment.  Of  the  two  evils,  that  of  con- 
victing on  insufficient  evidence,  and  that  of  suffering  a 
guilty  person  to  escape  a  few  years'  imprisonment,  they 
would  not  have  been  liable  to  blame,  for  choosing  to  incur 
the  risk  of  that  which  they  considered  the  least.  The  cir- 
cumstances of  this  case,  however,  being  very  different  from 
what  is  here  supposed,  might  we  not  have  reasonably  ex- 
pected a  different  verdict  ?  That  Jones  was  assaulted  at, 
or  very  near  the  time  alleged,  could  not  be  doubted  for  a 
moment,  and  his  exclamation,  as  he  entered  the  house  with 
the  appearance  of  sudden  fright,  that  Schwartz  had  shot 
him,  and  his  coming  in  the  direction  from  Schwartz's  house, 
strongly  authenticated  his  statement,  that  the  assault  was 
committed  by  Schwartz,  —  so  strongly  indeed,  that  in  the 
absence  of  any  conflicting  evidence  on  the  part  of  the  de- 
fendant, it  was  entitled  to  implicit  belief,  Such  a  scene 
might,  no  doubt,  have  been  got  up  by  a  sane  person,  for 
the  purpose  of  gratifying  some  malignant  feelings  ;  but 
men,  affected  with  the  kind  of  insanity  under  which  Jones 
was  laboring,  rarely,  if  ever,  contrive  such  schemes.  It 
was  a  circumstance  too,  which  should  have  had  its  weight, 
that  in  relating  the  facts  of  the  assault,  he  was  cairn  and 
consistent,  and  that  it  was  only  when  touching  on  the  sub- 
ject of  his  delusions,  that  he  was  excited  and  incoherent. 
His  insanity  was  not  of  the  kind  which  would  deprive  him 
of  the  second  condition  of  capacity  to  testify  (§  363),  and 
it  is  the  third  only,  in  regard  to  which  there  could  have  ex- 


EFFECT  OF  INSANITY  ON  EVIDENCE.        409 

isted  any  reasonable  doubts ;  and  these  were  obviated 
more  or  less  satisfactorily,  by  the  above-mentioned  circum- 
stances.1 

§  368.  In  a  case  which  lately  came  before  the  court  of 
sessions  in  New  York,  the  principle  we  have  contended  for, 
was  adopted  by  the  court.  A  gentleman  by  the  name  of 
Gracie  labored  under  the  delusion  that  various  persons  to 
him  unknown,  were  entertaining  designs  against  his  life, 
and  he  had  spent  much  money  in  attempting  to  discover 
the  conspirators.  Taking  advantage  of  this  delusion,  a 
couple  of  rogues  obtained  money  from  him  at  different 
times,  under  pretence  of  aiding  him  in  his  researches,  for 
which  practices  they  were  finally  indicted.  On  trial,  their 
counsel  resisted  the  admission  of  Mr.  Gracie's  testimony, 
on  the  ground  of  monomania  ;  but  the  court  decided  that 
this  objection  applied  only  to  his  credibility,  not  to  his  com- 
petency.2 

§  369.  The  view  here  taken  of  the  competence  of  some 
monomaniacs,  as  witnesses,  is  not  without  some  support  in 
the  legal  profession.  "  Of  an  insane  person,"  says  Mr. 
Evans,  "  it  might,  for  defect  of  other  evidence,  merit  to  be 
considered,  whether  in  civil  cases  at  least,  the  testimony  of 
such  might  not  be  admissible  upon  points  where  his  under- 
standing did  not  appear  to  be  subject  to  disturbance  ;  it  be- 
ing well  known  that  in  many  of  these  melancholy  instances, 
especially  when  the  result  of  some  violent  passion,  the  party 
affected  is  entirely  cool,  clear,  and  collected  in  his  ideas, 
and  as  free  as  other  persons  from  the  delusions  of  a  per- 
verted imagination,  in  everything  not  connected  with  the 
cause  of  his  insanity  ;  with  regard  to  persons  who  have  only 

1  For  the  facts  of  the  above  case,  the  author  is  indebted  to  the 
kindness  of  J.  G.  Reed,  Esq.,  of  Waldoborough,  Me.,  who  was  the 
defendant's  counsel. 

2  Boston  Semi-weekly  Advertiser,  July  15,  1843. 

35 


410  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

temporary  fits  of  madness  (those  usually  termed  lunacy), 
and  at  other  times  are  in  all  respects  sound  of  reason,  these 
are  then  considered  as  capable  of  testimony  as  of  any 
other  legal  act."  1 

§  370.  If  the  evidence  of  the  monomaniacs  in  question 
be  rejected,  it  must  be  from  a  fear  of  deception  ;  and  prob- 
ably most  of  the  distrust  manifested  towards  such  witnesses 
arises  from  a  lurking  suspicion,  that  their  mental  impair- 
ment is  necessarily  accompanied  with  impaired  veracity. 
It  cannot  be  denied  that  there  is  some  ground  for  this  sus- 
picion, and  though  it  should  not  have  the  effect  of  totally 
invalidating  their  testimony,  it  is  proper  to  bear  it  in  mind 
whenever  their  credibility  is  in  question.  It  is  well  known 
how  prone  the  inmates  of  lunatic  asylums  are  to  complain 
of  the  servants,  the  overseers,  and  one  another,  and  prefer 
against  them  special  charges  that  are  without  any  founda- 
tion whatever ;  whether  from  an  involuntary  propensity  to 
lying  and  mischief,  or  from  a  morbidly  exalted  imagination, 
which  distorts  and  discolors  its  perceptions,  it  is  not  easy 
to  decide.  Some,  however,  will  relate  very  accurately 
what  they  see  and  hear,  and  their  statements  are  received 
with  implicit  credit.  On  the  whole,  we  may  conclude  with 
Georget,  "  that  it  is  necessary  to  know  the  patient,  the 
character  of  his  madness,  his  customary  relations  to  sur- 
rounding objects,  before  we  can  know  what  degree  of  confi- 
dence to  place  in  his  assertions."  It  should  not  be  forgotten 
also,  that  in  the  greater  proportion  of  cases  of  mental  de- 
rangement, there  is  a  weakness  of  memory  that  prevents 
it  from  retaining  impressions  so  long  and  so  faithfully,  as 
when  in  its  sound  condition  ;  and  therefore,  the  facts  to 
which  a  monomaniac  testifies,  should  always  be  of  recent 
occurrence,  to  render  his  testimony  at  all  credible. 


Pothier  on  Obligations,  Appendix,  2-59. 


EFFECT  OF  INSANITY  ON  EVIDENCE.        411 

§  371.  In  the  subjects  of  general  mania,  all  competence 
to  testify  is  lost,  except  during  what  is  called  the  lucid 
interval,  when  they  may  testify  in  regard  to  transactions 
that  occurred  during  a  lucid  interval,  or  at  a  time  previous 
to  their  illness.  Their  evidence  should  be  implicitly  re- 
ceived only  when  it  relates  to  simple  facts  easily  perceived, 
for  their  intellect  may  be  hardly  strong  enough  to  bring  to 
mind  and  expose  in  order,  a  complicated  mass  of  details. 

§  372.  In  partial  moral  mania,  there  is  nothing  to  inca- 
pacitate one  from  testifying,  unless  we  except  that  kind  of 
it  where  the  individual  labors  under  an  uncontrollable  pro- 
pensity for  lying.  Of  all  the  forms  of  mania,  this  really 
diminishes  competence  more  than  any  other,  but  it  will  be 
long,  probably,  before  it  will  be  considered  in  this  light,  in 
courts  of  justice. 

§  373.  In  general  moral  mania,  as  illustrated  before 
(§  124-136),  it  has  been  seen  that  the  intellectual  powers 
are  not  perceptibly  impaired,  and  that  the  patient  loses  none 
of  his  interest  in  what  passes  around  him,  nor  of  his  power 
to  observe  and  remember  them  with  ordinary  distinctness. 
Under  such  circumstances,  there  would  be  little  reason  for 
rejecting  his  evidence  on  the  score  of  incapacity.  Con- 
sidering, however,  the  great  derangement  of  the  affective 
powers  under  which  he  labors,  and  the  unfounded  likes  and 
dislikes  which  it  produces,  his  veracity  may  be  justly  sus- 
pected, and  his  evidence  should  be  entitled  to  little  weight, 
except  when  limited  to  facts  in  regard  to  which  it  can  be 
shown  that  his  feelings  are  not  interested. 

§  374.  The  competence  of  old  men  in  the  early  stages 
of  dementia  to  testify,  is  a  point  frequently  discussed  in 
courts  of  justice,  and  the  want  is  severely  felt,  of  some 
fixed  principles  that  shall  serve  as  a  guide  to  correct  deci- 
sions. In  every  stage  of  this  affection,  the  impairment  of 
the  memory  is  more  perceptible  in  regard  to  recent  than 
remote  impressions,  and  it  often  happens  that  a  person  may 


412  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

have  a  distinct  recollection  of  things  that  occurred  in  his 
youth,  while  those  of  a  month's  or  a  year's  date,  are  but 
imperfectly  remembered,  if  at  all.  To  test  the  strength  of 
his  memory  respecting  certain  things,  it  is  only  necessary 
to  ascertain  if  he  remembers  various  other  transactions  of 
about  the  same  date,  in  which  he  is  known  to  have  been  en- 
gaged. If  he  can  do  this,  it  is  a  strong  presumption  in 
favor  of  his  competency  ;  if  not,  it  is  incumbent  on  the 
party  offering  his  testimony  to  show  why  his  memory  should 
have  been  more  faithful  in  the  one  case  than  in  the  other. 
This  is  rendered  still  more  necessary  by  the  fact,  that  the 
weakness  of  mind  incident  to  this  condition  makes  its  sub- 
jects more  easily  swayed  by  the  suggestions  of  others,  and 
leads  them  to  believe  that  they  remember  what  they  are  told 
they  ought  to  remember,  or  what  they  are  assured  they 
actually  did  remember  till  within  a  recent  period.  The 
slightest  examination  will  show  how  much  dependence  can 
be  placed  on  their  recollections  of  recent  events. 


CHAPTER    XXIV. 


DRUNKENNESS. 

§  375.  BEFORE  we  can  properly  appreciate  the  legal 
consequences  of  drunkenness,  it  is  necessary  to  understand 
its  immediate  and  remote  effects  on  the  mind,  and  the  or- 
ganism with  which  it  is  connected.  Correct  information  of 
this  kind  will  enable  us  to  avoid  many  of  the  prevalent 
errors  that  have  arisen  from  vague  and  imperfect  notions 
respecting  the  nature  of  drunkenness.  We  shall  first  con- 
sider the  symptoms,  or  immediate  effects,  of  free  indul- 
gence in  intoxicating  drinks  ;  for  the  following  account  of 
which  we  are  chiefly  indebted  to  lloffbauer  and  Macnish.1 

§  376.  The  first  effect  of  alcoholic  liquors  is  to  exalt 
the  general  sentiment  of  self-satisfaction,  and  diffuse  an 
unusual  serenity-over  the  mind.  The  intellectual  as  well 
as  physical  powers  act  with  increased  vigor  and  activity, 
the  thoughts  flow  with  more  facility  and  accuracy,  and  the 
individual  becomes  perfectly  well  pleased  with  himself  and 
others.  He  feels  an  exhilaration  of  spirits,  a  sense  of 
warmth  and  gaiety,  and  his  imagination  is  crowded  with 
delightful  images.  The  sight  and  hearing  are  very  slightly 
affected  ;  a  low,  humming  sound  is  heard  in  the  pauses  of 
the  conversation  ;  and  objects  are  enveloped  in  a  slight  mist, 
which  prevents  them  from  being  seen  distinctly.  Thus  far 


1  Anatomy  of  Drunkenness. 
35* 


414  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE     OF    INSANITY. 

there  is  no  appearance  of  drunkenness.  Soon  the  torrent 
of  his  ideas  becomes  more  rapid  and  violent,  and  he  can 
scarcely  repress  them.  This  is  the  moment  of  his  happiest 
sallies,  and  he  pours  forth  his  thoughts  with  a  force  of  ex- 
pression and  a  richness  of  conception  unknown  in  his  sober 
hours,  and  now  he  feels  the  ecstatic  pleasures  of  getting 
drunk.  As  yet  the  brain  is  in  tolerable  order,  though 
a  great  effort  is  necessary  to  relate  a  story  or  transaction  at 
all  complicated  in  its  details,  for  the  thoughts  succeed  one 
another  too  rapidly,  to  allow  sufficient  time  to  arrange  them 
in  the  order  that  the  recital  requires.  This  is  the  first  well- 
marked  symptom  of  intoxication.  Now  his  ideas  succeed 
one  another  with  constantly  increasing  force  and  rapidity  ; 
his  sensations  lose  their  ordinary  delicacy  ;  and  his  imagi- 
nation gains  as  fast  as  they  lose.  His  language  is,  in  some 
respects,  more  oratorical  and  poetical,  and  though  he  now 
feels  an  irresistible  propensity  to  talk  nonsense,  he  is  per- 
fectly conscious,  all  the  while,  that  it  is  nonsense.  His 
voice  is  louder,  because  he  hears  less  acutely,  and  judges 
of  the  hearing  of  others  by  his  own.  Now  the  organic  ac- 
tivity of  the  brain  is  at  its  height.  His  imagination  is  filled 
with  strange  and  queer  images,  and  he  is  conscious,  if  so  it 
may  be  called,  of  a  sense  of  oppression  and  giddiness  in 
his  head.  His  perceptions  of  color,  form,  distance,  and 
number  become  utterly  confused  ;  he  confounds  one  per- 
son with  another  ;  the  candles  burn  all  colors  in  succession, 
and  are  multiplied  fourfold  ;  and  in  stretching  forth  his 
glass  to  set  it  on  the  table,  he  lets  it  go  before  reaching  its 
edge.  He  is  apt  to  imagine,  either  that  he  has  offended 
some  one,  and  shows  a  ludicrous  anxiety  to  apologize,  or 
that  he  has  been  offended,  and  fixes  upon  some  one  as  the 
object  of  his  maledictions,  perhaps  his  blows.  Judging  from 
his  discourse,  his  ideas  begin  to  want  connection,  notwith- 
standing their  vivacity,  but  this  vivacity  and  rapidity  of  his 
ideas  give  to  his  passions  an  insurmountable  power,  against 


DRUNKENNESS.  415 

which  reason  has  nothing  to  oppose,  and  unless  some  acci- 
dent divert  him  from  their  object,  he  is  hurried  on  wherever 
they  impel  him.  Soon  his  tongue  stammers  and  his  voice 
gets  thick  ;  his  legs  falter,  he  falls  from  his  seat,  and  is 
plunged  into  a  profound  sleep,  in  which  the  manifestation 
of  his  physical  and  intellectual  powers  is  completely  extin- 
guished. In  this  condition,  he  is  said  to  be  dead  drunk. 
Such  is  the  ordinary  course  of  a  fit  of  drunkenness,  but  it 
sometimes  varies  more  or  less,  with  the  temperament  or 
habits  of  the  individual,  and  the  attending  circumstances. 

§  377.  Such  is  the  immediate  effect  of  drunkenness  on 
the  mind  ;  we  have  now  to  show  how  the  long-continued 
and  excessive  use  of  alcoholic  liquors  affects  the  moral  and 
intellectual  powers.  Except  in  some  happily-organized  na- 
tures, the  original  delicacy  and  acuteness  of  the  moral  per- 
ceptions are  invariably  blunted  ;  the  relations  of  neighbor, 
citizen,  father,  spouse,  have  lost  their  accustomed  place  in 
his  thoughts  ;  great  moral  interests  no  longer  obtain  a  strong 
hold  on  his  attention  ;  the  voice  of  distress  is  apt  to  fall  on 
his  ear  like  an  unmeaning  sound  ;  and  the  finer  emotions 
of  the  soul,  which  will  occasionally  be  felt  by  the  least  cul- 
tivated minds,  have  entirely  deserted  his  nature.  The  inju- 
ry sustained  by  the  intellect  is  more  obvious,  if  not  more 
deplorable.  The  course  of  the  ideas  is  sluggish,  and  they 
want  their  former  force  and  brilliancy ;  the  mind  has  lost 
its  comprehensiveness  of  grasp,  and  experiences  a  difficulty 
in  seizing  the  relations  of  one  idea  to  another ;  it  is  inca- 
pable of  the  long-continued  efforts  which  were  once  easy, 
and  of  concentrating  the  whole  force  of  its  faculties  on  the 
subjects  submitted  to  its  examination.  In  consequence  too, 
of  the  brain  having  been  so  much  accustomed  to  artificial 
stimulus,  according  to  a  well-known  law  of  the  animal 
economy,  it  becomes  incapable  of  an  effort  without  the  aid 
of  this  stimulus,  which  is  necessary  to  the  performance  of 
even  its  most  ordinary  exercise.  Drinking  is  thus  made  an 


416  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

indispensable  habit,  and  by  this  means,  it  sometimes  hap- 
pens that  the  tame,  cold,  and  lifeless  being,  as  if  touched 
by  a  spark  of  Promethean  fire,  is  converted  into  the  ani- 
mated, sociable,  and  efficient  man  of  his  better  days. 
Sheridan  never  spoke  in  the  house  of  commons  without  the 
inspiration  of  half  a  pint  of  brandy,  and  numberless  are  the 
heroes  of  the  buskin  and  the  sock,  who  require  to  be  wound 
up,  as  it  were,  to  a  certain  pitch,  by  artificial  stimulus,  be- 
fore they  venture  to  undertake  the  labors  of  the  night. 

§  378.  This  account  of  the  pathological  effects  of  drunk- 
enness would  be  incomplete,  without  some  mention  of  that 
curious  disease  to  which  it  often  leads,  called  delirium  tre- 
menSj  or  mania  a  poiu.  It  may  be  the  immediate  effect  of 
an  excess,  or  series  of  excesses,  in  those  who  are  not  habit- 
ually intemperate,  as  well  as  in  those  who  are  ;  but  it  most 
commonly  occurs  in  habitual  drinkers,  after  a  few  days  of 
total  abstinence  from  spirituous  liquors.  It  is  also  very 
liable  to  occur  in  this  latter  class  when  laboring  under  other 
diseases,  or  severe  external  injuries  that  give  rise  to  any 
degree  of  constitutional  disturbance.  The  approach  of  the 
disease  is  generally  indicated  by  a  slight  tremor  and  falter- 
ing of  the  hands  and  lower  extremities,  a  tremulousness  of 
the  voice,  a  certain  restlessness  and  sense  of  anxiety,  which 
the  patient  knows  not  how  to  describe  or  account  for,  dis- 
turbed sleep,  and  impaired  appetite.  These  symptoms 
having  continued  two  or  three  days,  at  the  end  of  which 
time  they  have  obviously  increased  in  severity,  the  patient 
ceases  to  sleep  altogether,  and  soon  becomes  delirious.  At 
first,  the  delirium  is  not  constant,  the  mind  wandering 
during  the  night,  but,  during  the  day,  when  its  attention  is 
fixed,  capable  of  rational  discourse.  It  is  not  long,  how- 
ever, before  it  becomes  constant,  and  constitutes  the  most 
prominent  feature  of  the  disease.  Occasionally,  the  deliri- 
um occurs  at  an  earlier  period  of  the  disease,  and  may 
even  be  the  first  symptom  of  any  disorder.  This  state  of 


DRUNKENNESS.  417 

watchfulness  and  delirium  continues  three  or  four  days, 
when,  if  the  patient  recover,  it  is  succeeded  by  sleep,  which, 
at  first,  appears  in  uneasy  and  irregular  naps,  and  lastly 
in  long,  sound,  and  refreshing  slumbers.  When  sleep  does 
not  supervene  about  this  period,  the  disease  is  fatal  ;  and 
whether  subjected  to  medical  treatment,  or  left  to  itself, 
neither  its  symptoms  nor  duration  are  materially  modified. 
§  379.  The  character  of  the  delirium  in  this  disease  is 
peculiar,  bearing  a  stronger  resemblance  to  dreaming,  than 
any  other  form  of  mental  derangement.  It  would  seem  as 
if  the  dreams  which  disturb  and  harass  the  mind  during  the 
imperfect  sleep  that  precedes  the  explosion  of  the  disease, 
continue  to  occupy  it  when  awake,  being  then  viewed  as 
realities,  instead  of  dreams.  The  patient  imagines  himself, 
for  instance,  to  be  in  some  particular  situation,  or  engaged 
in  certain  occupations,  according  to  each  individual's  habits 
and  profession,  and  his  discourse  and  conduct  will  be  con- 
formed to  this  delusion,  with  this  striking  peculiarity,  how- 
ever, that  he  is  thwarted  at  every  step,  and  is  constantly 
meeting  with  obstacles  that  defy  his  utmost  efforts  to  re- 
move. Almost  invariably,  the  patient  manifests,  more  or 
less,  feelings  of  suspicion  and  fear,  laboring  under  contin- 
ual apprehension  of  being  made  the  victim  of  sinister  de- 
signs and  practices.  He  imagines  that  certain  people  have 
conspired  to  rob  or  murder  him,  and  insists  that  he  can  hear 
them  in  an  adjoining  apartment,  arranging  their  plans  and 
preparing  to  rush  into  his  room  ;  or  that  he  is  in  a  strange 
place,  where  he  is  forcibly  detained  and  prevented  from  go- 
ing to  his  own  home.  One  of  the  most  common  hallucina- 
tions, is,  to  be  constantly  seeing  devils,  snakes,  vermin,  and 
all  manner  of  unclean  things  around  him  and  about  him, 
and  filling  every  nook  and  corner  of  his  apartment.  The 
extreme  terror  which  these  delusions  often  inspire,  produces 
in  the  countenance  an  unutterable  expression  of  anguish, 
and,  in  the  hope  of  escaping  from  his  fancied  tormentors, 


418  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

the  wretched  patient  endeavors  to  cut  his  throat,  or  jump 
from  the  window.  Under  the  influence  of  these  terrible 
apprehensions,  he  sometimes  murders  his  wife  or  attendant, 
whom  his  disordered  imagination  identifies  with  his  ene- 
mies, though  he  is  generally  tractable  and  not  inclined  to 
be  mischievous.  After  perpetrating  an  act  of  this  kind,  he 
generally  gives  some  illusive  reason  for  his  conduct,  re- 
joices in  his  success,  and  expresses  his  regret  at  not  having 
done  it  before.  So  complete  and  obvious  is  the  mental  de- 
rangement in  this  disease,  so  entirely  are  the  thoughts  and 
actions  governed  by  the  most  unfounded  and  absurd  delu- 
sions, that  if  any  form  of  insanity  absolves  from  criminal 
responsibility,  this  certainly  must  have  that  effect. 

§  380.  Before  being  able  to  decide  the  question  under- 
standingly,  of  the  relation  of  drunkenness  to  moral  agency, 
it  is  necessary  to  proceed  one  step  farther  in  this  investiga- 
tion, and  inquire  into  the  pathological,  or,  as  it  is  technically 
called,  the  proximate  cause  of  drunkenness.  No  impres- 
sions, whether  from  within  or  without,  can  affect  the  mind, 
but  through  the  brain.  In  drunkenness,  therefore,  it  is  this 
organ  which  is  principally  affected,  and  that  portion  of  it 
more  particularly  which  is  connected  with  the  manifestation 
of  the  moral  and  intellectual  powers.  The  vital  actions,  of 
which  it  is  the  seat,  receive  an  increased  share  of  activity, 
so  that  every  process  that  goes  on,  is  conducted  with  fresh 
energy  and  speed.  Drunkenness,  however,  depends  on 
something  more  than  mere  increase  of  cerebral  action,  be- 
cause it  varies,  in  some  degree,  with  the  nature  of  the 
intoxicating  agent,  but  what  this  specific  action  is  exactly,  it 
is  impossible  for  us  to  know.  As  the  fit  proceeds,  this  in- 
crease of  action  continues,  until  it.  arrives  at  such  a  pitch, 
that  the  organ  is  unable  to  perform  its  functions  properly ; 
hence,  the  disorder  and  tumult  of  mind  that  attend  the  last 
stages  of  the  fit.  The  torpor  and  exhaustion  that  follow,  are 
the  natural  consequence  of  the  previous  excessive  stimulation, 


DRUNKENNESS,  419 

and  the  one  is  generally  proportioned  to  the  other.  This 
increased  action,  that  takes  place  in  drunkenness,  degene- 
rates, after  frequent  repetition,  into  a  permanent  state  of 
irritation  which,  at  last,  becomes  real  inflammation.  The 
coats  of  the  vessels  are  thickened  and  less  transparent  than 
usual,  and  in  some  places,  they  assume  a  varicose  appear- 
ance. The  cerebral  texture  is  less  delicate  and  elastic, 
becoming  either  unnaturally  hard,  or  soft.  Slight  effusions 
of  water  are  not  uncommon.  These  appearances,  to  a  more 
or  less  extent,  are  found  in  the  brains  of  nearly  all  confirmed 
drunkards,  and  it  may  be  now  considered  a  well-established 
fact,  that  the  habitual  drunkard  has  always  more  or  less  of 
cerebral  disease. 

§381.  Obviously  as  these  pathological  changes  are  the 
effect  of  a  long-continued  voluntary  habit,  there  is  strong 
evidence  in  favor  of  the  idea  that  they,  in  turn,  become 
efficient  causes,  and  act  powerfully  in  maintaining  this  habit, 
even  in  spite  of  the  resistance  of  the  will.  So  deplorably 
common  has  drunkenness  been  in  this  country,  that  there 
are  few  who  have  not  seen  the  melancholy  spectacle  of  the 
most  powerful  motives,  the  most  solemn  promises  and  reso- 
lutions, a  constant  sense  of  shame  and  danger,  bodily  pain 
and  chastisements,  the  prayers  and  supplications  of  friend- 
ship, of  as  little  avail  in  reforming  the  drunkard,  as  they 
would  be  in  averting  an  attack  of  fever,  or  consumption. 
With  a  full  knowledge  of  the  dreadful  consequences  to  for- 
tune, character  and  family,  he  plunges  on  in  his  mad  career, 
deploring,  it  may  be,  with  unutterable  agony  of  spirit,  the 
resistless  impulse  by  which  he  is  mastered.  Macnish  re- 
lates the  case  of  a  young  man  of  fortune,  twenty-six  years 
old,  which  presents  an  impressive  illustration  of  this  truth. 
"  Every  morning  before  breakfast,"  he  says,  "  he  drank  a 
bottle  of  brandy  ;  another  he  consumed  between  breakfast 
and  dinner,  and  a  third,  shortly  before  going  to  bed.  Inde- 
pendently of  this,  he  indulged  in  wine  and  whatever  liquor 


420  MEDICAL    JUKISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

came  within  his  reach.  Even  during  the  hours  usually  ap- 
propriated to  sleep,  the  same  system  was  pursued — brandy 
being  placed  at  the  bed-side  for  his  use  in  the  night  time. 
To  this  destructive  vice  he  had  been  addicted  since  his  six- 
teenth year ;  and  it  had  gone  on  increasing  from  day  to  day 
till  it  had  acquired  its  then  alarming  and  incredible  mag- 
nitude. In  vain  did  he  try  to  resist  the  insidious  poison. 
With  the  perfect  consciousness  that  he  was  destroying  him- 
self, and  with  every  desire  to  struggle  against  the  insatiable 
cravings  of  his  diseased  appetite,  he  found  it  utterly  impossi- 
ble to  offer  the  slightest  opposition  to  them."  '  Another, 
whose  case  he  quotes,  replied  to  the  remonstrances  of  his 
friend,  who  painted  the  distresses  of  his  family,  the  loss  of 
his  business  and  character,  and  the  ruin  of  his  health,  "  my 
good  friend,  your  remarks  are  just ;  they  are  indeed  too  true  ; 
but  I  can  no  longer  resist  temptation.  If  a  bottle  of  brandy 
stood  at  one  hand,  and  the  pit  of  hell  yawned  at  the  other, 
and  I  were  convinced  that  I  would  be  pushed  m  as  sure  as 
I  took  one  glass,  I  could  not  refrain.  You  are  very  kind  ;  I 
ought  to  be  grateful  for  so  many  kind,  good  friends,  but  you 
may  spare  yourselves  the  trouble  of  trying  to  reform  me ; 
the  thing  is  out  of  the  question."  * 

§  382.  These  phenomena  strongly  remind  us  of  some  of 
the  manifestations  of  moral  mania,  and  if  farther  evidence  is 
necessary  to  convince  us  that  they  are  both  connected  with 
similar  pathological  conditions,  it  is  abundantly  furnished  in 
some  other  phenomena  of  drunkenness.  It  is  now  well 
understood  that  this  vice  sometimes  assumes  a  periodical 
character,  persons  indulging  in  the  greatest  excesses  periodi- 
cally, who  are  perfectly  sober  during  the  intervals,  which 
may  be  from  the  space  of  a  month  to  that  of  a  year.  From 
a  state  of  complete  sobriety,  they  suddenly  lapse  into  the 
most  unbounded  indulgence  in  stimulating  drinks,  and 

1  Anatomy  of  Drunkenness,  163.  2  Idem,  162. 


DRUNKENNESS.  421 

nothing  but  absolute  confinement  can  restrain  them.  Mac- 
nish,  who  saw  several  cases,  says  -that  they  "  seemed  to  be 
quite  aware  of  the  uncontrollable  nature  of  their  passion, 
and  proceeded  systematically,  confining  themselves  to  their 
room,  and  procuring  a  large  quantity  of  ardent  spirits.  As 
soon  as  this  was  done,  they  commenced  and  drank  to  excess 
till  vomiting  ensued,  and  the  stomach  absolutely  refused  to 
receive  another  drop  of  liquor.  This  state  may  last  a  few 
days  or  a  few  weeks,  according  to  constitutional  strength,  or 
the  rapidity  with  which. the  libations  are  poured  down.  So 
soon  as  the  stomach  rejects  everything  that  is  swallowed, 
and  severe  sickness  comes  on,  the  fit  ceases.  From  that 
moment  recovery  takes  place,  and  his  former  fondness  for 
liquor  is  succeeded  by  aversion  or  disgust.  This  gains  such 
an  ascendency  over  him,  that  he  abstains  religiously  from  it 
for  weeks,  or  months,  or  even  for  a  year,  as  the  case  may 
be.  During  this  interval  he  leads  a  life  of  the  most  exem- 
plary temperance,  drinking  nothing  but  cold  water,  and 
probably  shunning  every  society  where  he  is  likely  to  be 
exposed  to  indulgence."  ' 

§  383.  Esquirol  has  distinctly  recognized  this  disorder,2 
both  in  its  continued  and  periodical  form,  under  the  name 
of  dipsomania;  and  attributing  it  to  the  influence  of  patho- 
logical changes,  considers  its  unhappy  victims  as  not  morally 
responsible.  This  distinguished  observer  of  mental  affec- 
tions affirms,  that  "  sometimes  the  abuse  of  intoxicating 
drinks  and  drunkenness  are  the  first  symptoms,  or  rather 
the  most  prominent  symptoms,  of  the  first  stages  of  mad- 
ness ;"  that  "  the  stomach  being  in  that  peculiar  condition 
which  produces  an  extremely  painful,  moral,  and  physical 
depression,  craves  strong  drink  ;"  that  "  this  craving  is 
imperious  and  irresistible  ;"  that  "  it  continues  as  long  as 

1  Op.  cit.  36. 

2  Note  in  Hoffbauer,  §  195,  arid  Maladies  mentales,  ii.  80. 

36 


422  MEDICAL     JURISPRUDENCE  OF     INSANITY. 

the  paroxysm,  after  which  the  patient  becomes  sober  and 
assumes  all  the  habits  of  a  temperate  life."  He  also  says, 
that  these  people  u  obey  an  impulse  which,  they  have  not 
the  power  of  resisting  ;  that  they  are  "  true  monomaniacs  ;" 
and  that  if  carefully  observed,  we  shall  find  in  them  "all 
the  characteristic  features  of  partial  madness."  In  illustra- 
tion of  his  views  he  relates  the  following  case.  "  M.  N.,  a 
merchant,  aged  about  forty,  of  a  robust  but  nervous  consti- 
tution, became,  six  years  before,  towards  the  beginning  of 
autumn,  gloomy  and  disquieted,  in  consequence,  apparently, 
of  some  reverses  in  his  affairs.  After  a  few  weeks,  he 
neglected  his  business,  and  became  irritable  and  ill-tem- 
pered in  his  family.  His  taste  and  habits  changed,  he  took 
to  drinking,  and  seriously  endangered  the  safety  of  his  for- 
tune and  his  family.  The  prayers  and  tears  of  his  wife 
and  children,  the  authority  of  his  father,  and  the  inroads 
upon  his  property,  were  equally  unavailing  in  checking  his 
career.  Thus  passed  the  winter;  at  the  approach  of 
spring,  the  craving  for  drink  ceased.  M.  N.  resumed  his 
regular  and  sober  habits,  and  by  his  application  to  business 
and  increased  tenderness  towards  his  family,  he  endeavored 
to  forget  the  occurrences  of  the  past  winter.  In  the  follow- 
ing autumn  there  appeared  the  same  phenomenon,  the 
same  disorders,  and  the  same  spontaneous  cure  in  the 
spring.  It  was  the  same  for  the  two  following  years,  except 
that  the  symptoms  were  so  aggravated,  that  his  properly 
suffered  severely,  and  his  wife's  life  was  sometimes  endan- 
gered. At  the  end  of  his  fourth  paroxysm,  in  1817,  M.  N. 
came  to  Paris  to  consult  me  and  submit  to  my  directions, 
conjuring  me  to  deliver  him  from  a  disease  that  rendered 
him  the  most  miserable  of  men."  Esquirol  subjected  him 
to  a  course  of  medical  treatment,  and  in  August  sent  him 
off  on  a  journey  into  Italy.  That  year  he  escaped,  except 
that  in  December  he  manifested  a  slight  desire  to  drink,  but 
found  himself  able  to  resist,  and  never  afterwards  had  a 


DRUNKENNESS.  423 

return  of  his  complaint.  He  also  relates  the  case  of  a 
lady,  who,  after  being  melancholy  for  six  weeks,  with 
weakness  of  the  stomach  and  indisposition  to  take  the  least 
exercise,  was  suddenly  seized  with  the  strongest  craving 
for  spirituous  drinks,  together  with  sleeplessness,  agitation, 
disturbance  of  mind  and  perversion  of  the  affections.  For 
six  years,  these  symptoms  made  their  appearance  annually, 
and  continued  two  months. 

§  384.  A  case  is  related  of  a  Parisian  bookbinder,  sixty 
years  old,  who  for  fifteen  years  was  afflicted  with  periodical 
drunkenness,  having  previously  been  a  model  of  sobriety 
and  virtue.  The  paroxysm  lasted  two  or  three  months 
with  an  interval  of  equal  duration.  M.  Pierquin,  the  nar- 
rator of  the  case,  observed  him  closely  for  the  space  of  two 
years,  and  found  that  his  daily  habit  was,  to  rise  at  five  or 
six  o'clock  in  the  morning,  take  some  money  out  of  the  till, 
and  hasten  to  the  nearest  cabaret,  where  he  would  drink 
incessantly,  until  ten  or  eleven  o'clock.  He  would  then 
stagger  home,  go  down  into  his  cellar,  bring  up  some  large 
bottles  of  wine,  and  drink  night  and  day,  seldom  sleeping 
and  very  rarely  eating.  During  the  early  period  of  the 
attack,  he  would  go  to  the  cabaret,  forenoon  and  afternoon  ; 
but  during  the  last  eighteen  or  twenty  days,  he  never  went 
from  home.  Then  he  became  reserved,  passionate,  avoid- 
ing the  light,  and  seeking  the  darkest  corner  of  the  kitchen. 
He  was  never  observed  to  be  delirious,  nor  deranged  in 
mind,  but  would  answer  questions  correctly,  and  follow  the 
train  of  conversation.  The  paroxysm  ended  in  a  profound 
sleep,  from  which  he  would  awake  in  his  sober  senses,  and 
resume  his  avocations  as  if  he  had  just  quitted  them  the 
preceding  evening,  being  unconscious,  or  pretending  to  be 
so,  of  any  thing  that  had  occurred.1 

§  385.     It  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that  the  above  cases 

1  Journal  des  Progress,  &c.  xi. 


424  MEDICAL     JURISPRUDENCE     OF     INSANITY. 

originated  in  pathological  changes  ;  and  there  is  also  an- 
other class  of  cases  which  strongly  point  to  the  same  origin, 
and  present  a  close  affinity,  both  in  this  respect,  and  in  that 
of  their  symptoms.  In  the  cases  referred  to,  the  persons, 
who  are  habitually  sober,  are  irresistibly  impelled  to  indulge 
in  the  reckless,  unlimited  use  of  intoxicating  drinks,  when- 
ever agitated  by- strong  moral  emotions.  The  author  was 
once  acquainted  with  a  very  amiable,  intelligent,  and  vir- 
tuous young  seaman,  who,  by  means  'of  strict  attention  to 
his  duties,  his  staid  deportment,  and  his  knowledge  of  navi- 
gation, rose  to  the  command  of  a  ship,  at  a  very  early  age. 
During  his  second  voyage  as  captain,  while  in  a  foreign 
port,  in  a  hot  climate,  some  circumstances  occurred,  which 
subjected  him  to  considerable  fatigue  and  exposure  and 
great  anxiety  of  mind,  and  seriously  affected  his  health. 
By  this  and  some  other  things  which  took  place  on  the  pas- 
sage home,  his  mind  was  so  disturbed,  that  this  young  man 
who  hardly  knew  the  taste  of  ardent  spirits,  suddenly 
abandoned  himself  to  the  wildest  excesses.  The  fit  con- 
tinued till  within  a  few  days  of  their  arrival  at  port,  during 
which  time  he  was  totally  unconscious  of  what  was  going 
on,  and  the  first  officer  took  charge  of  the  vessel.  The  same 
scenes  again  occurred  the  next  voyage,  and  he  lost  his  em- 
ployment ;  but  with  these  two  exceptions,  no  man  living 
practised  more  rigid  abstinence  from  every  kind  of  intoxi- 
cating drink.  Nothing  could  tempt  him  to  the  slightest 
indulgence,  and  he  evinced  the  strongest  repugnance  to  all 
spirituous  liquors  of  Whatever  kind.  The  author  also  knew 
another  young  man  of 'similar  character,  who  rose  in  a 
similar  manner  to  the  command  of  a  ship  ;  but  no  sooner 
did  he  reach -this  reward  of  his  merits,  than  he  began  to 
drink  with  all  the  recklessness  of  an  old  toper.  As  soon  as 
he  was  degraded  to  an  inferior  station,  no  man  could  be 
.more  temperate,  and  this  appearance  of  reform  each  time 
encouraging  his  friends  with  the  hope,  that  he  had  aban- 


DRUNKENNESS.  425 

doned  his  bad  habits  altogether,  they  would  restore  him  to 
the  station  he  had  lost,  to  be  again  and  again  forfeited  by 
his  mad  propensity.  In  these  cases,  it  seems  as  if  the  anx- 
iety arising  from  a  sense  of  heavy  responsibility,  and  from 
adverse  circumstances,  produced  an  irritation,  if  not  inflam- 
mation of  some  portion  of  the  brain  —  of  that  which,  if 
phrenology  be  true,  is  connected  with  the  appetite  of  hun- 
ger and  thirst. 

§  386.  Esquirol  mentions  the  case  of  a  servant  girl  in 
the  Salpetriere,  who,  upon  the  slightest  cross  or  contradic- 
tion, began  and  continued  to  drink  until  prevented  by  strict, 
seclusion.  If  not  prevented  in  time,  she  got  drunk,  became 
furious,  and  attempted  suicide.1 

§  387.  Marc  observes  that  dipsomania  sometimes  occurs 
in  women  at  the  turn  of  life,  as  it  is  called,  as  a  result  of  the 
important  physiological  changes  which,  at  that  period,  take 
place  in  the  female  constitution.  He  has  met  with  many 
examples  of  it  in  women  who  previously  had  exhibited  all 
the  virtues  of  their  sex,  and  especially  temperance.2 

1  Des  Maladies  mentales,  ii.  73.  2  De  la  folie,  &c.  ii.  605. 

36* 


CHAPTER  XXV. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    DRUNKENNESS. 

§  388.  BEFORE  we  undertake  to  estimate  the  legal  re- 
sponsibilities of  drunkards,  it  will  be  necessary  to  retrace  our 
steps  for  a  moment,  in  order  to  ascertain  what  is  the  exact  state 
of  the  mind  while  under  the  immediate  influence  of  intoxicat- 
ing drinks ;  and  for  this  purpose  we  shall  distinguish,  with 
Hoffbauer,  three  degrees  or  periods  of  drunkenness.  In  the 
first  degree,  to  use  in  some  measure  the  language  of  this 
writer,  the  ideas  are  only  uncommonly  vivacious ;  conse- 
quently the  empire  of  the  understanding  over  the  actions  is 
so  little  weakened,  that  the  individual  perfectly  retains  the 
consciousness  of  his  external  condition,  and  in  fact  may  be 
said  to  be  in  complete  possession  of  his  senses.  Still  this 
rapid  flow  of  ideas  is  unfavorable  to  reflection ;  and  there 
also  accompany  it  great  irritability  and  activity  of  the 
moral  emotions.  It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that 
anger  is  more  rare  in  this  degree  of  drunkenness,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  self-satisfaction  which  the  person  enjoys, 
and  which  renders  him  more  patient;  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  some  previous  circumstances  that  may  have  increased 
his  susceptibility,  even  the  sallies  of  a  wild  gaiety,  or  a 
simple  dispute  of  words,  though  conducted  with  courtesy, 
strongly  dispose  him  to  transports  of  passion.  Still,  as  long 
as  drunkenness  does  not  exceed  the  first  degree,  the  passions 
can  be  repressed.  In  the  second  degree  of  drunkenness  a 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    DRUNKENNESS.  427 

man  has  still  the  use  of  his  senses,  though  they  are  remark- 
ably enfeebled  ;  but  he  is  entirely  beside  himself,  memory 
and  judgment  have  abandoned  him.  He  acts  as  if  he  lived 
only  for  the  present,  with  no  idea  of  the  consequences  of 
his  actions,  nor  their  relations  to  one  another.  The  past  has 
gone  from  his  mind,  and  he  cannot  be  influenced  by  con- 
siderations which  he  no  longer  remembers.  He  conducts 
himself  as  if  no  control  over  his  actions  were  necessary. 
The  slightest  provocation  is  sufficient  to  awaken  the  most 
unbounded  rage.  He  is,  therefore,  not  unlike  the  maniac, 
and  can  be  responsible  for  his  actions  only  so  far  as  he  is 
for  his  drunkenness.  In  the  last  degree,  he  not  only  loses 
the  possession  of  his  reason,  but  his  senses  are  so  enfeebled, 
that  he  is  no  longer  conscious  of  his  external  relations.  In 
this  condition  he  is  more  dangerous  to  himself  than  to 
others. 

§  389.  In  the  first  stage  of  drunkenness,  it  is  obvious 
that  the  legal  relations  of  the  individual  cannot  be  affected, 
inasmuch  as  he  has  lost  none  of  the  ordinary  soundness  of 
his  judgment.  In  the  second  and  third  stages,  so  much  is 
the  soundness  of  his  understanding  arid  clearness  of  his  per- 
ceptions impaired,  and  his  passions  excited,  that  he  acts 
more  or  less  unconsciously  and  without  deliberation.  But 
since  drunkenness  is  itself  a  sin,  it  becomes  a  question, 
how  far  a  person's  liability  for  the  consequences  of  his  acts 
in  that  state  can  be  affected  by  a  condition  which  is  itself 
utterly  inexcusable. 

§  390.  The  common  law  of  England  has  shown  but  little 
disposition  to  afford  relief  from  any  of  the  immediate  con- 
sequences of  drunkenness,  either  in  civil  or  criminal  cases. 
It  has  never  considered  mere  drunkenness  alone  a  sufficient 
reason  for  invalidating  a  deed  or  agreement,  except  when 
carried  to  that  excessive  degree  which  deprives  the  party 
of  all  consciousness  of  what  he  is  doing.  Courts  of  equity, 
also,  have  strenuously  refused  their  relief  in  moderate 


428  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

drunkenness,  unless  it  were  procured  by  the  contrivance 
of  the  other  party,  or  were  made  the  means  of  obtaining 
some  unfair  advantage.1  The  general  doctrine  to  be  de- 
rived from  modern  English  decisions,  is,  first,  that  moderate 
drunkenness  does  not  necessarily  deprive  the  mind  of  the 
power  of  rational  consent,  is  not  always  apparent  to  others, 
and  ought  not,  of  itself,  to  avoid  any  deed  or  contract ;  se- 
condly, that  inasmuch  as  excessive  drunkenness  deprives  a 
person,  more  or  less,  of  the  consciousness  of  what  he  is 
doing,  and  is  perfectly  obvious  to  every  one,  all  acts  exe- 
cuted while  in  this  condition  may  be  avoided  at  law  on 
the  ground  of  incompetency,  and  in  equity,  on  that  of 
fraud.  Nothing,  certainly,  can"  be  fairer  than  this,  since  it 
equally  guards  the  interests  of  the  drunken  party,  and  of 
those  who  deal  with  him.  In  this  country,  the  English 
practice  has  been  followed,2  and  in  France  the  courts  have 
been  governed  by  similar  views.3  Writers  on  natural  and 
public  law  have  regarded  drunkenness  under  any  circum- 
stances, as  a  sufficient  cause  for  avoiding  any  acts  that  may 
have  been  executed  under  its  influence,  upon  the  principle 
that  the  free  and  deliberate  consent  of  the  understanding  is 
essential  to  the  validity  of  such  acts.4 

§  391.  It  is  the  legal  relations  of  drunkenness  in  regard 
to  criminal  acts,  however,  which  more  particularly  require 
our  attention.  A  remarkable  diversity  of  views  has  pre- 
vailed on  this  point  at  .different  times  and  among  different 
nations,  and  it  would  certainly  be  a  curious,  if  not  useful 
inquiry, .to  investigate  the  peculiar  circumstances  that  have 
given  rise  to  it.  Respecting  the  principles  and  practice  of 
the  ancient  Greeks  on  this  subject,  we  know  but  little  more 


1  Story,  Commentaries  on  Equity,  1,  §  232. 

2  Amer.  Jurist,  xxi  6. 

3  Pothier,  Traite  des  Oblig.  by  Evans,  26. 

4  Puffendorf,  Law  of  Nat.  and  Nat.  ch.  4,  §  8. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    DRUNKENNESS.  429 

than  that  Solon  condemned  to  death  a.  drunken  Archon  ; 
and  that  by  a  law  of  Pittacus,  he  who  committed  a  crime 
when  drunk,  was  to  receive  a  double  punishment, —  one 
for  the  crime  itself,  another  for  the  drunkenness  in  conse- 
quence of  which  it  was  committed.1  The  Roman  law  con- 
tains no  general  provision  on  the  subject,  but  in  practice  it 
had  the  effect  of  depriving  a  criminal  act  of  the  quality  of 
malicious  intention,  and  thus  lessening  the  amount  of  pun- 
ishment.2 In  the  canon,  imperial  and  common  criminal 
law  of  Germany,  drunkenness  was  viewed  as  a  ground  of 
extenuation,  and  in  the  sixteenth  century,  writers  began  to 
distinguish  its  various  kinds,  and  discriminate  between  their 
legal  consequences.  Excessive  drunkenness  was  regarded 
as  exempting  from  the  punishment  of  dolus,  intentional 
injury,  though  not  from  that  of  culpa,  fault ;  unless  it  were 
intentional,  or  preceded  by  a  consciousness  that  it  might 
lead  to  crime,  in  which  case  it  was  to  have  no  exculpatory 
effect.  When  not  so  severe  as  to  deprive  the  subject  of 
the  use  of  reason,  it  was  to  receive  no  consideration.  These 
views,  which  gradually  determined,  the  German  practice, 
prevailed  also  in  the  practice  of  Italy,  Spain,  Portugal,  Hol- 
land and  the  Netherlands. 

§  392.  Modern  legislation,  in  Germany,  remains  true  to 
the  old  practice  on  the  subject  of  drunkenness.  In  the  Aus- 
trian code  of  1803,  §  2,  lit.  c,  it  is  made  a  ground  of  ex- 
culpation from  responsibility,  when  not  -produced  with  a 
view  of  committing  the  crime.  In  the  Prussian  Landrecht, 
p.  ii.  tit.  20,  ^  22,  it  is  intimated,  that  a  criminal  act,  com- 

1  Bruning's  Compend.  antiquatat.  graecar.  C.  2,  p.  20. 

2  Mittermaier,   Effect  of  Drunkenness   upon  criminal    responsi- 
bility.    Amer.  Jurist  xxiii.     For  the  following  notices  of  the  law 
of  Germany  on  this  subject,  we  are  also  indebted  to  this  article, 
in  which   the  subject  of  drunkenness  in  connection  with  crime,  is 
amply  and.  ably  discussed  in  the  spirit  of  a  learned  and  enlightened 
jurisprudence. 


430  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

mitted  in  a  state  of  drunkenness,  which  originates  in  fault, 
is  punishable  for  the  fault  only ;  and  a  case  has  been  men- 
tioned, where  a  man  who  killed  his  child  in  a  drunken  fit, 
was  punished  by  only  one  year's  imprisonment.  In  the  Ba- 
varian code,  art.  121,  "  inculpable  disorder  of  the  senses, 
or  of  the  understanding,"  which  includes  drunkenness,  is 
mentioned  as  one  of  the  grounds  that  exempt  from  respon- 
sibility. But  if  it  be  intentional,  and  for  the  purpose  of 
committing  the  crime,  the  code  expressly  declares,  art.  40, 
that  it  shall  be  no  ground  of  exculpation.  In  the  revised 
project  of  the  Bavarian  code  of  1827,  art.  67,  the  above- 
quoted  language  is  retained,  with  the  exception  of  the  word 
"  inculpable."  The  Hanover  project,  art.  99,  contains  the 
words  of  the  code,  with  the  following  additional  clause, — 
"  namely,  in  cases  of  the  highest  degree  of  inculpable 
drunkenness."  Drunkenness  is  also  mentioned  generally 
as  a  ground  of  extenuation,  art.  109.  The  Zurich  project 
of  1829,  art.  159,  declares  that  one  who  commits  a  crime, 
in  a  state  of  inculpable  drunkenness  of  the  highest  degree, 
is  punishable  in  the  same  manner  as  if  he  were  under  legal 
age. 

§  393.  Very  different  from  this  has  been  the  legislation 
of  France,  England  and  Scotland,  into  which  these  milder 
views  of  the  legal  consequences  of  drunkenness  have  never 
been  suffered  to  enter.  In  France,  an  ordinance  of  Francis  I. 
declares  that  it  shall  not  in  any  case  absolve  from  the  ordi- 
nary punishment  of  crime.  In  the  present  penal  code  of 
that  country,  drunkenness  is  not  mentioned,  expressly  or  by 
implication,  as  a  ground  of  exculpation.  Accordingly  in 
1837,  the  court  of  cassation,  which  is  the  highest  in  the  king- 
dom and  receives  appeals  from  all  other  courts,  formally 
decided  that  drunkenness  being  a  voluntary  and  reprehensible 
state,  could  never  constitute  a  legal  or  moral  excuse.  Many 
eminent  French  jurists,  however,  have  lamented  the  deficien- 
cies of  the  code  on  this  subject,  and  contended  for  the  intro- 


LEGAL    COM  SEQUENCES    OF    DRUNKENNESS.  431 

duction  of  milder  principles.  It  has  even  been  contended 
that  the  penal  code,  art.  64,  which  declares  insanity,  without 
distinction  of  any  kind,  to  be  a  ground  of  entire  exculpation, 
would  justify  the  admission  of  drunkenness  which  produces  a 
temporary  insanity,  among  the  grounds  of  extenuation. 
Within  a  few  years,  juries  have  availed  themselves  of  the 
suggestion,  although  in  affording  relief  in  the  only  way  they 
could,  that  is,  acquitting  the  accused  altogether,  they  have 
certainly  gone  too  far.  In  the  case  of  J.  M.  Erion,  men- 
tioned by  Georget,1  who  was  tried  for  an  assault  on  his 
mother,  he  being  intoxicated  at  the  time,  the  verdict  of  the 
jury  was,  that  he  was  guilty,  but  acted  involuntarily.  Con- 
sequently he  was  discharged  in  virtue  of  the  364th  art. 
of  the  code  of  criminal  instruction,  viz.  :  "  The  court  will 
discharge  the  accused  if  the  act  for  which  he  is  indicted 
is  not  prohibited  by  any  penal  law." 5  In  another  case,  the 
jury  returned  that  the  accused  "  was  guilty,  but  acted  with- 
out discernment  and  without  will." A 

§  394.  In  England  drunkenness  has  never  been  admitted 
as  a  ground  of  extenuation  for  any  offences  committed  under 
its  influence.  "  A  drunkard  who  is  voluntarius  demo,  hath 


1  Discussion  medico-legale,  23. 

2  The  apparent  want  of  connection  between  the  discharge  of  the 
accused  and  the  provisions  of  this  article,  is  to  be  explained  by  a 
difference  of  procedure  in  French  and  English  courts.    The  former, 
unlike  the  latter,  permit  the  jury  in  criminal  as  well  as  civil  cases, 
to  render  a  special  verdict,  and  accordingly  they  found  Erion  guilty 
of  the  assault,  but  that  having  "acted  involuntarily,"  he  was  guilty 
of  no  crime,  and  was  entitled  to  a  discharge  from  the  court,  as  much 
as  if  he  had  been  found  by  the  same  verdict,  guilty  of  the  assault, 
but  deranged,  and  not  acting  voluntarily.     The  law  makes  no  man 
responsible  for  an  involuntary  act,  and  drunkenness  is  not  recognized 
as  a  circumstance  that  deprives  acts  of  this  quality  which  are  com- 
mitted under  its  influence. 

3  Gazette  des  Tribunaux,  1828,  nr.  639. 


432  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE     OF     INSANITY. 

no  priviledge  thereby,"  saith  a  learned  expounder  of  the 
common  law ;  "  whatever  ill  or  hurt  he  doth,  his  drunkenness 
doth  aggravate  it." '  It  is  not  strictly  true,  however,  that 
drunkenness  is  an  aggravating  circumstance  when  attending 
the  commission  of  real  offences.  It  may  be  said  more  cor- 
rectly, that  it  has  no  legal  effect  whatever,  on  any  offence 
which  it  accompanies  ;  it  neither  modifies  its  nature,  nor  in- 
creases its  penalties.  Nothing  can  be  farther  from  the  spirit 
of  English  jurisprudence  than  the  idea  that  drunkenness,  un- 
less produced  by  force  or  fraud,  should  afford  any  relief 
from  the  ordinary  consequences  of  crime.  Owing  to  the 
exclusive  influence  of  this  spirit,  few  are  able  to  contemplate 
the  milder  views  that  have  prevailed  in  some  parts  of  Europe, 
with  any  other  than  feelings  of  deep  distrust  and  aversion. 
The  inevitable  consequence  thereof,  it  is  alleged,  is  to  in- 
crease the  temptations  to  crime,  and  to  obliterate  some  of 
the  most  important  distinctions  of  morality.  To  one  who 
comes  to  the  examination  of  this  subject  with  an  unbiased 
and  inquiring  mind,  it  certainly  is  not  very  obvious  how  the 
views  in  question  lead  only  to  mischief.  The  apprehension 
that' men  would  intentionally  make  themselves  drunk  for  the 
purpose  of  committing  a  crime  with  impunity,  has  hardly 
the  shadow  of  a  foundation.  In  the  first  place,  the  existence 
of  the  previous  intention  is  liable  to  be  detected  ;  and  again, 
if  the  accused  be  successful  in  concealing  it,  and  his  plea  is 
admitted,  still,  at  the  very  least,  the  penalty  would  probably 
be  severe,  for  the  drunkenness  is  merely  a  ground  of  excul- 
pation. We  do  not  apprehend,  therefore,  that  men  would 
abandon  the  ordinary  method  of.  committing  crime,  in  se- 
crecy and  silence,  for  one  that  is  sure  to.be  followed  by 
severe  punishment  — perhaps  the  very  punishment  they 
would  avoid. 


Thomas's  Coke's  Littleton,  46. 


LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  DRUNKENNESS.      433 

§  395.  While  we  are  far  from  believing  that  these 
milder  views  manifest  too  much  indulgence  to  drunkenness, 
we  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  that  English  jurisprudence 
has  erred  most  widely  in  the  other  direction.  The  whole 
theory  of  the  English  law  in  regard  to  drunkenness,  is 
founded  on  the  fallacy,  that  because  the  act  of  drinking  is 
voluntary,  the  person  is  responsible  for  whatever  actions  it 
may  lead  him  to  commit.  An  act  that  unintentionally  leads 
to  the  commission  of  crime,  is  thus  confounded  with  such  as 
are  deliberately  designed  to  have  this  effect,  —  the  distinc- 
tion being  utterly  overlooked  between  what  the  law  calls 
culpa  and  dolus,  fault  and  intentional  injury  or  crime.  It 
is  difficult  to  conceive  why  such  a  confusion  of  moral  and 
legal  distinctions  should  be  —  not  overlooked  —  but  actually 
acknowledged  arid  defended,  even  at  the  present  day.  An 
essential  element  of  crime  is  the  previous  intention,  and 
unless  the  criminal  act  be  accompanied  by  wrong  intention, 
the  author  thereof  is  regarded  by  the  laws  of  all  civilized 
people,  and  even  by  the  English  law,  except  in  a  few  in- 
stances, as  guilty  of  culpa,  not  of  dolus.  We  are  not 
satisfied  that  there  should  be  an  exception  to  this  principle 
in  the  case  of  drunkenness.  If  a  person  who  enters  a  stable 
with  a  lighted  candle  not  properly  protected,  and  carelessly 
drops  it  into  a  hay-mow  whereby  the  building  is  destroyed, 
is  not  deemed  guilty  of  arson,  no  more  should  one  who,  in 
a  fit  of  drunkenness,  kills  a  fellow-being  without  any  pre- 
vious intention  so  to  do,  be  deemed  guilty  of  murder.  True,, 
the  fault  of  drunkenness  is  far  greater,  than  that  of  careless- 
ness, and  consequently  should  be  punished  with  proportion- 
ate severity ;  but  the  difference  is  one  merely  of  degree. 
The  doctrine  of  the  common  law  would  have  a  shadow  of 
support,  if  drunkenness  were  really  a  crime  of  some  mag- 
nitude ;  but  it  is  not  so  regarded  by  the  laws  of  England,, 
and  in  most  parts  of  this  country  it  is  no  crime  at  all.  The 
free,  unembarrassed  use  of  the  reasoning  powers  is  essential 
37 


434  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

to  responsibility;  but  while  the  contrary  condition  of  these 
powers  in  insanity  absolves  its  subjects  from  the  legal  con- 
sequences of  crime,  it  is  not  permitted  to  have  the  same 
effect  when  produced  and  accompanied  by  drunkenness. 
It  does  not  seem-to  be  a  sufficient  reason  for  this  distinction, 
that  in  the  latter  case,  the  loss  of  moral  liberty  is  the  volun- 
tary act  of  the  party,  while  in  the  former  it  is  the  effect  of 
disease.  In  the  first  place,  the  only  object  which  the  drunk- 
ard has  in  view,  is  animal  enjoyment ;  for  the  loss  of  his 
reason,  though  a  certain  result,  is  not  the  motive  for  his  in- 
dulgence ;  and,  secondly,  the  very  insanity  which  is  admitted 
in  excuse  for  crime,  may  be,  as  in  a  very  large  proportion 
of  cases  it  really  is,  the  result  of  habits  of  drunkenness  in 
which  the  party  has  voluntarily  persisted.  Where  the  moral 
guilt  is  very  nearly,  if  not  precisely  equal,  it  seems  unjust 
that  the  legal  consequences  should  differ  so  widely,  as  they 
do  in  regard  to  criminal  acts  committed  under  the  influence 
of  drunkenness,  and  of  that  insanity  which  may  be  one  of 
its  direct  results. 

§  396.  Drunkenness,  in  reference  to  its  moral  and  legal 
character,  may  be  divided  into  three  kinds,  dolous  or  crimi- 
nal, culpable,  and  inculpable.  Bearing  these  distinctions  in 
mind,  we  shall  be  able  to  arrive  at  more  accurate  notions  in 
regard  to  the  effect  which  this  condition  should  produce  on 
criminal  responsibility.  Dolous  drunkenness  is  that  which 
is  deliberately  produced  for  the  purpose  of  committing  a 
crime  while  under  its  influence,  and  is  generally  regarded 
as  affording  no  relief  from  the  ordinary  punishment  of  that 
crime.  Drunkenness  is  culpable  when,  though  knowingly 
produced,  it  is  accompanied  by  no  previous  criminal  inten- 
tion. Of  course  there  must  be  various  degrees  of  culpability, 
and  the  amount  of  punishment  they  severally  require,  must 
be  determined  by  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  The 
English  law,  however,  as  has  been  already  observed,  does 
not  admit  this  kind  of  drunkenness  as  a  ground  of  extenua- 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    DRUNKENNESS.  435 

tion,  though  it  would  seem  to  be  incompatible  with  one 
crime  at  least  with  which  drunkards  are  often  charged,  that 
of  murder,  as  defined  by  legal  authorities.  If,  previous  to 
the  drunken  fit,  there  were  no  design  nor  malice  which  are 
essential  to  murder,  we  are  obliged  to  suppose  that  they 
arose  in  the  mind  after  it  had  been  brought  under  the  influ- 
ence of  drunkenness.  But  a  mind  which  has  lost  the  perfect 
use  of  its  reasoning  powers,  cannot,  without  an  unwarranted 
abuse  of  language,  be  deemed  guilty  of  originating  the  feel- 
ing of  malice.  Lawyers  have  occasionally  suspected  that 
it  is  going  too  far  to  attribute  malice  to  a  mind  under  the 
influence  of  drunkenness,  but  their  doubts  have  never  been 
suffered  to  affect  their  practice.  In  a  case  where  the  defend- 
ant was  tried  for  murder  committed  in  a  fit  of  intoxication, 
and  where  the  circumstances  precluded  the  idea  of  previous 
intention,  it  was  suggested  by  the  court,  as  worthy  the  con- 
sideration of  the  jury,  that,  "  as  drunkenness  clouds  the 
understanding  and  excites  passion,  it  may  be  evidence  of 
passion  only,  and  of  want  of  malice  and  design."  l  It 
scarcely  needs  to  be  added  that  the  accused  was  convicted 
of  murder ;  or  that  an  eminent  jurist  in  commenting  on  the 
opinion  of  the  court,  should  characterize  it  as  "  rather  re- 
fined and  hazardous  speculation."  '  Juries,  however,  both 
in  this  country  and  England,  are  beginning  to  think  other- 
wise. Thomas,  lately  tried  in  New  Hampshire,  for  the 
same  offence  committed  while  drunk,  was  found  guilty  of 
murder  in  the  second  degree.3 

§  397.  Inculpable  drunkenness  is  that  which  occurs 
without  any  fault  in  the  party,  and  consequently  renders 
him  irresponsible  for  whatever  acts  he  may  commit,  while 
under  its  influence.  The  common  law  recognizes  but  two 
ways  in  which  it  can  be  produced,  viz,  by  "  the  unskilful- 


1  Pennsylvania  v.  McFall,  Addison's  Rep.  257. 

2  American  Jurist,  xxi.  7.  3  Zion's  Herald,  April  14,  1841. 


436  MEDICAL     JURISPRUDENCE     OF     INSANITY. 

ness  of  the  physician,  or  the  contrivance  of  enemies."  l  It 
appears  to  us,  that  it  may  also  be  produced  in  at  least  two 
other  ways  ;  hy  the  party's  having  drank  no  more  liquor 
than  he  had  habitually  taken  without  being  intoxicated,  but 
which,  from  some  cause  unknown  to  him  at  the  time,  was 
much  stronger  than  usual ;  or  which,  without  any  change 
in  its  quantity  or  quality,  exerts  an  unusually  potent  effect  on 
the  brain,  in  consequence  of  certain  pathological  conditions. 
This  latter  kind  of  inculpable  drunkenness,  is  not  an  uncom- 
mon occasion  of  crime,  but  in  English  and  American  courts, 
it  has  never,  that  I  am  aware  of,  been  admitted  in  exten- 
uation of  punishment.  The  following  passage  contains  in 
a  few  words,  the  spirit  of  the  law  on  this  subject.  "  There 
are  many  men,  soldiers,  who  have  been  severely  wounded, 
in  the  head  especially,  who  well  know  that  excess  makes 
them  mad  ;  but  if  such  persons  wilfully  deprive  themselves 
of  reason,  they  ought  not  to  be  excused  one  crime  by  the 
voluntary  perpetration  of  another.'"  2  It  is  not  very  obvious 
how  that  can  be  properly  called  a  crime,  which  may  not  be 
once  mentioned  in  the  statute-book  ;  nor,  if  it  be  a  crime, 
why  in  the  absence  of  any  legislative  enactment  on  the 
subject,  it  should  be  visited  with  capital  punishment,  as  it 
virtually  is  when  it  leads  to  a  capital  crime.  In  the  follow- 
ing cases,  we  have  instances  of  this  kind  of  drunkenness, 
and  a  practical  illustration  of  the  spirit  in  which  they  are 
regarded. 

§  398.  William  M'Donough  was  tried  and  convicted, 
on  an  indictment  for  the  murder  of  his  wife,  before  the 
supreme  court  of  Massachusetts,  in  November  1817.  It 
appeared  in  evidence,  that  many  years  previous,  the  defend- 
ant had  received  a  severe  injury  of  the  head,  in  conse- 


1  Russel  on  Crimes,  8. 

8  Paris  and  Fonblanque,  Medical  Jurisprudence,    iii. 


LEGAL     CONSEQUENCES     OF     DRUNKENNESS.  437 

quence  of  which,  he  had  suffered  occasional  paroxysms  of 
insanity,  though  the  general  habit  of  his  mind  was  sound 
and  clear.  It  appeared  that  they  were  often  produced  by 
intoxication,  and  there  was  some  evidence  to  prove  that 
they  sometimes  occurred  unconnected  with  any  apparent 
exciting  cause.  In  one  of  these  fits  of  insanity  induced  by 
drinking,  and  while  actually  under  the  influence  of  liquor, 
he  murdered  his  wife.  The  court,  in  its  charge  to  the  jury, 
observed,  that,  "  if  they  believed  the  prisoner  was  in  a  fit 
of  lunacy  when  he  committed  the  act,  he  should  be  acquit- 
ted ;  but  if  they  believed  he  was  of  sound  mind,  or,  if  his 
reason  was  impaired,  and  that  it  was  caused  by  intoxication 
only,  the  fact  being  proved  and  no  palliating  circumstances 
existing,  he  must  be  convicted."  ]  If  in  using  this  language, 
the  court  had  in  view  any  circumstance  that  might  be 
deemed  to  be  of  a  palliating  character,  it  is  not  easy  to 
see  what  it  was,  unless  it  were  the  pathological  condition 
resulting  from  the  injury  of  the  head,  which  rendered  him 
peculiarly  susceptible  to  the  effects  of  ardent  spirits.  If  the 
court  actually  did  consider  this  a  palliating  circumstance,  it 
is  to  be  regretted  that  its  language  was  not  more  explicit 
on  this  point.  It  is  very  probable,  that  in  this  case  also, 
the  jury  were  considerably  influenced  by  the  character  of 
the  exciting  cause  of  M'Donough's  insanity.  If  it  had 
been  testified  that,  instead  of  getting  drunk,  he  was  in  the 
habit  of  attending  religious  meetings,  where  warm  and  pun- 
gent appeals  were  addressed  to  his  feelings  ;  that  the  ex- 
citement thus  produced  occasionally  degenerated  into  a  fit 
of  madness,  in  one  of  which  he  killed  his  wife,  the  jury 
would  have  acquitted  him  without  leaving  their  seats.  Yet 
the  essential  condition  of  guilt  would  have  been  the  same 
as  in  the  case  that  actually  happened.  "  The  voluntary 


1  Trial  of  William  M'Donough  for  the  murder  of  his  wife,  65. 
37* 


438  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

use  of  a  stimulus,"  as  it  is  expressed  by  Dr.  Beck,  "  which 
he  was  well  aware  would  disorder  his  mind,  fully  placed 
him  under  the  purview  of  the  law."  ]  It  is  not  a  satisfac- 
tory reply  to  this  objection,  that  in  the  one  case,  the  excit- 
ing cause  is,  in  itself,  of  a  commendable  character,  while 
in  the  other,  it  is  in  the  highest  degree  sinful  and  pernicious. 
Drunkenness  in  itself,  is  not  by  law  a  crime  ;  and  though 
the  moral  sense  of  the  community  at  the  present  day,  con- 
demns even  the  moderate  use  of  intoxicating  drinks,  it 
must  be  recollected  that  twenty  years  ago,  and  especially 
in  the  class  to  which  M'Donough  belonged,  such  use  was 
generally  considered  not  only  harmless,  but  absolutely 
necessary  to  the  bodily  health.  Had  he  not  labored  under 
this  peculiar  irritability  of  the  brain,  it  is  not  supposed  that 
the  bloody  act  would  have  been  committed  or  even  thought 
of,  so  that  M'Donough  was  virtually  convicted  for  the  con- 
sequences of  a  bodily  infirmity. 

§  399.  The  following  case,  related  by  Georget,  presents 
us  with  another  striking  illustration  of  mental  disorder  ex- 
cited by  the  use  of  spirituous  liquors.  Vatelot,  a  gendarme, 
while  passing  the  Place  Louis  Quinze,  suddenly  struck  the 
Sieur  Chardon  with  his  sabre.  The  latter  turned  round, 
and  seeing  a  stranger  brandishing  a  sabre  over  his  head, 
asked  if  he  knew  him,  and  what  he  meant.  "I  know 
you,"  replied  Vatelot,  "  you  are  mine  enemy,  and  I  will 
give  it  to  you."  At  the  same  moment  he  aimed  at  him 
another  blow,  and  after  pursuing  him  awhile  with  his  drawn 
sword,  left  him.  He  soon  met  the  Sieur  Bellon  whom  he 
struck  on  the  head,  and  aimed  two  blows  at  Sieur  Avenel, 
who  accompanied  Bellon.  The  Sieur  Beaupied  who  ran  to 


1  Medical  Jurisprudence,  627.  In  a  subsequent  edition  of  his 
work,  however,  the  Doctor  observes,  that  in  using  the  language 
above  quoted,  he  has  "probably  expressed  himself  too  strongly," 
and  seems  inclined  to  retract  his  approval  of  the  verdict  of  the  jury. 


LEGAL     CONSEQUENCES     OF     DRUNKENNESS.  439 

their  assistance,  and  another  person  who  never  injured  him, 
he  also  threatened  ;  and  finally  observing  a  young  lady 
standing  at  her  door,  he  struck  her  over  the  head  with  his 
sabre,  and  then  fled.  On  trial  before  the  court  of  assizes 
at  Paris,  he  denied  the  facts,  and  admitted  that  he  had  been 
drinking,  but  was  not  drunk.  He  was  convicted  of  homi- 
cide committed  voluntarily,  but  without  premeditation,  and 
condemned  to  hard  labor  for  life.1 

§  400.  The  homicidal  acts  of  Vatelot  obviously  have  all 
the  characteristics  that  distinguish  those  committed  by  furi- 
ous maniacs.  "  He  attacked  indiscriminately  all  whom  he 
met,"  said  the  court,  "  and  made  four  successive  attempts 
at  homicide  without  being  moved  by  any  of  the  passions 
characteristic  of  crime,  but  in  consequence  of  a  fatal 
phrensy  which  impelled  him  to  the  shedding  of  blood  when- 
ever an  apportunity  offered."  One  of  the  elements  of  guilt 
in  M'Donough's  case  is  wanting  in  this  ;  for  it  does  not  ap- 
pear that  strong  drink  had  ever  produced  a  fit  of  insanity 
before,  and  thus  it  could  not  be  urged  that  Vatelot  sinned 
against  the  light  of  his  own  experience.  If  he  had  not  drank 
enough  to  intoxicate  him  under  ordinary  circumstances,  he 
had  done  nothing  which  the  law  or  public  opinion  recognized 
to  be  wrong,  and  there  was  not  a  shadow  of  justice  in  re- 
jecting his  plea  of  insanity.  Even  if  he  had,  are  we  to 
make  no  distinction,  as  Georget  forcibly  inquires,  between  a 
drunken  person  who  commits  a  crime  from  motives  of  inter- 
est, such  as  theft,  or  to  gratify  a  criminal  passion  existing 
before  the  intoxication,  and  one  who,  like  Vatelot,  becomes 
a  murderer  without  interest,  without  motive,  without  any  ra- 
tional cause  for  his  conduct  ? 

§  401.  We  shall  close  our  observations  on  this  form  of 
inculpable  drunkeness,  with  a  couple  of  passages  from  re- 


1  Discussion  Medico-Legale,  159. 


440  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

cent  writers.  "  If  either  the  insanity  has  supervened  from 
drinking,"  says  Mr.  Alison,  "  without  the  panel's  having 
been  aware  that  such  an  indulgence  in  his  case  leads  to  such 
a  consequence  ;  or  if  it  has  arisen  from  the  combination  of 
drinking  with  a  half  crazy  or  infirm  state  of  mind,  or  a 
previous  wound  or  illness  which  rendered  spirits  fatal  to  his 
intellect,  to  a  degree  unusual  in  other  men,  or  which  could 
not  have  been  anticipated,  it  seems  inhuman  to  visit  him  with 
the  extreme  punishment  which  was  suitable  in  the  other  case. 
In  such  a  case,  the  proper  course  is  to  convict ;  but  in  con- 
sideration of  the  degree  of  infirmity  proved,  recommend  to 
the  royal  mercy."  l 

"  There  is  a  class  of  cases  in  which  persons  have  sus- 
tained injuries  to  the  head,  as  often  happens  with  soldiers 
and  sailors,  where  drunkeness,  even  when  existing  to  a  slight 
degree,  produces  sometimes  temporary  insanity,  and  leaves 
the  mind  in  possession  of  its  habitual  sanity  when  the 

drunken  fit  is  over Such  persons  certainly  ought  not 

to  undergo  the  same  punishment  as  sane  criminals,  unless 
the  crime  be  accompanied  by  many  circumstances  of  aggra- 
vation, and  the  plea  rest  rather  upon  suspicion  than  proof."  a 

§  402.  In  regard  to  the  effect  of  delirium  tremens  on  re- 
sponsibility, we  have  been  unable  to  ascertain  the  principles 
and  practice  of  English  courts.  Those  of  our  own  courts 
will  be  best  exhibited  by  presenting  a  few  of  the  cases  that 
have  been  tried. 

§  403.  At  the  May  term,  in  1828,  of  the  circuit  court  of 
the  United  States,  Alexander  Drew,  commander  of  the 
whaling  ship  John  Jay,  was  tried  for  the  murder  of  his 
second  mate,  Charles  F.  Clark.  It  appeared  in  evidence, 
that  previously  to  the  voyage  during  which  this  fatal  act 
occurred,  Drew  had  sustained  a  fair  character,  and  was  a 

1  Principles  of  the  Criminal  Law  of  Scotland,  654. 

2  British  and  Foreign  Medical  Review,  x.  161. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    DRUNKENNESS.  441 

man  of  humane  and  benevolent  disposition,  though  addicted 
to  the  excessive  use  of  ardent  spirits.  After  recovering 
from  a  drunken  debauch,  in  the  latter  part  of  August,  1827, 
he  resolved  to  drink  no  more,  and  all  the  liquor  on  board  of 
the  ship  was  thrown  overboard.  In  two  or  three  days  after, 
he  lost  his  appetite,  was  unable  to  sleep,  and  manifested 
various  hallucinations.  He  thought  the  crew  had  conspired 
to  kill  him,  and  expressed  great  fear  of  an  Indian  belonging 
to  the  ship,  calling  him  by  name  when  not  present,  and  pro- 
mising that  he  would  drink  no  more  rum,  if  he  would  not 
kill  him.  Sometimes  he  would  sing  obscene  songs,  and 
sometimes  hymns,  and  would  pray  and  swear  alternately. 
In  the  night  of  the  31st  August,  he  went  on  deck,  and  at- 
tempted to  throw  himself  overboard,  but  was  restrained  by 
the  witness.  At  seven  o'clock  in  the  forenoon,  September 
1st,  while  the  witness,  Drew,  and  Clark  were  at  breakfast, 
Drew  suddenly  left  the  table,  and  appeared  to  conceal  some- 
thing under  his  jacket,  which  was  on  the  transom  in  another 
part  of  the  cabin.  He  immediately  turned  round  to  Clark, 
and  requested  him  to  go  upon  deck.  The  latter  replied  that 
he  would  when  he  should  have  finished  his  breakfast.  Drew 
then  exclaimed,  "  go  upon  deck,  or  I  will  help  you  ;  "  and 
immediately  took  a  knife  that  had  been  covered  over  by  his 
jacket,  and  before  another  word  was  spoken  by  either,  he 
plunged  it  into  the  right  side  of  Clark's  breast.  Clark  fell 
instantly,  but  soon  afterwards  rose  and  went  upon  deck. 
As  the  witness  left  the  cabin,  Drew  cocked  his  pistol,  pointed 
it  at  him  and  snapped  it,  but  it  missed  fire.  Drew  followed 
them  upon  deck,  and,  addressing  the  mate,  said,  "  Mr.  Cof- 
fin, in  twenty-four  hours  the  ship  shall  go  ashore."  He  was 
then  seized  and  confined.  His  whole  demeanor,  for  some 
weeks  after,  was  that  of  an  insane  person.  When  he  first 
appeared  to  be  in  his  right  mind  he  was  informed  of  Clark's 
death  and  its  cause  ;  he  replied  that  he  knew  nothing  about 
it ;  that,  when  he  awoke  he  found  himself  handcuffed,  and 


442  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

that  it  appeared  to  him  like  a  dream.  It  also  appeared  that 
there  had  not  been  for  months  any  quarrel  between  Clark 
and  Drew. 

§  404.  After  hearing  the  witness  who  testified  the  above 
facts,  the  court  interposed,  and  through  Mr.  justice  Story, 
delivered  its  opinion  that  on  these  admitted  facts  the  indict- 
ment could  not  be  maintained,  because  the  prisoner  was  un- 
questionably insane  at  the  time  of  committing  the  offence. 
"  The  question  made  at  the  bar,"  continued  the  court,  "  is 
whether  insanity,  whose  remote  cause  is  habitual  drunken- 
ness, is,  or  is  not  an  excuse  in  a  court  of  law,  for  a  homicide 
committed  by  the  party  while  so  insane,  but  not  at  the  time 
intoxicated  or  under  the  influence  of  liquor.  We  are  clearly 
of  opinion  that  insanity  is  a  competent  excuse  in  such  a 
case.  In  general,  insanity  is  an  excuse  for  any  crime, 
because  the  party  has  not  the  possession  of  his  reason,  which 
includes  responsibility.  An  exception  is,  when  the  crime  is 
committed  while  the  party  is  in  a  fit  of  intoxication,  and 
while  it  lasts  ;  and  not,  as  in  this  case,  a  remote  consequence, 
superinduced  by  the  antecedent  exhaustion  of  the  party 
arising  from  gross  and  habitual  drunkenness.  However  crim- 
inal, in  a  moral  point  of  view,  such  an  indulgence  is,  and 
however  justly  a  party  may  be  responsible  for  his  acts  aris- 
ing from  it  to  Almighty  God,  human  tribunals  are  generally 
restricted  from  punishing  them,  since  they  are  not  ,the  acts 
of  a  reasonable  being.  Had  the  crime  been  committed 
when  Drew  was  in  a  fit  of  intoxication,  he  would  have  been 
liable  to  be  convicted  of  murder.  As  he  was  not  then  in- 
toxicated but  merely  insane  from  an  abstinence  from  liquor, 
he  cannot  be  pronounced  guilty  of  the  offence.  The  law 
looks  to  the  immediate,  and  not  to  the  remote  cause,  to  the 
actual  stale  of  the  party  and  not  to  the  cause  which  remotely 
produced  it.  Many  species  of  insanity  arise  remotely  from 
what  in  a  moral  point  of  view,  is  a  criminal  neglect  or  fault 
of  the  party  ;  as  from  religious  melancholy,  undue  exposure, 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    DRUNKENNESS.  443 

extravagant  pride,  ambition,  &c. ;  yet  such  insanity  has 
always  been  deemed  a  sufficient  excuse  for  any  crime  done 
under  its  influence."  The  jury  returned  a  verdict  of  not 
guilty.1  j* 

§  405.  At  a  term  of  the  supreme  court  in  York  county  Me., 
April,  1836,  Theodore  Wilson  was  tried  for  the  murder  of 
his  wife  in  June  1835,  at  Kittery.  It  appeared  in  evidence, 
that  for  several  years  Wilson  had  been  addicted  to  intem- 
perate drinking  ;  that  on  the  Saturday  previous  to  the  mur- 
der, he  had  brought  some  rum  from  Portsmouth,  N.  H.,  and 
that  on  the  next  day  he  had  drank  it  all.  It  did  not  appear 
that  he  drank  any  more  after  this,  and  circumstances  render 
it  probable  that  he  did  not.  There  was  nothing  strange  or 
unusual  in  his  conduct  till  Wednesday  morning,  when  he 
arose  early  and  went  to  the  house  of  a  neighbor  to  get  some 
barley  and  procure  a  person  to  sow  it  for  him.  He  returned 
home  about  six  o'clock,  and  then  complained  of  being  sick. 
His  wife  assisted  him  to  undress,  and  he  lay  down,  saying 
that  he  was  dying.  In  the  mean  time  he  complained  that 
his  wife  would  do  nothing  for  him  ;  that  she  had  often  set 
traps  for  him,  and  once  put  fire  and  wood  into  the  oven  to 
burn  him  up.  He  ate  some  porridge  only  for  his  breakfast, 
was  constantly  talking,  and  among  other  things  spoke  of  his 
having  been  fishing  when  he  was  four  years  old.  While 
the  family  were  at  dinner,  he  rose  from  bed  and  walked 
about  in  great  agitation,  striking  the  walls  with  his  fists,  and 
beating  in  the  door  with  the  tongs.  As  he  became  more 
furious,  a  woman,  who  resided  with  him  at  this  time,  left  the 
house,  he  and  his  wife  then  being  the  only  persons  in  it.  A 
short  time  after,  he  was  seen  coming  out  of  the  house  stark 
naked  ;  and  in  this  condition  he  walked  rapidly  down  the 
road,  throwing  up  his  arms,  and  making  a  wild  howling 
noise,  and  finally  lay  down  by  a  fence.  It  appeared  that 

1  3  American  Jurist,  7-9  j  5  Mason's  Reports,  28. 


444  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

after  he  left  the  house,  his  wife  went  to  one  of  the  neigh- 
bors to  ask  his  aid  in  getting  her  husband  back,  and  this 
person  declining  to  interfere,  she  went  alone.  As  she  ap- 
proached him  still  lying  by  the  fence,  she  asked  him  why 
he  was  lying  there  and  making  such  a  noise.  He  immedi- 
ately sprang  up,  put  his  hands  upon  her  shoulders,  threw 
her  down  and  beat  out  her  brains  with  a  stone.  He  then 
left  the  body,  and  on  reaching  a  house  near  by,  broke  in  the 
windows  with  his  fists,  and  also  struck  at  the  doors  and  side 
of  the  house,  to  seal  it,  as  he  said,  with  his  wife's  blood. 
Here  he  proclaimed  that  he  had  killed  his  wife,  and  meant 
to  kill  two  more  ;  he  was  then  arrested.  To  those  who 
watched  with  him  during  the  night,  he  declared  he  was  not 
sorry  for  what  he  had  done,  but  was  glad  of  it  and  intended 
to  have  done  it  before.  He  continued  furious,  talking  wildly 
and  incoherently,  making  unnatural  noises,  sleeping  none, 
and  apparently  anxious  to  kill  himself,  till  the  next  Saturday 
morning,  when  he  became,  and  remained  rational.  It  fur- 
ther appeared,  that  in  1830  he  went  on  a  fishing  voyage, 
and  that  being  deprived  of  spirits,  he  became  deranged  after 
three  days  sailing,  and  had  to  be  confined.  He  then  began 
to  tear  his  clothes,  and  try  to  tear  the  clothes  of  others.  He 
complained  of  being  sick,  said  he  should  die,  and  requested 
the  captain  to  tell  his  sons  to  take  care  of  their  mother.  He 
was  afterwards  set  ashore  and  did  not  go  on  the  voyage. 
His  counsel  set  up  the  plea  of  insanity  in  his  defence  :  and 
the  court,  in  charging  the  jury,  observed  that  it  was  not  ma- 
terial for  them  to  determine  what  species  of  insanity  it  was 
under  which  the  prisoner  ha'd  been  suffering,  if  satisfied 
with  the  fact  of  its  existence.  He  was  acquitted.1 

§  406.     John  Birdsell   was  tried,  in   1829,  by  the   Su- 


1  For  the  facts  in  this  case,  the  author  acknowledges  his  obliga- 
tions to  Nathan  Dane  Appleton  Esq.,  one  of  the  defendant's  coun- 
sel. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    DRUNKENNESS.  445 

preme  Court  of  Ohio,  on  an  indictment  for  the  murder  of 
his  wife,  on  Thursday,  5th  of  March,  1829.  It  appeared  in 
evidence,  that  for  several  years  the  prisoner  had  indulged 
in  fits  of  intoxication,  which,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  time, 
had  been  followed  by  delirium  tremens,  which  generally 
lasted  for  several  days,  and  went  off  spontaneously.  In 
these  paroxysms  he  had  the  physical  and  moral  symptoms 
that  usually  characterize  the  disease.  Among  many  hallu- 
cinations under  which  he  labored,  the  prevailing  one  was, 
that  his  wife  was  in  combination  with  three  of  his  neigh- 
bors, one  of  whom  was  his  son  by  a  former  wife,  and  that 
they  had  conspired  to  take  his  life.  He  imagined  that  his 
wife  had  a  criminal  intimacy  with  these  persons,  and  even 
threatened  to  kill  her  if  she  did  not  desist.  On  the  Sun- 
day before  the  murder,  he  drank  freely,  and  was  intoxi- 
cated ;  in  which  condition  he  was  quiet,  dull,  and  disposed 
to  lie  in  bed.  Monday,  Tuesday  and  Wednesday,  pre- 
sented nothing  especial.  On  Wednesday  evening  he  com- 
plained to  a  neighbor  of  feeling  unwell,  and  asked  his  son's 
assistance  in  the  performance  of  some  necessary  manual 
labor  for  his  family.  He  seemed  to  the  witness  to  be  ra- 
tional. During  the  night  he  slept  none,  and  complained 
of  cramp  in  the  stomach.  The  next  morning  his  family 
thought  him  crazy,  but  were  not  alarmed,  as  they  were 
accustomed  to  such  attacks.  In  the  course  of  the  day  he: 
took  an  axe,  and  walked  rapidly  to  the  house  of  a  neighbor,, 
whom  he  desired  to  go  home  with  him,  saying  that  they 
wanted  to  kill  him  ;  and  about  the  same  time  he  told  an- 
other of  the  supposed  conspirators  that  he  had  overheard 
his  wife  and  him,  that  morning,  whispering  about  taking 
(the  witness')  life.  He  spent  the  day  at  home  in  the  midst 
of  his  family,  apparently  in  agitation  and  terror  ;  but  said 
he  would  not  hurt  any  one,  and  did  not  wish  to  be  hurt. 
He  also  placed  an  axe  with  a  scythe  under  the  bed,  where 
the  former  was  often  kept.  He  manifested  jealousy  of  his 
38 


446  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

wife,  and  told  her  to  act  better,  for  she  had  already  caused 
the  death  of  thirty  thousand  men.  He  fancied  that  the  per- 
sons of  whom  he  was  jealous  were  in  the  loft  manufactur- 
ing ropes  to  hang  him,  and  going  up,  returned,  saying  that 
he  had  cut  the  ropes  in  pieces,  and  brought  down  the  frag- 
ments in  his  hands,  though  he  had  nothing  in  them.  In 
the  course  of  the  afternoon  he  fastened  both  the  doors  of 
his  house.  At  the  usual  time  the  wife  went  out  to  milk, 
and  he  barred  the  door  after  her.  On  her  return,  he  fas- 
tened it  again.  She  was  seated  near  the  fire,  and  he  was 
walking  the  room.  At  length  he  took  the  axe  from  under 
the  bed,  and  gave  the  fatal  blow,  following  it  up  with  two 
others  on  the  face.  His  eldest  daughter  caught  the  axe, 
which  he  yielded  up  ;  and  then  he  seized  the  scythe,  with 
which  he  attempted  to  strike  her.  She  defended  herself 
with  a  chair,  till  the  smaller  children  having  opened  the 
door,  she  escaped.  He  took  the  youngest  child  in  his 
arms,  and  sat  down  by  the  window.  The  child  complained, 
"  Mamma  bleeds  ! "  which  he  said  made  him  feel  badly. 
When  his  neighbors  arrived,  immediately  afterwards,  he 
gave  himself  up,  acknowledged  what  he  had  done,  said  he 
knew  he  should  be  hanged  for  it,  but  that  he  ought  to  have 
done  it  nine  months  sooner  ;  that  if  he  had  to  do  it  again,  he 
would  strike  two  blows  where  he  only  struck  one.  It  was 
testified,  that  he  talked  so  rationally,  that  many  of  the  wit- 
nesses could  not  believe  him  deranged  ;  that  he  evinced  no 
dread  of  punishment  for  his  crime,  but  was  still  in  great  ap- 
prehension from  the  persons  who,  he  had  believed  had  intend- 
ed to  kill  him  ;  and  that  he  was  glad  he  had  defeated  their 
calculations.  On  his  way  to  jail  he  talked  rationally  and 
composedly  about  his  affairs,  and  various  other  subjects  ; 
but  frequently  asked  the  guard  if  they  did  not  hear  sweet 
sounds  of  different  kinds  ;  and,  on  being  answered  in  the 
negative,  insisted  that  he  could  not  be  mistaken.  After 
his  committal  he  became  rational,  and  expressed  his  regret 
at  what  he  had  done. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    DRUNKENNESS.  447 

§  407.  The  point  submitted  to  the  jury  for  their  deter- 
mination was,  whether  the  prisoner  was  capable  of  discrim- 
inating between  right  and  wrong.  They  concluded  that  he 
was,  and  returned  a  verdict  of  guilty.  Inconsequence  of  a 
petition  from  a  number  of  persons  who  had  no  doubts  of  Bird- 
sell's  insanity,  the  punishment  was  commuted  by  the  gover- 
nor to  that  of  imprisonment.  Previous  to  the  commutation, 
he  again  became  insane,  and  continued  so  permanently.1 

§  408.  The  essential  features  of  the  above  cases  being 
alike  in  everything  relative  to  their  pathological  nature,  we 
are  left  without  any  satisfactory  reason,  to  account  for  the 
issue  of  the  last.  It  is  probable  that  the  court  adhered  to 
the  antiquated  maxims  of  the  common  law  on  the  subject 
of  insanity,  and  that  the  jury  was  governed  by  the  opinions 
of  the  court,  or  relied  with  that  confidence  which  ignorance 
usually  inspires,  on  their  own  crude  and  erroneous  notions. 
The  verdict  of  the  jury  in  Birdsell's  case  furnishes  another 
instance  of  the  deplorable  consequences  of  obliging  a  body 
of  men,  the  most  of  whom  are  utterly  unacquainted  with 
the  phenomena  of  insanity,  to  decide  the  question  of  its  ex- 
istence in  a  given  example,  and  with  it  the  fate  of  an  un- 
fortunate fellow-being,  for  weal  or  woe,  here  and  here- 
after. They  concluded  that  the  accused  was  capable  of 
distinguishing  right  from  wrong,  probably  because  others 
who  knew  as  little  of  insanity  as  themselves  testified,  that 
immediately  after  committing  the  murder,  "he  talked  so 
rationally  that  they  could  not  believe  him  deranged ;"  and 
on  such  a  conclusion  they  founded  their  fatal  verdict.  Of 
course,  it  would  have  been  too  violent  a  contradiction  in 


1  This  case  was  reported,  and  the  medico-legal  questions  grow- 
ing out  of  it  were  discussed  at  considerable  length  by  Dr.  Drake, 
in  the  Western  Journal  of  the  Medical  and  Physical  Sciences,  vol. 
iii.  5  extracts  from  his  papers  may  be  found  in  the  American  Jurist, 
iii.  10-16. 


448  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

terms,  to  have  denied  the  existence  of  any  insanity  at  all  in 
a  disease  whose  very  name  is  delirium  ;  but  it  appeared 
that  the  prisoner  was  not  altogether  bereft  of  his  senses,  not 
quite  reduced  to  the  condition  of  a  brute  or  an  idiot.  Now 
without  resting  upon  the  general  fact  that  the  mind  is 
always  and  unequivocally  deranged  in  delirium  tremens, 
there  is  proof  enough  that  various  hallucinations  took  pos- 
session of  BirdselPs  mind,  and  prompted  him  to  the  bloody 
deed,  for  which  he  was  condemned  ;  that  he  was  under  the 
influence  of  manifest,  unequivocal,  strong  delusion,  that 
test  of  insanity  which,  when  present,  never  deceives.  If 
any  one,  on  being  made  acquainted  with  the  particulars  of 
BirdselPs  case,  can  pronounce  it  not  to  be  insanity,  he 
must  have  derived  his  notions  of  this  disease  from  some 
other  source  than  the  wards  of  the  hospital  and  asylum. 

§  409.  In  the  two  first  cases,  the  directions  of  the  court  to 
the  jury  were,  substantially,  that  if  they  were  satisfied  the 
accused  was  insane,  when  he  committed  the  criminal  act, 
that  they  were  not  to  go  back  and  inquire  into  the  cause  of 
insanity  ;  but,  on  this  fact  being  established  in  their  minds, 
the  prisoner  was  entitled  to  an  acquittal.  In  the  first  case, 
the  court  examined  the  question  whether  the  legal  conse- 
quences of  insanity  are  affected  by  the  character  of  the 
cause  which  produced  it;  and  so  clear  and  satisfactory  is 
its  opinion,  that  anything  further  on  this  point  is  rendered 
unnecessary  here.  But  we  are  not  so  well  satisfied  with  its 
distinction  between  the  insanity  which  is  the  remote  cause, 
and  that  which  is  the  immediate  effect  of  drunkenness. 
Where  the  moral  guilt  is  so  nearly  alike,  as  it  certainly  is 
in  the  two  cases,  we  are  unable  to  perceive  the  justice  of 
making  such  a  fearful  difference  in  regard  to  their  legal 
consequences.  The  distinction  is  not  only  unjust,  but  we 
apprehend  that  there  would  often  be  no  little  difficulty  in 
applying  it  to  practice.  It  would  not  be  very  easy  to  deter- 
mine the  precise  period  when  the  drunken  fit  is  over, — 


LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  DRUNKENNESS.     449 

when  the  individual  ceases  to  be  under  the  influence  of 
the  intoxicating  liquor.  A  case  is  related  by  Hitzig  in 
which  this  difficulty  would  have  been  experienced,  if  the 
legal  consequences  of  the  act  in  question  had  not  been  de- 
termined by  very  different  principles.  A  carpenter  in 
Pregelswalde,  named  Thiel,  had  contracted  such  a  pro- 
pensity for  drink,  that  he  finally  became  a  dipsomaniac. 
During  the  fits  he  would  continue  drunk  from  eight  to 
fifteen  days  together,  taking  no  food  in  the  mean  time,  and 
on  two  occasions,  he  continued  for  three  weeks  in  a  com- 
plete state  of  drunken  stupor.  While  the  fit  was  on  him, 
he  was  quiet,  taciturn,  and  peaceable,  and  during  the  last 
three  or  four  days,  extremely  stupid.  The  fit  that  occa- 
sioned the  criminal  act  with  which  he  was  charged,  began 
on  the  27th  of  May,  1824,  and  continued  till  the  2d  of 
June,  on  which  day  he  drank  less,  and  on  the  following 
day,  (3d  of  June,)  he  drank  only  one  glass  of  beer,  and 
one  of  brandy.  At  noon-time  he  assisted  his  wife  in  sawing 
wood,  though  she  had  to  tell  him  just  what  he  was  to  do. 
In  the  evening  he  slept  a  few  hours,  awoke,  walked  about, 
and  finally  went  to  bed  with  his  wife.  The  latter,  on 
getting  out  of  the  bed  for  the  purpose  of  going  to  the  win- 
dow, to  watch  some  cloth  that  was  bleaching,  awoke  him 
again.  Soon  after,  he  experienced  a  strong  sense  of  anxi- 
ety, and  felt  a  trembling  over  his  whole  body,  and  he 
imagined  that  he  heard  an  inward  voice  commanding  him 
to  kill  his  youngest  child,  a  boy  of  five  years  old,  who  with 
two  older  children,  were  sleeping  in  the  same  room. 
After  a  while,  the  command  was  repeated  so  peremptorily 
that  he  could  no  longer  resist,  and  he  accordingly  murdered 
his  favorite  child.  Whether  at  this  moment  he  was  under 
the  direct  influence  of  the  liquor  he  had  drunk  on  the  3d, 
is  a  question  to  which  it  would  be  impossible  to  give  a 
satisfactory  answer.  In  the  present  case  it  was  not  re- 
quired, for  drunkenness  being  regarded  by  the  German  law, 
38* 


450  MEDICAL     JURISPRUDENCE     OF     INSANITY. 

as  an  extenuating  circumstance,  he  was  condemned  to  one 
year's  imprisonment,  and  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  prosecu- 
tion.1 

§  410.  In  Birdsell's  case  there  was  presented  a  new  fea- 
ture of  no  little  interest  to  the  medico-legal  student,  which, 
though  it  was  suffered  to  have  no  influence  on  the  verdict, 
might,  if  the  court  had  chosen  to  urge  its  opinion  respecting 
it  upon  the  jury,  have  prevented  an  acquittal,  even  if  they 
had  satisfied  themselves  beyond  a  doubt  that  the  party  was 
incapable  of  distinguishing  right  from  wrong.  In  replying 
to  the  arguments  of  counsel  for  a  new  trial,  the  court  ob- 
served in  the  course  of  its  remarks,  "  that  they  were  not 
called  upon  to  give  an  opinion  whether  Mania  a  potu  would, 
under  any  circumstances,  be  an  excuse  for  the  commission 
of  a  crime  ;  but  they  felt  no  unwillingness  to  express  their 
opinion,  that  if  the  insanity  were  the  offspring  of  intemper- 
ance, and  the  prisoner  knew  that  intoxication  would  produce 
it,  he  could  not  plead  it  as  an  apology."  Birdsell,  it  has 
been  seen,  had  experienced  several  fits  of  delirium  tremens 
following  his  drunken  debauches,  previous  to  that  in  which 
he  destroyed  his  wife,  and  consequently  knew  that  intoxica- 
tion would  be  likely  to  produce  insanity.  How  far  this  fact 
changes  the  attitude  of  the  case,  is  a  point  which  deserves 
a  careful  examination,  before  being  allowed  to  have  a  bear- 
ing on  judicial  decisions.  If  the  party  had  known  that,  in 
his  previous  attacks  of  delirium  tremens,  he  had  attempted 
the  life  of  his  wife,  then  indeed  this  opinion  would  not  have 
been  without  some  foundation  ;  for  in  that  case,  perhaps,  he 
might  have  been  justly  held  responsible  for  whatever  crim- 
inal acts  he  committed  while  in  a  state  of  insanity,  just  so 
far  as  he  was  responsible  for  the  intoxication  that  produced 
it.  All  that  Birdsell  knew  on  this  subject,  however,  was, 
that  indulgence  in  drinking  having  frequently  occasioned 

1  Henke's  Annalen,  viii.  186. 


LEGAL     CONSEQUENCES     OF     DRUNKENNESS.  451 

delirium  tremens,  would  be  liable  to  produce  a  renewal  of 
its  attacks.  As  to  what  acts  he  might  commit  while  under 
their  influence,  he  knew  absolutely  nothing.  It  is  not  very 
clear  how  delirium  tremens  can  have  a  different  effect  on 
legal  responsibility,  from  that  which  would  follow  any  other 
form  of  mental  derangement  resulting  from  habits  of  intem- 
perance. If  BirdselPs  habits  had  led  to,  attacks  of  common 
mania  instead  of  delirium  tremens,  his  guilt,  in  a  moral 
point  of  view,  would  certainly  have  been  no  less  ;  nor,  on 
the  hypothesis  of  the  court  that  insanity  is  no  apology  for 
crime,  if  the  party  knew  that  intoxication  would  produce  it, 
would  his  legal  responsibility  have  been  diminished.  It  does 
not  appear,  however,  that  in  ordinary  cases  where  insanity 
is  pleaded  in  excuse  for  crime,  the  question  is  ever  raised 
whether  the  insanity  be  a  consequence  of  intemperate  drink- 
ing ;  and,  in  the  event  of  its  being  so,  whether  the  party  knew 
that  such  a  result  might  be  expected.  It  is  not  easy  to  resist 
the  impression,  that  the  opinion  of  the  court  against  the  excul- 
patory effects  of  Birdsell's  insanity  was  determined  in  some 
measure,  by  the  reprehensible  character  of  its  cause.  If  his 
insanity  had  been  produced  by  mingling  in  scenes  of  reli- 
gious excitement,  by  indulging  in  schemes  of  commercial 
speculation,  or  a  more  criminal  species  of  gambling,  would 
the  court  have  said  it  afforded  no  apology  for  crime  because 
he  had  suffered  previous  attacks  in  consequence  of  exposure 
to  the  action  of  these  same  causes  ?  Probably  not  ;  and 
yet  if  guilt  is  made  to  consist  in  disregarding  the  lessons  of 
experience  relative  to  the  manner  in  which  the  insanity  is 
produced,  then  the  nature  of  its  exciting  causes  is  clearly 
an  immaterial  circumstance.  In  short,  the  opinion  of  the 
court  of  Ohio  conflicts  with  the  principles  laid  down  by  Mr. 
justice  Story  (§  404)  ;  and  if  the  latter  be  admitted,  as  they 
must  be  undoubtedly  by  every  one,  so  far  as  they  relate  to 
the  causes  of  insanity,  the  former  is  untenable  for  a  mo- 
ment, and  therefore  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  pursue  this 
train  of  reflections  any  farther. 


MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

§  411.  Criminal  acts  are  sometimes  committed  by  drunk- 
en people,  in  consequence  of  the  illusions  by  which  their 
minds  are  frequently  possessed.  Although  the  ordinary 
legal  consequences  of  such  acts  would  not  be  regarded  by 
the  English  law  as  being  modified  at  all  in  consequence  of 
the  mental  illusion  under  which  it  is  committed,  yet  it  can- 
not be  doubted  that- the  person  is  actuated  by  no  criminal 
intention,  nor  any  other  improper  motive.  Such  acts  have 
been  viewed  in  France,  Germany,  and  in  one  instance,  at 
least,  extraordinary  as  it  may  seem,  even  in  England,  with 
more  indulgence  than  those  which  arise  from  the  excited 
passions  and  quarrels  produced  by  drunkenness.  On  the  Nor- 
folk circuij,  10th  March,  1840,  a  man  was  tried  for  killing 
his  friend,  both  being  intoxicated,  "under  the  illusion  that 
he  was  some  other  person  who  had  come  to  attack  him. 
The  judge  made  the  prisoner's  guilt  to  rest  upon  the  fact, 
whether,  had  he  been  sober,  he  would  have  perpetrated  the 
act  under  a  similar  illusion.  As  he  had  voluntarily  brought 
himself  into  a  state  of  intoxication,  that  was  no  justification. 
He  was  found  guilty  of  manslaughter,  and  sentenced  to  two 
months  imprisonment."  l 

§  412.  After  the  thirty  years  war  in  Germany,  it  was  a 
popular  superstition,  on  the  banks  of  the  Elbe,  that  the  spirits 
of  Swedish  cavaliers  were  sometimes  seen  at  midnight 
mounted  on  horses  and  dressed  in  a  blue  uniform  faced  with 
red.  Two  peasants  who  had  always  been  intimate  friends, 
were  on  their  return  in  the  evening  from  their  labors  in  the 
fields,  when  they  stopped  to  rest  their  limbs  under  a  tree, 
and  there  they  drank  from  a  bottle  of  brandy  they  happened 
to  have,  until  they  became  quite  drunk.  In  this  condition 
they  talked  about  the  Swedish  cavaliers,  till  their  imagina- 
tions, heated  by  the  drink,  made  them  believe  that  they 
were  surrounded  by  the  spirits,  and  that  they  could  only 

1  British  and  Foreign  Medical  Review,  x.  172. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    DRUNKENNESS.  453 

escape  by  fighting  them.  Each  had  a  staff,  and  they  pro- 
ceeded to  belabor  each  other,  believing  they  were  contending 
with  the  cavaliers,  till  one  was  finally  killed.  The  victor 
went  home  and  proclaimed  his  triumph  over  the  devils  that 
tried  to  carry  him  off.  He  was  condemned  to  ten  years 
imprisonment.1 

§  413.  On  the  17th  December,  1838,  two  young  French 
peasants  in  the  commune  of  the  Prairie  of  Sept.  Vents, 
started  to  walk  home  about  ten  o'clock  in  the  evening,  after 
having  drank  excessively.  According  to  the  account  of  the 
survivor,  they  were  conversing  about  witches,  on  their  way 
home,  when  they  arrived  at  a  little  bridge,  which  it  was 
rather  difficult  and  dangerous  to  pass.  The  survivor  offered 
to  carry  over  the  deceased  on  his  shoulders,  but  the  latter 
refused,  and  passed  over  first  on  his  hands  and  knees.  The 
former  did  not  know  how  he  got  over ;  he  only  remembered 
that  when  he  reached  the  other  side,  he  could  not  find  his 
companion,  but  that  in  groping  about,  he  stumbled  against 
something  white  with  long  hair  on  its  legs.  He  called  out 
and  summoned  the  strange  thing  to  get  up  and  speak,  but 
receiving  no  answer,  and  getting  more  and  more  frightened, 
he  took  out  his  knife  and  stabbed  it  repeatedly.  Losing  the 
knife,  he  broke  the  branch  of  a  tree,  and  attacked  the  ob- 
ject of  his  fears  with  renewed  fury,  trying,  at  last,  to  break 
one  of  its  legs,  that  he  might  be  sure  of  finding  it  next  morn- 
ing. Being  cold  and  tired,  however,  he  concluded  to  go 
home,  and  the  body  of  his  companion  was  found  next  day, 
near  the  bridge,  horribly  mutilated.  The  prisoner  was  con- 
demned to  hard  labor  for  life,  and  to  exposition.2 

§  414.  In  the  first  of  the  above  cases,  the  verdict  of  the 
jury,  it  will  be  observed,  is  directly  at  variance  with  the 
principle  laid  down  by  the  court,  as,  indeed,  it  is  with  the 
whole  doctrine  of  the  English  criminal  law  in  regard  to  this 

1  Marc,  De  la  Folie,  &c  ii.  635.  2  Idem,  ii.  G39. 


454  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

subject.  When  a  man  voluntarily  deprives  himself  of  the 
perfect  use  of  his  reason,  and  in  this  condition  commits  a 
criminal  act,  it  is  immaterial,  so  far  as  his  moral  guilt  is 
concerned,  whether  the  act  be  prompted  by  passion,  frenzy 
or  hallucination.  The  verdict  is  a  memorable  one,  inas- 
much as  it  is  the  first  within  my  knowledge,  in  which  an 
English  jury  has  made  any  distinction  between  a  homicide 
committed  in  a  state  of  drunkenness  though  without  any  crimi- 
nal intention,  and  one  deliberately  planned  and  deliberately 
executed  in  the  full  possession  of  the  reasoning  powers. 

§  415.  Criminal  cases  are  not  very  unfrequent  in  which 
intemperance  and  insanity  are  so  mingled  together  that  it  is 
impossible  to  unravel  their  relations  to  each  other,  and  as- 
certain their  respective  shares  of  influence  in  producing  the 
criminal  act.  The  following  will  serve  as  an  illustration  of 
this  class  of  cases. 

§  416.  David  Abbot  was  tried  by  the  superior  court  of 
Connecticut,  for  the  murder  of  his  wife  in  July,  1841.  The 
facts,  as  they  appeared  from  the  testimony,  were  substan- 
tially as  follows.  The  prisoner  belonged  to  a  respectable 
family,  possessed  some  property,  and  had  twelve  children 
by  his  wife.  For  several  years  prior  to  the  event,  he  had 
been  very  intemperate,  but  not  to  such  a  degree  as  to  pre- 
vent his  walking  about  and  conversing  as  at  other  times. 
Habitually  harsh  and  cruel  to  his  wife,  he  became  still  more 
so  when  under  the  immediate  influence  of  liquor.  He  be- 
came jealous  of  her  and  believed  that  she  had  frequent 
criminal  intercourse  with  two  of  their  neighbors.  But  it 
was  admitted  by  all  parties  that  the  conduct  of  these  persons 
and  of  his  wife  was  perfectly  unexceptionable,  so  far  as  this 
subject  was  concerned.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  day  when 
the  murder  was  committed,  he  was  observed  to  drink  rum 
and  cider  several  times.  After  he  and  his  wife  had  gone  to 
bed  they  were  heard  talking  together,  and  at  11  o'clock  he 
called  up  one  of  his  daughters,  and  directed  her  to  summon 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    DRUNKENNESS.  455 

the  neighbors,  "  as  they  were  all  dead  or  would  be  soon." 
The  wife  was  found  dead,  apparently  choked  to  death,  and 
he  lying  on  the  floor  with  his  throat  cut  in  several  places, 
but  not  fatally.  When  asked  what  he  had  been  doing,  he 
replied,  "  that  the  devil  had  been  there,  that  he  had  had  a 
clinch  with  him,  and  that  the  devil  had  been  trying  to  kill 
them  both,  and  had  cut  his  throat."  Subsequently,  however, 
when  he  became  more  composed,  he  stated  that  after  they 
went  to  bed,  an  altercation  ensued  ;  that  he  became  pro- 
voked, and  seized  her  by  the  throat,  holding  her  five  or  six 
minutes  when  he  found  she  was  dead.  He  then  attempted 
to  cut  his  own  throat  with  a  razor,  but  having  lost  the  razor 
and  bled  a  while,  he  changed  his  mind,  and  called  up  his 
daughter.  It  also  appeared  in  evidence  that  his  father,  two 
brothers  and  sister  had  been  insane  —  that  the  prisoner  him- 
self when  about  eighteen  years  old,  was  delirious  for  several 
weeks  immediately  after  attending  a  camp-meeting ;  and 
that  about  seven  years  before  the  death  of  his  wife,  he  went 
to  one  of  his  neighbors,  with  both  hands  on  the  top  of  his 
head,  saying  that  he  had  lost  the  top  of  his  head  and  must 
go  home  and  get  his  wife  to  put  it  on  again.  The  court,  in 
laying  down  the  law,  relative  to  the  legal  consequences  of 
intemperance,  adopted  the  principles  of  Mr.  justice  Story  in 
the  case  of  Drew,  and  the  jury  was  also  told,  that  if  they 
found  the  prisoner  insane,  but  not  to  such  a  degree  as  to 
render  him  wholly  irresponsible  for  his  acts,  they  had  a  right 
to  take  such  partial  insanity  into  consideration  in  connection 
with  the  provocation  in  determining  upon  its  sufficiency. 
If  they  found  that  the  provocation  in  that  case,  operating 
upon  a  mind  partially  insane  was  equal  in  its  effect  to  a 
provocation  which  would  reduce  a  homicide  committed  by  a 
man  of  perfectly  sound  mind  from  murder  to  manslaughter, 
they  would  have  a  right  to  find  the  prisoner  guilty  of  man- 
slaughter only.  The  prisoner  was  found  guilty  of  murder.1 

1  MS.  of  Mr.  justice  Waite  who  sat  upon  the  case,  and  kindly 
furnished  by  him. 


456  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

§  417.  In  the  present  state  of  public  opinion,  it  would  be 
difficult,  perhaps,  to  convince  a  jury  that  the  wretched  victims 
of  periodical  drunkenness,  or  of  that  other  form  of  the 
disorder  which  we  have  illustrated  (§  385)  ought  not  to  be 
held  responsible  for  their  criminal  acts.  It  would  be  object- 
ed probably,  that  these  conditions  are  the  result  of  habitual 
indulgence,  and  that  at  the  utmost,  the  only  difference  be- 
tween these  and  other  drunkards  is,  that  they  are  impelled 
to  the  gratification  of  their  insatiable  cravings  by  different 
degrees  of  violence  —  a  circumstance  which  it  would  be 
mischievous  to  recognize  in  estimating  the  degree  of  crimi- 
nal responsibility.  The  truth  would  be  overlooked  or 
disputed,  that  this  irresistible  propensity  to  excessive  drink- 
ing is  manifested  as  often,  if  not  oftener,  in  temperate  men, 
as  in  habitual  drunkards  ;  and  that  it  is  either  a  symptom 
of  the  first  stage  of  madness,  or  of  a  temporary  impair- 
ment of  the  mind  produced  by  some  disturbance  of  the 
cerebral  circulation.  The  drunkenness  being  thus  an  acci- 
dental, involuntary  consequence  of  a  maniacal  state  of  the 
mind,  it  cannot  impart  the  character  of  criminality  to  any 
action  to  which  it  may  give  rise.  If  the  merchant,  or 
servant  girl  whose  cases  we  have  quoted,  Esquirol  (§  383, 
386,)  had  committed  murder  in  one  of  their  paroxysms,  we 
should,  no  doubt,  have  had  the  testimony  of  that  distin- 
guished physician,  as  he  has  already  recorded  it  in  his 
writings  that  they  were  "  true  monomaniacs,  not  morally 
responsible."  The  other  cases  we  have  related,  though 
differing  a  little  from  these,  in  some  of  their  accidental 
symptoms,  evidently  proceeded  from  the  same  pathological 
causes ;  and  if  moral  responsibility  ceases  in  the  former,  it 
must  equally  cease  in  the  latter. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 


INTERDICTION     AND     ISOLATION. 

§  418.  WITH  respect  to  the  kind  and  degree  of  mental 
impairment  that  warrant  interdiction,  there  prevails  the 
utmost  diversity  of  opinion,  and  such  must  continue  to  be 
the  case,  till  sounder  views  are  entertained  of  the  true  pur- 
poses of  this  measure.  The  radical  fault  of  speculations 
on  this  subject  is,  that  the  attention  has  been  directed  to 
general  rules  and  abstract  distinctions,  rather  than  to  a 
thorough  and  discriminating  examination  of  the  particular 
circumstances  of  each  individual  case.  In  the  following 
paragraphs  will  be  found  abundant  illustrations  of  the  truth 
of  this  remark. 

§  419.  Imbeciles  in  the  first  degree  cannot  be  justly 
deprived  of  the  management  of  their  property,  on  the 
ground  of  mental  deficiency  alone.  If  they  have  shown 
no  disposition  to  squander  their  money  on  trifles,  nor  suf- 
fered their  affairs  to  be  grossly  neglected,  there  can  be  no 
reasonable  pretence  for  taking  it  altogether  from  their  con- 
trol and  enjoyment.  Neither  should  we  be  too  rigid  in  our 
scrutiny  of  these  cases.  If  a  whole  life  of  extravagance, 
or  hazardous  speculation,  is  not  enough  to  produce  the- 
interdiction  of  a  sound  person,  why  should  an  occasional 
act  of  either  in  one  of  feeble  intellect,  provoke  that  meas- 
ure ?  Of  course  there  can  be  no  question  of  its  propriety 
when  it  is  perfectly  obvious  that  he  is  dissipating  his  for. 
tune,  to  the  great  detriment  of  himself  and  of  those  who* 
are  dependent  on  him. 
39 


458  MEDICAL     JURISPRUDENCE     OF     INSANITY. 

§  420.  Much  discussion  and  tedious  litigation  have  arisen 
from  the  difficulty  of  determining  the  exact  measure  of  in- 
tellectual capacity  requisite  to  the  undisturbed  enjoyment  of 
civil  rights  and  privileges,  chiefly  in  consequence  of  losing 
sight  of  the  real  object  before  us,  and  pursuing  a  shadow  of 
our  own  creating.  It  is  a  question  of  capacity  in  reference 
to  certain  ends  and  duties,  and  we  are  not  called  on  to  go 
beyond  the  consideration  of  these,  in  our  endeavors  to  settle 
this  question.  The  speculative  opinions  of  the  imbecile  per- 
son, the  little  peculiarities  of  his  conduct,  his  style  of  living 
and  talking,  and  his  general  deportment  in  society,  are  points 
that  require  but  little  attention  in  this  inquiry.  Our  business 
is  with  the  manner  in  which  he  has  conducted  his  affairs, 
and  from  this  chiefly,  we  are  to  draw  our  inferences  respect- 
ing his  probable  future  conduct  and  capacity.  And  here  we 
are  not  bound  to  institute  a  rigid  comparison  between  his 
habits  and  those  of  people  enjoying  ordinary  soundness  and 
vigor  of  intellect.  We  are  not  warranted  in  stripping  him 
of  all  his  possessions  and  leaving  him  at  the  mercy  of  others, 
the  moment  we  can  fix  upon  a  single  instance  in  the  course 
of  his  life,  where  he  has  neglected  to  profit  by  a  happy  turn 
of  fortune,  or  has  rewarded  a  service,  or  bestowed  his  boun- 
ties, in  a  manner  altogether  opposed  to  our  ideas  of  fore- 
thought and  economy.  Has  the  individual  indulged  in  re- 
peated acts  of  extravagance,  or  of  profitless  expenditure  ? 
Has  he  engaged  in  the  execution  of  visionary  projects  with 
reckless  indifference  as  to  the  extent  of  his  means  and  appli- 
ances ?  Has  he  squandered  his  money  on  favorites,  or 
become  an  instrument  in  the  hands  of  designing  and  pro- 
fligate associates  for  advancing  their  own  selfish  projects  ? 
These  are  among  the  most  prominent  questions  that  require 
a  satisfactory  answer,  and  if  they  are  kept  steadily  before 
us,  there  will  be  little  fear  of  losing  ourselves  in  the  maze 
of  perplexities  which  the  judicial  investigation  of  cases  of 
imbecility  frequently  creates. 


INTERDICTION    AND    ISOLATION.  459 

§421.  These  views,  it  will  be  seen,  afford  no  countenance 
to  the  usual  practice  of  canvassing  the  whole  history  of  the 
imbecile  person,  arraying  act  against  act,  and  speech  against 
speech,  and  drawing  from  each  an  inference  for  or  against 
his  capacity  of  managing  his  own  affairs  in  his  own  way. 
Few  of  those  whose  interests  become  involved  in  protracted 
litigation,  are  so  destitute  of  intellect  as  never  to  conduct 
like  persons  of  well-developed  minds  under  similar  circum- 
stances. They  may  write  sensible  letters,  make  shrewd 
bargains,  and  converse  on  ordinary  topics  without  betraying 
any  mental  deficiency,  while  yielding  implicitly  to  the  will 
of  others,  and  committing  acts  of  folly  that  can  arise  from 
nothing  short  of  unequivocal  imbecility.  The  popular  error 
that  imbecility  is  only  an  inferior  endowment  of  mind  con- 
sidered in  regard  to  its  absolute  quantity,  has  led  people  to 
forget  that  in  this  condition,  the  mental  faculties  may  be  very 
unequally  defective  ;  and,  therefore,  that  very  different  con- 
clusions would  be  formed  respecting  an  individual's  capacity, 
according  as  the  attention  is  exclusively  directed  to  the  man- 
ifestation of  this  or  that  faculty.  Many  also,  who,  while 
surrounded  by  their  usual  circle  of  associations,  manage 
their  slender  means  with  the  utmost  prudence  and  economy, 
would  prove  themselves  totally  inadequate  to  the  manage- 
ment of  a  large  property,  and  be  easily  led,  by  the  influence 
of  new  associates  and  the  excitement  of  new  desires,  into 
habits  of  extravagance  and  dissipation. 

§  422.  The  little  success  that  has  attended  every  attempt 
to  fix  upon  certain  criteria  as  tests  of  that  degree  of  imbe- 
cility which  is  incompatible  with  the  management  of  pro- 
perty, and  to  run  the  line  between  this  mental  condition  and 
that  of  legal  capacity,  is  another  circumstance  in  favor  of 
the  course  here  indicated.  "  In  order  to  arrive  at  the  true 
meaning  of  '  imbecility  of  mind,' "  says  Sir  John  Nicholl, 
"  we  may  resort  to  what  the  law  describes  as  perfect  capa- 
city, which  is  most  correctly  found  in  the  form  of  pleadings 


460  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

used  in  the  ecclesiastical  courts,  in  the  averment  in  support 
of  a  will,  that  the  testator  was  of  'sound  mind,  memory, 
and  understanding  —  talked  and  discoursed  rationally  and 
sensibly,  and  was  fully  capable  of  any  rational  act  requiring 
thought,  judgment,  and  reflection.'  Here  is  the  legal  stand- 
ard." '  It  may  be  doubted  if  this  definition  can  ever  be  of 
much  practical  service,  for  no  definition  can  be  so  which 
embraces  either  more  or  less  than  is  strictly  warranted  by 
the  exact  nature  of  the  thing  defined.  Many  an  imbecile 
who  could  not  be  safely  trusted  with  the  control  of  property 
for  a  single  week,  may  nevertheless  "  talk  and  discourse 
rationally  and  sensibly,"  so  long  as  the  conversation  is  con- 
fined to  simple  subjects  that  have  long  been  familiar  to  the 
mind  ;  and  many  a  man  of  legal  capacity  may  be  found,  of 
whom  it  cannot  be  said  that  he  is  "  fully  capable  of  any 
rational  act "  whatever,  "  requiring  thought,  judgment  and 
reflection."  The  very  point  to  be  decided  is,  whether  the 
person  in  question,  who  talks  and  discourses  so  rationally 
and  sensibly  and  does  so  many  rational  acts,  is  or  is  not 
capable  of  managing  his  affairs  ;  and  however  much  we 
may  scrutinize  the  character  of  his  intellect,  the  only  just 
and  accurate  test  of  such  capacity  is  the  manner  in  which 
he  has  already  managed  his  affairs.  The  tests  of  legal  ca- 
pacity so  much  sought  after  in  imbecility,  cannot  be  obtained, 
from  the  nature  of  things,  because  the  general  strength  of 
mind  is  but  an  uncertain  index  of  its  ability  when  exercised 
on  particular  subjects.  The  ministers  of  the  law  therefore 
should  be  extremely  cautious  how  they  are  moved  by  theo- 
retical considerations,  instead  of  particular  facts  bearing  on 
the  point  at  issue,  in  examining  requests  for  interdiction  on 
the  ground  of  imbecility. 

§  423.  General  intellectual  and  general  moral  mania  are 


Ingram  v.  Wyatt,  1  Haggard's  Eccl.  Reports,  401. 


INTERDICTION    AND    ISOLATION.  461 

always  a  sufficient  cause  of  interdiction  ;  for  the  reflective 
faculties  are  too  much  deranged  in  those  disorders  to  discern 
the  relations  of  property,  or  to  provide  the  necessary  ar- 
rangements for  preserving  and  improving  it.  The  only 
question  is,  how  soon  after  the  manifestation  of  the  disease, 
are  we  warranted  in  taking  this  measure.  Since  its  publicity 
serves  to  expose  the  patient  and  his  family  to  the  popular 
and  not  unfounded  prejudice  against  insanity,  and  since 
mania,  when  early  attended  to,  is  cured,  in  the  larger  pro- 
portion of  cases,  within  the  first  or  second  year,  this  step 
should  be  delayed,  unless  extraordinary  reasons  require  im- 
mediate action,  till  the  effect  of  judicious  treatment  has  been 
observed.  The  restraint  and  seclusion  which  curative  meas- 
ures necessarily  require,  prevent  the  patient  from  engaging 
in  business,  and  indeed  place  him  in  the  same  condition  as 
would  sickness  of  any  other  kind.  Neither  is  this  measure 
always  justifiable  when  the  disease  is  so  slight  as  not  to 
prevent  him  from  going  abroad  and  mingling  in  the  affairs 
of  the  world.  If,  however,  the  patient  is  a  merchant,  for 
instance,  and  continues  to  engage  in  the  transaction  of  busi- 
ness, immediate  interdiction  would  be  required  perhaps,  to 
save  him  from  the  effects  of  ruinous  contracts.  Generally 
speaking,  no  harm  is  done  by  a  little  delay,  but  the  practice 
of  taking  property  from  its  lawful  possessors  to  place  it  in 
the  control  of  others  who  may  have  no  other  object  than 
that  of  enriching  themselves  by  their  trust,  the  first  moment 
the  presence  of  madness  is  satisfactorily  established,  must 
lead  to  positive  and  considerable  evils.  So  jealous  is  the 
French  law  of  this  hasty  interference,  that  it  permits  nothing 
less  than  habitual  insanity  to  procure  interdiction.1 

§  424.     In  partial  mania,  Hoffbauer 2  thinks  we  should 
be  governed  by  the   nature  of  the   predominant  idea,  not 


1  Code  civil,  Art.  489.  2  Op.  cit.  §  110. 

39* 


462  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

considering  it  a  sufficient  ground  of  interdiction,  unless  con- 
nected with  the  subject  of  property,  in  a  manner  likely  to 
lead  to  its  wasteful  and  improvident  management.  Such 
too  was  the  opinion  of  Dr.  Rush,1  and  a  late  writer2  has 
contended  against  the  opposite  practice  with  signal  ability 
and  skill.  "  Mental  derangement,  to  be  a  sufficient  reason 
for  interdiction,"  says  a  French  jurist,  "  should  have  refer- 
ence to  the  ordinary  affairs  of  civil  life,  and  to  the  govern- 
ment of  the  person  and  property  of  the  individual ;  a  man 
who  is  merely  visionary,  or  entertains  speculative  notions 
that  are  palpably  false,  should  not  be  interdicted,  if  he  man- 
age his  affairs  well  enough  in  other  respects.""  Georget, 
however,  thinks  that  monomaniacs  are  not  to  be  trusted, 
and  that  we  can  never  be  sure  that  the  predominant  idea 
may  not,  by  means  of  some  mental  associations,  lead  to  the 
dissipation  of  their  fortunes.  Accordingly,  he  is  dissatisfied 
with  the  decision  of  the  tribunal  of  La  Seine,  who  rejected 
a  petition  for  the  interdiction  of  M.  Selves,  a  celebrated 
advocate,  although  admitted  to  be  a  "  meddler  in  his  family, 
litigious  in  society,  impertinent  towards  the  magistrates, 
vainly  profuse  in  his  expenditures,  and  subject  to  some  illu- 
sions." 4 

§  425.  This  distrust  of  the  insane,  of  whatever  descrip- 
tion, is  nowhere  more  strongly  implied  than  in  the  habitual 
practice  of  Great  Britain  at  the  present  day.  One  finds  it 
difficult  to  believe  on  what  slight  grounds,  interdiction  is 
there  every  day  procured,  —  a  measure,  that  with  the  osten- 
sible purpose  of  protecting  the  interest  of  the  insane  party, 
is  too  often,  in  reality,  designed  to  promote  the  selfish  views 
of  relatives  and  friends.  A  kind  and  degree  of  mental  im- 


1  Lecture  on  Medical  Jurisprudence,  Philadelphia,  1811. 

2  Conolly,  Indications  of  Insanity,  430-445. 

3  Toullier,  le  Droit  civil  Franqais,  &c.  1811. 

4  Des  Maladies  mentales,  108. 


INTERDICTION   AND    ISOLATION.  463 

pairment  that  has  never  obscured  the  patient's  knowledge 
of  his  relative  situation,  never  altered  his  disposition  to  be 
kind  and  useful  to  those  around  him,  never  weakened  his 
enjoyment  of  social  pleasures,  and  never  affected  his  capa- 
city to  manage  his  concerns  with  his  usual  prudence,  has 
been  repeatedly  deemed  a  sufficient  reason  for  depriving 
him  of  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  his  own  property,  and  sub- 
jecting him  to  all  the  disabilities  the  law  can  impose.  Dr. 
Conolly  speaks  of  a  gentleman  on  whose  account  his  family 
applied  for  a  commission  of  lunacy,  because  he  had  become 
possessed  with  the  idea,  that  the  queen  of  England  was  in 
love  with  him.  Yet  this  person  conducted  himself  very  well 
in  most  of  the  offices  of  life,  and  on  one  occasion  after  this 
application  was  made,  while  dining  with  a  party  of  friends 
in  company  with  the  lord  chancellor,  he  contributed  so  re- 
markably to  the  enjoyment  of  the  day  by  his  polite,  agreea- 
ble and  amusing  manner,  that  this  functionary  could  not 
help  expressing  to  him  how  much  he  had  been  gratified  by 
his  introduction  to  him,  and  how  utterly  absurd  it  now  ap- 
peared to  him,  to  have  ever  given  credit  to  the  story  of 
his  delusion.  This  was  enough  to  produce  its  avowal  from 
the  patient,  and  the  issuing  of  the  commission  from  the  lord 
chancellor.  The  sequel  furnished  a  striking  comment  on 
the  injustice  of  this  act ;  for  the  insane  gentleman  gave  so 
much  assistance  to  those  entrusted  with  the  management  of 
his  affairs,  that  he  was  the  means  of  their  getting  over  diffi- 
culties which,  without  his  aid,  would  have  been  insurmount- 
able ;  and  in  the  end,  he  was  actually,  if  not  formally,  con- 
stituted the  steward  of  his  own  estate.  It  is  well  known 
that  a  monomaniac  in  England,  who  fancied  himself  duke 
of  Hexham,  and  was  accordingly  interdicted,  became  the 
agent  of  his  own  committee  for  the  management  of  his  own 
estate,  and  did  the  duties  of  the  office,  for  a  time  at  least, 
not  incorrectly. 

§  426.     The  case  of  Mr.  Edward  Davies,  which  engrossed 


464  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

the  attention  of  the  English  public,  a  few  years  since,  being, 
says  Dr.  Gooch,  "  by  far  the  most  important  lunatic  cause 
which  has  been  tried  in  our  time,"  furnishes  a  striking  illus- 
tration of  the  manner  in  which  these  things  are  managed  in 
England.  Mr.  Edward  Davies  was  born  of  humble  parents, 
and  though  particularly  shy  and  reserved  among  his  school- 
fellows, he  was  generally  considered  sharp  and  intelligent. 
On  leaving  school,  he  commenced  the  business  of  a  tea- 
dealer  in  London,  and  by  indefatigable  industry  and  cautious 
management,  rapidly  became  rich.  It  appears  that  his 
health,  at  best,  was  delicate,  and  that  he  suffered  much  from 
dyspepsia  and  nervous  excitement.  He  was  fond  of  reading 
medical  books ;  and,  like  most  persons  who  indulge  in  such 
a  taste,  was  fanciful  about  his  complaints  and  subject  to 
false  alarms.  The  defects  of  his  early  education,  he  en- 
deavored to  remedy,  by  reading  what  he  took  to  be  the  best 
authors,  and  was  often  guilty  of  making  a  ridiculous  display 
of  his  acquirements,  by  making  long  quotations  which  he 
would  spout  with  a  theatrical  air.  He  was  of  a  remarkably 
timid  and  yielding  disposition,  to  such  a  degree  as  to  be 
completely  subjected  to  the  authority  of  his  mother.  Though 
he  was  twenty-seven  years  of  age,  and  managing  an  exten- 
sive and  lucrative  business,  she  would  not  allow  him  to  carry 
any  money  in  his  pocket,  nor  to  spend  the  most  trifling  sum 
without  her  permission.  He  dared  not  go  to  the  play,  nor 
leave  the  house  for  a  few  hours,  without  asking  her  leave. 
She  was  particularly  at  great  pains  to  prevent  his  meeting 
young  women,  lest,  in  the  event  of  his  marriage,  she  might 
be  displaced  from  the  control  of  his  conduct,  and  the  com- 
mand of  his  purse ;  and  she  took  various  opportunities  of 
inducing  him  to  give  considerable  sums  of  money  to  differ- 
ent branches  of  her  family.  At  the  age  of  twenty-seven, 
he  grew  restive  under  the  maternal  restraints,  and  made 
many  attempts  to  emancipate  himself.  He  offered  to  leave 
the  shop  to  his  mother  and  take  his  own  property  away ;  or 


INTERDICTION    AND    ISOLATION.  465 

to  give  her  seven  thousand  pounds,  on  her  consenting  to 
leave  the  concern ;  but  she  was  not  to  be  got  rid  of  at  that 
price.  The  incessant  state  of  contention  at  last  seriously 
impaired  his  health  and  his  mental  tranquillity,  and  on  the 
first  of  July,  1829,  he  applied  to  Mr.  Lawrence,  the  sur- 
geon. He  told  this  gentleman  a  long  story  about  his  health 
and  his  tea-trade ;  and  at  another  interview,  he  recited 
poetry  and  expressed  a  strong  antipathy  to  his  mother  and 
several  relations.  Mr.  Lawrence  considered  him  of  un- 
sound mind,  but  thought  that  if  he  could  be  reconciled  to  his 
mother  and  family,  the  disease  would  be  at  an  end  —  that 
his  antipathy  to  his  mother  was  his  chief  delusion. 

§  427.  About  this  time,  he  applied  to  Dr.  Latham, 
claiming  his  protection.  His  discourse  was  wild  and  ram- 
bling, and  his  manner  strange  and  excited.  He  told  the 
doctor  in  a  sort  of  whisper,  that  he  had  a  tale  to  relate  of 
the  greatest  horror,  and  then  flung  himself  away  and  stalked 
into  the  middle  of  the  room.  He  appeared  very  apprehen- 
sive lest  he  might  be  overheard,  and  begged  that  he  might 
lock  the  doors  and  close  the  windows.  He  spoke  of  his 
wealth  and  his  trade,  and  quoted  poetry  largely,  using  great 
gesticulation  and  throwing  his  arms  about.  Several  times 
he  asked  if  he  looked  insane,  and  on  leaving  the  house,  he 
said ;  "If  you  fail  (in  his  promise  to  call  on  him)  dread  the 
vengeance  of  a  madman  ;  for  I  carry  a  loaded  pistol."  Dr. 
Latham  thought  him  insane,  though  not  prepared  to  recom- 
mend that  he  should  be  shut  up  as  an  acknowledged  lunatic. 
Shortly  after  this,  he  left  his  own  house  and  went  to  spend 
the  night  at  Furnival  Inn,  on  the  third  of  August.  About 
one  o'clock  in  the  night,  he  rang  the  bell,  and  told  the  waiter 
that  there  were  thieves  in  the  house  ;  that  he  heard  them 
snapping  off  pistols,  and  striking  a  light.  On  being  remon- 
strated with  by  the  waiter,  on  the  impropriety  of  his  ringing 
the  bell,  and  thus  disturbing  the  lodgers,  he  said  he  was 


466  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

sorry  for  it,  went  upon  his  knees,  and  humbly  begged  his 
pardon. 

§  428.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  that  on  the  same  days 
on  which  Dr.  Latham,  Mr.  Lawrence,  and  others,  saw  him 
in  his  most  explosive  state,  his  friends  who  had  known  him 
long,  passed  hours  with  him  ;  and  though  he  was  ill  and 
terrified,  he  appeared  to  them  quite  himself,  and  as  equal 
as  ever  he  had  been  to  give  directions  about  his  shop  affairs. 
Indeed,  the  very  persons  who  were  trying  to  confine  him  as 
unfit  to  take  care  of  his  business,  were  themselves  consult- 
ing him  about  the  management  of  that  business. 

§  429.  Mr.  Davies  was  shortly  after  this  removed  to  a 
private  mad-house,  where  he  remained  till  the  end  of 
December,  when  he  was  liberated  by  the  verdict  of  the 
jury.  Here  his  agitation  subsided,  his  incoherence  dimin- 
ished almost  to  nothing ;  and  the  only  remaining  grounds 
for  believing  him  a  lunatic,  were  his  antipathy  to  his  mother, 
and  certain  suspicions  that  were  considered  to  be  delirious. 
Nevertheless,  a  commission  of  lunacy  was  granted  by  the 
lord  chancellor,  which  finally  resulted  in  restoring  him  to 
liberty,  and  the  management  of  his  property.  The  evidence 
of  the  physicians,  who  were  sent  expressly  for  the  purpose 
of  examining  Mr.  Davies,  at  various  interviews,  and  who 
pronounced  him  to  be  mad,  is  worthy  of  a  little  notice,  in- 
asmuch, as  they  present  the  grounds  on  which,  in  the  year 
1829,  the  most  eminent  physicians  for  diseases  of  the  mind 
shut  up  patients  in  mad-houses,  among  the  English. 

§  430.  Sir  George  Tuthill  testified,  that  he  was  of  un- 
sound mind,  at  the  period  of  his  last  visit;  principally, 
because  he  spoke  indignantly  of  the  manner  in  which  he 
had  been  treated  by  his  family.  His  additional  reasons  for 
thinking  him  insane,  and  unable  to  manage  his  affairs,  were 
his  learning  to  box,  his  purchasing  a  fowl  for  ten  shillings, 
and  his  saying  that  he  could  weep  over  his  little  rabbits, 
which  he  had  not  seen  for  six  weeks. 


INTERDICTION    AND    ISOLATION.  467 

Dr.  Algernon  Frampton  testified,  that  he  could  not  con- 
sider him  sane  on  the  seventh  of  December,  because  he 
would  not  admit  himself  to  have  been  insane  on  the  eighth 
of  August.  He  thought  there  was  a  delusion  in  his  mind  as 
to  his  mother's  conduct,  though  he  admitted  there  would  be 
no  delusion,  if  his  mother  had  interfered  as  Davies  described, 
and  as  other  witnesses  testified.  He  thought  that  the  pur- 
chase of  a  certain  estate  for  6000  guineas  was  in  itself  an 
act  of  insanity,  considering  his  circumstances,  though  he 
admitted  that  he  knew  nothing  of  his  circumstances.  A 
man  of  business,  he  thought,  ought  not  to  lock  up  so  much 
of  his  capital.  He  never  inquired  how  Mr.  Davies  managed 
his  business,  though  he  declared  that  he  was  incapable  of 
managing  it. 

Mr.  Haslam  testified,  that  he  was  induced  to  consider 
him  insane,  from  his  manner  of  complaining  of  the  dirty 
habits  of  the  keepers  of  the  establishment  where  he  was  con- 
fined. He  said  decidedly,  that  as  long  as  his  morbid  hostility 
remained  against  his  mother,  it  was  not  safe  for  him  to  go 
at  large. 

§  431.  In  opposition  to  this  evidence  —  and  it  is  but  a 
small  portion  of  what  might  be  given — it  may  be  well  to 
exhibit  a  specimen  or  two  of  that  given  by  Mr.  Davies's 
medical  witnesses.  Dr.  Macmichael,  who  had  been  sent 
down  by  the  lord  chancellor  to  examine  into  the  state  of  his 
mind,  satisfactorily  showed  that  Mr  Davies's  peculiar  notions 
and  views  which  had  been  considered  by  many  as  delusions, 
either  did  not  exist  at  all,  or  proved  upon  examination,  to 
be  perfectly  rational  and  proper.  In  attributing  his  prospe- 
rity to  the  favor  of  providence,  which  had  been  mentioned 
as  one  of  his  delusions,  he  said  he  did  not  mean  immediate 
or  special  interference,  but.  that  general  providence  which 
regulates  human  affairs.  His  boast  of  having  improved  the 
revenue  by  his  biddings,  which  had  also  been  imputed  to 


468  MEDICAL     JURISPRUDENCE     OF     INSANITY. 

him  as  a  delusion,  he  explained  by  saying  that  there  was  a 
certain  kind  of  tea  that  was  now  almost  given  away  ;  that 
if  he  bid  higher  than  others,  the  duty  would  be  increased, 
and  that  thus  he  should  put  money  into  the  pocket  of  govern- 
ment. He  showed,  that  instead  of  sacrificing  his  property 
bv  this  course,  he  realized  a  large  sum  of  money  in  a  very 
short  time.  Dr.  Macmichael  was  not  willing  to  admit  that 
his  learning  pugilism,  or  carrying  pistols,  was  any  evidence 
of  unsoundness  of  mind,  for  he  might  have  had  good  reason 
for  doing  both. 

§  432.  Dr.  Mackinnon,  who  was  connected  by  marriage 
with  the  family  of  Mr.  Davies,  and  had  visited  him  several 
times  during  his  confinement,  thought  him,  from  the  first 
interview  to  the  last,  capable  of  managing  himself  and  his 
affairs.  He  showed  that  many  of  his  peculiar  habits  and 
manners,  which  had  given  rise  to  the  idea  of  insanity,  he 
had  always  manifested  when  in  good  health.  His  letters, 
which,  from  being  full  of  quotations  and  puns,  were  thought 
to  indicate  disordered  mind,  he  showed  were  not  different, 
in  that  respect,  from  those  he  wrote  long  before  insanity 
was  imputed  to  him.  He  conversed  with  him  freely  on 
the  affairs  of  his  family,  and  his  remarks  upon  his  mo- 
ther's interference  were  rational,  just,  and  free  from  excite- 
ment. His  inquiry  into  the  imputed  delusions,  ended  in 
the  same  result  as  Dr.  Macrnichael's.  In  particular,  he  did 
not  consider  his  hostility  to  his  mother  as  a  delusion,  for, 
from  the  son's  account,  there  was  good  reason  for  it.  On 
a  variety  of  other  subjects,  his  discourse  was  calm  and 
rational. 

§  433.  It  certainly  would  not  be  strange,  if  this  case 
should  induce  every  one  to  adopt  the  conclusion  of  Dr. 
Gooch,  that  "  it  ought  to  be  made  punishable,  by  heavy  fine 
and  imprisonment,  to  deprive  a  man  of  his  liberty  for  any 
cause  excepting  mischievousness  to  others  and  to  himself, 


INTERDICTION    AND    ISOLATION.  469 

and  the  parties  who  commit  such  outrages  ought  to  be  pro- 
secuted at  the  public  expense."  * 

§  434.     This  case  is  not  calculated  to  recommend   the 
opinion  of  those  who  look  on  the  slightest  mental  aberration 
as  a  sufficient  ground  of  interdiction.     The  principle  to  be 
followed  here  is    precisely  that  which  we  have  indicated  as 
applicable  to  cases  of  imbecility.     Instead  of  puzzling  our- 
selves with  vain  attempts  to  gauge  the  depth  and  breadth  of 
the  absolute  capacity  of  the  mind,  our  duty  is  simply  to 
ascertain  if  the  individual  has  been  guilty  of  any  instances 
of  gross  improvidence,  of  expenditure  beyond  his  means,  or 
for  objects   unsuited  to  his  station  and  pursuits.     If  it  be 
found  that  he  has,  then  interdiction  is  implicitly  required  by 
a  regard  to  his  own  and  the  interests  of  those  who  are 
dependent  on  him  for  support,  or  entertain  rational  expecta- 
tions of  being  benefited  by  his  wealth.     If  he  has  not,  it  is 
not  very  clear  how  his  property  can  be  taken  from  his  con- 
trol, without  violating  the  first  principles  of  civil  liberty.     If 
no  one  doubts  that  the  mental  operations  in  monomania  may 
be  perfectly  sound,  except  within   a  certain  very  narrow 
circle,  why  should  it  be  a  matter  of  surprise,  that  ideas  of 
property  should  sometimes  be  among  those  which  are  un- 
affected by  the  influence  of  the  disorder?     To  deprive  a 
person,  laboring  under  a  partial  mania  that  does  not  involve 
his  notions  of  property,  of  the  natural  right  of  controlling 
and  disposing  of  his  own  fortune,  is  as  unjust  and  irrational, 
as  it  would  be  to  inflict  upon  a  felon  convicted  of  theft,  the 
penalties  attached  to  the  violation  of  every  article  in   the 
criminal  code.     If,  too,  we  interdict  one  monomaniac,  whose 
derangement  is  limited  to  a  single  subject,  we  are  bound  in 
consistency  to  proceed  till  we  have  included  all,  from  him 


1  The  facts  of  the  above  case  are  taken  from  an  article  written,  it 
is  said,  by  the  late  Dr.  Gooch,  in  the  London  Quarterly  Review, 
vol.  xlii. 

40 


470  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

who  believes  he  has  lost  his  rational  soul,  to  the  poor  hypo- 
chondriac who  imagines  his  legs  are  made  of  glass,  or  that 
a  fish  has  taken  up  its  abode  in  his  stomach.  The  mischief 
that  would  arise  from  such  a  course  of  disqualification,  may 
be  easily  enough  conceived,  without  the  aid  of  any  more 
particular  description.  Even  when  the  hallucination  has 
reference  to  property,  as  the  idea  for  instance,  that  the  in- 
dividual possesses  immense  wealth,  or  that  every  ship  which 
enters  the  harbor  is  his  and  freighted  with  his  goods,  we  are 
not  too  hastily  to  strip  him  of  what  is  really  his  own,  for  he 
might,  nevertheless,  in  the  management  of  it,  evince  the 
most  commendable  prudence  and  economy.  It  is  a  remark- 
able but  not  an  uncommon  fact,  that  monomaniacs  often 
make  no  practical  application  of  their  insane  notions  to  their 
own  conduct  or  concerns,  but  continue  to  manage  both,  as 
if  no  such  delusion  existed. 

§  435.  In  the  progress  of  dementia,  there  always  comes 
a  period  sooner  or  later,  when  interdiction  is  required, 
wherever  the  patient  has  much  property,  or  conflicting 
interests  are  involved  in  its  disposition.  To  decide  when 
this  period  has  actually  arrived,  is  generally  a  difficult  and 
responsible  duty.  To  avoid  the  disagreeable  alternative  of 
favoring  the  designs  of  selfish  relatives,  which  would  be 
promoted  by  the  interdiction  and  seclusion  of  the  old  man, 
by  premature  interference,  or  of  delaying  proper  measures, 
for  fear  of  being  thought  accessory  to  schemes  of  fraud 
and  oppression,  until  too  late  to  be  of  any  service,  is  to 
gain  the  happy  medium  which  all  should  seek,  but  which 
few  perhaps  are  successful  enough  to  obtain.  The  difficul- 
ties which  medical  men  have  to  encounter,  who  are  con- 
ulted  in  such  cases,  are  graphically  described  by  Dr. 
Conolly.  "  An  old  gentleman,"  he  says,  "  whose  intellects 
are  so  impaired  that  he  does  not  know  whether  he  has  re- 
ceived his  rents  or  not,  or  who  is  unable  to  arrange  his  own 
dress  decently,  and  requires,  when  up  stairs,  all  the  atten- 


INTERDICTION     AND    ISOLATION.  471 

tion  of  a  child,  is  seen  by  the  medical  practitioner,  for  the 
purpose  of  its  being  ascertained  how  far  interference  with 
his  property  is  justifiable.  The  very  servant  who  is  hourly 
robbing  him,  takes  care  to  send  him  down  very  carefully 
drest.  The  mere  effect  of  habit  is  to  cause  the  patient 
himself  to  be  more  guarded  and  exact  in  his  manner  and 
words  in  the  presence  of  a  stranger  ;  he  feels  under  a 
temporary  and  a  wholesome  restraint ;  asks  and  answers 
common  questions  as  well  as  most  other  old  men,  and  is 
perfectly  correct  in  his  deportment.  Two  very  serious 
evils  may  ensue.  If  the  practitioner  is  unacquainted  with  the 
varieties  of  the  mind  and  their  tendencies  ;  and  imagines 
that  insanity  and  sanity  cannot  be  mixed  up  together  in  the 
mind  as  they  are  in  the  body  ;  he  feels  a  degree  of  con- 
scientious horror  concerning  any  interference  with  an  old 
gentleman  who  may  be  a  little  weak,  but  who,  he  is  quite 
convinced,  is  no  more  mad  than  any  of  those  about  him. 
He  turns  his  thoughts  to  the  probable  motives  of  interest, 
in  the  children  or  the  friends,  and,  determining  not  to  war- 
rant any  kind  of  restraint,  inwardly  applauds  his  own  sa- 
gacity and  incorruptibility.  The  friends,  now  more  afraid 
to  interfere  than  before,  allow  the  old  man  to  do  as  he  likes, 
and  he  sets  off,  and  gets  married  to  a  worthless  and 
designing  woman,  or  he  alters  his  will  in  favor  of  some 
unprincipled  person,  or  finds  his  way  to  some  neighboring 
town,  where  he  becomes  a  disgraceful  spectacle,  and  gets 
robbed  of  his  money  and  ill-treated  ;  or  perhaps  he  falls 
into  the  pond,  and  is  drowned  ;  all  the  world  then  exclaim- 
ing against  the  heartlessness  and  inattention  of  those  about 
him,  and  the  unaccountable  supineness  of  those  who  were 
consulted  about  the  case.  Thus,  the  view  of  a  very  plain 
and  easy  duty  is,  not  unfrequently,  obscured  by  prevalent 
opinions  respecting  the  nature  of  insanity,  and  respecting 
the  measures  which  insanity  is  supposed  to  render  indispen- 
sable. If  the  patient  whom  I  have  described,  as  conducting 


472  MEDICAL     JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY, 

himself  so  satisfactorily  in  a  short  and  common  conversa- 
tion, is  left  to  his  own  thought  for  a  little  time,  and  his 
attention  is  not  excited  by  those  about  him,  his  state  will 
become  evident  enough.  He  will  be  seen  to  be  wandering, 
and  lost  in  his  reflections,  and  will  perhaps  rise  up,  and 
endeavor  to  make  his  way  out  of  the  room,  but  without 
seeming  to  remember  the  situation  of  the  door.  Or  he  will 
declare  his  intention  to  set  off  on  a  long  journey,  or  by 
many  slight  indications  show  that  his  mind  is  reduced  to 
imbecility.  In  some,  the  effects  of  the  recent  restraint  of 
a  stranger's  presence  may  be  more  permanent  than  in 
others  ;  but  half  an  hour  or  a  few  hours  at  the  utmost,  will 
suffice  to  show  the  state  of  the  case.  The  decision  is  im- 
portant, and  due  time  must  be  allowed  for  it.  If  one  visit 
is  not  sufficient,  the  visit  should  be  repeated,  until  the  prac- 
titioner can  give  a  clear  and  decided  opinion. 

u  But  now  comes  the  other  danger.  A  sanguine  prac- 
titioner sees  the  undoubted  signs  of  folly  and  weakness  in 
the  old  man,  and  forgetting  that  they  are  as  much  the 
effects  of  age  as  are  the  unsteadiness  of  his  limbs,  and  the 
dullness  of  his  hearing,  pronounces  the  patient  to  be  mad  ; 
and  to  gratify  persons  of  no  feeling  or  compunction,  con- 
signs the  poor  patient  to  strange  hands,  and  causes  him  to 
spend  the  little  remnant  of  his  days  away  from  his  own 
house,  and  unseen  by  any  of  those  whom  his  former  care 
perhaps  preserved,  and  whom  his  wealth  will  enrich.1  " 

§  436.  The  principles  we  have  indicated,  as  proper  to 
guide  us  in  deciding  questions  of  interdiction  in  the  various 
forms  of  imbecility  and  mania,  are  not  to  be  so  implicitly 
relied  on  here,  because  the  unfitness  of  the  patient  to  man- 
age his  own  concerns  is  often  proved,  not  so  much  by  spe- 
cific acts  of  extravagance  or  folly  as  by  his  subjection  to 
the  will  of  those  who  are  deliberately  and  cautiously  prey- 

1  Indications  of  Insanity,  440. 


INTERDICTION    AND    ISOLATION.  473 

ing  upon  his  substance.  We  may  also  bear  in  mind,  that 
although  we  take  from  him  the  control  of  his  property,  even 
while  his  faculties  are  sound  enough  to  make  him  capable 
of  performing  the  duty  himself,  yet  we  are  only  prema- 
turely taking  a  measure  which  a  few  weeks  or  months  will 
generally  render  absolutely  necessary. 

§  437.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  in  cases  of  insanity, 
where  the  mental  disorder  does  not  seem  sufficient  to  war- 
rant so  extreme  a  measure  as  complete  interdiction,  while 
it  occasions  reasonable  doubts  of  the  ability  to  manage 
property  with  ordinary  prudence,  our  laws  have  established 
no  inferior  grades  of  restraint.  The  civil  code  of  France 
ordains  that  "  in  rejecting  a  demand  for  interdiction,  the 
court  may  nevertheless,  if  circumstances  require  it,  debar 
the  defendant  from  appearing  in  suits,  making  contracts, 
borrowing,  receiving  payment  for  debts  or  giving  a  dis- 
charge, alienating  or  pledging  his  properly,  without  the  aid 
of  a  council  which  shall  be  appointed  in  the  same  judg- 
ment." '  It  would  be  well,  if  something  of  this  kind 
always  found  a  place  in  the  legal  regulations  of  the  insane. 

§  438.  The  views  here  presented  on  the  propriety  of 
interdiction  in  different  kinds  of  insanity,  can,  at  the  most, 
affect  only  the  opinions  of  the  expert,  or  the  conclusions  of 
the  judge.  They  cannot  easily  be  embodied  into  a  legisla- 
tive enactment,  and  it  is  doubtful  if  the  slightest  attempt 
thereto,  would  not  be  productive  of  uncertainty  and  embar- 
rassment. In  the  French  civil  code  it  is  enacted  that  only 
habitual  imbecility,  dementia,  or  furor,  can  be  a  sufficient 
cause  of  interdiction.2  In  thus  requiring  the  alienation  to 
have  been  habitual,  it  was  the  object  of  the  legislator, 
no  doubt,  to  prevent  the  abuses  that  might  arise,  if  this 
measure  were  allowed  in  those  temporary  alienations  that 
readily  yield  to  medical  treatment.  But  as  no  two  individ- 

i  Code  Civil,  Art.,  499.  2  Art.  489. 

40* 


474  MEDICAL     JURISPRUDENCE     OF     INSANITY. 

uals  would  probably  agree  as  to  the  number  of  weeks  or 
months  necessary  to  make  a  case  of  insanity  habitual,  the 
law  must  of  necessity,  either  be  entirely  disregarded  in 
practice,  or  become  the  means  of  great  injustice,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  diversity  of  interpretation  to  which  it  is 
liable.  Georget  observes,  that  in  Paris,  the  judge  is  always 
governed  by  the  opinion  of  the  patient's  physician,  relative 
to  the  future  progress  and  result  of  the  disease,  rather  than 
to  its  previous  duration.1  The  French  jurists  have  dis- 
agreed as  to  the  construction  intended  to  be  put  on  the 
terms,  imbecility,  &c.  While  some  contend  that  these 
terms  are  thus  multiplied  merely  in  order  to  embrace  every 
possible  form  of  mental  disorder  ;  it  is  contended  by  others, 
that  the  legislator's  object  was  to  prevent  interdiction  on 
account  of  any  mental  disorder  which  could  not  fairly  be 
brought  under  one  of  these  divisions.  The  consequence  is 
what  might  be  expected  —  the  law  is  practically  disre- 
garded altogether. 

§  439.  What  the  legislator  can  and  ought  to  do,  is  to 
provide  for  the  impartial  administration  of  justice  where 
interdiction  is  provoked,  by  such  a  course  of  procedure  as 
will  tend  to  bring  out  all  the  material  facts.  In  France  the 
facts  of  the  case  must  be  stated  in  writing,  and  supported 
by  documents  and  witnesses  ;  the  family-council  gives  its 
opinion  touching  the  utility  of  the  measure  ;  and  the  re- 
spondent is  examined  by  the  court  and  the  attorney  general. 
If  the  examination  and  the  documents  are  not  satisfactory, 
the  court  may  order  an  inquest.  The  same  formalities  are 
required  for  removing  the  interdiction.2  In  England  inter- 
diction is  obtained  by  application  to  the  Lord  Chancellor 
who  appoints  a  Commission  of  Lunacy,  consisting  of  three 
or  five  persons,  who  cause  a  jury  to  be  summoned  with 

1  Discussion  med.  leg.  174. 

2  Code  Civil,  Art.  493,  494,  495. 


INTERDICTION     AND     ISOLATION.  475 

whom  the  commissioners  sit  as  a  court,  and  hear  the  evi- 
dence adduced.  The  inquisition  may  be  traversed,  though 
the  chancellor  be  satisfied  with  it.  In  some  of  the 
United  States,  this  method  is  still  preserved,  except  that  in 
such  as  have  no  chancery  court,  the  commission  is  issued 
by  a  court  of  law.  In  most  of  them  however,  application 
is  made  to  the  judge  of  probate  who  gives  due  notice  to  the 
respondent,  appoints  a  time  and  place  for  the  hearing  of 
the  case,  and  decides  without  the  intervention  of  a  jury. 
This  course  is  far  preferable  to  the  English  on  the  ground 
of  expense,  and  probably  the  ends  of  justice  are  as  fully 
obtained  as  if  the  case  were  submitted  to  a  jury.  In  the 
German  States,  medical  evidence  is  always  required  by  the 
law,  and  the  opinions  of  the  physicians  govern  the  decision 
of  the  judge.  In  Prussia,  for  instance,  the  law  ordains  that 
in  all  cases  involving  the  question  of  insanity,  the  opinions 
thereon  of  two  physicians  shall  be  obtained,  one  of  whom 
is  to  be  chosen  by  the  friends  or  relations  of  the  party 
whose  sanity  is  questioned,  and  the  other  by  the  court;  and 
no  person  can  be  pronounced  insane  by  the  court,  unless  so 
considered  by  both  physicians.1  No  provision  can  be  bet- 
ter than  this  for  settling  the  question  of  insanity,  though 
whether  it  be  sufficient  to  warrant  interdiction  is  another 
question  in  the  decision  of  which  other  considerations  must 
enter. 

§  440.  Isolation  is  a  measure  entirely  distinct  from 
that  of  interdiction,  and  neither  should  be  considered,  as 
they  sometimes  are,  necessarily  dependent  on  the  other. 
On  no  point  in  the  whole  range  of  the  subject  under  con- 
sideration, is  it  more  necessary  that  we  entertain  clear  and 
definite  notions,  than  on  that  of  the  restraint  of  the  insane, 
because,  while  often  essential  to  the  restoration  or  comfort 

1  Schroder,  de  legibus  in  commodum  mente  alienatorum,  197. 


476  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

of  the  patient,  and  to  the  safety  of  the  community,  it  is,  at 
the  same  time,  liable  to  the  most  serious  and  shameful 
abuses.  In  this  country,  it  is  true,  the  public  attention  has 
scarcely  been  attracted  to  this  subject,  but  either  human 
nature  is  very  different  here  from  what  it  is  in  other  coun- 
tries, or  we  shall,  at  some  time  or  other,  have  to  deplore 
the  abuses  which  they  are  now  anxiously  seeking  to  rem- 
edy, unless,  admonished  by  the  lesson  there  set  before  us, 
we  prevent  them  altogether  by  suitable  and  seasonable 
legislation. 

§  441.  In  isolating  the  insane,  we  have  in  view  one  or 
more  of  the  following  objects ;  first,  their  own  restoration 
to  health  ;  secondly,  their  comfort  and  well-being  merely, 
with  little  expectation  of  their  cure  ;  thirdly,  the  security 
of  society.  When  the  restoration  of  the  patient  is  the 
object  sought  for,  as  it  always  is  or  should  be,  in  recent 
cases,  no  unnecessary  restrictions  should  be  imposed  on  this 
measure.  The  simple  fact  of  the  recency  of  the  case 
should  be  sufficient,  when  properly  attested,  to  warrant  his 
seclusion,  if  it  be  deemed  necessary  to  his  cure.  It  has 
been  suggested  that  many  of  the  abuses  of  isolation  might 
be  prevented,  by  making  interdiction  a  preliminary  step  in 
all  cases,  but  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  evils  of  this 
arrangement  would  more  than  counterbalance  the  good. 
In  recent  cases,  isolation  cannot  be  effected  too  soon,  and 
the  patient's  chance  of  recovery  is  greatly  lessened  by  the 
delay  that  would  be  required  in  order  to  obtain  his  interdic- 
tion. And  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  delay  would 
be  still  further  increased  by  the  repugnance  of  families  to 
bring  before  the  public  observation,  a  misfortune  which,  for 
various  reasons,  good  or  otherwise,  people  are  generally 
anxious  to  conceal. 

§  442,  It  is  in  that  large  class  of  patients,  whose  disorder 
is  of  too  long  standing  to  admit  of  any  rational  expectations 
of  cure,  that  isolation  is  most  in  danger  of  being  abused. 


INTERDICTION    AND     ISOLATION.  477 

To  place  a  person  in  confinement,  is  a  measure  of  so 
serious  a  nature,  that  some  better  reason  for  it  should 
be  offered,  than  the  bare  fact  that  he  is  laboring  under 
some  kind  of  mental  impairment.  The  idea  of  depriving 
a  person  of  his  liberty,  merely  because  certain  other 
persons  who  would  be  benefited  by  such  a  step,  say  that 
he  is  mad,  is  of  so  monstrous  a  nature,  that  one  finds 
it  difficult  to  believe  that  it  has  ever  been  actually  carried 
into  practice.  Perhaps,  in  this  country,  it  never  has  ;  if  so, 
however,  it  is  not  because  it  has  been  prevented  by  the  sal- 
utary restraints  of  the  law,  which,  in  many  states,  at  least, 
is  utterly  silent  respecting  it.  It  may  not  have  entered  into 
the  minds  of  grasping  and  ill-natured  relatives,  that  re- 
moval and  confinement  present  a  readier  means  of  obtain- 
ing the  control  of  property  on  which  their  affections  are 
placed,  than  the  slow  and  uncertain  effects  of  disease  or 
old  age  ;  but  it  would  be  unwise  to  act  as  if  this  state  of 
innocence  were  to  continue  always.  In  Great  Britain, 
where  the  isolation  of  the  insane  has  been  the  subject  of 
much  parliamentary  inquiry,  and  various  acts  and  amend- 
ments to  acts  have  been  passed,  for  the  purpose  of  pre- 
venting the  abuses  that  from  time  to  time  have  been  brought 
to  light,  this  measure  has  in  consequence  become  so  hedged 
round  with  checks  and  precautions,  that  it  would  seem  diffi- 
cult, if  not  impossible,  that  it  should  become  a  means  of 
injustice  and  cruelty.  How  far  the  object  proposed  has 
been  obtained,  may  be  sufficiently  understood  from  the  tes- 
timony of  one  whose  ample  experience  rendered  him  well 
qualified  to  give  it.  "  It  is  a  miserable  thing  to  come  away 
from  a  lunatic  house,  as  I  have  many  times  done,  with  a 
conviction  that  there  were  individuals  in  it,  whose  liberation 
and  a  proper  superintendence  would  turn  wretchedness  into 
comfort,  without  endangering  the  interests  of  any  human 
being  ;  persons  unfit,  perhaps,  to  return  to  their  families, 
or  even  to  see  them  every  day  ;  but  yet  alive  to  warm 


478  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

affections,  never  more  to  be  indulged  ;  longing,  as  parents 
long,  to  see  the  faces  of  their  children  ;  but,  in  consequence 
of  an  infirmity  of  temper,  doubtless  of  a  morbid  kind,  and 
requiring  superintendence,  subjected  to  live  and  die  in  a 
place  which  was  to  them  a  prison,  without  a  friend  with 
whom  they  could  unreservedly  converse."1 

<§»  443.  Moral  insanity  often  presents  us  with  cases,  in 
regard  to  which,  the  question  of  isolation  must  be  decided 
by  considerations  not  likely  to  be  equally  forcible  to  differ- 
ent minds.  The  patient,  without  being  positively  danger- 
ous, has  imbibed  strong  dislikes  against  various  members  of 
his  family,  which  lead  to  a  course  of  conduct  and  conver- 
sation on  his  part,  utterly  destructive  of  their  domestic 
peace.  To  one  not  acquainted  with  all  the  facts  of  the 
case,  it  is  very  liable  to  be  mistaken  for  a  family  quarrel, 
in  which  mutual  patience  and  forbearance,  would  be  more 
proper  than  the  extreme  measure  of  confinement.  How 
far  a  family  is  morally  bound  to  sacrifice  its  peace  to  the 
insane  humors  of  one  of  its  members,  is  a  question  we  are 
not  required  to  consider.  It  is  enough  for  us  to  know,  that 
when  the  patient  has  so  little  control  over  his  passions,  as  to 
embitter  the  existence  of  those  who  ought  to  be  dear  to 
him,  and  who  were  once  treated  with  fondness  and  respect, 
his  own  comfort  would  be  best  consulted  by  removing  him 
from  a  place  where  his  mind  is  subjected  to  constant  irrita- 
tion, to  a  well-regulated  asylum.  He  would  represent  him- 
self, no  doubt,  as  a  victim  of  the  most  high-handed  oppres- 
sion, but  the  observation  of  many  such  patients  has  con- 
vinced me,  that  however  hard  the  restraints  of  an  asylum 
may  appear  to  them,  the  unlimited  freedom  of  their  own 
homes,  would  result  in  much  greater  discomfort. 

§  444.  The  third  object  above-mentioned,  as  sought  by 
the  isolation  of  the  insane,  is  the  security  of  society. 

1  Conolly,  Indications  of  Insanity,  438. 


INTERDICTION    AND    ISOLATION.  479 

By  the  laws  of  Maine,  any  two  justices  of  the  peace  are  au- 
thorized to  commit  to  the  house  of  correction  any  person 
within  their  county,  who,  they  are  convinced,  is  lunatic, 
and  so  furiously  mad,  as  to  render  it  dangerous  to  the  peace 
or  the  safety  of  the  good  people,  for  him  to  go  at  large,  there 
to  be  detained  till  he  or  she  shall  be  restored  to  his  or  her 
mind,  or  otherwise  delivered  by  due  course  of  law.1  It 
may  naturally  excite  some  surprise  that  so  grave  a  question, 
as  that  of  the  perpetual  imprisonment  of  a  person,  should 
not  have  been  entrusted  to  the  decision  of  a  higher  set  of 
functionaries  than  a  couple  of  justices  of  the  peace.  When, 
in  addition  to  this,  it  is  considered  that  no  plan  of  inquiry 
is  laid  down  for  them  to  pursue,  nor  a  single  hint  to  guide 
them  in  their  examination  ;  that  they  are  left  to  summon 
only  what  witnesses  they  please,  and  with  as  much  or  as 
little  publicity  as  they  please,  we  are  forced  to  believe  that 
it  is  not  in  human  nature,  that  such  power  should  escape 
frequent  and  flagrant  abuses.2  Temporary  confinement  is 


1  The  same  was  the  law  of  Massachusetts,  until  quite  recently  ; 
but  by  the  laws  now  in  force  in  that  state,  all  lunatics,  "  so  furiously 
mad  as  to  render  it  manifestly  dangerous  to  the  peace  and  safety  of 
the  community,  that  they  should  be  at  large,"  are  upon  complaint 
made  to  the  Judges  of  Probate  in  the  several  counties,  to  be  commit- 
ted to  the  State  Lunatic  Hospital  at  Worcester  ;  and,  "  whenever 
request  for  that  purpose  shall  be  made  by  the  person  complained 
against,"  the  Judge  is  obliged  to  order  a  jury  to  be  summoned,  to  try 
the  question  of  insanity.  By  a  law  passed  April  13,  1836,  two  justices, 
one  of  the  quorum,  are  authorized  to  commit  to  the  house  of  correc- 
tion, any  "idiot  or  lunatic  or  insane"  person,  "not  being  furiously 
mad ;"  and,  at  this  date,  March  20,  1838,  a  bill  is  pending  before  the 
Legislature,  giving  the  right  of  trial  by  jury,  upon  request  of  the  per- 
son complained  against,  in  those  cases  also.  After  the  passing  of  this 
law,  no  person  in  Massachusetts  can  be  confined  by  process  of  law, 
as  an  idiot,  lunatic  or  insane  person,  without  right  of  a  trial  by  jury. 

'It  is  stated  in  the  first  annual  report  of  the  Trustees  of  the  State 
Lunatic  Hospital  of  Massachusetts,  that  under  a  similar  provision 


480  MEDICAL    JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

all  that  the  immediate  security  of  society  requires,  and 
therefore  the  term  of  imprisonment,  for  which  justices  should 
have  the  power  to  commit,  should  be  limited  to  a  few  weeks 
or  months.  If  it  be  deemed  necessary  that  this  term  should 
be  protracted,  it  should  be  only  by  order  of  the  judge  of 
probate  or  one  of  the  justices  of  the  courts  of  law,  whose 
duty  it  should  be  to  examine  the  circumstances  of  the  case, 
and  if  he  decide  in  favor  of  farther  imprisonment  for  an- 
other term  which  should  be  fixed  by  law,  to  ascertain  by 
proper  inquiries  from  time  to  time,  whether  any  change  in 
the  mental  condition  of  the  patient  will  warrant  his  release 
before  the  end  of  such  term. 

§  445.  It  may  not  be  unprofitable  to  look  at  the  legis- 
lative provisions  in  different  countries  respecting  the  isola- 
tion of  the  insane.  In  France  this  measure  is  altogether 
unknown  to  the  laws,  except  in  relation  to  those  whose 
liberty  might  endanger  the  safety  of  society.  Such,  and 
such  only,  the  municipal  authorities  are  required  to  confine. 
The  Penal  Code,  art.  341,  inflicts  the  punishment  of  hard 
labor  on  any  one  who  shall  arrest,  detain,  or  sequester  the 
person  of  another  not  charged  with  any  criminal  offence, 
without  the  order  of  the  constituted  authorities.  The  4th 
article  of  the  charter  of  1830,  also  declares  that  "  no  person 
can  be  pursued  or  arrested,  except  in  cases  provided  by 
the  law,  and  in  the  forms  that  it  prescribes."  Of  course, 
establishments  for  the  reception  of  the  insane  exist,  but 
their  whole  economy,  is  regulated  by  their  respective  gov- 
ernments. "  In  many  departments,"  says  Esquirol,  "  it  is 
sufficient  to  apply  to  the  administration  of  the  hospital  or 


of  law  then  in  force  in  that  state,  an  idiot  had  been  committed  who 
could  neither  stand  nor  walk,  who  was  unable  to  extend  the  lower 
limbs  from  the  closest  possible  contraction  towards  the  body,  and 
who  had  but  little  muscular  strength  even  in  his  arms.  Reports 
and  other  documents  relative  to  the  State  Lunatic  Hospital,  p.  42. 


INTERDICTION     AND     ISOLATION.  481 

asylum,  in  order  to  obtain  the  admission  of  a  patient.  In 
some  places  the  authorization  of  the  mayor  is  necessary,  if 
the  establishment  is  communal  ;  of  the  prefect,  if  it  is  de- 
partmental. In  a  few  establishments,  the  patient  must  be 
interdicted  before  he  can  gain  admission."  ]  The  necessity 
of  express  legislation  on  this  subject  is  generally  felt,  and 
within  the  last  year  or  two,  it  has  received  the  attention  of 
the  legislature,  but  with  what  result  we  are  unable  to  say. 
In  the  civil  code  of  Austria,  it  is  ordained  that  no  person 
can  be  confined  on  account  of  insanity,  who  has  not  been 
legally  declared  to  be  insane  by  physicians  appointed  for 
the  purpose  of  investigating  his  mental  condition.2  In  this 
country,  the  law  as  it  relates  to  the  isolation  of  the  insane, 
is  in  very  nearly  the  same  condition,  as  that  of  France, 
except  in  those  States  which  possess  hospitals  that  are  con- 
trolled and  supported  by  government.  Isolation  is  also 
sanctioned  by  the  law  when  adopted  as  a  measure  of  police, 
as  in  the  law  of  Maine,  mentioned  above,  but  under  any 
other  circumstances,  it  is  in  violation  of  constitutional  pro- 
visions. In  England,  a  person  cannot  be  admitted  into  any 
lunatic  asylum,  without  a  certificate  of  his  insanity,  signed 
by  two  physicians,  within  seven  days  of  his  admission. 

§  446.  It  would  be  out  of  place  here  to  detail  the  pro- 
visions of  such  a  legislative  act,  as  would  place  the  isolation 
of  the  insane  as  far  as  possible  beyond  the  reach  of  abuse, 
but  its  general  features  may  be  stated  in  a  few  words.  The 
right  of  keeping  the  insane  in  confinement  should  be  ob- 
tained by  license  from  the  government,  which  should  impose 
such  conditions  as  will  best  promote  their  welfare.  It  should 
appoint  a  board  of  commissioners,  two  or  more  of  whom 
should  be  medical  men  of  some  practical  knowledge  of  in- 
sanity, whose  duty  it  should  be  to  visit,  from  time  to  time, 


1  Des  Maladies  mentales,  ii.  786.         Schroder,  op.  cit  sup.  142. 
41 


482  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF    INSANITY. 

houses  licensed  for  the  reception  of  the  insane,  examine 
their  accommodations,  the  moral  and  medical  treatment 
made  use  of,  and  every  other  point  in  which  the  welfare  of 
the  inmates  is  deeply  concerned,  and  submit  their  report  to 
some  branch  of  the  government.  They  should  have  the 
power  of  discharging  any  patient  whom  they  may  consider 
unjustly  confined,  or  capable  of  enjoying  himself  more  at 
his  own  home.  No  patient  should  be  admitted  without  a 
certificate  of  two  or  more  physicians,  one  of  whom  should 
be  an  expert,  countersigned  by  the  selectmen  of  the  town 
or  mayor  of  the  city  in  which  the  patient  resides,  that  the 
individual  is  insane,  and  is  unable  to  receive  at  home  that 
care  or  attention  which  is  necessary  to  his  restoration,  or  to 
his  temporary  comfort  and  final  welfare.  The  superintend- 
ents of  these  houses  should  be  required  to  keep  a  register, 
in  which  should  be  noted  the  names  of  the  patients,  the  date 
of  their  admission,  the  character  of  their  insanity,  by  whom 
their  certificates  are  signed,  and  such  other  particulars  as- 
may  be  deemed  necessary  by  the  commissioners. 


INDEX. 


[The  figures  refer  to  the  sections*] 

Abbot,  decision  in  his  case,  27  ;  account  of  his  case,  416. 

Allison,  on  the  test  of  right  and  wrong,  20 ;  on  delusion,  20 ;  on 

drunkenness  as  an  excuse  for  crime,  401. 
Arithmetical  acquirements,  not  conclusive  proof  of  legal  capacity, 

62,  88. 

Barbier's  case  of  homicidal  insanity,  169. 

Barkley's  case,  81. 

Baxter's  case,  61. 

Beauquaire's  will  established,  89. 

Beck's  remarks  on  McDonough's  case,  398. 

Bell,  on  insanity  from  masturbation,  134 ;  on  the  plea  of  insanity, 

228  ;  case  of  simulation,  309. 
Bellingham's  case,  15,  31. 
Ben  Jonson's  hallucination,  111. 
Bertet's  case,  224. 
Bichat's  picture  of  old  age,  241. 
Birdsell's  case,  406. 

Brain,  the  seat  of  mania,  93  ;  small  and  diseased  in  idiocy,  38. 
British  and  Foreign  Medical  Review,  on  Miss  Bagster's  case,  62. 
Brown,  Rev.  Simon,  his  delusion,  118. 
Brown,  Wm.  his  case,  150. 
Broussonnet's  case,  121. 

Cartwright  v.  Cartwright,  283. 
Castelli's  case,  349. 


484  INDEX. 

Character,  change  of,  an  essential  symptom  of  insanity,  99. 

Charolai's  Count,  notice  of$  59. 

Chitty,  on  right  and  wrong,  as  a  test  of  insanity,  19  ;  views  of 
moral  insanity,  23. 

Classification  of  mental  diseases,  3,  35. 

Combe,  on  change  of  character,  99  ;  on  lucid  intervals,  279. 

Competency  of  a  witness,  conditions  of,  363. 

Commission  of  lunacy,  its  proper  duty,  5. 

Conolly's  definition  of  insanity,  113;  on  simulated  insanity,  289  ; 
case  of,  306;  on  the  writing  of  the  .insane,  322;  on  their  isola- 
tion, 442. 

Continued  observation,  320. 

Contracts  of  the  insane,  law  relating  to,  7,  198  ;  invalidated  by 
somnambulism,  358  ;  of  imbeciles,  90. 

Crawford's  case  of  moral  imbecility,  57. 

Cory's  case,  decision  in,  27. 

Connier's  case,  31,  177-181. 

Cox  on  moral  mania,   124. 

Cretinism,  40. 

Crime  distinguished  from  passion,  25. 

Criminal  law  of  insanity,  why  so  slowly  improved  in  England,  14; 
expounded  by  the  English  judges,  26. 

Coke's  classification  of  the  insane,  3;  on  the  law  of  drunkenness, 
394. 

Cunning,  active  in  the  insane,  21 ;  in  imbecility,  55. 

Curability  of  insanity  at  different  periods,  263. 

D'Aguesseau  on  lucid  intervals,  2S1  j  on  the  interrogatory,  319  ; 

Davies's  case,  426-432. 

Deafness  in  old  age,  241. 

Delirium  common  in  the  last  stages  of  disease,  216  ;  its  effects  on 

the  memory,  254  ;  its  lucid  intervals,  25S. 
Delirium  tremens  discribed,  378  ;  cases  of,  403-409. 
Delay  in  trying  cases  of  insanity  enjoined,  223. 
Delepine's  case,  73-78. 
Delusions  considered  as  a  test  of  insanity,  22  ;  their  effect  on  the 

mental  soundness,  211. 
Design,  not  a  test  of  insanity,  21. 

Dementia,  senile  described,  235-238  ;  simulation  of,  305. 
Denman  Lord,  decision  in  Oxford's  case,  26. 
Dennet  and  wife,  v.  Dow,  245-249. 
Dow  v.  Clarke,  206. 


INDEX.  485 

Drew's  case,  403. 

Dipsomania,  Esquirol  on,  383;  cases  of,  384,  385,  409  ;  Marc  on,  387. 

Drunkenness,  fit  of,  described,  376;  its  proximate  cause,  380; 
common  law  relative  to  it,  391;  French,  German,  and  other 
laws  relative  to  it,  392-395  ;  culpable  and  inculpable,  396 ; 
involuntary  incompatible  with  malice,  396  ;  attended  by  delu- 
sions, 411-413. 

' 

Eccentricity,  its  relation  to  insanity,  98. 

Eldon,  Lord,  his  definition  of  an  unsound  mind,  5  ;  on  the  proof  of 
a  lucid  interval,  281  ;  case  of  concealed  insanity,  315. 

Epidemic  character  of  homicidal  insanity,  220,  221 ;  of  suicide, 
339. 

Erion's  case,  393. 

Errington's  case,  22. 

Erotic  mania,  cases  of,   142—146. 

Erskine,  Lord,  his  objection  to  a  verdict,  5  ;  distinguishes  between 
civil  and  criminal  cases,  10  ;  mistakes  the  facts  in  Arnold's  case, 
14  ;  on  delusion  as  a  test  of  insanity,  14. 

Esquirol  on  hallucinations  and  illusions,  111  ;  case  of  impaired 
language,  121  ;  cases  of  homicidal  insanity,  167-169  ;  on  the 
validity  of  a  monomaniac's  will,  208 ;  on  the  mental  condition 
after  recovery,  267  ;  on  the  proportion  of  epileptics  to  other  in- 
sane, 324;  on  recurrent  madness,  267;  on  periodical  drunken- 
ness, 383. 

Evans,  on  the  legal  consequences  of  partial  mania,  204,  369. 

Evidence  of  medical  men,  29-31. 

Experts,  their  duties  defined,  31 ;  the  necessity  illustrated,  250. 

Ferrer's,  Earl,  case  of,  128,  214. 

Ferocity  not  the  cause  of  homicidal  insanity,  218. 

Fodere's  case  of  propensity  to  steal,  138  ;  theory  of  lucid  intervals, 

276 ;  on  the  legal  consequences  of  somnambulism,  359. 
Flight  of  homicidal  monomaniacs,  not  a  proof  of  guilt,  216. 
Franck's  case,  147. 
Frederick  William's  case,  135. 
French  penal  code  relative  to  insanity,  13,  28 ;  civil  code  in  relation 

to  interdiction,  89. 
Friedreich's  case  of  propensity  to  steal,  138  ;  on  lucid  intervals, 

286. 

Gall,  cases  of  propensity  to  steal,  138 ;  of  erotic  mania,  142-146  j 
41* 


486  INDEX. 

case  of  pyromania,  147  ;  of  homicidal  insanity,  159,  172,  175 ; 
of  suicide,  334,  337. 

Georget's  remarks  on  Hale's  doctrines,  11  ;  on  Cornier's  case,  181; 
on  lucid  intervals,  277  ;  on  simulated  madness,  289  ;  remarks  on 
Jean  Pierre's  case,  293  ;  on  the  inquest,  323  ;  on  imbeciles,  55 ; 
on  the  effect  of  monomania  on  the  mind  generally,  211  ;  gen- 
eral propositions  relative  to  homicidal  insanity,  225. 

Gibbs,  Sir  Vicary,  on  design  as  a  test  of  insanity,  10. 

Gerard,  ease  of,  311. 

Green  Smith's  case,  26. 

Greenwood's  case,  25,  225. 

Graborkwa's  case,  150. 

Grade's  case,  368. 

, 

Hadfield's  case,  14,  223. 

Hale's  classification  of  the  insane,  3  ;  distinction  between  total 
and  partial  insanity,  8  ;  test  of  responsibility,  8. 

Hallucinations  explained,  109  ',  instances  of,  117-120. 

Hansterin's  case,  175. 

Hardwick,  Lord,  on  unsoundness,  5. 

Haslam,  case  of  insanity,  quoted,  21  ;  on  lucid  intervals,  275  j  on 
simulated  insanity,  289,  303. 

Head,  size  of,  in  idiocy,  38 ;  injuries  of,  their  effect  on  the  mind, 
262. 

Hoewe's  case,  326. 

Hoffbauer,  on  imbecility,  47-50  ;  on  stupidity,  48-50  ;  on  moral 
mania,  125 ;  on  liability  of  the  insane  for  trespasses,  196 ;  on  the 
exculpatory  effects  of  partial  mania,  202. 

Homicidal-  insanity  generally  attended  by  physical  disorder,  162  ; 
accompanying  certain  physical  changes,  166  ;  has  prevailed  epi- 
demically, 220,  221 ;  compared  with  moral  depravity,  218,  226  ; 
simulation  of,  308. 

Homicide  mutual,  346. 

Howison's  case,  23,  31. 

Hood's  case  of  impaired  language,  121. 

Humboldt's  case  of  homicidal  insanity,  156. 

Hume,  on  right  and  wrong,  19. 

Idiot  defined  by  the  common  law,  4  ;  different  kinds  of,  40. 

Imbecility,  simulation  of,  304  ;  criterion  of,  422. 

Imbeciles,  classified  ,by  Hoffbauer,  47-48  j  Georget's  account  of, 
55  ;  not  fit  objects  of  punishment,  85  ;  their  knowledge  of  num- 
bers, 88 ;  their  testamentary  capacity  considered,  89  ;  their  ca- 


INDEX.  487 

pacity  to  make  contracts,  90  ;  to  contract  marriage,  91  ;  to  give 

testimony,  364 ;  interdiction  of,  419,  420,  421. 
Incoherence  of  ideas  not  essential  to  madness,  291. 
Incubation  of  madness,  100. 
Insanity,  how  treated  as  'an  excuse  for  crime  in   various   codes, 

28.   ' 

Insensibility  of  maniacs  to  various  medicines,  302. 
Inquest,  323. 

Interrogatory,  317.  *   . 

Intermission  of  disease,  271. 
Intoxicating  drinks  a  test  of  simulation,  310. 

Irritability  of  the  brain  during   the  lucid  interval,  256  ;  character- 
istic of  genuine  mania,  300. 
Irritation,  the  initial  stage  of  disease,  94.   ' 

Jean  Pierre's  case,  292. 
.     Jensen's  case,  165. 
Jones's  case,  366. 

Kindleside  v.  Harrison,  243. 

Kenyon  Lord,  decision  in  Hadfield's  case,  2S3. 

Lawrence's  case,  27. 
Language,  impairment  of,   121. 
Lecouffe's  case,  S2-S4. 

Liberty  of  will  and  action,  essential  to  criminal  responsibility,  216. 
Lock's  definition  of  insanity,  113. 
Lying,  propensity  to,  139. 

Lyndhurst,  Lord,  quashes  an  inquisition,  5  ;   decision  in   Oxford's 
case,  19. 

Mania,  definition  of,  99  ;  sudden  attacks  of,  104  ;  its  effect  on  civil 

acts,  202-209. 

Macnish's  cases  of  drunkenness,  381-382. 
Mansfield,  Lord,  on  the  criminal  law  of  insanity,  16. 
"    Marc   on  pyromania,    152  ;  observations  on  a  case  of  simulation, 

303,  314  ;  on  dipsomania,  387. 
McNaughton,  decision  in  his  case,  26. 
Marriage,  validity  of,  in  imbeciles,  91  ;  in  maniacs,  200. 
McDonough's  case,  396. 
•Mechanical  ingenuity  of  maniacs,  21. 
Memory,  how  affected  by  insanity,  102,  291,  235. 
Mercer's  case,  104,  105. 


488  INDEX. 

Moral  faculties  seldom  escape  the  influence  of  disordered  intellect, 
102,  114,  294. 

Mounin's  case,  164. 

Moore,  will  of,  207. 

Negretti's  case,  347. 

Nicholl,  Sir  J.,  on  the  proof  of  insanity  in  civil  cases,  12  ;  decision 
in  case  of  marriage,  200  ;  on  lucid  intervals,  258,  285  ;  on  imbe- 
cility, 422. 

Nielsen's  case,  176. 

Oxford's  case,  26. 
Oppel's  case,  327. 

Papavoine's  case,  218. 

Park,  decision  in  Green  Smith's  case,  25. 

Parker,  C.  J.  of  N.  H.  on  the  plea  of  insanity,  228. 

Parker,  C.  J.  of  Mass,  decision  in  case  of  suicide,  341  ;  of  mar- 
riage, 200. 

Parent  Duchatelet,  on  moral  imbecility,  58. 

Pascal's  hallucinations,  113. 

Paris  and  Fonblanque  on  partial  mania,  203  ',  on  drunkenness,  397. 

Pechot's  case,  307. 

Peyronnet  on  the  criminal  law  of  insanity,  11. 

Periodicity  of  disease,  269. 

Pinel,  reformed  the  treatment  of  the  insane,  1  ;  first  described 
moral  insanity,  123  ;  on  curability  of  insanity,  263. 

Portsmouth's  Earl  case,  63. 

Pothier,  on  experts,  31. 

Prichard,  discription  of  moral  insanity,  124  ;  recognizes  the  pro- 
pensity to  theft,  138. 

Prescott's  case,  78-80. 

Proof  of  insanity,  not  the  same  in  criminal,  as  in  civil  cases,  12. 

Provocation,  real  or  fancied,  not  the  true  measure  of  punishment, 
212. 

Pulse  of  the  insane,  296. 

Purington's  case,  186. 

Pyromania,  connected  with  sexual  evolution,  151. 

Rabello's  case,  184. 
Recovery  takes  place  gradually,  264. 
Recurrence  of  madness,  278. 
Reid  on  lucid  intervals,  278. 


INDEX.  489 

Religious  fanaticism  connected  with  homicidal  insanity,  185. 

Responsibility,  its  elements,  66,  192. 

Reasoning  of  the  insane  illogical  and  confused,  212-214. 

Relapses,  267. 

Richardson,  C.  J.   decision,   Cory's  case,  27 ;  remark  on  Prescott 

79. 

Rider,  Jane,  notice  of,  35-0353. 
Right  and  wrong,  knowledge  of,  not  a  test  of  responsibility,  16,  17, 

18. 

Rogers,  decision  in  his  case,  27. 
Rush  on  moral  imbecility,  59  ;  on  the  propensity  to  steal,  138  ',  on 

the  pulse  of  the  insane,  296. 
Russel  on  right  and  wrong,  16  ;  on  design,  21. 

Schmidt's  case,  70-72. 

Sgambari's  case,  119. 

Shakespear  represents  a  feature  of  insanity,  214. 

Shaw,  C.  J.,  decision  in  Rogers's  case,  27. 

Selves  case,  424. 

Shelford  on  suicide,  13. 

Sleeplessness  of  the  insane,  297. 

Story,  J.  on  the  plea  of  lunacy  in  avoidance  of  contracts,  7;  on  the 
criminal  law  of  drunkenness,  404. 

Stowell,  Lord,  decision  in  a  case  of  marriage,  200. 

Stupidity  distinguished  from  imbecility,  43-46. 

Suicide,  from  religious  monomania,  331  ;  hereditary,  337  ;  epidemic, 
341 ;  not  proof  of  insanity,  341 ;  attempts  at,  not  always  remem- 
bered, 336. 

Swinburne  on  the  law  of  insanity,  relative  to  wills,  12. 

Theft,  common  in  imbecility,  55  ;  propensity  to,  138. 

Thiel's  case,  409. 

Thurlow's  discription  of  a  lucid  interval,  273  j  proof  of  a,  281. 

Tindal,  C.  J.,  decision  in  McNaughton's  case,  26. 

Tracy,  Justice,  decision  in  Arnold's  case,  10. 

Trespass,  action  of,  lies  against  the  insane,  195. 

Trestel's  case,  183. 

Unsoundness  discussed,  5. 
Vatelot's  case,  399. 


490  INDEX. 

Weber's  case,  149. 

Wilson's  case,  27,  405. 

Wills  of  imbeciles,  89  ;  of  monomaniacs,  205-209  ;  of  the  de- 
mented, 243,  251  ;  of  the  delirious,  259,  260  ;  how  affected  by 
suicide,  344. 

Witnesses,  medical,  27. 

Wynne,  Sir  W.  on  lucid  intervals,  283. 

Woodward  on  the  plea  of  insanity,  228 ;  case  of  a  will  made  in 
delirium,  257. 


14  DAY  USE 

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